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Abstract
In this thesis I argue that sequences of discourse
contributions may be both structurally-characterised and
functionally-motivated from within an autonomous level of linguistic
patterning specifically concerned with the achievement of
conversational interaction. In contrast to prior mainstream
computational and linguistic research in the area of discourse
design, I draw upon the results of ethnomethodology and conversation
analysis to move attention away from issues necessarily involving
individual speakers' knowledge, beliefs, and intentions and towarxis
an 'intersubjectively'-viable statement of the shared linguistic
resources responsible for achieving interaction. I examine linguistic
resources for designing discourse in two principal areas. In the
first, I extend the discourse construct exchange, that has arisen in
Neo-Firthian linguistics as an attempt to formalise the
ethnomethodological notion of the 'adjacency pair', to make contact
with a wider range of grammatical (and particularly, 'cohesive' )
phenomena and discourse 'trajectories' than has been achieved
previously. The fine details of the principles I propose are
developed on the basis of an analysis of data; protocols elicited in
a co-operative game situation proved well-suited to this end and thus
a sample of such protocols forms the main body of data I address. In
the second area of investigation, which follows from the
Hallidayan-bias of the linguistic metatheory I adopt, I consider some
of the consequences that 'context' has for the deployment of
linguistic features; this amounts to,a considerable extension to the
traditional notion of register so as to include the negotiation of
particular restricted forms of expression valid over particular
courses of interaction. Although in this thesis I do not provide a
formalisation of the linguistic resources I describe, I do place them
in the context of an existing computational implementation of a
Hallidayan view of grammar (the Nigel system) and explain the role of
my obervations as a necessary stage in the task of achieving the
eventual goal of an appropriate formalisation of the organisation of
discourse.
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1. Overview - the method of attack
The primary objective of this thesis is to begin the
articulation of a theory capable of capturing the organisation of
natural discourse. This organisation is taken to be evident both in
the fine details of micro-organisation which shape the design of
individual utterances and in a broader macro-organisation of
significant, extended stretches of discourse.
The principle theoretical ingredients I have found necessary
during this search for a satisfactory treatment of discourse are as
follows. First, I view ordinary-language philosophy,
ethnomethodology, and existential philosophy as providing grounds for
the description of 'nonindividualistic', 'intersubjective', and
noncognitive processes in accounts of human behaviour. Second, I
interpret Hallidayan systemic linguistics as the most coherent and
well developed linguistic framework currently in existence that is
capable of allowing a serious consideration of intersubjective
processes in relation to fine-grained linguistic description. Third,
I argue that an extended systemic account provides for a
formalisation and integration of the results of 'Conversation
Analysis' without doing violence to the basic tenets to which
conversation analytic approaches adhere. And fourth and finally.
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although they will not be made use of in this thesis, I accept the
tools of cognitive science and computational modelling as a basic
resource for theory construction that, during subsequent cycles of
investigation, is intended to provide a foundation for the account I
propose. The central domain with which I shall assume familiarity
will therefore be cognitive science and the next section will use
some cognitive science accounts of language as a spring-board to the
issues that will concern us below. For the other areas, of necessity
somewhat schematic introductions will be given. Although these will
hopefully permit the arguments to be followed rather than presenting
as thorough discussions of the issues involved as might be desirable,
suitable references will always be given for those who may wish to
follow up a particular topic in more detail.
The structure of the thesis and the rationale for that
structure are as follows.
Chapter one provides an introductory discussion of the
requirements placed on a linguistic theory by my rejection of
'cognitivism' as a tenable approach to the study of language. The
chapter first briefly discusses this viewpoint and its motivation,
sketches the compatible 'conversation analytic' way of approaching
discourse that I accept as offering a suitable background with
respect to which theory construction may proceed, and then,
justifying the rather strict, 'inter-organism' perspective from
which, following Halliday, I insist we view it, introduces Hallidayan
systemic grammar. This is the linguistic theory that I claim to be
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most appropriate both for working within the general metatheoretical
orientation of this thesis and for capturing those particular
insights provided by conversation analysis.
Chapter two describes how discourse phenomena have formerly
been considered within systemic linguistics, introduces the most
detailed systemic grammar currently in existence - the computational
systemic grammar 'Nigel', and begins the construction of a linguistic
characterisation of the organisation of discourse that prepares the
ground for the main body of analysis that is found in chapters four
and five.
As an introduction to that analysis, chapter three describes
the data with which I am working and explains why the simplest
initial framework for discourse suggested in chapter two is in need
of substantial revision if the exigencies of naturally-occurring
language are to be captured.
The division into chapters four and five of the data analysis
and the corresponding development of the theoretical framework which
supports that analysis reflects the two principal areas with which I
am concerned. Chapter four considers some syntactic and intonational
manifestations of the linguistic resources available for creating
discourse, while chapter five relates these discourse resources to
one aspect of the development and structuring of 'context'. Language
as such, as is mentioned below and explained in chapter one, is taken
essentially to be the means by which intersubjective, social contexts
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are maintained and developed and chapter five suggests ways of
capturing some particular consequences of this.
Finally, in chapter six, the initial cycle of investigation
that constitutes this thesis is summarised and evaluated, enabling
the necessities of the next cycle to be outlined.
While this completes a brief sketch of the structure of the
thesis as a whole, it might be useful here at the outset to introduce
in slightly more detail some examples of the types of problem that I
contend require the extensive, and by no means neutral,
metatheoretical commitment that I adopt. The most general claim of
this thesis is that a strict, *interorganism', Hallidayan
interpretation of conversation analysis provides the basis of a far
more appropriate and insightful view of the workings of natural
discourse than that proposed within either mainstream cognitive
science and discourse analysis or within conversation analysis when
considered alone. However, the particular claim of the thesis, by
which the general claim is supported, is that it is possible to
uncover some purely linguistic organisational properties of discourse
which can contribute considerably to our understanding of how
discourse functions. Furthermore, I suggest that most cognitivist
accounts currently proposed in fact obscure this level of
organisation by the imposition of inappropriate concepts imported
unwittingly from an entirely distinct level of social-situational
organisation. The thesis therefore undertakes to separate these two
sources of explanation, the discoursal and the situational, to show
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some typical contributions that each of them makes, and to specify in
some detail certain very common discourse level organisational
resources apparently utlised in the design of discourse.
In order to get us underway, then, and to motivate somewhat the
shape of the subsequent discussion, I will now suggest several ways
in which I take current cognitive-oriented understandings of the
nature of discourse and of how discourse functions to be
inappropriate. This will take the form of a sketch of some 'state of
the art' discourse processing techniques found within cognitive
science and the particular directions these techniques suggest to be
necessary for future development and concludes with a consideration
of how these suggestions fare in the face of a detailed analysis in
the conversation analytic tradition, carried out by Schegloff [l977],
of some aspects of a simple, spontaneous telephone conversation.
I mention computational techniques here at the outset because
the construction of computational language processors and of
computational conversationalists provides a very useful testing
ground for our current understanding of the functionality of
discourse. The computational paradigm offers an unrivaled means of
capturing complexity in the area of linguistic processing without
being overwhelmed by that complexity", a well-developed computational
account can concern itself simultaneously with fine detail over a
wide range of issues and with presenting a perspicuous vantage point
from which to view in general terms the mechanisms that are involved.
Therefore, although I will suggest that the vast majority of
- 5 -
computational accounts of language have not dealt sufficiently with
certain crucial aspects of utterance and discourse design, I will
nevertheless support the use of a computational approach generally -
even in the light of some of the severe philosophical criticisms I
have discussed elsewhere.
2. The search for discourse mechanisms - the state of the game
One of the clear results that has emerged from the
computational approach to discourse so far concerns a recognition of
the variety of distinct types of knowledge that need to be brought to
bear in the production and interpretation of connected,
'multisentential' language. Regardless of how these processes are
implemented some attention needs to be paid to at least the current
state of the discourse and the current state of the listener', this
information is usually maintained in distinct 'discourse models' and
'hearer models'. Mann, Bates, Grosz, McDonald, McKeown and Swartout's
(1981) discussion of the current state of the art in text generation
establishes that the first of these models, that of the discourse,
should be sensitive to at least (1981, p5):
1. The structures that can be built out of sentences and larger
units.
2. The needs of the writer that each discourse structure meets.
3. The principal effects that the use of each structure produces.
4. The effects of various discourse structures on the reader's
attention.
while the latter, that of the hearer/reader, should make available at
least (ibid., p4):
1. What is obvious - including common factual knowledge and
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certain "obvious" inferable information. Obviousness does not
agree with logical validity.
2. What has already been told, and what is obvious from that.
3. What others believe - including mutual beliefs and beliefs
about the writer's belief.
4. What is currently in the reader's attention.
Now, these models and the information they supply help
constitute the relevant 'context' with respect to which each
successive utterance, sentence, etc. contributed to the discourse is
to be judged. Unless such contributions can be 'integrated' in some
sense with what has gone before they will not be intelligible as
continuations of the discourse; their relevance will be obscured.
However, the need for 'obvious inferable information' sets up quite a
problem for the construction of context since precisely what is
obvious1 depends upon the kind of context which is perceived to be in
force. This establishes the area of problems investigated under the
heading of 'context recognition': how is it that a language using
system can decide what kinds of contexts are applicable so as to
constrain within practical limits the information that might
potentially be relevant to a discourse and which, therefore, ought to
be kept on hand ready to aid interpretation and shape production?
Two general approaches to this question can be isolated. The
first, which can be termed the 'deep micro-world' approach, tries to
capture as much information as is possible within a narrow problem
1. And indeed, what is inferable - if this is not to be simply a
logical inferability which ignores what speakers might actually
infer in various contexts.
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domain so that a system will already know, as near as it can,
everything that may be relevant for its domain. All discourse with
which the system is expected to be concerned has its subject matter
fixed to the problem domain and the purpose of any discourse is
restricted to a particular, narrow set of possible interactions.
Examples of such approaches are, of course, expert systems, data base
inquiry systems, and the like.
Although increasing success is now being claimed in this area,
there are clear drawbacks for the expert system view of linguistic
interaction as a viable model of human conversation. In fact, human
language users appear to adopt precisely an opposite strategy in
dealing with language to that modelled in expert system type
approaches. Rather than trading breadth of coverage for depth, humans
instead maintain for language a maximal breadth of applicability:
being a competent language user could almost be said to mean being
able to converse at some level irrespective of topic and context,
whereas if one strays outside the appropriate domain for an expert
system there are generally no means available for supporting
conversation capable of considering a new domain.
It is often assumed that this limitation of the expert system
approach is not theoretically significant and does not present a
problem for constructing more general accounts of discourse and
conversation. All that is indicated is that as yet insufficient
'factual knowledge' has been built into any system. Furthermore,
since an expert system is to function as an expert, not as a general
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conversationalist, it is also argued that a restriction to narrow
domains of knowledge is in any case quite appropriate.
This view is shortsighted for several important reasons that
should influence both the design of expert systems and any attempt to
construct a theory of human conversation. The essential point to be
grasped here is that ignoring human conversational practices results
in expert systems and theories of discourse that are seriously
inadequate. By assuming that such conversational practices are not
functionally relevant in the domain of structuring knowledge and
information and that human conversation can be modelled by relying
upon a 'deep understanding' made possible by knowledge of the
particular domain in which expertise is claimed, a computational
conversationalist will in fact only be able to achieve a low level of
conversational competence. This is because it is only the broader and
generally applicable mechanisms of conversation deployed in natural
interactions that reduces the deep processing that would otherwise
need to be undertaken to within practical limits. There are good
reasons, as we shall see below, to believe that the design of
discourse contributions is often specifically chosen so as to
simplify the problems faced by its intended interpreters. The
restriction of the conversational competence of systems to particular
domains of expertise then requires more inferential work to be
performed in order to get a less satisfactory result - clearly a
situation in need of change.
Support for this position is now forthcoming from the
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computational camp also. By means of a study of actual interactions
between people and a question-answering system, Cohen, Perrault, and
Allen (1982) have demonstrated that
"users of these systems expect more than just answers to
isolated questions. They expect to engage in a conversation
whose coherence is manifested in the interdependence of their
often unstated plans and goals with those of the system. They
also expect the system to be able to incorporate its own
responses into analyses of their subsequent utterances.
Moreover, they maintain these expectations even in the face of
strong evidence that the system is not a competent
conversationalist." (1982, p245)
As a consequence of this, even simple
"question-answer interactions should be treated as degenerate
cases of conversation." (ibid., p270)
Humans expect to interact linguistically in the form of
conversations. This expectation is not altered just because a
conversationalist happens to be a machine. It is desirable, then, for
systems that are intended to interact linguistically with people to
be able to converse more naturally and this requires that we achieve
an understanding of just what 'more naturally', in this context,
entails; i.e., a 'theory of conversation' needs to be constructed.
One convenient characterisation of the work undertaken in this
thesis is then the following: by means of an improved understanding
of the structures of extended discourse and conversation and of the
strong relationship of mutual constraint that holds between discourse
structure and context, I will seek to make more explicit the ways in
which language itself guides the deployment of relevant knowledge. I
will claim below, particularly in chapter four, that fine details of
syntactic construction, and 'cohesive' items generally - pronouns,
specific lexical choices, etc. - can clearly signal the kind of
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discourse development that is underway. Therefore, any proposal for
context recognition that does not fully utilise such information
necessarily complicates its task greatly.
This then constitutes the second general approach to the
question of how to constrain context. Vays are sought to enable the
language that occurs do more of the work required. The beginnings of
this can already be seen in proposals for context recognition that
centre closely upon the form and content of discourse contributions
rather than assuming beforehand that the subject matter and modes of
interaction are more or less fixed. However, with most proposed
solutions in this area, I will claim that insufficient attention has
been given to the purposes of discourse contributions. The currently
accepted view of such purposes does not significantly improve upon
that of Aristotle's Rhetoric, although Grimes (1972, 1975) is often
cited as presenting a more current and linguistically viable
introduction. The basic premise of all such approaches is that there
is some set of functional relations which may hold between segments
of discourse; these Grimes terms 'rhetorical predicates*. When a
discourse is constructed following the patterns the rhetorical
predicates define as possible, a coherent discourse should result.
Examples of the kind of relation Grimes has in mind are the











gives a more detailed account of
something mentioned centrally
associates a central element with
an abstract statement
provides an analogy
specialised kind of attribution
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etc.
More or less similar lists have been proposed by Shepherd (1926),
Stratton (1971 ), Beekman and Callow (1974), Longacre (1976), van Dijk
(1977), Reichman [l98l], Mann and Thompson (1983), and many others.
The most popular development of these notions in the treatment
of actual discourse structure has been to construct discourse
schemata using the rhetorical relations as basic building blocks.
This permits quite complex discourse structures to be proposed;
examples of this approach include Reichman [l981J, McKeovn (1982),
Mann (1984), and also some of the more structural studies of genre,
e.g. Hasan (1977). However, even though there may be general
agreement about the general categories of such rhetorical relations,
agreement over their finer details is considerably less frequent.
Indeed, there seem few criteria upon which any such agreement could
be based; the allocation of a particular analysis to any instance of
language use relies purely upon that language already having been
understood in order that an appropriate choice of rhetorical relation
can be made according to our intuitive understandings of just what
the rhetorical relations are intended to cover. Clearly, what is
required is some means of formal identification for discourse
structure; without an independent specification of the structures
that are to be allocated to a discourse that allocation remains
circular and impressionistic.
The search for more adequate definitions of discourse schemata
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has proceeded on three main fronts: the precise statement of the
linguistic consequences of the deployment of a schema; the statement
of sequencing rules among schemata and among the elements that
constitute schemata; and the characterisation of the 'meanings' of
schemata in terms of the particular developments of propositional
content individual schema support. Unfortunately, the more important
question as to what it actually means to propose a discourse schema
is considered too obvious: discourse structure is how people organise
discourse. If one takes any proposed discourse schema, however, and
asks what all instances of the use of that particular schema have in
common, the only general answer is that the language so classified
performs the function that the schema identifies. An instance of an
analogy schema makes an analogy, an instance of an explanation schema
gives an explanation, an instance of an example schema gives an
example, and so on.
But whether a segment of language use may justifiably serve as,
for example, an explanation is not something which may be decided on
linguistic grounds. The decision can only be made on the basis of a
language use's conformity with the socially established norms and
criteria for the offering of a successful explanation. Similarly, as
will be illustrated in chapter two, the evaluation of a segment of
language as a story or narrative is crucially dependent upon the
culturally-given view of what constitutes stories or narratives.^ The
schema, in each case, as a socially-stabilised 'plan', is a
socially-established and labelled possible course of action.^ The
criteria for membership for a discourse schema, as construed in terms
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of rhetorical relations, are therefore based upon the interpretation
of a piece of language as performing the social function that the
schema identifies. There is, then, no guarantee that instances of a
schema will share anything linguistic at all.
A consideration of the work of Reichman (1981), which is also
developed in Reichman (1978) and Reichman-Adar (1984), as one of the
more extensively developed theories in this area will serve to
clarify this important point.
2.1 Reichman*s account of discourse - some problems unsolved
Reichman's framework attempts to formalise the genre of
informal argument and debate. Her presupposition is that the highly
structural nature of discourses such as those studied by Grosz
(1977a,b; 1978; 1981) is not, in fact, merely a property of
task-oriented dialogues but instead, if one investigates at the
appropriate level of abstraction, applies to all naturally occurring
discourse; thus,
"While classes are given to teach the rules of writing,
conversational speech has often been thought of as a rule-free
process of communication. The analysis of actual dialogues
forces one to reject such an hypothesis and to recognise that
oral speech is a rule-governed mode of communication... This
study demonstrates that the conversations in which people
partake daily are highly structured and formally analyzable
2. What constitutes 'American stories' has been addressed in a
very interesting study by Polanyi (1978b), while some of the
distinctions between American and Greek narratives have been
investigated in Tannen (1980).
3. This possibility has at least been raised with respect to
scripts, cf. de Beaugrande (1980, pl64) and Schank and Abelson
(1977, p72n), although the significant consequences of this
position have not been adequately addressed previously.
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entities." (1978, p283)
Accordingly, Reichman develops a formalism of hierarchically arranged
'context spaces' analogous to Grosz's representation of task and
sub-tasks but presented as the "most abstract level of discourse
structure." [l981, p242] This is to claim that
"one can characterise and specify a specific set of standard
thematic relationships that utterances (or context spaces)
have with one another. A listener's interpretation of a
speaker's utterances is facilitated by a listener's (1.)
accessing this standard set of relations; (2) knowing which
relations are most likely to occur at a given point in the
discourse; (3) having an up-to-date handle on the current
relevant discourse environment; and (4) noting specific
surface forms used by a speaker." [ibid., p57]
Furthermore,
"...the grammar's characterisation of a communicative act is,
in the main, specific to a maxim-abiding, structural and
functional thematic development of the discourse, not to
underlying psychological motivation. ... The role of the
grammar developed here is to express the constraints inherent
in linguistic communication, within which the psychological
motivations ... must operate." [ibid., p253l
Now, although this supports a nonpsychological interpretation of
discourse that I applaud and further justify in chapter one,
Reichman's use of 'context space' to denote an "abstract non-content
oriented level of structure common to all forms of discourse
engagement" [ibid., p249] demonstrates an equivocation about
discourse and context that is severely damaging. In particular,
Reichman finds herself with a maximally abstract statement of
possible discourse structure but a relatively poor statement of how
this is to correspond with particular discourse units in particular
genres. This should be made clear by the following.
Reichman concerns herself almost completely with argument and
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debate, and yet the context space schemata she develops at the most
abstract level of her theory are claimed to underlie all discourse
forms and to be independent of genre. The particular functional roles
that segments of a discourse can fulfill in the pursuance of
maxim-abiding informal argument are only to be found at a much less
abstract level. These functional roles, or 'communicative goals', are
assigned to particular types of context space (nine are described) to
give possible 'conversational moves'. Each conversational move is an
actual discourse unit which can occur in maxim-abiding discourse and
is associated with a 'clue' word or phrase which is taken to be
symptomatic of its use. The moves Reichman describes and their
associated clue words are the following:
The abstract context space schemata provide a general abstract
class of possible discourse units that may be instantiated as
particular conversational move types. Some of the consequences and
preconditions for a conversational move can be left to the general
properties of abstract context space schemata, while others need to
be filled in specifically; the consequences of a support or further
support move, for example, are defined by Reichman thus:













because; like; like when
so
incidentally; by the way
anyway; in any case
yes; right but
(no) but
all right; OK but
but look; listen; you see
but ... (though)
it's like; the same as
now
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context space or put it in a controlling state. If the
preceding active context space is a supportive context space,
then the move closes this preceding supportive context space;
if the preceding active context space is an issue context
space then the move puts this issue context space in a
controlling state. These differences reflect the different
discourse environments available for a support conversational
move." [ibid., p98j
The terms 'active', 'close', and 'controlling' identify "levels of
conversational influence" [ibid., p86] that a context space may have
(seven levels are distinguished); it is these levels which define the
global sense of focus in which context spaces are considered with
respect to the discourse. The terms 'issue' and 'supportive' refer to
types of context space; the former is considered as an 'independent'
unit, the latter as a necessarily dependent unit.
Now, each conversational move that is defined needs some such
specification of the consequences that it is to have on the
development of any hierarchical discourse structure of which its use
forms a part. Thus, for each genre considered a new set of
conversational moves may be uncovered, each of which would require
its own detailed statement of consequences. Reichman's framework,
however, provides very little in the way of guiding principles for
the construction of genre-specific descriptions and this is because
the generality of the context space schemata has been bought at the
cost of arbitrariness at the level of conversational move
systematisation. The complexity of the 'discourse grammar' Reichman
constructs reflects this difficulty and it is a pity that the
possible generality of the abstract context space schemata is
obscured when attention is turned to the more concrete description of
particular genres. This is one consequence of the inappropriate view
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she adopts of the levels of abstraction that are involved, of which
the aforementioned conflation of 'discourse' and social 'context' is
symptomatic.
Reichman herself, with a view to providing a place for some of
the distinct positions that have been adopted concerning genre,
discourse structure, 'schemata', etc., sees the need to distinguish
between three interpretations of 'structure', as applied to text,
which she considers as 'orthogonal' levels of characterisation
[ibid., p247]. Two of these levels of characterisation are derived
from the psychological research of Anderson, Pichert, and Shirey and
correspond to some traditionally accepted areas of knowledge. The
first, 'textual schemata', embody
"knowledge of discourse conventions that signal organisation,
with specialized conventions characteristic to distinct text
forms and other conventions common to most text forms. These
organisational schemata include a story schema, a personal
letter schema, a news article schema, a scientific report
schema, and so on." (Lange, 1981)
This is clearly equivalent to a psychological statement of genre and
would include the possible forms of argument that Reichman
enumerates. The second, 'content schemata', simply refer to the
"knowledge of real and imaginary worlds" (ibid.) that a language user
must possess and corresponds to the factual knowledge of an expert
system. And finally, the third level of structural characterisation
of text is that of Reichman's abstract context space schemata. This
three-way division of labour permits Reichman to maintain that all
forms of discourse share the same structure and rules of discourse
management, i.e. those of the context space schemata, while still
admitting the utility, at a lower level of abstraction, of analyses
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in terms of genre and genre-specific characteristics.
However, neither the framework itself, nor any discernible
'metatheory', makes it clear how these three levels of
characterisation might be supplemented in a well-motivated fashion.
In her conclusion, Reichman writes
"Lest, however, I leave the reader with the impression that
all questions of structure characterisation have been
adequately addressed in this work, I must point out that, in a
sense, I have only carefully distinguished between the end
points of the "structure-spectrum" addressed in the context
space theory. The mid-points of this spectrum remain hazy."
[1981, p314j
The least abstract point on this so-called structure-spectrum is that
of content schemata and the most abstract is, of course, that of
context spaces as Reichman defines them. The 'hazy' mid-section of
the structure-spectrum includes most of the traditional approaches to
discourse structure and rhetoric, including the textual schemata of
particular genres, and it is unclear both where organisational
details such as these are to be placed and how they are to be dealt
with systematically. If Reichman's theory is then to be seen as an
attempt to provide a more general set of constraints upon discourse
schemata in order that they might be formalised more adequately, it
must be considered unsuccessful.
Indeed, it could even be argued that Reichman's context space
theory fails to make contact with those very phenomena of discourse
structure that approaches remaining within the rhetorical relation
tradition are concerned to explain. The only 'surface' linguistic
phenomena that Reichman is able to appeal to in her identification of
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conversational moves are pronominalisation and form of reference
patterning, the use of certain key phrases (her 'clue' words), and
the use of the present progressive tense; by and large the
segmentation is impressionistic. This generates likely conversational
moves which may subsequently be classified in terms of their
consequences for 'context space' development but does not really
allow us to get to grips with the fundamental problem of linking
these kinds of discourse categories with their appropriate
realisations in form.
This should not, of course, be taken as a criticism of
Reichman's approach specifically. Without a clear conception of what
discourse structure might be, a straightforward interpretation of the
presumed linguistic organisation in terms of the functional
organisation of the text that we perceive as its meaning will always
be favoured. Mann (1984), for example, also states explicitly that
his proposed development of a formalisation of text structure will
proceed along functional lines analogous to Reichman's communicative
goals. In his view,
"Text appears as it does because of intentional activity by
the writer. It exists to serve the writer's purposes. Many of
the linguistic resources of natural language are associated
with particular kinds of purposes which they serve: questions
for obtaining information, marked syntactic constructions for
creating emphasis, and so forth. At the schema level as well,
it is easy to associate particular schemas with the effects
that they tend to produce: the Request schema for inducing
actions, the Evidence schema for making claims credible, the
Inform schema for causing a reader to know particular
information, and so forth. Our knowledge of language in
general and rhetorical structures in particular can be
organized around the kinds of human goals that the linguistic
resources tend to advance." (1984, pl3)
Again, the clear tendency is for the social goals of
- 20 -
conversationalists to be imposed upon the linguistic goals displayed
in the discourse even prior to an examination of what such goals
might be. In all such accounts, what is shared linguistically by
discourses which perform the 'same' function remains a mystery.
I will now support this claim that there are indeed linguistic
commonalities across discourse contribution design to be captured by
contrasting the type of analysis that an account such as Reichman's
might suggest and one taken from the conversation analytic tradition.
These analyses will be made with respect to a segment from a
telephone conversation used by Schegloff (1977). This will clarify
the ways in which a proper consideration of the purposes of discourse
at a conversational level can yield a more appropriate and
simplifying view of discourse design and function.
2.2 A simple telephone conversation as analysed by Schegloff
The segment of the telephone conversation of principal concern
in Schegloff's analysis is reproduced as figure 1 below, the context
of which is described thus:
"B has been describing to A the differences he (B) has been
having with his high school history teacher over the morality
of American foreign policy since the time of George
Washington." [1977, p8l]
Schegloff's main point in this example revolves around the analysis
of the discourse contributions of lines 12-15; i.e.:
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1. B: An' s- an' ( ) we were discussing, it tur-
2. it comes down, he s- he says, I-I-you've talked
3. with thi- si- i- about this many times. I said,
4. it comes down t' this:=
5. B: = Our main difference: I feel that a government,
6. i- the main thing, is- th-the purpose a' the
7. government, is, what is best for the country.
8. A: A/mhmm
9. B: He says, governments, an' you know he keeps- he
10. talks about governments, they sh- the thing that
11. they sh'd do is what's right or wrong.
12. A: For whom.
13. B: Well he says- // he-
14. A: By what standard
15. B: That's what- that's exactly what I mean, he s-
but he says ...
(underlining represents emphasis; '=' represents no gap between
utterances; '//' represents the point in one utterance where
a subsequent overlapping utterance begins; represents a
stretched syllable)
Figure l:
Segment of telephone conversation: Schegloff (1977, P81)
12. A: For whom.
13. B: Well he says- // he-
14. A: By what standard
15. B: That's what- that's exactly what I mean, he s-
but he says ...
What attracts Schegloff to this particular conversation segment is
the occurrence of an interruption in line 13; earlier conversation
analytic work has noted the comparative rarity of interruptions and
so their occurrence immediately warrants study. Schegloff wants to
know, therefore, precisely why the interruption occurred in this case
and what /mictions it serves
Now, if this segment of conversation is decomposed along the
lines suggested by Reichman, the following picture can be constructed
for lines 5-11. First, B asserts that what is to follow captures the
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'main difference' between him/herself and the teacher (T); this might
be represented as a context space (possibly, due to the 'it comes
down t' this' of line 4, serving a 'logical abstraction' or
'respecification' function^) that contains the proposition:
there exists a
such that main-difference-between (B, T, a)
B then goes on to further define that main difference with what may
be a 'further development' conversational move that creates a context
space containing the proposition:
a = { B believes:
there exists X




such that what-government-should-do (X) &
right-or-wrong (X)
}.
It should also be possible to extend Reichman's view to represent
that the beliefs of T are in a relation of 'directly challenging' the
beliefs of B, capturing another level of organisation evident in this
discourse.
However, at line 12 comes A's question: "For whom.' This could
most simply be represented as a context space containing some such
proposition as:
query value of Y
in benefits (X, Y)
what then have to be identified are (i) the functional role of this
4. It is typical that very few of the clear clue-words Reichman
lists actually appear when they are needed in an analysis to be
able to label the functional role of a discourse segment
unambiguously.
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context space and (ii) the context space to which it relates. The
second of these is easier to determine although the result is not
entirely unproblematic. There is no clue-word of any kind employed
and so there is no indication that the context space has altered.
This should then link A's utterance to the teacher's challenge of B's
beliefs; also, due to the high focus of 'what governments should do'
(cf., e.g.: Reichman's rule F3, 1981, pl21) the range of values for X
may be restricted appropriately. As far as the functional role of the
context space is concerned, two options appear most readily: first,
the context space may function as a contribution to the teacher's
challenge itself, as indicated by the link between their containing
context spaces, and second, as a query about the teacher's challenge.
Pursuing the first of these does not offer much help in
accounting for A's interruption in line 14. If B is taking sides with
the teacher then to interrupt B before s/he can respond to the
challenge can only serve to challenge again - although perhaps with a
little more force. But then B's 'that's exactly what I mean' in line
15 is hardly compatible with a view which takes A to be challenging
B's position; although, following Reichman's list of clue-words given
above, the surface form of line 15 (... but ...) may render
'sub-argument concession' at least theoretically applicable at that
point.
The second possible role of querying the teacher's challenge as
B has expressed it seems more appropriate. Reichman does not
concentrate upon the general right of conversationalists to ask
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clarificatory questions however. Here again though the role of A's
interruption remains unclear. B begins to answer A's question only to
be interrupted by the question being put again. Furthermore, B's
contribution at line 15 is strongly suggestive of B sharing A's
question about the validity of the teacher's beliefs - a possibility
not even suggested by the analysis so far.
In the end, the only path open to Reichman's type of account as
it stands currently is to investigate the sets of beliefs of the
three individuals involved so as to assess the most likely
allegiances among them - thereby weighting the theoretically possible
interpretations of A's utterances towards those most likely in this
case. The need for this is further reinforced by the lack of surface
detail that is available to the discourse interpretation process.
Although this could always be increased, there is no systematic
motivation for doing so provided by the framework itself. In contrast
to this approach, the analysis of Schegloff that I will now describe
centres throughout on a detailed consideration of the precise form of
the discourse contributions produced and their function as
sequentially-placed carriers of a conversation.
Schegloff claims that the reason for the interruption is in
fact to be found in an inherent ambiguity in the contribution A makes
at line 12. This ambiguity is not a 'theoretical' ambiguity of the
kind observed above, i.e. an ambiguity that arises from two or more
possible interpretations equally sanctioned by theory though perhaps
only one of those interpretations is responded to by discourse
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participants in any particular context: the ambiguity here is claimed
to be 'empirical' in that both participants actually respond to both
interpretations.
Schegloff sees this distinction between theoretical and
empirical ambiguity as quite important because it allows him to argue
that many of the so-called ambiguities which formal theories of
language are inclined to study are simply artifacts of the method of
analysis. By restricting the ambiguities dealt with to those which
discourse participants also explicitly take into consideration,
Schegloff hopes not to be misled into seeing problems of choice of
one interpretation where perhaps no choice exists. This forces one,
therefore, to examine more deeply why that choice does not exist.
Schegloff needs to show, then, the basis for a real ambiguity
that would motivate the discourse sequence of lines 12-15 above. He
does this by explaining two sequentially-oriented organisations that
the conversation supports. Again, the importance of sequentiality
rather than specific content is a central feature of conversation
analytic approaches; the results of conversation analysis, therefore,
automatically tend to provide content-independent characterisations
that do not crucially rely upon undertaking a deep semantic analysis
of the knowledge, intentions and beliefs of the individuals
concerned. The first sequence Schegloff describes supports an
interpretation of line 12's "for whom' as a question, the second an
interpretation as an agreement. Their details are as follows.
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Schegloff notes^ that upon a possible completion of a 'story'
in conversation, a structural' position in the discourse is created
for the recipient of the story either to display understanding of
that story and a realisation that it has come to an end - thereby
converting the possible completion into an actual completion - or to
display misunderstanding or unwillingness for the story to end at
that point - thereby prolonging the story-telling episode. This
structural position makes it relevant for a story teller to attend to
his/her addressee's utterance at a point of possible story conclusion
as a potential disallowance of that conclusion. For example, one of
the common ways of achieving disallowance is by means of a question
and this justifies a speaker adopting the strategy of attempting to
interpret an utterance at that point as a question if s/he can. This
would provide the necessary "independent sequential basis" [1977,
p96] for speech act assignment required.
In the case at hand, there is evidence that the participants
prior to line 12 are treating the discourse as a story-telling (for
example, A limits his/her contributions to 'carry on' signals such as
'mmhmm', which is a standard way of displaying recognition that an
extended turn is in progress). At line 12, a possible completion
point is reached and it becomes relevant for B, if s/he can, to find
a question in A's contribution. Furthermore, evidence for seeing a
question is indeed available in the particular form of A's
contribution. "For whom" relies for its completeness on its being
linked with the form of the previous contribution and, since that
5. Following Sacks (1972, 1975).
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contribution was an expression of someone else's views, i.e. the
teacher's, as reported by B, there are then good grounds for
interpreting line 12 as a question requesting clarification by B of
those views. This was the second of the theoretically-relevant
interpretations reached in the Reichman style of analysis.
The second possible interpretation here arises out of the
sequential organisation of the story itself. B's description of the
teacher's views takes the form of an argument in which B and the
teacher trade turns; this is reflected in the extremely common
technique of rapid alternation of 'I said ...'-, 'he says...'-headed
sequences. This makes available to A a further set of sequential
relevances: those of the simultaneous alternation of turns and
positions in an argument. Now, B's contribution in lines 9-11,
9. B: He says, governments, an' you know he keeps- he
10. talks about governments, they sh- the thing that
11. they sh'd do is what's right or wrong.
puts forward a turn of the teacher, expressing the teacher's view.
Therefore, if the argument sequencing established previously were
adhered to, the next turn should be a turn by B challenging that
position. A, however, can also make use of this and, again by virtue
of the dependence of line 12 on the form of line 11, produces a turn
which may be interpreted as a continuation of the argument. A is then
providing a piece of B's argument for B, thereby displaying an
association with B's position rather than with the teacher's -
effectively agreeing with B. Again, although it would be possible for
the Reichman style of analysis to state this interpretation, how it
might be guided to it by the shape of the discourse itself so that it
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could be proposed is quite unclear.
One point of rather wider significance inherent in Schegloff's
proposal, therefore, is that it provides a basis by which A's "for
whom" can be heard as part of B's position without needing to rely
"on intuitions about what that position would be if we
extrapolated from what is given in the conversation, in order
to find "for whom" consistent with it." [1977, p96]
In other words, this suggests a mechanism by which the detailed
analysis of the content and intent of the utterances that occur in
terms of situation-specific communicative plans of the individuals
concerned - as exemplified in Reichman's style of analysis - may be
rendered potentially redundant. Such a possibility, with its
attendant simplification and generalisation of the discourse
production/interpretation task, should not then be dismissed lightly.
All that remains here is for Schegloff to justify that his
analysis does indeed bear some relationship to the activities of the
discourse participants that throws light on the interruption that
prompted the whole discussion; this is relatively easy. A's turn at
line 12 is indeed interpreted by B as a question requiring
clarification of the teacher's viewpoint. B's response."
13. B: Well he says- // he-
shows the standard extended answer-initial 'well' and begins with 'he
says-' to clarify the information given at lines 9-11. But this is
equally evident to A, which means that now both participants have
achieved an orientation to line 12 as a question. However, A appears
to have intended his/her turn to be an agreement, not a question, and
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so, as soon as it is clear that B has misinterpreted A, A interrupts
with an attempt to 're-do' his/her turn at line 12 with a
functionally-equivalent
14. A: By what standard
which, again, links in form with A's contribution at line 11. This,
by virtue of the interruption, informs A that his/her previous
interpretation was not the one intended and also, by virtue of its
similarity with line 12, gives A another opportunity to see how A's
turn is to be taken. This time B correctly constructs the
sequentially-relevanced agreement interpretation and acknowledges
that agreement with an acceptance of A's proposed contribution to
his/her (B's) argument:
15. B: That's what- that's exactly what I mean ...
In addition, both participants have now displayed an orientation in
the discourse design to both possible interpretations and the
ambiguity is shown as Schegloff claimed to be empirical rather than
theoretical.
2.3 Summary
The principal considerations that should be drawn from this
brief contrast of approaches at this point may be summarised thus.
The conversation analytic approach suggests a view in which: (i) many
problems of disambiguation may in fact be artifacts of inappropriate
analysis; (ii) there seem to exist content-independent general
mechanisms of conversation design; (iii) the specific, fine-grained
form of discourse contributions may offer a positive resource for
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structuring interpretations that has been underestimated previously;
and (iv) a sequential basis for speech act assignment may be a
potential rival for more complex and domain-specific, plan-based
techniques. Each of these possibilities will be examined in depth by
this thesis.
Although there is no doubt that these are significant points
which are clearly relevant to the requirements and problems of any
general account of discourse, the level of detail in even my
abbreviated account of Schegloff's analysis may strike some as
daunting: is it really necessary to treat discourse at such a low
level in order to achieve the claimed generality of results? Do we
really need to scrabble around in the micro-organisation of
conversation, instead of being able to propose high-level (and grand
looking) general planning mechanisms which would take care of the
messiness of natural discourse for us? I believe the answer to these
questions to be in the affirmative - it seems, and conversation
analytic work makes this almost incontrovertible, that almost any
level of idealisation away from the actual stream of language
behaviour loses valuable information which discourse participants
utilise in maintaining their understanding of what is occurring in
the speech event. However, the current state of disarray in the area
of linguistics concerned with dealing with the fine-detailed
phenomena that appear relevant to conversation, text and discourse
design is illustrated in the vast range of theoretical constructs
proposed in this area as contrasted with the relatively few
linguistic phenomena such constructs are intended to cover. As a
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graphic display of the present state of the 'art', figure 2 below
significantly extends the table of relevant constructs presented in
Bates (1976, pl68)® and lists the majority of the constructs that
have been proposed to date.
In addition, as we have seen here, the problem is no nearer
solution within cognitive science; in fact recently, Mann and Moore
(1980, p27) came to the conclusion that, concerning the state of the
art for the computational design of multisentence English text:
1. Every kind of relevant information is scarce - abstract
principles, prior system designs, working precedents, useful
algorithms are all hard to find.
2. Existing precedents (of any of these kinds) tend to be
specialized to the particular environments in which they
arose, and so they tend to depend on arbitrary combinations of
conditions that occur only infrequently.
3. There is no theoretical framework useful to designers.
Of course, following upon the realisation of the importance of
developing accounts of discourse and conversation, there is now an
impressive concentration of research resources upon this problem.
Yet, despite that concentration,, it remains the case that many
crucial aspects of conversation have not been addressed and,
consequently, an adequate general theory is still unavailable. This,
I have suggested, is in fact largely a paradigm problem in that the
wrong sort of answers are being proposed by superimposing social
6. And again in Bates and MacWhinney (1979, pl76). It should also
be noted that figure 2 only lists those constructs which have been
used in the analysis of English; there are additional constructs
of a similar nature which have been proposed in studies of other
languages - see, e.g.: Meyer's (1975) treatment of coherence
relations in German. The bibliography for figure 2 is presented
separately as Appendix II. For a further review of the literature
also see Kuno (1977).
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goals upon linguistic organisation.
Therefore, in order to be able to gain a better insight into
the working of natural conversation I believe that it is necessary to
follow the lead of conversation analysis and to work very closely
with the actual design of discourse contributions that speakers
produce in context. However, I also believe that the necessary
complexity that this entails can be made considerably more tractable
by the articulation of a more appropriate formal linguistic account
than those constructed to date. It is this eventual goal then that
both motivates the research I describe and shapes my discussion of
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van Dijk: 1977 (".. .HIERARCHICALLY
ORGANISES the conceptual (propositional)
structure of the sequence [of which it
is topic]" [pi34])
van Dijk:1977 ("...a proposition entailed
by the sequence of propositions
underlying the discourse (or part of
it)." [pi37])
Ellis:1966
Figure 2: Textual layer constructs 1
The theoretical constructs of discourse analysis
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3. Summary of the organisation of the thesis
The overall structure of the thesis can now be summarised as
follows. First, chapter one claims the necessity of treating language
as a foundational phenomenon of an intersubjective social level of
description only in terms of which can our behaviour be explained and
then describes a linguistic framework that is fully compatible with
this view. Chapter two goes on to explain both the status of
discourse within that framework and to suggest the possible
centrality of discourse as a linguistic phenomenon, introducing the
account that is to be provided for discourse in more detail. Chapters
three, four and five then build upon that introduction by developing
the account proposed with specific reference to the analysis of some
spoken discourse. This account takes the form of: (i) a set of
linguistic 'structural patterns' whose deployment helps constitute
extended sequences of topically coherent two-person discourse, such
as those to which Schegloff's analysis above appealed, and (ii) the
beginnings of a possible account for some of the contextual
consequences of that deployment. Finally, chapter six brings the
thesis to a close with a summary of what has been achieved, its
consequences for the subsequent attempts to formalise conversation -




Requirements for an appropriate theory of discourse
1. Language as a foundational phenomenon
Kuhn's well-known discussion of the historical development of
scientific theories in terms of 'paradigms' presents some ideas which
are particularly relevant for cognitive science at this time. It will
be recalled that Kuhn describes a paradigm as that implicit
background of practices and assumptions which pre-structures
investigators' views of scientific reality. This is taken to be a
necessary feature of scientific investigation and, indeed, one which
provides for the economical and productive deployment of research
strategies.
"So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove
capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves
fastest and penetrates most deeply through confident
employment of these tools. The reason is clear. As in
manufacture so in science - retooling is an extravagance to be
reserved for the occasion that demands it." (Kuhn, 1962, p76)
And so,
"When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for
granted, he need no longer, in his major work, attempt to
build his field anew, starting from first principles and
justifying the use of each concept introduced." (ibid.,
pi9/20)
Within cognitive science doubt is sometimes expressed as to
whether there yet can be said to be a paradigm. I think it is clear,
however, that there is a paradigm - albeit one which is extremely
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impoverished when compared with those of, for example, the physical
sciences because it does little more than reflect some traditional
philosophical positions adopted towards human intelligence and
behaviour. This paradigm I will term the 'cognitivist' paradigm and,
in recognition of one of its most significant philosophical forbears,
it may be classified as 'Cartesian*.
Now, one of the beneficial properties of paradigms is that the
expectations they generate and the depth of scientific investigation
they support combine to bring about occasions when a prevailing
paradigm can be seen to be inadequate. Such occasions Kuhn terms
'crises' since a replacement of paradigm amounts to a radical
alteration in 'world-view': a situation not lightly entertained.
However, as Kuhn notes,
"Without the special apparatus that is constructed mainly for
anticipated functions, the results that lead ultimately to
novelty could not occur. And even when the apparatus exists,
novelty ordinarily emerges only for the man who, knowing with
precision what he should expect, is able to recognise that
something has gone wrong. Anomaly appears only against the
background provided by the paradigm. The more precise and
far-reaching that paradigm is, the more sensitive an indicator
it provides of anomaly and hence of an occasion for paradigm
change." (ibid., p65)
It is here that doubts about the existence of a paradigm within
cognitive science find more force because the cognitivist paradigm,
as neither "precise" nor, in the positive sense implied by Kuhn,
"far-reaching", cannot currently be expected to function as a
sensitive indicator of anomaly. That is: empirical work undertaken
within the paradigm may not be able to show unambiguously the
existence of fundamental problems.
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As a consequence of this, it has fallen to philosophers to
debate the adequacy of the proposed paradigm, which they do with
great vigour for the subject matter of cognitive science centres
fairly and squarely around some of the most problematic questions to
have been raised in the philosophy of mind and language. Furthermore,
one of the most severe critics of the entire cognitive science
enterprise has been Dreyfus who, sometimes likening cognitive science
to alchemy, has concluded that
"Current difficulties, once they are interpreted independently
of optimistic a priori assumptions ... suggest that the areas
of intelligent behaviour are discontinuous and that the
boundary is near. The stagnation of each of the specific
efforts in artificial intelligence suggests that there can be
no piecemeal breakthrough to fully formed adult intelligent
behaviour for any isolated kind of human performance."
(Dreyfus, 1972, p214)
Indeed, he goes further:
"We can then view recent work in artificial intelligence as a
crucial experiment disconfirming the traditional assumption
that human reason can be analyzed into rule-governed
operations on situation-free discrete elements - the most
important disconfirmation of this metaphysical demand that has
ever been produced. This technique of turning our
philosophical assumptions into technology until they reveal
their limits suggests fascinating new areas for basic
research." (ibid., p215/6)
There can be no doubt that the scope and vehemence of Dreyfus's
disapproval has done much to raise the temperature of the ensuing
debate* and one consequence of this has been that, although his
arguments are often mentioned, they are far less often understood as
1. Dreyfus's conviction that AI is philosophically unsound goes
back a long way; see, for example: Dreyfus (1965). Also, Dreyfus
(1979, 1981 ) show that he does not believe more recent
developments to have altered the situation in the slightest.
2. See, for example, the critiques from Papert (1968) or Pylyshyn
(1974).
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well as they ought to be.2 This is unfortunate because he does, in
fact, raise some important theoretical and conceptual difficulties
which will need to be addressed if genuine progress is going to be
possible within cognitive science; some of these difficulties, and
ones closely related, have now been discussed by Haugeland (1978),
Searle (1980a), Winograd (1980), and Coulter (1979), (1983), among
others. Furthermore, I have also discussed these issues in some depth
in Bateman (1983, 1985)* in order to argue that language should be
placed at a far more basic and central position in subsequent
so-called 'cognitive* attempts to understand human intelligent
behaviour in general and language in particular. Indeed, since many
constructs proposed previously within cognitive science for the
explanation of language (e.g. plans and knowledge) are, in fact,
already dependent upon the existence of language, they cannot serve
as explanations for language as is currently assumed. In an important
sense, then, I am attempting to reverse the direction of explanation
in many respects where language is concerned.
Now, since I have already discussed elsewhere at some length
the more significant problems with what may be termed the
'cognitivist' assumption that underlies the cognitivist paradigm,
i.e. that the way to explain intelligent behaviour, and particularly
the use of language, is by means of a 'reduction' to a psychological
domain of the cognitive processes of individual language users, I
will not repeat that discussion here (although a detailed selection
of the relevant literature has nevertheless been included in the
bibliography for those who might be interested). However, the fact
* In Gilbert and Heath (forthcoming).
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that my underlying aim throughout this thesis will be to produce a
framework fully compatible with the position for which I have argued
requires that, in order for this to be comprehensible, I need at the
outset to sketch very briefly some of the basic tenets to which the
revised paradigm for cognitive science I advocate commits us. In
particular, I need to suggest why, and in what sense, I am
maintaining language to be a 'foundational' phenomenon rather than
one derivative upon cognitive-type processes.
This can be achieved most simply by the establishment of an
important distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of
description and explanation. On the one hand, the psychological or
neurophysiological mechanisms which enable us to act intelligently
are placed at the sub-personal level whereas, on the other, language
phenomena help constitute the foundations of the personal level. The
advocated reversal of direction in explanation then amounts to the
claims that many constructs and phenomena previously assigned to the
sub-personal domain are, in fact, more appropriately considered at
the personal level and that that personal level is crucially
dependent upon the existence of language.
This is supported by a further, equally important, property of
the personal level that substantially affects the status and form of
theories concerning it; that is, it is not essentially personal at
all - it is inter-personal. At the level of description appropriate
to the personal level, theoretical constructs are inherently social
in that they already transcend individual organisms and give rise
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subsequently to individual subjectivities from a position of
inter-subjectivity. Here I will be assuming that it may be justified
that the sub-personal comes to exist as it is, both evolutionarily
and developmentally, precisely in order to support the mechanisms of
the personal level and, therefore, it is to set oneself an
unnecessarily difficult task if one studies sub-personal functioning
without any account of the reasons why the sub-personal is as it is,
i.e. without an account of the personal level. I will assume further
that intelligent human behaviour can in fact only arise out of that
personal level since people's action in the world is based upon their
understanding of that world, of others in that world, and of their
own place in that world; all of which are personal level constructs.
Thus: the best account of human 'intelligent' behaviour is one which
makes such an understanding clear in its functionality for people as
social beings. Such an understanding is always social - socially
established, socially transmitted, etc. - and it is here that the
true centrality of language resides.
Intersubjective 'understanding' is under this account then no
longer an agreement of substantive issues 'internalised' within the
'subjective stocks of knowledge" of participating subjects. On the
contrary, it is to maintain that understanding
"appears in our analysis of action rather than in the heads of
actors, and it appears as a necessary condition of the actor's
occurrence, rather than as a report of what happened 'out
there'." (Bauman, 1978, pl78)
This is a point also made by Vittgenstein in the following terms:
"Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at
all.- For that is the expression that confuses you. But ask
yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances,
do we say, "Now I know how to go on..." (Wittgenstein,
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1974/1958, p61)
The 'processes' of understanding under this account are those methods
by uhich members of societies come to accept that there is shared
agreement - the further, individualistic, step of claiming that this
involves actual sharing of the same internal substantive issues,
'concepts', or whatever is unnecessary and unwarranted.
This somewhat counter-intuitive viewpoint may be clarified by
the following brief discussion and simple examples. There is no doubt
that one particularly important aspect of human behaviour is the
construction of 'folk-psychologies' that render behaviour
intelligible. But the reasons why the sub-personal is as it is are
not then to be found in any available folk-psychology, e.g. standard
folk-psychological constructs no matter how formalised they might be,
because such accounts are omitting an all important intermediate
step. It is only in the sociological elucidation of the construct
'person' that has building folk-psychologies as one of its many
possible activities that all such activities, psychologising
included, may be explained. Furthermore, since that elucidation shows
language to have a central position, it may indeed be claimed that
belief and planning talk is to be properly subjugated by language
talk; the former is seen purely as a result of the latter while it is
the latter that represents the mechanisms, processes, or whatever
that provide the functional organisation and motivation for the
sub-personal being as it is. It is only at a derived level of
description therefore that plans and the like reside. The mechanisms
of language use which provide for such derived levels of explanation,
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even though they do not correspond to the 'psychological' reality of
a sub-personal description, are nevertheless explanatory in that our
intelligent behaviour is only to be 'explained' by reference to those
social intersubjective 'processes' by which its meaningfulness is
constructed.3 In short, what the explanatory personal-level account
has to capture are the "conventionalities and constraints" (Coulter,
1983, pl28) which give rise to displays of an always presupposed
social order. If an account of such constraints on intersubjective
behaviour in general were achieved, then this would offer an
explanation for attendant intelligent, relative-rational,
socially-accountable ways of behaving, including the construction of
psychologies.
The personal level acquires explanatory status, therefore,
precisely because the social world is not considered to be built up
at a sub-personal level. Although the sub-personal has to achieve
situated ways of behaving which provide evidence for the existence of
an external, 'objective', social reality, within the sub-personal
level the abstractable regularities of that objective reality are
dissolved by the "uniqueness" of the individual. Personal-level
accounts are then needed to explain the regularities of
personal-level behaviour, while sub-personal accounts are needed to
3. I should note here that the position I am advocating will
remain generally hostile to using 'planning' in the same sense for
both people and animals. Clearly, however, certain animals do
manage to 'plan' in some sense and so the questions can be raised:
(i) in what sense is it that animals manage to plan? And (ii) are
there then similar areas of planning to be found within human
behaviour which, therefore, would also not require the support of
language? These interesting questions will have to remain
unanswered here however.
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explain how the behaviour of the personal level is achieved once
relevanced. Two brief examples of this division of labour in
explanation are as follows.
First, if one examines the neurophysiological make-up of an
individual then, presumably at some future stage in neuro-science,
there will be isolable 'mechanisms' which are causally-responsible
for the particular fact that there will be preferred ranges of
distances to be maintained from fellow conversationalists in the
face-to-face situation. However, the reasons that there are preferred
ranges will not be found in the neurophysiological system. This can
only be explained by reference to distances which are imbued with
social significance by the interactions of the personal level. The
personal level account explains why a certain distance in a
particular situation is preferred - in terms of consequences for
future actions and the accountability of such actions; the
sub-personal account explains how that behaviour, once relevanced, is
being achieved. The type of account which is to be seen as
explanatory therefore depends strictly upon the purpose the
explanation is to serve.
Returning to language proper for the second example: any
everyday talk of the personal level concerning, for example, beliefs,
desires, knowledge, etc., i.e. folk-psychology, forms part of a
systematic way of talking that entails accountable orientations to
behaviour which is hence rendered intelligible for the users of that
talk.4 This is a generalisation of Dennett's (1978) intentional
- 46 -
system stance to include any folk-psychology. Now, (since at the
essentially 'anonymous' level of social description at which language
resides the 'I' is not, in the most part, differentiated from the
'Other'; cf. Heidegger (1962/1927, pl54)) one can orient to one's own
behaviour in the same way; i.e. one 'understands' oneself in the
terms of the folk-psychology. But does one then 'have' beliefs,
knowledge, or whatever which the psychologist can profitably
investigate? No, of course not: what one 'has' is simply a way of
speaking. The folk-psychological constructs are quite accurately
described as 'ghosts of linguistic practices', albeit extremely
active ghosts.
Note furthermore that what the personal level has to explain
here is this way of talking in terms of 'having' beliefs, knowledge,
etc. And, since these are just ways of talking, it is appropriate
that language has indeed been singled out as central. Also, the
sub-personal account does not have to explain the 'how' of 'having'
beliefs, knowledge, etc. because this is a purely derivative
phenomenon already explained in principle by the sub-personal
explanation of how any way of talking is possible. To risk a
computational analogy, the 'explanation' of the functioning of the
machine hardware should not be called upon to explain the syntax of
the higher-level languages that machine has implemented upon it.
The practical consequences of this viewpoint manifest
4. See Coulter's (1983, ppl27-146) related discussion of, for
example, "Thought' avowals as sequential and illocutionary
operators".
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themselves in the status of proposed theories and in the courses of
possible explanation that are admissible at the personal level.
Regularly occurring uses of language are to be explained, whenever
possible, not by describing them to be instances of speakers'
intentional deployment of linguistic knowledge so as to achieve goals
in their personal plans constructed for achieving conversation, but
instead by describing linguistic resources in terms of the
consequences they may have on the 'context' - already intersubjective
and including those who participate in it - in which the resources
are deployed. Thus, it is being claimed that to 'internalise'
statements concerning linguistic issues so as to make reference
directly to some assumed area of psychological relevance is in
general quite unnecessary and can seriously distort our appreciation
of what is occuring.
This is to establish a further perspective to the dichotomous
'processor-centric' versus 'omniscient' ways of viewing language use
that have been proposed previously. The omniscient view, the
so-called 'god's eye-view' attitude, is one which has been adopted in
many traditional formal logic accounts of language, while the
processor-centric viewpoint is that regularly adopted in cognitivist
accounts, usually on the grounds that it corresponds more closely to
'reality'. Problematic with processor-centricity, however, is how
individual processors get to share anything sufficiently for
intersubjective understanding to be possible. The third possible
perspective, which I have proposed we adopt, is the intersubjective
viewpoint. This claims that that which needs to be shared for
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intersubjectivity to be possible is already shared; this is made
possible by the social level of description's essential anonymity -
it applies equally to all. Subsequently, however, distinctions and
differences can be introduced as deviations from the anonymous
account so as to bring about specific individual orientations.
Importantly, it is the social which is logically prior and so we need
an account of this first if appropriate regularities are to be
uncovered.
As we shall see more clearly below, this intersubjective
approach relies upon the organisational strata of language and
context being bound together very closely - in particular, it is
assumed that it is only out of an appreciation of the structure of
discourse and interaction that a correct understanding, i.e. a
correctly structured context, is both maintainable on, and in turn
maintains, the intersubjective plane within which language operates.
All of the linguistic resources I propose below are to be
interpreted in this way. They are properties of situations rather
than individuals and can, therefore, bring constraints to bear on
many individuals simultaneously, thereby defining the limits within
which those individuals must work without needing to delve into
details of individuals' plans. This is to be remembered most when
resources are proposed which resemble their cognitivist counterparts
- one particularly clear example of this will be the treatment of
'focus' in chapter four.
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It is, in fact, to be expected that many similarities will be
found between intersubjective accounts and their corresponding
cognitivist versions. But this is not, in general, because of any
inherent appropriateness of the cognitivist approach. What is really
going on in such cases, again as I have argued elsewhere, is that the
so-called cognitivist accounts are already essentially social but
their status as such has not been grasped. The intersubjective
approach, however, both allows us to see such mechanisms for what
they are, thereby significantly improving our chances of
understanding them more appropriately, and offers us the means of
integrating them into a more comprehensive framework without
distorting their basis as social phenomena.
With this very general statement of the underlying principles
of the revised paradigm, it is now possible to move on to consider in
more depth the kind of theory it suggests to be appropriate for
dealing with discourse. I will proceed via a discussion of a
sociologically-based school of thought that shares many of the
principles I have described and claimed to be relevant - i.e.
'ethnomethodology' - and the approach to discourse that has arisen
within it. This will establish more strongly the particular
perspective I will be taking on language throughout this thesis.
2. Ethnomethodology
For ethnomethodologists there is no possibility of explaining
human behaviour in a context-free, objective way. It may be possible
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to describe it, for example in terms of physical actions, but by
leaving out precisely what makes any action relevant and appropriate
for its context, such descriptions are taken to be fundamentally
nonexplanatory; they are, literally, irrelevant. Garfinkel, one of
the leading developers of this viewpoint and the inventor of its
name, uses the term 'ethnomethodology'
"to refer to various policies, methods, results, risks, and
lunacies with which to locate and accomplish the study of the
rational properties of practical actions as contingent ongoing
accomplishments of organised artful practices of everyday
life." (Garfinkel, 1967, pi 1)
Ethnomethodologists therefore focus
"on the manner by which individual actions construct
particular social scenes so as to provide one another evidence
of an objective, taken-for-granted reality." (Johnson, 1977,
p!59)
Furthermore, the most powerful kinds of action for "the social
world's situated construction" (ibid., pl60) are those which are
linguistic.
Appropriate theories of this personal-level domain can, as I
claimed above, be seen to be explanatory for that domain in
ethnomethodological terms for the following reason. All
ethnomethodological accounts argue convincingly that individuals'
accounts exhibit a constant orientation to displaying the accountable
rationality and reasonableness of their actions. That is, in every
action, societally-provided norms are skillfully achieved so as to
provide evidence to 'Anyone' who is a member of the culture that the
action is being performed appropriately with respect to some
background of taken-for-granted practices which renders it
meaningful, understandable, and relevant. There is no need, then,
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even to attempt to make that background fully explicit as is
typically required by a cognitivist account. The background is always
made as explicit as needs be for particular purposes and situations
by virtue of the evidence provided in members' situated practices. As
members, they 'know' how acting in certain ways is sufficient; by
having so acted they cannot be claimed by others to need to explain
themselves (Garfinkel, 1967, p31). Only in cases of 'break-down' need
further details be forthcoming and then, again, only so many as
necessary for repair.
Accordingly, we can see the role played by sub-personal
mechanisms, be they neurophysiological, psychological, or hydraulic,
to be one of 'enabling' individuals to exhibit the skills required
for providing evidence that what they do makes sense. These skills
are social norms and, as such, are akin to norms for lengths of
unfilled hesitations in speech, for the distances to be maintained
between conversationalists of varying relationships in face-to-face
interaction, for extensive gestural accompaniment to speech, for not
talking with one's mouth full, for talking with one's mouth full, for
loudly slurping one's noodles, for nodding one's head in
disagreement, etc. etc. The appropriate level of abstraction to
capture the necessary regularities here is that of the personal
level; only given the unifying nature of the 'mechanisms' described
at that level can sense be made of the - at the sub-personal level
unmotivated - mass of detail that is to be found in the
physically-causal mechanisms underlying.
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The particular value of evidence-providing skills then is
precisely that by virtue of their use a shared background of
meaningful practices is constituted. But, all importantly, that
sharing lies in the adherence to ways of acting in situations, in
'grounded practices', rather than in the sharing of explicit
conceptualisations. There is an important sense, then, in which what
it mearrs to say of a community that a common language is spoken is
that the members share a set of skills for acting in context which
display both the intelligibility of the contexts and the rationality
of the actions. The ever-present orientation to such displays hence
'maintains' the appearance of a rational social background that the
community shares.
This again brings us to the domain of phenomena for which
personal-level accounts may provide explanations - indeed, for which
only such accounts may provide explanations. The accomplishment of a
shared, (relative-)rational, social world in which it makes sense to
discuss beliefs, knowledge, intentions, etc. is only to be found in
the situated practices of the members whose accomplishment it is.
Achieving accountable orientations to behaviour so as to render the
behaviour intelligible is not, however, work which societal members
may shirk; that achievement is inherent in all their ways of acting -
this is the result of socialisation and the apparent centrality of
this process for being human. Nevertheless, the achievement is a
"contingent, ongoing" accomplishment brought about by the efforts of
members. Established folk-psychologies tend to be 'accurate' then,
i.e. of reasonable predictive power, not necessarily because they
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accurately reflect sub-personal processes and hence capture causal
mechanisms, but because members invest considerable effort in making
them work. Many psychological accounts of language are therefore in
actuality better construed as mistaken attempts to recast
socially-motivated interactions as cognitively-motivated underlying
processes.
This is brought out quite clearly in Dennett's (1978)
discussion of the 'ideal' believing system where he seeks to
establish a basis for the alignment of personal level organisations
purely in terms of rational conduct thereby dissolving the problem of
'intersubjectivity'.5 In this discussion he claims that
"When we are in a position to ascribe the single belief that p
to a system, we must, in virtue of our open-ended expectations
of the ideal believer-that-p, be in a position to ascribe to
the system an indefinite number of further beliefs, desires,
etc." (Dennett, 1978, p26)
In a curiously ethnocentric fashion Dennett does not draw attention
to the essential role of society in sanctioning precisely which
"further beliefs, desires, etc." are to be expected. The "normative
cast" to belief-talk can be made "honest", not just by "excellence of
design" (ibid., p27), but also, and perhaps more often, by members'
efforts to make it such. Furthermore,
Once sight is lost of the mundane observability of such
[intentional] states of affairs, it becomes very easy to make
the unwarranted leap and argue that such predicates label
(albeit indirectly) neural, computational or 'mental' events,
states and processes instead of signal states of affairs in
the intersubjective world." (Coulter, 1983, pl62)
In short, people will act rationally by virtue of their design to act
to display orientation to norms, not because they have been endowed
5. This problem is discussed more fully in Bateman (1985) - which
is to be found in Gilbert and Heath (forthcoming).
- 54 -
with excellent design for 'rational' behaviour as such. Rationality
is a social construct and excellence of design can therefore be
social as well as 'objective-functional'.
Unfortunately, even though sociology has of necessity concerned
itself with this social order we observe around us which provides for
that perceived orderliness and comprehensibility that makes human
existence possible, Garfinkel, in establishing the
ethnomethodological perspective, argues that sociology as a
discipline has in fact failed to make this social order sufficiently
problematic as a phenomenon in its own right. That is,
"Despite the topic's centrality, an immense literature
contains little data and few methods with which the essential
features of socially recognized "familiar scenes" may be
detected and related to details of social organization.
Although sociologists take socially structured scenes of
everyday life as a point of departure they rarely see ... the
general question of how any such common sense world is
possible. Instead, the possibility of the everyday world is
either settled by theoretical representation or merely
assumed. As a topic and methodological ground for sociological
inquiries, the definition of the common sense world of
everyday life, though it is appropriately a project of
sociological inquiry, has been neglected." (Garfinkel, 1967,
p36)
In order to rectify this situation and to begin to make some
contact with those situated practices by which the social world is
presumed to be accomplished and in terms of which, therefore,
explanations at the personal level are to be couched, Garfinkel
undertook a series of studies aimed at revealing some of the
properties of this taken-for-granted common sense world of everyday
life. His method was to investigate ways in which the smooth
functioning of background expectations might be disrupted, i.e. the
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'taken-for-grantedness' of the everyday life-world was to be made
problematic so that the phenomenon itself might be focussed upon as
an issue and the evidence-providing skills of societal members made
visible.
One of these studies® which is particularly effective and
relevant to my development of an account of discourse ran as follows.
Garfinkel set a group of his students the task of reporting
conversations in which they had taken part by writing both what was
literally said and, along side, what was understood to have been said
or communicated by each utterance. For example, part of a
conversation was reported thus:
"HUSBAND: Dana succeeded in This afternoon as I was bringing Dana,
putting a penny in our four-year-old son, home from the
a parking meter nursery school, he succeeded in reaching
today without high enough to put a penny in a parking
being picked up. meter when we parked in a meter parking
zone, whereas before he has always had
to be picked up to reach that high.
WIFE: Did you take him Since he put a penny in a meter that
to the record means that you stopped while he was with
store? you. I know that you stopped at the
record store either on the way to get
him or on the way back. Was it on the
way back, so that he was with
you or did you stop there on the
way to get him and somewhere else on the
way back?"
(ibid., p38/9)
Garfinkel then made this task progressively more difficult by asking
his students to make their explanations ever more complete. His final
aim was to be able to recover what the conversationalists had
actually talked about "only from reading literally what they wrote
6. For others, see Garfinkel (1967); while for more detailed
introductions to ethnomethodology generally, see: Turner (1974).
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literally" (ibid., p26). The students at this point typically gave up
and complained that the task was impossible: impossible not because
there seemed to be some bounded area "made so vast by pedantry that
they lacked sufficient time, stamina, paper, drive or good reason to
write "all of it'"(ibid.) but, instead, because the very way the task
was set up seemed to guarantee that vhatever they wrote could be
found to be incomplete if the reader were so inclined.
Garfinkel suggested that the way this should be seen is as
follows. Rather than considering the explications of what was
'actually' said as the 'contents' of what was said, they could be
regarded better as attempts to furnish instructions for recognising
what the parties were "actually and certainly saying." (ibid., p29)
Instructions which, furthermore, were required to "withstand every
exigency of situation, imagination, and development." (ibid., p30) In
other words, Garfinkel had asked his students to formulate rules
which had succeeded in freeing themselves from the sociocultural
settings both of the conversational participants and of the reader of
the rules.
It should be noted that this is precisely the task that the
theorist working with the constructs of knowledge representation
takes on; in order to formalise a knowledge representation it is
necessary for it to be autonomously specifiable. Yet Garfinkel's
point is that it is only each conversational participant's taken for
granted assumption that the other is operating within a similar
sociocultural setting that supports the entire enterprise of mutual
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intersubjective understanding. No matter how literal the rules might
become, they would still fall back upon the shared understanding of
the writer and reader because it is only by sharing in the
intersubjective world of a human society that an individual is able
to communicate with and understand those around him or her.
Therefore, from Garfinkel's perspective, to undertake such a
formalisation is to miss what should, in fact, have been the main
object of inquiry: the taken for granted background scheme of
expectations which makes understanding possible.
Such expectations should not, however, be construed as a means
of deducing what was really and actually said in any utterance, i.e.
the 'meaning' of the utterance in some context-neutral sense. They
instead are what permits the process of 'glossing' what was said to
take place and this process, as suggested above, is essentially
boundless. As long as there is some motivation for continuing the
process, there will be more to say. A more important role for the
background expectations is to permit 'actual appearances' to be
"recognizeable and intelligible as the
appearances-of-familiar-events." (ibid., p33) Such recognisability
and intelligibility of familiar events generally make it unnecessary
and, indeed, inappropriate to undertake explicit glossing activities
when participants are involved in real conversations.
"For the purposes of conducting their everyday affairs persons
refuse to permit each other to understand "what they are
really talking about" in this way. The anticipation that
persons will understand, the occasionally of expressions, the
specific vagueness of references, the
retrospective-prospective sense of a present occurrence,
waiting for something later in order to see what was meant
before, are sanctioned properties of common discourse. They
furnish a background of seen but unnoticed features of common
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discourse whereby actual utterances are recognised as events
of common, reasonable, understandable, plain talk." (ibid.,
P41)
By adhering to these unstated but ever present resources for
organising talk, conversational participants can rest assured that
they are entitled to assume that they will be 'understood' by others.
'Understanding' therefore again comes to signify not the
sharing of conceptualisations but the possibility of responding
appropriately according to the social methods available for
displaying various orientations to what has gone before. This can
make no appeal to common conceptualisations of the 'meanings' of
utterances because, as Garfinkel argues, the process of obtaining
such meanings is as boundless as that of providing glosses. The
availability and precise construction of appropriate responses does
not itself rely upon a gloss having been achieved; indeed, reaching a
gloss or a meaning is only possible on the basis of an understanding
of 'appropriate' responses.
Central to this account, then, are the methods by which
societal members display the rationality and accountability of their
actions, talk included. Furthermore, these methods may be regarded
essentially as 'features of the talk by which such accountability is
told'; this means that, for ethnomethodologists also, language can
justly take on a crucial role. They must study how talk is
constructed in order to display its rationality and appropriateness
to its context of use while simultaneously extending that context in
meaningful directions - this constitutes the ethnomethodological
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study of discourse that has come to be termed 'conversation
analysis'.
3. Conversation analysis
From its roots in ethnomethodology conversation analysis
inherits basic tenets in two main areas: the relationship between
language and context and the kind and extent of the formalisation
considered appropriate for capturing the resources of conversation
construction. Clearly both of these are central in current attempts
to explicate the nature of discourse.
First then, the essential 'indexicality' of uses of language
makes a constant orientation to the question of context inescapable
in studying language: conversation analysis must always concern
itself with the situated use of language. Part of what Garfinkel
deduces from investigations such as the one cited above is that any
glossing procedure must make essential reference to the context. That
is, for most utterances
"their sense cannot be decided by an auditor unless he knows
or assumes something about the biography and the purposes of
the speaker, the circumstances of the utterance, the previous
course of the conversation, or the particular relationship of
actual or potential interaction that exists between user and
auditor. The expressions do not have a sense that remains
identical through the changing occasions of their use." (1967,
p40)7
This finds expression in conversation analysis as follows. Utterances
from natural conversations are assumed to be both "context shaped"
and "context renewing": each utterance cannot be considered except in
the context which gave rise to it and each utterance cannot help but
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contribute to the context which will form the basis of interpretation
for subsequent utterances. It should be noted that this property of
utterances is inherent also not only in the Firthian and Neo-Firthian
branches of linguistics that will be of concern below, but also in
many very recently formulated accounts including, most significantly
perhaps, Barwise and Perry's 'situation semantics',® which is
currently attracting much attention, as well as the discourse model
and mental model approaches that, as was shown in the introduction,
are now widespread. For the ethnomethodologist, an understanding of
speech 'acts' as functions from contexts into contexts has long been
a commonplace and so it remains unfortunate that their results have
not hitherto been more widely studied.
One aspect of the context with which ethnomethodologists are
particularly concerned provides a foundation for the other main area
of conversation analysis: the investigation of the methods employed
for conversation construction. Understanding the contribution an
utterance makes to the conversation as a whole must include reference
to the "immediately local configuration of preceding actions ... in
which it participates." (Heritage, forthcoming.a, p2) This aspect of
the context leads to the initial 'formalisations' that have been
offered for conversation-organisational resources, the most basic of
7. This is, of course, in conflict with those current views of
natural language semantics which would have a specific semantic
content associated with each surface syntactic form - that
semantic content often being derivable according to strict formal
operations obeying the principle of compositionality; this issue
will be addresseed further below.
8. See, for example, Barwise (1981), Barwise and Perry (1981,
1983), Evans (1982), Israel (1983).
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which is the 'adjacency pair' of Schegloff (1968) and Schegloff and
Sacks (1973).
This construct relies upon the segmentation of talk into
'turns', each turn typically being the responsibility of a single
participant in the conversation and disjoint from the turns of other
participants. The detailed study of the organisation of turns in
naturally-occurring conversations received its first major treatment
in Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson's (1974) proposed 'simplest
systematics' for turn-taking where, from an extensive study of
conversation, Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson conclude that speaker
turns are built from 'turn-construction units' which are based around
stretches of language with some syntactic integrity, e.g. clauses,
noun phrases, words, etc. These units define 'transition relevance
places'; these are points in the discourse at which a possible
turn-construction unit ends and towards which, by virtue of their
structural 'projectability', speakers can orient themselves and time
their entrances accordingly.
This is necessary because speakers appear overwhelmingly to
make their entrances into, and exits from, conversations with very
little 'overlap' of turns; attempts by more than one speaker to hold
the floor simultaneously are comparatively rare. When two or more
speakers do happen to attempt turns simultaneously the usual result
is that all but one speaker will generally stop speaking, thereby
preserving the principle that only one speaker will speak at a time.
In order for speakers to effect their entrances and exits so cleanly
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some degree of prediction on structural grounds seems inescapable. At
certain points a change of speaker becomes a relevant issue and,
unless special provisions are made within the preceding turn, the
first to speak at these points will usually obtain the right to hold
the floor for the subsequent turn, i.e. at least one
turn-construction unit.
This strong organisational influence has many further effects.
Since speaker transition relevance points will occur, and speakers
can orient towards these points and project their future occurrence,
speakers can also take this into account when constructing turns so
as to organise their interaction more effectively. Indeed, Sacks,
Schegloff, and Jefferson argue that this orientation to speaker turns
is responsible for not only the deployment, but also the development,
of many of the resources that are available for syntactic
organisation. As they write:
"It is expectable, then, that some aspects of the syntax of a
sentence will be best understood by reference to the jobs that
need to be done in a turn-in-a-series, turns being a
fundamental place for the occurrence of sentences." (1974,
P723)
Each turn at talk needs to accomplish some minimal conversational
'work' that makes that turn responsive to its position in some
particular sequence of turns in a conversation.
"Turns display gross organisational features that reflect
their occurrence in a series. They regularly have a three-part
structure: one which addresses the relation of a turn to a
prior, one involved with what is occupying the turn, and one
which addresses the relationship of the turn to a succeeding
one." (ibid., p722)
Part of the motivation for language developing the highly
structurally-cohesive entities typically described by syntax,
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therefore, is that such entities demarcate a recognisable portion of
talk within which the speaker can achieve the minimally necessary
interactional work, interruptions being clear as such due to the
projectability of what is occurring on syntactic grounds; this is
also dealt with by Jefferson (1973). There has not, however, been any
extensive formalisation of just what interactional work is achieved
by the deployment of particular syntactic resources and I will return
to this issue in principle in section 6 and in detail in chapter
four.
The line of investigation principally followed by conversation
analysts concerns the types of communicative acts that turns may
carry considered in terms of their effects upon the sequences of
turns in which they occur. That is, a turn can influence the types of
turn that may follow it by bringing strong constraints to bear on the
interpretations that the context created by the turn may support.
Conversation analysis thus attempts
"... to discover the systematic properties of the sequential
organisation of talk, and the ways in which utterances are
designed to manage such sequences." (Levinson, 1983, p287)
The adjacency pair offers then the simplest example of a
sequential organisation that is regularly employed in conversation.
It consists of two parts, a first pair-part and a second pair-part.
The first pair-part establishes a context of interpretation which
strongly constrains the reading to be given to the turn which
follows. Whatever actual turn follows it will of necessity be
considered in the light of the expectations established by the first
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pair-part. Based upon this creation of expectations across a two part
sequence of turns is the notion of 'conditional relevance': the first
pair-part "provides for the relevance of the occurrence" (Schegloff,
1972, p76) of the second pair-part. If the second pair-part does not
occur, then it is missing, i.e. the expectations established by the
prior turn have not been fulfilled.
While perhaps the most obvious type of sequence conforming to
the adjacency pair organisation is the question-answer pair, a number
of other sequence-types which conform to the basic adjacency pair
pattern have now also been studied. Typically, each type allows for a
distinctive range of first pair-part realisations and appropriate
second pair-part responses. For example, greetings and farewells
yield pairs such as "Hallo - Hallo", "Goodbye - Bye", etc. in which
the selection of some closed set lexical item or phrase of the
appropriate kind calls for and relevances a response drawn from that
same set. Similarly, summons-answer sequences are usually constructed
from an attention seeking first pair-part, such as a name, and a
second pair-part showing that the second speaker is available for
further interaction, e.g. "Yes". In each of these cases the
turn-taking mechanism operates in essentially the same way. A turn is
constructed so as to be a recognisable first pair-part of a given
type of adjacency pair and this then makes relevant and expected the
subsequent occurrence of a turn constructed according to the
specifications appropriate for a second pair-part of that particular
type of adjacency pair.
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It has proved possible to extend the simple adjacency pair
format to cover more complex sequences also. One such extension is
the "insertion sequence' described by Schegloff (1968, 1972), in
which a question-answer pair may have a further question-answer pair
embedded, or inserted, within it; for example:
"A: Are you coming tonight?
B: Can I bring a guest?
A: Sure.
B: I'll be there." (Schegloff, 1972, p78)
or, in theory, even:
"A: Are you coming tonight?
B: Can I bring a quest?
A: Male or female?
B: What difference does that make?
A: A question of balance.
B: Female.
A: Sure.
B: I'll be there." (ibid., p78)
The deployment of the turn-taking resources in these kinds of
contexts enables quite complex sequences of interaction to be
orchestrated by the participants involved and now several 'higher'
level components of conversations have been studied, including, for
example, 'openings' and 'closings'. Conversations will not usually
start with a main topic of discussion but will tend to be opened more
indirectly - first a greeting may be given, followed by polite
inquiries as to the health of the participants, and only then (and
even then not necessarily), these preliminaries being safely
accomplished and the availability of the participants for further
talk ensured, will the conversation proper begin. Similarly a
conversation will tend not to come to an abrupt end but will move
towards a position where all the participants know that the end has
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arrived and a farewell is appropriate and will not be considered rude
or out of place by its recipients. Conversational work has to be
expended both to get a conversation established and to bring it to a
successful, mutually-acceptable conclusion;^ the operation of the
turn-taking mechanism can only be started up and then closed down by
the conversational participants' own efforts.
The necessary bringing into alignment of expectations this
involves has been approached in conversation analytic terms by a
consideration of 'pre-sequence' objects. These are stretches of
interaction which prepare the ground for agreed sequences to follow;
without that agreement having been reached interaction could not be
synchronised as well as natural conversations clearly are. Thus,
prior to the closing segment of a conversation, there may be a
pre-closing segment which gives the participants the opportunity to
postpone the closing segment if they have further topics to discuss.
This will normally take the form of several turns in a sequence which
do not add any substantive content to the topics already under






Ma: Ok:ay.= " (Button and Casey, forthcoming, p28/9)
9. Schegloff and Sacks (1973).
10. This segment of talk again demonstrates the format favoured
for transcripts by conversation analysts. The conventions are as
for figure 1 of the thesis introduction; i.e.: signifies a
lengthened syllable and ' = ' indicates 'latched' utterances, i.e.
utterances from two speakers produced with no gap between them.
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Several other types of pre-sequence have been discussed in the
literature and I will mention some of these again below or in later
chapters; they include pre-invitations, pre-requests,
pre-arrangements, and pre-announcements.
Pre-sequences, and especially pre-requests, form the basis of
an alternative analysis of indirect speech acts which has been
developed by Levinson (1983) as a demonstration of how the
conversation analytic approach can dissolve certain traditionally
problematic issues by offering an arguably more appropriate view of
the functioning of conversation in which the problems simply do not
arise. Indirect speech acts have attracted much attention in the past
because of the difficulty experienced in achieving any principled and
general account of how, for example, 'can you pass the salt?' results
in salt being passed rather than in an answer being given to the
question. In other words, how is it that the apparent 'literal'
illocutionary force of an utterance can apparently have some other
illocutionary effect? Levinson does achieve a general solution to
this problem and, furthermore, he does so without introducing any
special mechanisms additional to those generally already found in
conversation analytic accounts.
Levinson's approach is to show how indirect speech acts can be
seen as initiating four-part sequences which are conventionally
collapsed under particular and quite predictable conditions to three-
or even two-part sequences. The full, unshortened sequence consists
of a pre-request, a go ahead, a request, and a response and are
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exemplified in segments of talk such as:
A: Hi. Do you have uh size C flashlight batteries?
B: Yes sir
A: I'll have four please
B: {turns to get them}
(cited by Levinson, 1983, p357)
Levinson proposes, following a suggestion of Schegloff, that the
absolute sequential location in a sequence of turns should be
distinguished from a functionally motivated characterisation of
sequential location as, for example, a response relative to a
preceding, but not necessarily immediately preceding, initiating
turn. There are clearly good grounds for this", Schegloff's insertion
sequences rely upon the functional position of turns being
identifiable rather than absolute location and conditional relevance
need not then be restricted to immediately sequential terms. Indeed,
for analysis to be possible the function of turns will need to be
sufficiently well signposted to permit their functional
interpretation to take place. Such interpretations will, of course,
be sensitive to their sequential environment but they must,
nevertheless, show themselves to be appropriate candidates for the
functions sequentially relevanced.
In this particular context, this has the consequence that, if a
pre-request signals its function clearly, then the entire pre-request
talk trajectory is projected for the participants and they can
respond to this even before the sequence has been played out. Thus,
if there is the situational motivation, the trajectory could be
altered so that the originally projected sequence does not even
appear. For indirect speech acts, then, a pre-request is given, the
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four-part trajectory is projected, but the addressee then
conventionally has the option of collapsing that trajectory so that
the utterance scheduled for the fourth turn appears at the second.
That is, the sequence on the left becomes the sequence on the right:
A: can you pass the salt? A: can you pass the salt?
B: yes I can
A: please do so
B: {does so} B: {does so}
The motivation for operations such as this is to be found in
the notion of 'preference organisation'. Certain types of interaction
are societally 'preferred' over others and so, if a trajectory is
projected which contains less preferred actions, that trajectory will
be a ready target for alteration. It should be emphasised that
preference organisation has found a wide application and has not been
introduced solely for the benefit of this particular analysis; as
Heritage (forthcoming.a) points out, the function of preference
organisation appears related to the avoidance of threats to 'face':^
any activity which may be classified by a language community as
face-threatening will be dispreferred and hence regularly avoided
when possible and justified when not. Of particular relevance to the
design of sequences which have been classified as exemplifying the
use of indirect speech acts are preference rankings such as the
following: first, it appears that 'refusals' or 'rejections' are
generally dispreferred and so much work will be expended in order to
avoid their occurrence; second, it appears that it is preferred for
someone to offer, rather than to receive a request; and third, a
spontaneous action is to be preferred over a request for that action.
11. See: Goffman (1955, 1967), Brown and Levinson (1978), and Owen
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Furthermore, one can see from ths approach to indirect speech
acts that
"... considerations having to do with the normal design and
trajectory of sequences can be shown to inform the design and
interpretation of conventionalised turns. Moreover the
phenomenon of 'indirect speech acts' can be shown to be
explicable by reference to simple facts of conversational
sequence in place of more tortuous and confusing attempts to
work solely at the level of the syntax and semantics of
sentences." (Heritage, forthcoming.a, p9/10)
As this should also be seen in the light of the commitment to speech
act assignation on sequential grounds illustrated in the
introduction, we can now see that there are in fact many kinds of
discourse level organisation apparent in natural conversation and
that the study of these organisational details in sequential terms
and independently from their particular contents can reveal the
motivations for various aspects of turn and sequence design. Any
attempt to understand conversation and discourse without an account
of these organisational details then ignores much useful information
that is actually available to conversational participants.
Figure 1 below summarises the further discourse level
constructs that have been introduced in this section and extends the
list presented in the introduction. For more detailed introductions
to conversation analysis see: Wootton (1975), Coulthard (1977),
Levinson (1983), and Heritage (forthcoming.a). In addition, although
conversation analysis may be criticised in general concerning the
lack of detail that has been shown with respect to formal linguistic
phenomena, there are discourse conditioned phenomena to which
(1979, 1983).
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conversation analysis has drawn attention and which should,
therefore, also be added to the list I gave above in figure 1 of the
introduction. These include the selection of syntactic resources
specifically for the construction and control of turns, e.g.
syntactic sub-ordination can indicate that a turn is incomplete, or
the use of particular items such as pause fillers for maintaining
rights to a turn", the nonlinguistic synchronisation of gaze and
gestures (cf. Beattie, 1981) and the deployment of intonation for
signaling the end, or otherwise, of turns; and also the selection of
particular features for utterances so that they signal more clearly
the function they are intended to serve, e.g. the selection of modals
and 'please' in the design of pre-requests to function as requests






























Textual layer constructs 2: conversation analytic approaches
Conversation analysts have now, of course, also begun to
investigate longer sequences of turns in attempts to achieve a more
global understanding of the mechanisms responsible for conversation;
for example, Heritage (forthcoming.a) cites a study by Jefferson^
which examines conversations in which the participants are expressing
accounts of 'troubles' or 'anxieties' of concern to them. However,
her analysis clearly resembles the now common use of textual schemata
in discourse analysis and hence would appear to leave itself open to
several of the ehtnomethodologically-based criticisms brought against
discourse analysis on the grounds of its ready reliance upon
'underlying knowledge' and the sharing of concepts. Indeed, the very
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prior delimitation of the domain of inquiry to 'troubles' talk
presupposes a common subject matter in a way not traditionally found
in conversation analytic studies and rests upon one of the more
complex and poorly understood phenomena of both conversation analysis
and discourse analysis, i.e.: 'topic'. In order for Jefferson to
classify sequences of turns as instances of elements of her schema
she must be able to recognise the subject matter, point, or topic of
those sequences - but conversation analysis bases its recognition of
the subject matter of any utterance primarily upon the analyst's
understanding of what is occurring in the conversation.
It should be noted that although there is some very useful work
concerning the establishment and development of topics which will be
discussed in chapter six, in general conversation analysis is no
nearer explicating this problematic issue than is discourse analysis.
It might well be suggested, therefore, that discourse analysis, with
its acceptance of the necessity of a formalisation of semantic
interpretation, could at this stage usefully supplement the
conversation analytic account. Indeed', as Levinson writes:
"The main strength of the DA [discourse analysis] approach is
that it promises to integrate linguistic findings about
intra-sentential organisation with discourse structure; while
the strength of the CA [conversation analysis] position is
that the procedures employed have already proved themselves
capable of yielding by far the most substantial insights that
have yet been gained into the organisation of discourse."
(1983, p287)
Nevertheless, proponents of the two orientations are usually hostile
to the possibility of useful collaboration between them and, in order
to avoid misguided attempts at synthesis, it is necessary to
12. Jefferson (1980).
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understand why this is the case. This will be the task of the next
section.
4. Arguments against synthesis
The essential difficulty that has faced attempts to 'formalise'
the results and methods of conversation analysis is that that very
formalisation has been prone to shift the emphasis of investigation
to coincide with that of discourse analysis because of an
insufficient understanding of the basic tenets of the conversation
analytic view of discourse; that which makes conversation analysis
different, and hence provides for its success, is therefore often
lost. This is not simply due to the difference in attitudes adopted
towards formalisation: discourse analysts 'believing in it' while
conversation analysts, out of some perversity, not. Nevertheless,
several authors have, criticised ethnomethodologists precisely on the
grounds that they avoid formalisation and have suggested that various
'improvements' need to be made to the 'precision' with which
conversation analysis is undertaken. Brown and Yule, for example, go
as far as to suggest that the lack of precision in conversation
analysis makes it "difficult for others to use in any practical way"
(1983, p231) - a view shared by Coulthard (1975), Gumperz (1982,
pi60), and others. Conversation analysis theorists, however, hold
that not only is the formalisation found in discourse analysis
unsuitable for analysing natural conversation, but that it also rests
upon unwarranted theoretical assumptions concerning 'the nature of
communication' and 'intention' and these concepts' relations to
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individual speakers. It is important, therefore, for the conversation
analytic position not to be compromised merely for the want of ready
- and hence ill-considered - formalisation.
In the previous section I introduced a few of the more
established conversation analytic constructs in relatively neutral
terms. Thus, there may have appeared little to argue against a
standard cognitivist appropriation of those constructs along the
lines of the appropriation of systemic grammar that I will describe
below. Such a move would consider the adjacency pair, insertion
sequence, and the rest simply as further structural resources
available to language users for the intentional production and
interpretation of discourse; indeed, the final case of Jefferson's
proposed text schema or text plan for telling 'troubles' could easily
fail to be differentiated from the plan-oriented approaches of
discourse analysis and computational linguistic theories. It is
necessary now, therefore, to concentrate more carefully upon the
differences and distinctiveness of conversation analytic constructs
when compared with those of discourse analysis; it is precisely in
these areas that the battle in any attempt to offer a thoroughly
appropriate formalisation will be won or lost.
I will discuss three principal areas of difference: the
transaction/interaction distinction, the structure/'local management'
distinction, and the lack of fit between form and function which
arises from the different categories of units to which conversation
and discourse analysis appeal.
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The first difference is more often found voiced by those
concerned with discourse analysis; for example, Yule (1981, pl7) and
Brown and Yule (1983, p2). This holds that the discourse analysis
theorist is to be concerned with "primarily transactional language",
i.e. language in which the speaker is chiefly involved in the
"efficient transference of information". In contrast to this, the
'interactional' view, purportedly that of conversation analysts,
focuses more on so-called 'phatic' communication where there is talk
for 'social reasons' rather than for the sake of a message. For Brown
and Yule this seems to arise from an acceptance that Lyons' (1977)
distinction between 'descriptive' and 'social expressive' language^
is parallel to the distinction between transactional and
interactional language. Lyons says as a statement of intent that he
will not be interested primarily in the use of language for
expressing 'feeling, moods, and attitudes' but will concentrate
instead upon "the intentional transmission of factual, or
propositional, information" (1977, p32). This can then also be
accepted as a characterisation of the proper area of concern for
discourse analysis. Thus, conversation analysis and discourse
analysis are considered to be dealing with two very different aspects
of language which need not bear any close relationship to one
another. This offers a warrant for each perspective to dismiss the
results of the other as irrelevant for its own concerns.
13. Or Lyons' (1972) distinction between "communicative
(^intentional)' and "informative (^unintentional)" aspects of
speech.
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The second distinction argues the two orientations to have very
different approaches to linguistic organisation and is more commonly
maintained by conversation analysts although others have expressed
somewhat similar claims.*4 Levinson's statement of it establishes the
issues involved:
"Conversation is not a structural product in the same way that
a sentence is - it is rather the outcome of the interaction of
two or more independent, goal-directed individuals, with often
divergent interests. Moving from the study of sentences to the
study of conversation is like moving from physics to biology:
quite different analytical procedures and methods are
appropriate even though conversations are (in part) composed
of units that have some direct correspondence to sentences."
(1983, p294)
Levinson can therefore argue that discourse analytic approaches
cannot be made compatible with those of conversation analysis because
they accept a structurally-motivated view of discourse which is
entirely inappropriate for natural conversation. Turn-taking, for
example, should be seen as a 'local management system' (ibid., p297)
that operates on a turn-by-turn basis rather than as a pre-given
structuring according to a rule. The selection of the next speaker to
take a turn and initiation of turns are, in every case, achievements
of those concerned and not pre-ordained by a rule.
This is one consequence of the conversation analysts complete
acceptance of the shared basis of talk. An absolute structural
constraint cannot be brought to bear because the flow of the
discourse relies upon the work of more than one participant and so
'deviations' from the expected or predicted course of events can
always be introduced. It takes the agreement of all those involved in
14. E.g. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) and Nunberg (1981).
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a conversation to finalise what is occurring - one speaker on his/her
own can only propose what is to come, not guarantee it. Thus
conversation is always seen as a contingent negotiated achievement of
organisation on the part of those involved. Schegloff explains this
particularly well:
"If certain stable forms appear to emerge or recur in talk,
they should be understood as an orderliness wrested by the
participants from interactional contingency, rather than as
automatic products of standardized plans. Form, one might say,
is also the distillate of action and/in interaction, not only
its blueprint. If that is so, then the description of forms of
behaviour, forms of discourse (such as stories) included, has
to include interaction among their constitutive domains, and
not just as the stage on which scripts within the mind are
played out." (Schegloff, 1982, p89)
This is the sense in which 'interaction' assumes such a central role
in conversation analysis. The development of talk is taken to be so
responsive to the demands of interactional efficacy that any theory
which seeks to evade a thorough incorporation of interaction by, for
example, formulating static pre-existing textual schemata or plans
which are only peripherally concerned with the natural process of
taking part in a conversation and with the give and take this
entails, must be considered seriously deficient.
"[It] seems productive to assume that, given conversation as a
major, if not THE major, location of a language's use, other
aspects of language structure will be designed for
conversational use and, pari passu, for turn-taking
contingencies." (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974, p722)
And so, a theory which places the emphasis on contingency, rather
than upon structural pre-determination, is accepted as essential.
The third and final chief distinction is based upon the origins
of the two approaches; on the one hand, conversation analysis arises
from sociology and so conversation analysts see themselves as
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investigating categories of social actionI discourse analysts, on the
other hand, see their research into the organisation of language in
terms of the structural tradition within linguistics and so create
categories of linguistic form for their theories. The relationship
between these two types of theoretical entity is, however, extremely
problematic.
Gazdar (1981), for example, has argued that pragmatics should
be kept quite distinct from semantics; that is to say that standard
discourse analytic approaches to the functions of language, e.g.
speech act theory, should base their studies solely upon utterances,
i.e. actual situated instances of linguistic behaviour, not upon
sentences, the formally-derived, and hence contextless, products of a
grammar, which are only subsequently assigned a 'meaning' by semantic
interpretation so that they might be fitted into contexts as
appropriate. But then, how is the concept of a grammar to maintain
its utility in the analysis of naturally-occurring talk, i.e. of
utterances? Conversation analysts would suggest that it does not and
so obtain a further motive for avoiding formalisations of grammatical
structure altogether.
Levinson (1981), also in this general vein, argues for the
necessity of dealing with situated utterances, not decontextualised
forms, on the basis that it is not possible to construct a mapping
between form and function. The correlation between illocutionary
force, e.g. promising, warning, or any other category specified by a
theory of speech acts,15 and the possible forms which may carry that
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force has to date resisted formalisation. Levinson supports his claim
that it will not, in fact, prove possible to arrive at a
formalisation on the following grounds.
"If we are to map unit acts onto utterance units, as the
speech act model requires, the utterance units must be
identifiable independently of the functions (the act units)
they perform." (1981, p478)
But, he argues, discourse has no independently characterisable
structure in terms of utterance units,
"the relevant utterance units that can function as
conversational contributions can be just about anything,
including nothing." (ibid., p479)
The attempt to define a function of which both domain and range are
so difficult to characterise is therefore seen as a pointless
exercise doomed to failure.^
Schegloff (1977) takes this claim yet further and concludes
that not even functions as basic as those apparently fossilised in
syntax, e.g. questioning, ordering, and asserting, need, in fact, be
susceptible to statements of their realisations in form: such
functions, he suggests, are simply taken from a different kind of
analysis to which questions of form are not immediately relevant.
Indeed, Schegloff argues that many of the functions of language
discussed in speech act accounts may not even be appropriate objects
of inquiry because they are based upon informal understandings of
15. For examples of speech act taxonomies see: Wilkins (1975),
Searle (1976), Searle and Vanderveken (1984).
16. Levinson also criticises all notions of 'sequencing rules' at
the level of act units (including that of adjacency pairs),
favouring an approach in which rules are replaced by strategies
for dealing effectively with goals and plans. This will be of more
concern in chapter four below.
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talk rather than the results of detailed analyses: "it is misleading
to start to account for such categories of action as "questions",
"promises", etc., as the analytic objects of interest. They are
commonsense, not technical, categories and should be treated
accordingly." (ibid., p82) The technical categories Schegloff finds
more appealing are, naturally, those arising out of conversation
analytic research programmes such as those with which he is
concerned. The justification for this is that the conversation
analysis constructs are held to be demonstrably real for
conversational participants. That is,
"Since it is the parties' understandings of prior turns' talk
that is relevant to their construction of next turns, it is
THEIR understandings that are wanted for analysis. The display
of those understandings in the talk of subsequent turns
affords both a resource for the analysis of prior turns and a
proof procedure for professional analyses of prior turns -
resources intrinsic to the data themselves." (Sacks,
Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974, p729)
And so,
"... for each substantial claim, the methodology employed in
CA requires evidence not only that some aspect of conversation
can be viewed in the way suggested, but that it actually is so
conceived by the participants producing it. That is, what
conversation analysts are trying to model are the procedures
and expectations actually employed by participants in
producing and understanding conversation." (Levinson, 1983,
p318/9)
The fundamental difficulty in matching the social acts revealed
by conversation analysis and the competence-oriented linguistic
'acts' which support them was alluded to in the introduction and can
be illustrated by examples such as the following. First a small
segment of talk is offered:
"B has called to invite C, but has been told that C is going
out to dinner:
B: Yeah. Well get on your clothes and get out and collect
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some of that free food and we'll make it some other
time Judy then.
C: Okay then Jack.
B: Bye bye
C: Bye bye" (Schegloff, 1977, p83)
"Bp: Why don't you come and see me some//times.
Aj: I would like to.
Bg: I would like you to. Lemme // just -
Ag: I don't know just where the-us-this address// is."
(ibid. )
Then Schegloff asks for the grounds by which certain turns can be
classified so as to capture the way the participants obviously
interpret these turns. Thus, in the former segment, although B's
initial utterance is a closing initiation - this is shown by C's
subsequent acceptance of the proposed close and the immediate and
expected move to the closing farewells - there appears little in the
form of that utterance which could be taken as unambiguously
signifying that function.
"While B's utterance has certain imperative aspects in its
language form, those are not the ones that count; his
utterance is a closing initiation; and C's utterance agrees
not to a command to get dressed (nor would she be inconsistent
if she failed to get dressed after the conversation), but to
an invitation to close the conversation." (ibid.
Similarly in the latter segment, B's first utterance, although
syntactically a question, is intended and interpreted as an
invitation which A then accepts; this is clear since A's utterance
cannot be glossed as an 'answer' to some question of B's - it was
designed to serve the particular function of 'invitation acceptance'
in a completely standard and frequently adopted fashion. Furthermore,
A's last utterance, although syntactically an assertion, is instead
intended and interpreted as a question or a 'request for directions'
17. This has also appeared as Schegloff and Sacks (1973, p313).
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- which B subsequently proceeds to give.
Schegloff then concludes that
"no analysis, grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, etc., of these
utterances taken singly and out of sequence, will yield their
import in use, will show what co-participants might make of
them and do about them." (ibid.
It is precisely these utterances* situated occurrence in actual
sequences of utterances that makes their interpretation possible.
Their 'sequential placement'is not, therefore, something which can
be treated as peripheral and interaction once again is pointed to as
being of crucial import. Schegloff continues:
"One consequence of this discussion, to my mind, is that not
only is the path from linguistic questions to interactional
ones not a straight line, but that not much may lie at its
end. For a substantial part of what we might expect to be
available to us as understanding of questions as a category of
action is best and most parsimoniously subsumed under the
category of "adjacency pairs"; much of what is so about
questions is so by virtue of the adjacency pair format. And
what distinguishes "questions" from first pair parts of other
sorts does not seem in any straightforward way to be sought
from linguistic resources." (ibid., p85)
Now, while I find myself largely in agreement with Schegloff
over the correct location for explanatory statements concerning what
constitutes, for example, questions, Schegloff's final statement must
be treated more cautiously. What makes a question a question may well
be its role in an adjacency pair - understood as a 'higher' level
scheme of organisation - after all, this does little more than accept
18. Interestingly, the acceptance of the necessity of dealing with
sequences even in speech act and textual relation accounts has
been argued recently by van Dijk (1980b), Ferrara (1980a, 1980b);
Mann and Thompson's (1983) 'relational propositions' are based
upon an, albeit restricted, acceptance of sequence as a basic
notion; while a very early attempt to treat speech act sequences
is exemplified by Mohan (1969).
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the existence of some kind of level of discourse 'structure', even if
it is at the level of social action. 19 However, if one goes on to
claim that the linguistic form cannot help us with the recognition of
the discourse 'structure' which is being produced then one has surely
strayed into an untenable position. The linguistic form and the
deployment of formal-stratum resources is the only concrete basis a
conversational participant has for his/her interpretive work. While
certain more traditional approaches to the use of language may have
been in error to rule out a pervasive contextual influence at all
levels of interpretation, conversation analysis would be equally
wrong if it were to overlook the effects of linguistic form upon
interpretation.
Clearly, conversation analysis cannot, and does not, place
itself in such a position. Yet the tendency present in Schegloff's
line of argument underlies an almost paradoxical attitude towards the
analysis of linguistic form. Heritage, for example, explains that
conversation analysts consider that discourse participants should be
"viewed as simultaneously engaged in fine-grained real time
co-ordination of speaking turns tracked predominantly in terms
of surface structural features and as acting in terms of
accountable normative expectations bearing on the nature and
design of their turns at talk." (Heritage, forthcoming.a, p6)
And Levinson's re-analysis of indirect speech acts cited above
clearly suggests the need for some tying together of surface features
and utterance function that does not rest solely with the analyst's
19. There is a striking similarity here between both the
ethnomethodologists' and Halliday's (1978) placing of discourse
organisation at the social level of context (as will be described
in chapter two) and Halliday's and Levinson's (1981) criticism of
a 'structural' approach to that level.
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intuitions.
Yet a specification of the surface structural features upon
which participants supposedly rely is strangely absent. One does not
generally find in conversation analytic work any explicit statement
of these features beyond impressionistic appeals to traditional,
folk-grammatical classifications and to loose pre-theoretical
intonation judgements. Conversation analysts argue that formalisation
is premature but does it really follow that all the results obtained
in the studies of syntax and intonation are to be considered
inappropriate or even irrelevant in conversation analytic work? It
would seem beneficial for any research programme such as conversation
analysis, which holds that minimal idealisation of its data is to be
pursued at all costs, to avail itself of methods that can handle the
complexity that this necessarily involves. Without such a move
formalisation, even when warranted, becomes an infinitely harder
task.
I believe that it is both possible and, eventually, unavoidable
that the techniques we now have for analysing the fine details of
form should be integrated with those techniques of conversation
analysis which investigate the fine details of interaction. That is:
it is possible to have a linguistic theory not only which accepts
discourse as a negotiated contingent achievement of meaningful
language-in-context in which sequential placement is a crucial
resource, but which also permits the precise specification of
grammatical, discoursal, prosodic, and contextual details. The
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remainder of this chapter explains how this is to be achieved by,
first, introducing an established linguistic paradigm that does not
necessarily conflict with the tenets of ethnomethodology and, second,
by addressing in turn each of the above distinctions between
conversation analysis and discourse analysis, explaining their basis,
and showing that all three can, in fact, be satisfactorily resolved
within the proposed linguistic perspective.
5. Language as social semiotic - the Hallidayan view of language
There have in fact been many proposals in the history of
linguistics^ akin to the view taken in conversation analysis that
language should be considered a 'social fact', i.e. both "external"
and "constraining".21 However, although there have been very few such
accounts to achieve any degree of explicitness in their treatment of
the fine details of linguistic events, a notable exception to this
rule is provided in the theories of the British linguist J.R. Firth.
Indeed, Firth's complete rejection of the utility for linguistics of
any mind-body duality helps establish the possibility of
incorporating within a detailed linguistic theory an understanding of
'the social' that is far more consonant with the philosophical and
sociological positions discussed above than that possible within much
of present day linguistic research.
Linguistics, for Firth, was to be
20. E.g. Humboldt (1971/1836), Saussure (1959/1915). Also in
psychology: see, e.g., Vygotsky (1962/1934), Rommetveit (1974).
21. Durkheim (1950).
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"... a discipline and technique for the statement of meanings
without reference to such dualisms and dichotomies as word and
idea, overt expressions and covert concepts, language and
thought, subject and object." (Firth, 1957/1951, pl92)
This, of course, is in marked contrast to what has become, for better
or worse, mainstream linguistics - particularly in Chomsky's version
where it has even been argued that part of the value of
transformational generative grammar arises precisely from its
reassertion of tenets central to approaches to language more
immediately related to the philosophy of Descartes (cf. Chomsky,
1966). Whether language is taken to be "the vehicle for the logical
outbursts of the individual soul" (Firth, 1964/1937, pi 13), as
Chomsky and many others have done, or taken to be more "the telephone
network, the nervous system of our society" (Firth, ibid. ), as Firth
suggests, in fact marks exactly the sharp dividing line in approach
that has already been illustrated with respect to cognitivist
discourse analysis and ethnomethodology. The former approach has been
described by Halliday (1978, pl2 and passim), the principal developer
of modern Neo-Firthian linguistic theory, as an intraorganism
approach, reflecting its concern with internal cognitive processes
and knowledge as the foundation of language, and the latter as .an
interorganism approach, in which language is a kind of meaningful
behaviour undertaken by social beings in social contexts.
It should be clear that interorganism approaches have not
received the concentrated attention that has fallen upon
intraorganism, or cognitivist, studies of language in recent years.
The main reason for this one-sideness in linguistic theorising is the
extent to which interorganism linguistics does not admit of ready
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formalisation. Thus, the explicitness of much of Firth's theorising
can still be considered wanting when judged by today's standards of
formal linguistic theory. However, Halliday's (1961) introduction of
'scale and category grammar' improved the formal status of this
branch of linguistics and the gradual development of systemic
grammar, again mostly by Halliday,22 which increasingly brings
'paradigmatic relations' and systems to the fore, provides a formal
framework capable, in principle, of at least beginning to attack many
of the issues Firth raised. This will be very useful because,
although the significance of those issues have been somewhat
displaced by the rise of intraorganism linguistics, the discussion of
the previous section reveals their importance anew.
The current Hallidayan view of the linguistic system can most
easily be interpreted in terms of Firth's well-known 'linguistics is
a prism' metaphor, by which various 'modes of meaning' can be
highlighted for analytic purposes.
"Let us ... apply the term linguistics to those disciplines
and techniques which deal with institutionalized languages or
dialects as such. A statement of the meaning of an isolate of
any of these cannot be achieved at one fell swoop by one
analysis at one level. Having made the first abstraction by
suitably isolating a piece of 'text' or part of the social
process of speaking for a listener or of writing for a reader,
the suggested procedure for dealing with meaning is its
dispersion into modes, rather like the dispersion of light of
mixed wave-lengths into a spectrum." (Firth, 1957/1951,
pi91/2)
Thus, any instance of language use is assumed to be a complex
integrated pattern of behaviour to which various specialised
22. See, for example, Halliday (1963, 1970, 1976). For an
introduction to the systemic approach and some examples of its use
see: Berry (1975, 1977), Hudson (1971, 1974, 1976).
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techniques of analysis may be applied. The result of applying these
techniques is a hierarchy of statements of meaning where each
language form or element is related to some appropriate context.23
Formally, each technique of analysis offers a possible context from
which to consider language forms or elements. Each such context is
then taken to be a component function of the total meaning that an
instance of language use entails.
The need to make these types of general statements of meaning
more precise subsequently gave rise to theoretical frameworks such as
Halliday's. However, it is only with Halliday (1978) and the papers
collected there that the "full spectrum" of possible "modes of
meaning" in language raised by Firth are considered in explicit
relation to one another. Therefore, I shall adopt, as an initial
'approximation', Halliday's view of the linguistic system in order to
locate the various linguistic levels and phenomena I examine below
and the relationships found to hold between them. It should be noted
that the remainder of this section will only describe in the most
general terms the view of the linguistic system that Halliday
provides - it will be the task of section 3 of the next chapter to
make that view more concrete by describing the actual mechanisms
employed within one implemented systemic account.
23. The importance of the notion of 'context' for Firth goes back
to the work of Malinowski (e.g. 1923) and Gardiner (1932) and is a
central construct in all theoretical positions descended from
Firth's as well as in his own.
24. E.g.: Yachek (1966), Danes (1970), Klein and von Stechow
(1973), Sgall, Hajicova, and Benesova (1973), and Firbas (1974).
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In the development of Halliday's theory the influence of the
Prague School^ and Buhler (1934) results in a certain
rationalisation of Firth's original conception of the linguistic
system as being composed of five principle component functions or
modes of meaning: the phonetic, the lexical, the morphological, the
syntactical, and the semantic, Although Firth's lower levels remain -
the phonetic level serves as a phonological stratum of the linguistic
system, while the lexical, morphological, and syntactical levels are
usually combined to form a 'lexicogrammatical' stratum - the semantic
level as Firth construed it is pushed higher in the organisation of
the system to become a level of situation-types or social contexts.
For Halliday, the effects of situation and context are mediated by a
semantic stratum. This is to simplify the statement of relations
between language and context by imposing a functional organisation
upon the linguistic system as a whole.
The semantic stratum represents the potential for meaning that
a speaker has and consists of three functional components, each of
which handles a generalised, or 'meta'-function, of language.
Halliday introduces these generalised functions, termed the
ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions, as follows.
"The ideational function represents the speaker's meaning
potential as an observer. It is the content function of
language, language as 'about something'... The interpersonal
component represents the speaker's meaning potential as an
intruder. It is the participatory function of language,
language as doing something... The textual component
represents the speaker's text-forming potential; it is what
makes language relevant. This is the component which provides
the texture; that which makes the difference between language
that is suspended in vacuo and language that is operational in
a context of situation." (Halliday, 1978, pll2/3)
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These functions are generalised, or 'meta-', in the sense that any
instance of language use is assumed necessarily to be already
fulfilling all of these functions in some particular way simply by
virtue of the fact that it is an example of language in use.
"Whatever we are using language for, we need to make some
reference to the categories of our experience; we need to take
on some role in the interpersonal situation", and we need to
embody these in the form of text." (Halliday, 1974, p49)
A use of language commits the language user to fulfilling .these
functions and the semantic stratum captures the range of potential
available to the speaker in this regard.25
The basic shape of the linguistic system as articulated by both
Firth and Haliday consists, then, of a hierarchy of levels which,
when taken together, constitute the possible meanings of instances of
language use; each level has a contribution to make. The 'higher'
levels relate to the social and cultural contexts in which language
is used, and are considered to be as much a part of the total
statement of meaning as the more traditional levels. This view of the
linguistic system is summarised in figure 2. Reading across this
diagram gives the levels, or 'strata', corresponding to Firth's
"modes of meaning". The lexicogrammar-semantics-context tripartition
may be seen as being loosely analogous to the traditional linguistic
division into syntax, semantics, and pragmatics although there are,
in fact, significant differences between them. In this system, the
25. In the Hallidayn view this is the way in which language is
allowed to 'transcend' individual particular situations and to
provide a generalised mode of expression or communication by which
any particular context can be addressed: "The input to the
semantic networks is sociological and specific; their output is
linguistic and general." (Halliday, 1973, p80) This will be
elaborated upon considerably below.
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strata are bound together by a relationship of 'realisation'. This is
intended to provide the mechanism by which it can be guaranteed that
the fragmentation of the complex integrated behaviour that is
linguistic activity into 'statements of meaning' at each of the
available strata is not destructive for the phenomenon as a whole.
That is, in addition to being able to take the use of language apart,
it is also possible to see how the isolated components relate so that
the reconstruction of the whole can be understood. The realisation
relationship thus entails that each possible selection from the
potentially available resources at any stratum has consequences for
those which are subsequently possible within the other strata. Strata
are considered, therefore, to be essentially linked in that there is
no support offered for a 'modular' interpretation of the actual
process of linguistic activity whereby selections might first be made
at one stratum in order to produce a result that is to be input to




SITUATION TYPES or SOCIAL CONTEXTS can do
I
SEMANTICS
(ideational interpersonal textual) can mean
LEXICOGRAMMAR can say
PHONOLOGY can 'sound'
Figure 2: The linguistic system according to Halliday (1978)
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Furthermore, although the notion of realisation is based upon
Lamb's (1971) cognitivist stratificational grammar, a fundamental
difference is preserved by the socio-functioncil organisation provided
by Halliday's semantic stratum and the acceptance of a stratum of
social context. Each stratum must be considered a statement of the
interorganism behaviour potential which realises the level above and
is realised in the level below. Any actual instance of language use
presupposes some selection of available potential, or actualisation,
at each level but that potential is always to be construed as being
socially-motivated.
To recap, then, this view of the linguistic system considers
there to be a hierarchy of strata related by realisation. The most
abstract is that which is to capture the possible ways of acting that
are available for participants in particular contexts or situation
types; a full statement of the resources of this level is clearly a
significant problem of sociology also. At a less abstract level is
the semantic stratum. This is to capture the available range of
meanings that a language provides for its users. Less abstract still
is the fomtal stratum within whcih the possibilities of form provided
by the language are represented. This stratum has traditionally
included both lexical and syntactic form information and so is often
referred to as the lexicogrammatical stratum. However, there is now
increasing acceptance of a level of intonational form also (cf.:
Brazil (1981, pl49) and Brown, Currie, and Kenworthy (1980)), and so
the formal stratum might well be taken to include at least three
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components at a similar level of abstraction, i.e. lexis, grammar,
and intonation.26 And finally, most concrete of all is the stratum of
phonology and its realisation in phonetic substance.
The realisation relationship which binds these strata into a
hierarchy then enforces an 'encoding' relationship between them. Each
stratum encodes distinctions at the stratum above and is encoded in
distinctions at the stratum below. Significantly however, that
encoding is made with respect to the total resources available within
any particular stratum - it is not, in general, possible to take a
simple distinction within one stratum and map it on to a single
correspondingly simple distinction within another. The anchoring of
the realisation chain among social situations then captures the idea
of language as a symbolic system that 'encodes' social realities; it
is in this sense that Halliday (1978) refers to language as a 'social
semiotic'.
However, it has not been necessary, with the extent to which
this framework has been used to' date, to make its interorganism
aspect so prominent. Most of the actual linguistic description
attempted within it has remained at the level of the nominal group,
clause, tone group, or sentence. Almost exclusively, it is only in
work which has not been primarily concerned with linguistic
description that wider issues have come to be addressed and, in such
work,any explicit commitment to an interorganismic orientation is
conspicuously absent. The reasons for this are: first, when
26. Four, if a separate morphological component is also required.
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attempting to formulate a linguistic description of clausal phenomena
it seems possible largely to forget the interorganism nature of the
linguistic system and concentrate, for example, on single sentences
produced by single speakers;28 ancj second, the nonlinguistically
motivated developments have all been made within a paradigm which is
already fundamentally intraorganismic in orientation. Thus, even
though Halliday's approach is avowedly interorganismic, which is what
allows him to make contact so readily with the social situations of
speaking and to avoid questions of psychology and mentalism, the
formulation of actual systemic grammars has not significantly
reflected interorganism concerns.
This easily obscures the essential distinction between a
Chomskyan conception of competence and the Hallidayan conception of
potential. The former, in good Cartesian tradition, denotes the
abstract 'knowledge' a speaker is presumed to need in order to use
language correctly; the latter, however, denotes no such
speaker-bound entity. In this respect, the form of words 'that which
a speaker can do, mean, or sa^' in the above diagram of the
linguistic system may be misleading in that it is open to an
interpretation in which the individual speaker 'represents' his/her
27. Cf. Winograd (1972), Davey (1975), Matthiessen (1981), Mann
(1981); Fawcett (1980) is an exception, however, although much
influenced by the former of these approaches he can still be said
to be aiming at linguistic description - albeit explicitly
cognitivist in orientation.
28. Cf. also Nunberg (1981, p214): "I think the implicit
assumption has always been that competence comes out empirically
the same as langue under a sufficiently severe idealization; ...
[this] assumption is right for syntax and phonology, and wrong for
semantics."
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possibilities for doing, meaning, or saying and then makes selections
from these accordingly. Under such an interpretation the distinction
between competence and potential has well-nigh disappeared and an
intraorganism appropriation of the systemic approach appears
justified. The linguistic potential of a speaker should be seen,
instead, as the potential for behaving linguistically that
generalised socially significant situation-types offer to the
speakers and hearers who participate. Linguistic potential is,
therefore, not speaker-bound, but situation-bound, and this becomes
progressively clearer as we move further beyond the domain of the
analysis of the clause.
Although not usually explicitly considered quite in this way,
the organisation of the systemic linguistic system clearly reflects
this situationally-bound aspect; lower levels realise higher levels
and the highest levels of all are those of contexts and
situation-types. Thus, we find that
'The linguistic system ... is organised in such a way that the
social context is predictive of the text. That is what makes
it possible for a member to make the necessary predictions
about the meanings that are being exchanged in any situation
which he encounters... If we did not do this, there would be
no communication, since only a part of the meanings we have to
understand are explicitly realised in the wordings. The rest
are unrealised; they are left out - or rather (a more
satisfactory metaphor) they are out of focus. We succeed in
the exchange of meanings because we have access to the
semiotic structure from other sources." (Halliday, 1978, pl89)
It is important to note that this in no way denies the
creativity of the individual language user. The situation is not an
autonomous construct which deals the participants in the situation
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their allotted roles and scripts which they must then follow
automata-like. What the situation achieves is an organisation of the
resources provided by the linguistic system according to what is
relevant for that situation. Under this view, the linguistic system
does not lie dormant, all resources equally available, waiting to be
called into action; the establishment of situations and a
relevance-relative structuring of linguistic potential are taken to
be inseparable, mutually-conditioning processes. One cannot be said
to lead the other. The essential context-dependence this creates can
be seen to be of particular relevance to the discussion of the
previous section and in the next section's synthesis of the
Hallidayan paradigm and the conversation analytic viewpoint.
This relationship of mutual constraint is captured
linguistically by the bidirectionality of realisation. Just as the
situation constrains the linguistic potential that is actually
available, equally the selection of linguistic possibilities creates
the particular situation that is in force; speakers and hearers, by
their actualisation of potential", bring intersubjective situations
into being.29 The situation is merely a particular way of looking at
one aspect of the behaviour that is occurring and does not seek to
devalue the contribution made by the participants who support it. In
fact, it can be argued that this view, by virtue of its recognition
of the situation-shaping function of language, values the creative
use of language far more highly than do approaches in which language
is simply a code for some level where the 'real' work is done. Here,
linguistic distinctions are considered meaningful in that they, via
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realisation, actualise social situation-types and, in so doing,
provide the means for maintaining intersubjective existence.
Linguistic creativity is thus not reduced to the production of an
infinite set of strings, nor to the generation of certain
'appropriate' structural configurations; instead it remains an
expression of the individuality of essentially social beings.
The strata of potential, both linguistic and social, that
constitute the 'linguistic' system are, then, an attempt to formalise
the resources by which creativity manifests itself in language.
Potential is represented by systems of choice which have as entry
conditions the output of logically prior systems of choice and which,
in turn, lead on to logically dependent systems of choice. Choice, or
the paradigmatic relationship, is therefore focused upon as the
fundamental principle around which language is organised^® although,
of course, this is an abstract conception of choice which does not
denote intentional selection by an individual. Structure, or the
syntagmatic relationship, is the consequence of actualisation: i.e.
when some choice within a system of choices is selected, that choice
may be realised in structure. In general, structure provides the
means by which disparate meaningful choices can be superimposed upon
29. Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz (1976), for example, is an
interesting study, from this perspective, of language used in
children's games, in which the language is defining the context
and not passively taking part within it.
30. This contrasts with Firth, for he placed more equal emphasis
on the syntagmatic and paradigmatic aspects of language. Halliday
considers systems of choice more able to capture the essential
notion of language as a resource than can a language as structure
conception: "In the microsemiotic encounters of daily life, we
find people making creative use of their resources of meaning...
(1978, pl92) See Berry (1982) for a criticism of this position.
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one another and yet remain accessible.
"
[The linguistic system] embodies all ... types of meaning in
simultaneous networks of options, from each of which derive
structures that are mapped onto one another in the course of
their lexicogrammatical realisation. The lexicogrammar acts as
the integrative system, taking configurations from all the
components of the semantics and combining them to form
multilayered, 'polyphonic' structural compositions."
(Halliday, 1978, pl34)
This offers a more general conception of structure than that
more usually found in linguistics. For example, with the present
organisation of the semantic stratum, a single clause has three
'layers' of structure, each with its own distinct structural
decomposition, corresponding to the consequences of the actualisation
of potential provided by the three semantic metafunctions.
The discussion Halliday (1978) presents, however, is often as
programmatic as amy offered by Firth and so, unfortunately, does not
provide the degree of formalisation required of an explicit
linguistic theory, even though the conception of language it
articulates is significantly more developed than that of Firth. For
the theoretical framework to be a theoretical framework, rather than
merely a collection of impressionistic suggestions, it must be
possible to relate it to the areas of data it is intended to cover in
a precise and replicable manner. Halliday (1978) does not provide a
theoretical framework, then, so much as a metatheoretical orientation
towards articulating such frameworks. The task a theoretical
framework must undertake is to direct the analytic cutting edge of
meaning and so, with an insufficiently well articulated framework,
that task is impossible and the analysis must falter. It will be the
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concern of the next chapter, therefore, to begin to specify how
Halliday's interorganismic conception of language might be
sufficiently formalised so as to permit a linguistically useful and
nonarbitrary application of the theory to live data and, in
particular, to conversation. But to conclude this chapter, I will now
draw upon my description of the principles underlying the Hallidayan
paradigm to explain how those of conversation analysis may be
profitably and appropriately assimilated, thereby clearing the way
for more adequate linguistic accounts of the interactions between the
fine details of linguistic form in syntax and intonation and
conversational organisation.
6. A synthesis achieved
Although the main thrust of this section will be to argue that
a framework for the appropriate formalisation of the insights that
conversation analysis has achieved already exists in the form of
Hallidayan systemic grammar, it should be clear that the particular
slant given to the subsequent development of the framework can
radically alter its applicability to conversation analysis. Those
developments which do not emphasise the interorganism aspect of
Halliday's work - and of these there are many - are not at all
suitable for conversation analytic work because they have themselves
been assimilated in all but name by the discourse analysis approach.
Indeed, I believe that an explicit adoption of the crucial tenets of
conversation analysis offers a much needed direction and purpose to
the further development of the Hallidayan paradigm as outlined in
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Halliday (1978). That paradigm itself does not offer sufficiently
explicit guidelines for work rigorous enough to be called linguistic
analysis to follow from it straightforwardly; I hope, therefore, that
the remainder of this thesis and the augmentation of the Hallidayan
paradigm that it proposes will go some way towards suggesting a
beneficial and appropriate direction in which to proceed.
Following upon my discussion in section 4 of the three
important distinctions that have been drawn between conversation and
discourse analysis, I will now show how a re-appraisal in terms of
the perspective granted by the Hallidayan paradigm alters their
significance greatly. Rather than supporting a fundamental divide in
approach, they will instead form the basis of the Hallidayan
discourse/conversation analytic synthesis I propose.
The first distinction is easily resolved for it rests upon two
principal misunderstandings. First, there has been a distinct meaning
change and, indeed, curtailment of meaning in the term 'interaction'
if, as Brown and Yule propose, Lyons' definitions are accepted and
methods of sequential interaction and purpose are reduced to the
indication of 'feelings, moods, and attitudes'. And second, the
suggestion that in language one can have either more or less of the
transactional aspect or the interactional aspect depending on use is
quite insupportable. This can be seen as follows.
Brown and Yule (1983, pi) have drawn a general correspondence
between the 'transaction'/'interaction' distinction and Halliday's
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ideational/interpersonal metafunction distinction. But, although this
does capture some aspects of the relation between the transaction and
interaction aspects of language more appropriately, one of those
aspects is precisely the fact that the Hallidayan conception of
linguistic metafunction posits generalised functions that language in
use must perform simply in virtue of its being language; these
functions are always present, not here in one situation and gone in
another. An attempt to study, for example, clauses in which only the
ideational layer of structure is filled does not define some subset
of possible clauses as subject matter; it defines an ill-specified
collection of poorly ordered structural elements from which the
construction of anything resembling a clause is most problematic:
every instance of language requires specification at each
metafunctional layer.
Similarly interactional and transactional aspects of language
should be seen as necessarily present features that inform the design
of all discourse contributions. To attempt to deal with one aspect
without the other is to guarantee an'inaccurate picture. Conversation
analysis has shown that many interactional issues are just as
"speaker-planned" and "hearer-responsive" as transactional ones and
so must be treated accordingly. Brown and Yule's parallels between
'interactional' and Lyons' (1977) 'socio-expressive' must be seen,
then, as quite ill-founded. Indeed, it is somewhat curious to have
this support for a restriction of attention to transactional language
coming from Brown and Yule who also offer strong criticism of text
grammarians dealing solely with content, i.e. ideational,
- 103 -
transactional details of language. The discoursal level I will
propose below will require transactional and 'interactional' issues
to be considered far more equally; that is, even though transaction
and interaction may be two distinct 'dimensions' of linguistic
organisation, accounts of discourse should nevertheless embrace them
both.
The second distinction is of greater import - particularly
because it forces attention to be paid to certain aspects of the
theoretical position of systemic grammar that are more usually
ignored. As I mentioned in the previous section, this has largely
been due to a restriction of attention to the lexicogrammar; and so,
with the consideration of discourse, it is entirely appropriate for
these issues to be raised in more depth. In short, while I think it
is quite acceptable that conversation should not be considered a
'structural product' in the way that a sentence commonly is, I also
think that the presupposition that this entails concerning sentences
deserves more attention. In fact, rather than attempting a surely
ill-fated argument that discourse sliould be more like sentences, it
seems that quite the reverse may be supportable, i.e. that sentences
are more like discourse.
It is clear that I should be more specific about how I am using
'sentence' here because what is actually meant is more reminiscent of
'utterance' than it is of sentence when understood as a structural
entity produced by a sentence grammar; the full significance of this
will become clear with the discussion of the third distinction below.
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Once the idea is accepted that language is through and through a
social fact it presents a more harmonious picture of the linguistic
system if the sharp divergence between structurally-built,
individually-oriented grammatical entities and
interpersonally-achieved conversational organisation were to be
brought under tighter theoretical constraint. Accommodating this
position establishes certain requirements for the 'syntactic*
theories that are appropriate. Indeed, whereas the more widely
accepted accounts of syntax can readily be seen not to be appropriate
- this is, after all, the origin of the structure/local management
split - Hallidayan systemic grammar can be shown to meet these
requirements and so can offer an appropriate theoretical framework.
This may be seen in the following. As has been explained, the
primary distinguishing feature of the Hallidayan view of language is
expressed in Halliday's description of the possible perspectives that
the linguist can take towards language. As long as the perspective of
a systemic approach remains interorganismic rather than
intraorganismic, the distinction between grammar and discourse can be
profitably based in the relative 'density' of structural predictions
at the two levels and not in a fundamental divergence of nature; this
will be argued below towards the end of section 1 of chapter two.
When the emphasis of linguistic description is moved towards the
situation rather than the individual, and "what is grammatical is
defined as what is acceptable" (Halliday, 1978, p52), there is
nowhere to base a principled distinction between the mechanisms
involved in generating discourse and generating 'sentences'. Both are
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'structural', in the systemic sense; both are 'locally managed", i.e.
the possible subsequent paths through the networks of potential can
only be defined with respect to where in the network one is situated
and the constraints that are in force from choices already made.
This position has a strong influence on how the third
distinction is to be approached, that is, on how the radical mismatch
between form and function is to be understood. Each seems wildly
unconstrained by the other: an interrogative form can answer a
question as well as it can ask one, a declarative form can ask a
question as well as it can answer one, and so on. Furthermore, as
Gazdar, Levinson, and Schegloff have shown, the correlation between
speech acts construed more generally - promising, warning, etc. - and
the possible forms for achieving such acts is, if possible, even less
constrained. It has to be accepted that there is not going to be a
specifiable mapping from sentence forms to discourse functions. There
instead needs to be scxne means of taking situated utterances, not
decontextualised system-sentences, as the starting point. It is worth
re-emphasising here, therefore, that the final goal of a Hallidayan
account, following from Firth's prism metaphor, is precisely to
permit the description of situated utterances at various levels of
abstraction: the notion of a sentence without a context, strictly
speaking, is not a coherent one within the Hallidayan paradigm. In a
very real and important sense, the utterances in context that form
the subject matter of Hallidayan linguistics already have their
function, it does not have to be 'assigned'.
- 106 -
This stands in stark contrast to any standard cognitivist view
of grammar in the following sense. Rules such as transformational
rules in a transformational grammar, for example, posit an
entity-out-of-context to which they may apply. That entity is first
created in some independent way, e.g. by a phrase structure grammar,
and the rules then transform that entity-out-of-context so as to
appear as would an appropriately contextualised entity. Thus
[Johnj thought [Johnj had cut Johnj]]
becomes
John thought that he had cut himself
together with a collection of semantic interpretations, possible
pragmatic consequences, and so on. The Hallidayan approach must claim
that the entity-out-of-context is an unnecessary construct. By the
correct contextualisation of resources only contextualised entities
are permitted to appear. To posit entities-out-of-context
necessitates the theoretical duplication of contextualisation every
time generation is to proceed.
Even though the situating 'of a sentence within a context is
accepted as necessary within standard cognitivist accounts, that
situating is typically seen as proceding via the contextless product
of a formally independent set of syntactic rules. The contrast to be
drawn between this and the Hallidayan systemic view is that the
theoretical mechanism of situating must operate prior to any
grammatical product being achieved. Contextualisation, therefore,
never proceeds via uninterpreted products of the grammar since no
such entities are created. A good expression of this notion in
- 107 -
conversation analytic terms is provided by Schegloff thus:
"The point here is that taking sentences in isolation is not
just a matter of taking such sentences that might appear in a
context out of the context; but that the very composition,
construction, assemblage of the sentences is predicated by
their speakers on the place in which it is being produced, and
it is through that that a sentence is context-bound, rather
than possibly independent sentences being different intact
objects in or out of context. The latter is what artificial
languages, such as mathematics, are designed to achieve. To
treat natural languages in that way is to treat them as having
the very properties whose absence has motivated the search for
formal artificial languages. But it is also to continue to
disattend, and indeed to deprecate, the very features that
make language, and in particular its everyday interactional
use, the powerful natural object that it is." (Schegloff,
1977, plOl)
As Chomsky's view of transformational grammar as an explanation
of linguistic creativity makes quite clear, the very point of
transformational rules is to achieve this contextualisation of
decontextualised entities. As he writes, for Descartes, the notion of
creativity was crucial:
"The essential difference between man and animal is exhibited
most clearly by human language, in particular, by main's
ability to form new statements which express new thoughts and
which are appropriate to new situations." (Chomsky, 1966, p3)
Descartes therefore accepted that an additional 'creative'-principle
was required to explain such a phenomenon; any purely mechanical
explanation was clearly inadequate when confronted with "the novelty,
coherence, and relevance of normal speech." (ibid., p7) But in
Chomsky's hands this becomes 'rule-governed creativity' and the task,
naturally, is to specify the rules. Chomsky can then claim that
transformational rules are the rules of creativity because (i) they
contextualise decontextualised entities, and (ii) creativity, as the
ability to provide "the appropriate response in any new context"
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(ibid., p5), is a problem of contextualisation. Combined with the
Cartesian emphasis on the study of 'mind', these rules of creativity
become conflated with the rules of thought, i.e. the very structure
of intentionality sought by transcendental phenomenologists or the
earlier Dennett. Transformational grammar is then a competence
grammar, concerned with the decontextualised language faculty as
such.
Halliday's position on this is quite clear:
"It is certainly true that for a speaker and a hearer to
interact linguistically they must have this knowledge [of the
functions of language]; but we only know that they have this
knowledge because we see them interact. If therefore it is
possible to describe the interaction ... as the actualization
of a system of potentials, then it becomes unnecessary to
introduce another level, that of knowledge." (Halliday, 1978,
p51)
Systemic grammar is essentially performance oriented, it is concerned
with the situated use of language. This means that one should not be
seeking a mapping from surface forms at the three levels of formal
potential to their function; the development of form and the
development of context must be seen as occurring in parallel, each
within the bounds of possibility specified at its own level of
potential. Thus, the thorough integration of 'levels of linguistic
and nonlinguistic knowledge' currently being attempted in practical
language-using computer systems is seen within a Hallidayan context
to be part and parcel of the theory itself. The modularity of the
distinct levels of potential is defined, via realisation, so as to
avoid the generation of any product which requires subsequent
interpretation.
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And so, since conversation analytic research has shown both
that there is very fine, detailed monitoring of discourse
contributions and that contributions are extremely well designed for
the particular tasks utterances are to achieve,31 it is reasonable to
claim that it would be inconceivable for there not to be a very rich
interaction between the forms selected and the functions these forms
achieve. However, in a Hallidayan framework, this problem of relating
form and function is recast; whereas the problematic 'mapping' that
has traditionally been sought is not required, some means of
'synchronising' the actualising of potential within levels and strata
so that the whole activity may cohere meaningfully clearly is
required. But, as sketched out very briefly in section 5 and as will
become clearer in the next chapter, this is precisely what the
Hallidayan conception of 'realisation' between strata is intended to
achieve. Now, therefore, this mechanism may also suggest a
particularly apt means of capturing the elusive relation between form
and function. Furthermore, it does so in a way which maintains the
interpersonal orientation as opposed to, in all likelihood
prematurely, hypothesising speakers' knowledge and intentions.
It should now be clear, then, that an adoption of the
Hallidayan paradigm leaves no great obstacles in the path of an
integration of detailed interaction-oriented work and the fine
specification of linguistic form. Schegloff's claim that there is no
useful path from linguistic resources to interactional ones is
31. A conclusion also reached in the work of Gumperz, particularly
in his development of the notion of 'contextualisation cues' (cf.
Gumperz, 1982, p!62).
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accepted, in as much as the theory no longer seeks a function from
one to the other, but its significance is now more tightly
constrained. The widespread ethnomethodological belief in the
fundamental incompatibility of conversation analysis and structural
linguistic analysis, which makes it difficult to talk of 'formal
manifestations' of context as I will wish to below, can be traced
directly to the incompatibility of the inter- and intra-organismic
perspectives on language. But of course, this incompatibility only
lasts as long as the unnecessary 'transactional' commitment in
structural linguistics is maintained. To regard 'discourse
strategies' as the speaker's resources for intentionally transferring
propositional information, as is prevalent in intra-organismic
linguistics, does indeed create this gulf between linguistic
resources (form) and categories of theories of social action
(function), such as adjacency pairs. In the Hallidayan
inter-organismic approach, however, linguistic resources are
thernselves resources for social action of a particular kind and so no
incompatibility can arise. The development of a Hallidayan
interpretation of conversation ' analytic results is therefore
established as a clear research priority.
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Chapter Two
Towards a Hallidayan systemic view of conversation
1. The status of discourse in prior systemic frameworks
It has long been realised that the study of discourse, that is,
the study of stretches of naturally occurring linguistic behaviour
which have been arbitrarily restricted in neither scope nor level of
idealisation, must form an essential part of the process of coming to
understand language. Furthermore, the Firthian and Neo-Firthian
linguistic traditions in particular have always accepted this
premise. Firth, for example, writes
"Neither linguists nor psychologists have begun the study of
conversation; but it is here we shall find the key to a better
understanding of what language really is and how it works."
(Firth, 1957/1935, p32)
For linguistics to concern itself with phenomena that were,
until recently, stigmatised by the label 'linguistic performance' is
now again respectable and forms the basis of much current research
within both socio- and psycholinguistics as well as within
linguistics itself. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter,
the areas of research claimed to be of most immediate relevance to
this thesis are those in which a predominantly 'sociological'
approach has been adopted; this may be taken to be because the
essentially interorganism nature of language reasserts itself most
strikingly when we come to examine discourse.
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In the more constrained linguistic domains that have been
studied in depth hitherto, i.e. lexicogrammar and intonation,
linguistic analysis has, for the most part, made progress without a
firm theoretical statement on the interorganism aspects and functions
of language being made. I do not think that this establishes the
desirability of such a situation; indeed, it has been my contention
that the widening of linguistic perspectives which is entailed by the
consideration of discourse necessitates a general approach which is
both fundamentally and explicitly intersubjective in nature. Of
course, even though discourse is commonly supported by a number of
participants in the speech situation, it remains a theoretical
possibility that an idealisation be made entirely analogous to that
which is performed within syntax, in which the basic type or mode of
discourse would be taken to be monologue, all other types being
variants or developments of this. For the "language is logical
outbursts of the individual soul"-theorist this must, presumably, be
a coherent position to take; however, I will not discuss such
positions further here.^
That there is a patterning of discourse seems reasonably
uncontroversial; but, what its status might be and where theoretical
statements concerning it are to be placed remains problematic. Within
1. Evidence for the primacy of multi-person, face-to-face
discourse is now widespread. In a historical context see, for
example: Sankoff and Brown (1976), Givon (1979a, 1979b), Wald
(1979), etc.; in a developmental context: Keenan and Schieffelin
(1976), Scollon (1976, 1979); and synchronically: Hopper and
Thompson (1980), many of the ethnomethodological studies quoted
throughout this thesis and chapters four and five.
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a linguistic framework such as the one I have introduced three
options for treating discourse present themselves. First, it might be
suggested that discourse patterns were describable within an already
existing functional component. For example, the lexicogrammar might
be extended; this is the claim of any theory which attempts to push
the upper bounds of statements of grammaticality beyond the sentence
to some higher unit such as the paragraph. This not only states that
there are structural relationships between sentences, but also that
these relationships have the same status as those found to obtain
within sentences. Second, a new functional component within one of
the system's strata might be established; the currently favoured
placing of intonation would exemplify this option. And third, an
entirely new stratum could be added to the model.2 These three
options are ordered in terms of the seriousness of the extensions
they propose for the model as a whole. Option one is the least
serious, while option three amounts to a major theoretical revision.
Halliday's view of discourse patterning, however, places its
significance outside the linguistic system proper. Each actual
instance of language use is said to constitute a 'text' and
necessarily exhibits 'texture'. One factor which contributes to this
is 'generic structure', which is
"... the form that a text has as a property of its genre...
The generic structure is outside the linguistic system', it is
language as the projection of a higher-level semiotic
structure. It is not simply a feature of literary genres',
there is a generic structure in all discourse, including the
most informal conversation ... The concept of generic
structure can be brought within the general framework of the
2. Of course, it remains to be seen whether discourse phenomena
are sufficiently homogeneous to be handled by the selection of
just one of these options. Two, or even all three, might well be
needed as the range of functions that discourse fulfills becomes
clearer.
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concept of register, the semantic patterning that is
characteristically associated with the 'context of situation'
of a text... " (Halliday, 1978, pl34)
This follows a line of development that begins with Firth's
suggestion that descriptive linguistics should concentrate on
'restricted languages' (1968/1956, pp87-95), where language use can
be more explicitly tied to the context in which it occurs, and passes
through certain approaches to 'style', including those of Spencer and
Gregory (1964), Halliday, Mcintosh, and Strevens (1964), Halliday
(1973), and Gregory and Carrol (1978).
The underlying conception here is of uncovering regular
correlations between 'contextual features' and linguistic features
but attempts to articulate contextual features and their consequences
for the selection of linguistic features have remained more
programmatic than actual.^ Halliday (1978), however, is beginning to
move towards a more dynamic view of situation, context, and language^
and this suggests a new approach over the essentially static
formulation of contextual features that still predominates. If
situation and context are interpreted in a manner more consistent
with a process-oriented view, then context of situation may be more
usefully interpreted as a situationally-restricted potential for
meaningful courses of behaviour. Furthermore, by invoking one of the
above three options for extending the linguistic system, it might
then prove possible to bring certain aspects of discourse structure
back within the linguistic system proper, thereby distributing the
explanatory load more evenly. The following discussion offers some
support for this move.
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Since, for Halliday, discourse structure is a consequence of
semantic patterning which is conditioned by situation, under a
process interpretation, the source of the generic structures
associated with particular genres would be the courses of behaviour
made available by situation-types. The clearest examples of this are
cases such as the task-oriented dialogues studied in Grosz (1977a and
elsewhere).5 But, in cases where the behaviour is more essentially
linguistic, it is not obvious that it is the situation-type which
leads in the large-scale structuring of that behaviour. The
situation-type captures the social significance and meaning of the
linguistic behaviour, but does not itself necessarily provide the
ideal locus of explanation for the origin of the form of that
linguistic behaviour. Three brief examples should clarify this.
Jefferson (1972) introduces the notion of the 'side sequence',
a conversation analytic construct akin to those described in the
previous chapter, which she describes as follows:
"In the course of some on-going activity (for example, a game,
a discussion), there are occurrences one might feel are not
"part" of that activity, but which appear to be in some sense
relevant. Such an occurrence constitutes a break in the
activity - specifically, a "break" in contrast to a
3. Well-known examples of the contextual feature approach are
Hymes (1962, 1964) and Lewis (1972); see also Brown and Yule
(1983, pp35-50) for an introduction and Enkvist (1980) for a
literature survey.
4. He suggests, for example, that text should primarily be
considered a 'sociosemiotic process' in which meanings are
exchanged by interaction (1978, pi39).
5. It also shows up very clearly in computational systemic
applications, e.g. Davey (1975) and Mann (1981), where a planning
process typically builds sequences of clauses or sentences before
entering a systemic lexicogrammar.
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"termination"; that is, the on-going activity will resume.
This could be described as a "side sequence within an ongoing
sequence"." (Jefferson, 1972, p294)
That is, within the development of some ongoing situation-type there
may be a break or interruption, where a related 'sub-situation' is
developed for a time, before a return to the former situation. The
range of interruptions available is dependent upon the situation in
which the break is to be embedded; i.e., the content and course of
the break is restricted according to the situation-type and the
semantic patterning that it governs. However, the form of the break
is not so variable. In Jefferson's terms, there is language related
to some ongoing activity, a suspension, and a return. More study
might draw out finer details® which could be said to support a
discourse form available by virtue of the facts that discourse is
occurring and that that form exists as a potential discourse
structure which is relatively independent of particular
situation-types.
Situation-types are commonly interruptable in the way Jefferson
describes and this fact must be included somewhere if a complete
account of the linguistic realisation of situation-types is to be
achieved. But, bearing in mind Halliday's statement concerning the
specific nature of the sociological input to the semantic stratum,
the generality of the phenomenon of side sequences might be construed
as evidence that such behaviour is available to the members of a
6. Cf. Owen's (1981) analysis of "well"; Wells, MacLure, and
Montgomery's (1981) addition of 'returns' to exchange structure;
Reichman's (1981) treatment of interruptions and returns; etc.
Jefferson herself suggests: 'Terms like "Oh, Okay" are so
frequently associated with these side sequences that they might be
included into the sequence as a potential component." (1972, p317)
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culture because it is a fact of the language and not a fact of all
the situations where such behaviour is possible. In other words,
there might be a general discourse structure that is available as a
resource for use in specific situations.
The second and third examples adopt the sociologist's ploy of
considering the familiar in terms of the unfamiliar that we saw at
work in Garfinkel's students' task in chapter one. Grimes (1972)
describes a form of narrative, which he calls 'overlay structure',
that contrasts interestingly with the pattern of organisation found
most commonly in the narratives of western European discourse, which,
for purposes of contrast, Grimes terms 'outline structure'. On the
one hand, outline structures, by and large, describe events in a
simple (for us) temporally- or causally-sequential fashion, adding
detail as necessary to fill in the story; overlay structures, on the
other hand, are formed by repeating established components of the
story and relating them each time to new details in order to bring
out the varieties of relationships that the repeated components bear
to the background of the story as a whole.
"The effect of overlaying can be characterised in a metaphor:
an outline structure puts semantic information into a
perspective in two dimensions by coordinating parallel
elements and subordinating other things to them, whereas
overlay structure adds a third dimension to the other two. The
repeated elements stand out in almost stereoscopic fashion by
virtue of being related to several contexts that are nearly
the same. Outline structures communicate relationships by
dependency; overlay structures use accretion as well."
(Grimes, 1972, p513)
The recounting of narratives is presumably a social event of some
significance and it will, therefore, be a particular type of
situation. If the structural components of the linguistic form
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realising a narrative were found to be significant solely in their
contribution to the fact that narration was occurring, then it would
not be correct to place the structural description at the social
level of situation-types. That is, in this case, an individual
'overlay', or layer in an overlay structure, might well be
significant in that it continues the narration in a felicitous way
without it needing to bear any additional particularly social
significance of its own.
A similar, but more complex, example is provided by the
distinction Becker (1979) shows between 'plot' and 'story' in
Javanese shadow theatre, or 'wayang'.
"The distinction between story and plot is very important in
studying the structure and development of a wayang text. The
plot has been defined as a set of constraints on the selecting
and ordering of episodes or motifs. The story is a prior text,
fictitious or factual or both, which is the source of these
episodes or motifs; it is a prior text to some degree known by
the audience." (Becker, 1979, p226)
The plot is analogous in status to Grimes's overlays; it is possible
to give a detailed structural account of plots in terms of a basic
structure and certain permissible structural rearrangements. These
plot structures are adhered to quite strictly and, although it "is
often very difficult for the viewer, foreign or Javanese, to know
just where he is in the story being presented, ... [one] always
knows, however, where one is in the plot." (ibid., p223/4) Here
again, the variations in structure are exploited by the performer to
serve the needs of the story and have social significance only in so
much as adhering to them constitutes a wayang performance. With a
rearrangement in structure, one does not get a different social
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event.
This appeal to 'exotic' language events serves to reveal, what
Becker terms, 'iconic linguistic facts' which are "assumed by native
speakers to be about the nature of the world, not about the nature of
language." (ibid., p218n) The existence of quite distinct iconicities
in different cultures requires that they be seen as facts of language
and, importantly, this can apply with equal force to our own iconic
linguistic facts. Thus, as Becker notes with respect to Aristotle's
constraints on plots:
"These basic constraints all have to do with unity and
causality, above all with temporal unity and linear causality
- two aspects of the same thing. All of them are rooted in the
simple fact that intersentence coherence in Indo-European
languages is structured primarily by tense. Clarity and
coherence means to speakers of these languages linear
temporal/causal sequencing. Tense is seen as iconic: that is,
past, present, and future are taken as facts about the world,
rather than facts about language. Tense is not iconic in all
language-cultures and hence temporal-causal linearity is not
the major constraint on textual coherence in all languages."
(ibid., p218)
The clear lesson to be drawn from the above examples is that it
would be wise to avoid premature placement of the properties observed
in discourse. If placed at the level of the situation-type, a
structural description constitutes a statement of social structure;
if placed within language, it constitutes a statement of linguistic
structure. It should not be the case that the establishment of
structure of some kind in language necessarily entails, by virtue of
the theory, that that structure should represent a statement of
social structure or meaning.
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Halliday clearly accepts this for lexicogrammatical structure,
but does not appear to consider the possibility of it holding for
discourse structure also. Whether or not some distinct level of
discourse is to be found remains, at this stage, an empirical matter.
A theoretical framework must, therefore, be capable of supporting
statements concerning such a level both should the need arise and,
also, in order to investigate that need most effectively. Halliday's
account as it stands does not admit the possibility of separate
discourse structures and social structures and so will conflate
important distinctions if an independent level of discourse structure
in fact occurs. In addition, since it is already the case, as we saw
in the previous chapter and as I claimed in the introduction, that
there appear to be useful statements of a sequential nature that can
be made independently of content, these may well serve as preliminary
candidates for such a level of discourse; I will address this further
below.
It should be noted, however, that the much maligned and
misinterpreted^ Halliday and Hasan (1976) does suggest the existence
of discourse structure, although it is not clear how it might be
incorporated within the rest of the framework. For example,
"There is no need here to labour the point that the presence
of certain elements, in a certain order, is essential to our
concept of narrative; a narrative has, as a text, a typical
organisation, or one of a number of organisations, and it
acquires texture by virtue of adhering to these forms." (p327)
This suggests that the lack of a well articulated account of the
status and role of discourse in the Hallidayan theory could be more a
7. At least, that is if it is to be made sense of within the
context of Hallidayan linguistics as a whole.
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consequence of insufficient development than of the theoretical
position that is adopted. Such a position is clearly held by Hasan;
for example:
"the assumptions here can be stated as follows: associated
with each genre of text - i.e. type of discourse - is a
generalized structural formula, which permits an array of
actual structures. Each complete text must be a realization of
a structure from such an array." (Hasan, 1977, p229)
However, certain general problems with orientations to the notion of
'discourse structure' such as Hasan's remain; for example, one
immediate problem is in the formalisation. Hasan follows Mitchell's
(1957) Firthian approach which divides speech situations into
'functionally'-labelled components; e.g. the ordered sequence:
Identification Application Offer Confirmation
in the context of applications by prospective patients to arrange
medical appointments (Hasan, 1977, p233). As with Mitchell, there are
no formal grounds available for allocating these functions to actual
utterances and it is unclear in what sense such structures can be
labelled 'textual' as opposed to 'situational'.
A related, and strictly linguistic, theoretical framework which
does include a significantly developed view of discourse patterning
is that of the English Language Research Group at the University of
Birmingham. Their basic position, described in Sinclair and Coulthard
(1975), and Coulthard and Brazil (1979, 1981), is centred around the
concept of the 'exchange' which, they argue, is to be seen as the
discourse unit concerned with the transmission of information. The
original conception of exchange structure was developed in the
analysis of language interaction between teachers and pupils in the
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classroom, and is similar in many respects to the, superficially
simpler, 'adjacency pair', or sequence organisation, used by
ethnomethodologists. Coulthard (1975), in order to justify the
development of the 'exchange structure' account,is one of those to
criticise the ethnomethodologists' restraint concerning formalisation
and cites Labov's point that
"...formalisation is a fruitful procedure even when it is
wrong: it sharpens our questions, and promotes the search for
answers." (Labov, 1972, pl21)
The Birmingham group then attempts to consider discourse analysis in
a more formal light by interpreting Halliday's (1961) early scale and
category grammar as an "explicit, abstract discussion on the nature
of linguistic description" (Coulthard and Brazil, 1981, p86), which
can, therefore, also be adapted for the particular needs of
discourse.
This involves concentrating on conditional relevance, or
'continual classification' as Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) term it,
as the organising principle of discourse patterning. The function of
an utterance in discourse is considered to be just its consequences
for continual classification; this is a quite deliberate restriction
on the meaning of 'function' so as to highlight particular discourse
issues and it is always necessary to remember that in the work of the
Birmingham group 'function' is being used in this way. Burton (1980)
makes this clear:
"The classroom description lists, amongst its 'Acts', an item
labelled 'Aside', where the teacher might mutter to himself
something like: 'Now where did I put the chalk?'... Now
clearly, in some functionalist models it would have a very
definite function - 'phatic' perhaps... Within the working of
the actual conversation, however, it serves no prospective or
retrospective function. That is, it neither sets up an
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expectation for a following utterance, nor fulfills one from a
previous utterance. It is in this sense, then, that it has no
function." (pi20)
The descriptive framework Sinclair and Coulthard develop, being
based on Halliday (1961), remains a neo-Firthian position in that the
functional organisation provided by the semantic stratum of Halliday
(1970 and later) is absent. However, their restricted view of
discourse function, in which continual classification plays the
central role, permits a further level to be interposed between
Firth's semantics and the formal levels of grammar. Their
construction of a discourse component therefore adopts the third,
most serious, possible option for the extension of the linguistic
system I described above; that is, they decide on building a new
level into the descriptive framework. This is analogous to the
development of Halliday's semantic stratum, but is restricted to be
solely concerned with the patterning of discourse.®
They justify this step by showing the independence of the units
posited at the formal and their functional levels. Within Halliday's
(1961) framework, and as is generally accepted concerning syntax and
phonology, there is no need for there to be a simple relationship of
constituency holding between the units of distinct levels; this is a
general motivation for the existence of distinct linguistic levels.
Within any single level, constituency relationships between the units
suggested are to be expected and, in Hallidayan-type frameworks this
8. In fact, Sinclair and Coulthard explicitly claim that
Halliday's later view of function did not provide them with a
useful starting point - a claim which has been criticised by Berry
(1981a) and to which I will return in section 4.
- 124 -
is expressed in the notion of a 'rank scale' which organises the
units of a level into a constituency hierarchy: units at any point in
the rank scale have as elements units from the point below and
themselves form elements of units at the point above. A typical
simplified rank scale cited for the lexicogrammar is, for example,
'morpheme: word: group: clause' (Halliday, 1978, pi29).
The relationship between levels is not one of constituency but
one of realisation. A morpheme does not 'consist of' phonemes but is
instead realised by phonemes; the plural morpheme may or may not be
realised as a syllable, and when realised as a phoneme may be either
/s/ or /z/. As a direct analogy to this, Sinclair and Coulthard point
out that their smallest discourse units can be realised in a wide
range of grammatical units and it is not possible to explain this
variety in terms of constituency. Discourse units are of a different
kind than grammatical units and the difference goes beyond the
relative 'sizes' of the units involved.
Thus, to consider their discourse unit 'directive', the
function of which is "to request a non-linguistic response" (Sinclair
and Coulthard, 1975, p28), any directive, for example one to 'shut
the door', can be realised by a range of lexicogrammatical forms
which include:
"can you shut the door
would you mind shutting the door
I wonder if you could shut the door
the door is still open
the door" (ibid.)
in addition to the obvious imperative. The rank scale Sinclair and
- 125 -
Coulthard propose for their functional discourse level is 'act: move:
exchange: transaction: interaction' (ibid., pl35) and a number of
studies have now been carried out using this scheme of analysis.
However, with the system as it stands the commitment to
sociofunctional organisation present in Halliday's theory has been
seriously circumscribed and it is not clear how that breadth of scope
is to be regained. This calls for an examination of the possibility
of recasting Sinclair and Coulthard's approach into the mostly
Hallidayan terms I am using here. Therefore, I will conclude this
section by showing that Sinclair and Coulthard's discussion of the
status of discourse succeeds neither in supplanting a Hallidayan view
of semantics nor in establishing discourse as a distinct stratum
within the linguistic system. This will make it clear precisely which
suspects of an exchange structure account can offer any hope for a
formalisation of discourse and so will prepare the ground appreciably
for the development I present in section 4.
An immediate point of contention between the two frameworks is
the linguistic stratum that is to mediate between the social and the
grammatical. Halliday's semantic stratum is more explicitly tied,
both upwards and downwards, to the rest of the system and provides a
useful initial factoring of the phenomena to be considered. It is,
though, centred on the clause, or clause complex (sentence), and only
allows for discourse structure by having the situation give rise to
non-structural 'cohesion' between clauses, thereby imposing
ill-specified 'generic structure'. Sinclair and Coulthard's
functional level tries to make a formal statement concerning the
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structural patterning of discourse, or linguistic interaction, which
is part of what is required here, but it does not incorporate a well
developed theoretical viewpoint from which to investigate the
functional, in a wider sense, relationship between language in
general and social organisation.
As might be expected from their Firthian ancestry, Sinclair and
Coulthard do briefly discuss their ideas about the relation between
the levels of discourse and of situation. However, even though they
adopt the structural descriptive system of Halliday (1961) for their
level of discourse, Sinclair and Coulthard, and later Coulthard and
Brazil, still maintain that interaction is more a social than a
formal phenomenon. In fact, as may be seen in the following, they use
this as an additional informal justification for their proposal of a
distinct level of discourse. This may be seen as follows.
By means of introspection a speaker may detect, and
spontaneously correct, grammatical 'errors', but this is not held to
be the case for discourse 'errors': they will generally be
interpreted as misunderstandings rather than linguistic mistakes. For
example, in a discourse segment such as
"A: So the meeting is on Friday
B: Thanks
A: No, I'm asking you." (Coulthard and Brazil, 1979, pl6)
there is nothing which can be analysed as violating the rules of
discourse in the way that a string such as
Friday meeting the on so is
is said to violate the rules of grammar. The structural description
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at the functional level serves to formalise the framework of
continual classification by which successive utterances are
interpreted as contributions which fit their prevailing discourse
situation. Although almost anything can appear as a discourse
contribution, the structural frame in force will determine how it is
unders tood. Fur thermore,
"...if a speaker's behaviour is heard as deviant the deviance
can be most satisfactorily characterised as deviance from a
social norm. This is popularly recognised in the use of labels
such as 'rude', 'evasive', and 'eccentric'." (ibid., pl7)
At the formal level of the linguistic system, i.e. the grammar,
structural constraints are considered far more binding and, when
contravened, Coulthard and Brazil claim it is not usual for social
significance to be attributed to the fact. This, for the Birmingham
group, is seen as good evidence for their functional discourse level
occupying the level between situation and form.
There are, however, two quite general criticisms that can be
made of this. It is certainly agreed by those who work within
frameworks related to the Hallidayan or Firthian views of the
linguistic system that some level, or stratum, should exist to
mediate between situation and form; for example, in addition to
Sinclair and Coulthard's (1975) adoption of 'discourse', Berry (1977)
suggests 'context', while Gregory (1983) has a 'semology'. Halliday's
'semantic stratum' is the broadest in scope of these and, as a
consequence of this, it is sometimes unclear what specific work his
semantic stratum is performing. As a consequence of this, there is a
distinct tendency for Halliday's pre-theoretical discussion of the
scope and power of the stratum which is to mediate between situation
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and form to be replaced by theoretical constructs which are more
narrowly delimited and, hence, more amenable for analysis. While this
may prove to be a necessary price to pay, it does seem unwise to
limit it prematurely to any such notion as a level of discourse
which, consisting of the units which make up its rank scale and the
systems of choice associated with them, only captures one specific
'dimension' of the meaning of a text or discourse: e.g. , the
dimension singled out by Sinclair and Coulthard's restricted
definition of function. The particular functions the stratum is to
serve is one question best answered by the formulation of an explicit
description of data and not by a prior restriction of the theoretical
framework.
If a level analogous to Sinclair and Coulthard's discourse
level should prove itself useful - whether it be as a component of a
semantic stratum or at some other level of description - then there
still remain two possible positions for it within the linguistic
system. It may either be interposed between the lexicogrammatical and
intonational levels of form and the organising semantic or
situational stratum or, alternatively, be added alongside the
lexicogrammatical and intonational levels within the stratum of form.
The first possibility entails that discourse patterns are realised in
lexicogrammatical and intonational distinctions, while the second
presents discourse structures as formal resources which, along with
the lexicogrammar and intonation, realise the situation, possibly as
mediated by the semantics. Coulthard and Brazil's (1979) observation
that there appears to be a difference between discoursal and
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grammatical structural constraints is not sufficient to eliminate the
second of these possibilities in favour of the first. They write,
"[With discourse] we are concerned with an object created by
the combined efforts of more than one speaker, and under these
circumstances it is difficult to see how anything can be ruled
out as 'not discourse'. To set out with the expectation that
such a ruling will be possible might, indeed, seem
counter-intuitive. There is no way in which one speaker can
place absolute constraints upon another speaker in any sense
comparable with the way his apprehension of grammatical rules
will block the production of certain sequences of elements
within his own utterances." (1979, pl5)
This reflects a tendency inherent in Sinclair and Coulthard's
discussion of orientation which considerably weakens their claim that
they are able to build both subjective and objective aspects of
language into a coherent model of verbal communication.
A speaker is said to create a "private linguistic universe" and
this, to some extent, is undoubtedly true. However, it is also
necessary to have some account of the limits of that privacy for,
without this, it is all too easy for private linguistic universes to
become altogether too private and the theoretical explanation of
intersubjectivity that renders cognitivist approaches so problematic
is again precluded. To talk of speakers putting constraints on other
speakers is to adopt the speaker-bound perspective inherited from
syntax. Constraints are brought to bear by situations on the
participants in, and carriers of, those situations. Utterances
restructure situations and so, via those situations, cannot help but
bring constraints to bear on participating speaker/hearers. 'Halfway
through a clause' certain expectations will have been set up; this is
the consequence of the range of potential available being restricted
by the actualisation that has already occurred. Precisely the same
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state of affairs will hold 'halfway through a discourse'.
A speaker actualises potential but it is inaccurate to suggest
that that potential 'blocks' the generation of ungrammatical
sequences: ungrammatical sequences can be, and in fact frequently
are, generated. This cannot in general be considered a violation of
the potential available, a performance error, because the
competence-performance distinction as drawn by Chomsky in terms of
'knowledge' is not recognised within this framework. Linguistic
potential is to account for what speakers actually do, mean, say,
etc., not what they should according to prescriptive notions of
grammaticality:
"... what is grammatical is defined as what is acceptable.
There is no distinction between these two, from which it also
follows that there is no place for a distinction between
competence and performance or between langue or parole,
because the only distinction that remains is that between the
actual and the potential of which it is an actualisation."
(Halliday, 1978, p52)
Coulthard and Brazil argue that 'grammaticality' is not a useful
concept in the field of discourse analysis and this, far from
establishing a typological distinction between discourse and grammar,
instead merely provides further support for the removal of the
competence-performance distinction from linguistic theory.
Coulthard and Brazil go on to conclude that,
"The most promising theoretical assumption seems to be that a
speaker can do anything he likes at any time, but that what he
does will be classified as a contribution to the discourse in
the light of whatever structural predictions the previous
contribution (his own or another's) may have set up." (1979,
Pl6)
As long as being able to "do anything he likes at any time" is
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understood to be a free actualisation of the potential available,
this assumption is as valid for lexicogrammatical potential as it is
for discourse potential. Furthermore, their point that discourse
behaviour classified as deviant deviates "from a social norm" also
fails to separate discourse and lexicogrammar into distinct strata.
Deviance at a lexicogrammatical, or even phonological, level
similarly evokes a social judgement; the slurring of words might
classify the speaker as drunk or someone with a speech impediment of
some kind, while odd grammatical structures might suggest an
eccentric or normative speaker. Quite where a distinction can be
drawn once the notion of grammaticality is removed is unclear.
2. The shape of the linguistic system adopted
For the above reasons, then, the organisation of the linguistic
system that I shall adopt as an 'initial hypothesis' will be extended
as shown in figure 1. This is an hypothesis in the sense that it is
only by attempting to analyse data according to this framework that
its particular strengths and weaknesses can be examined. In its
present stage of development it represents a metatheoretical
position: it provides not only a skeleton within which particular
linguistic hypotheses can be entertained as data are considered, but


























The shape of the linguistic system initially adopted
It also achieves the requirements outlined above of separating
social and discourse structure. Furthermore, the general 'layering*
brought about by the semantic stratum offers a potentially useful
heuristic device for focusing attention during the analysis; in fact
I will be concerned here primarily with phenomena which have been
classified as arising out of the 'textual' metafunction - all the
constructs listed in figure 2 of the introduction may be so
classified. In addition, the framework as it stands encourages
investigation of the relationships that hold between the levels of
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lexicogrammar, intonation, and discourse within the formal stratum;
of the realisation relationships that hold between strata - neither
of these kinds of relationship has been dealt with satisfactorily
hitherto; and of the possibility that the formal resources,
particularly those of the discourse level, might offer an organising
framework for ongoing contexts of situation - this would permit
useful generalisations to be made across contexts without the need to
resort to an unconstrained metalevel which could open the door to
infinite regression and unexplanatoriness. These investigations will
constitute the body of chapters four and five below.
It should also be noted that my multi-levelling of the formal
stratum is intended to leave the question of the precise relationship
between the formal levels as a matter for empirical investigation.
The discussions of the previous section should have made it clear
that there is at present no clearcut solution to the relative
positioning of these levels within the linguistic system as a whole.
The analyses presented below will, therefore, attempt to address this
issue.
3. The computational Hallidayan grammar 'Nigel'
In this intermediate section of the chapter I will briefly
sketch out an existing, highly detailed implementation of a
systemic-type framework in order to make the discussions of systemic
linguistics and of the accounts placed within systemic linguistics
that follow more concrete. It should be noted that in my subsequent
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development of a discoursal level of organisation, I will be assuming
the supporting environment of some framework such as the one I
describe in this section.
I will proceed in two stages. First, I will introduce the
implementation and some of the concepts upon which it is based - this
will also serve to clarify the general introduction to systemic
linguistics I have given above. And second, I will discuss certain
alterations which may need to be made to the framework as it stands
if it is to be fully compatible with the general organisation of the
linguistic system that I suggested in the previous section.
The origins of the framework as a whole are described in Mann
(1981, 1982) and the framework itself is introduced in Matthiessen
(1981). Detailed accounts of the framework's grammar component, which
is called 'Nigel', are given in Mann (1983b), Mann and Matthiessen
(1983b), and Matthiessen (1983, 1984a, 1984b). This component
represents an attempt to specify a domain-independent,
text-generation module in the form of a systemic grammar. However,
although it is argued that a systemic approach is ideally suited to
computational requirements, this will not be the aspect of the system
that I focus on here. The primary importance of this work for the
approach I am suggesting in this thesis lies in the new heights of
explicitness and detail, simultaneously combined with breadth of
linguistic coverage, to which 'Nigel' takes linguistic description
compatible with the Hallidayan paradigm.
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The two basic dimensions of organisation around which systemic
accounts revolve are the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic - or, as
Halliday (1963) has termed them, the "axes of chain and choice". Very
loosely, one can say that the former corresponds to standard
structural views of linguistic organisation, whereas the latter
corresponds to the choices that can be made between available
structures. In Nigel, following later Hallidayan positions, these
axes are held quite separate and choice is given the central
organising role.9 This means that grammatical 'creativity' resides
solely in the repeated making of choices, which have themselves been
made available by prior choices. Such choices are grouped by 'system'
and each system, when 'entered', makes available a set of
alternatives, called grammatical 'features'. Systems are then
connected together to form networks. The set of features generated by
traversing networks in order to reach any given system defines the
'entry conditions' for that system.
The entire Nigel grammar is, in fact, constructed as one large
network and the first, i.e. least 'delicate', in systemic terms,
choice is that of 'rank'. The network segment for the first two steps
in delicacy is given as an example in figure 2. The process of
generation then proceeds in 'cycles' of actualisation: throughout
actualisation the grammar is entered at the least level of delicacy,
choices are made until the maximally delicate distinctions have been
drawn and then, if another cycle is called for by the selections that
9. As I mentioned above, there have been criticisms of the
abandonment of the Firthian strict interdependence of chain and
choice. However, I. think that the Nigel framework demonstrates
that fears concerning the viability of this move are ill founded.
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have been made, the grammar is re-entered at the least level of















Taken from Matthiessen (1983, p61/2)
and Mann and Matthiessen (1983b, p21).
Figure 2: Nigel's least delicate system networks
The result of a single cycle of actualisation, or traversal
through the grammar network, is a complex list of the grammatical
features that have been selected; this is the paradigmatic
organisation of the linguistic unit being generated along a
particular plane of structural decomposition, e.g. clause, group, or
word. It is then necessary to specify the syntagmatic organisation
also for it is this which constitutes the final 'output' of the
grammar. That is:
"One cycle can be defined as one complete move from the
paradigmatic axis to the syntagmatic axis. Each cycle begins
with an entry of the system networks and ends with a structure
fragment." (Matthiessen, 1983, p67)
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This is achieved by means of realisation which, within Nigel, is
defined as follows.
Within the systemic framework structure is specified in terms
of ordered sequences of constituents which are composed of
grammatical 'functions'.10 In Nigel terminology these constituents
are called function bundles, or fundles. As an extremely
oversimplified example, the following network constructs the clause






This corresponds extremely loosely in the structures that it
generates to the phrase structure rules:
S -> NP VP
VP -> V(NP)
Whereas in the phrase structure approach one directly represents the
structures one wishes to create, witli the systemic grammar one first
selects 'choices' which capture the meaningful distinctions one
believes the differences in structure represent; in this example,
then, the network amounts to the claim that what is significant about
the structures that result is whether they are to be classified as
being transitive or intransitive.
10. These have also been termed 'micro-functions' - historically
as contrasted with 'macro-functions', Halliday's earlier term for
the metafunctions.
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The actual creation of structure is made derivative to the
making of choices by associating with those choices certain kinds of
operations upon the syntactic structural elements which form the
final output of the grammar. Here, then, these elements are
represented by the items enclosed in square brackets; those
associated with the clause state that there will be structural
elements inserted in the final clause which are to be given the
functional labels 'SUBJECT' and 'VERB'. Consequently, only if the
choice is made to generate a transitive clause is the structural
element labelled OBJECT included in the final structure. Finally, any
residual ordering problems left unspecified by the choices actually
taken in generation are resolved by referring to default 'function
order lists'. The two structures built by the above network are then:
[SUBJECT, VERB, OBJECT] and [SUBJECT, VERB]
corresponding to whether the top-most choice was taken or the lower
choice respectively.
The grammar as a whole operates by continually making those
choices which its connected netw'orks lead it to consider. These
choices introduce and subsequently arrange the functional elements
which go to constitute the final structure. As an example of the
default ordering mentioned above being overridden, one could
introduce the possibility of interrogative forms in the above network
simply by specifying another parallel network whose choices are to be










In this case, if the option declarative is taken in the second
network, then the output remains as it was before. However, if the
interrogative option is now taken, then the structural element which
is labelled as the verb would be ordered before that labelled the
subject - thus capturing the simplest form of questions in, for
example, French or German. Although actual systemic grammars do not
draw their grammar of English in this way, the general principles of
their operation - i.e. the continual making of choices which have
structural consequences - nevertheless remain the same.
To take a more realistic exepple then, the complete structure
specification at the clause level of the clause























Each column represents a set of grammatical functions which have been
conflated to yield a single clause constituent. These functions help
perform two main tasks: the correct specification of ordering at each
level and an appropriate restriction of possible lower level
realisations of constituents.
This syntagmatic level of representation is built up, then, by
means of realisation statements associated with the paradigmatic
level systems of choice. More specifically, grammatical features, as
well as being able to lead on to further systems of choice, can also
call for various operations to be carried out at the syntagmatic
level. In the first simple networks above these were the operations
that were specified within square brackets. Nigel defines just three
types of such operations: those that constrain ordering (termed:
Order, Partition, OrderAtEnd, and OrderAtFront), those that actually
introduce and build structure (Insert, Conflate, and Expand), and
those that have consequences for subsequent cycles of structure
generation (Classify, OutClassify, Lexify, and Preselect); these have
been found sufficient to handle an extremely wide range of English
grammatical structures. The fine details of the realisation phase of
generation in a systemic grammar has not previously been specified as
completely as has now been achieved within the Nigel framework.
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Belov, in order to clarify this approach somewhat, I will present
brief examples of the clause and nominal group generation processes.
At the opposite 'end' of the grammar, i.e. above rather than
below, comes the semantics and in this area Nigel moves well beyond
earlier systemic accounts. The essential construct here is that of
the 'chooser'. This is a process which describes on what basis the
choices available in a system network are to be selected. It is in
the operation of the grammar's choosers that text generation is made
responsive to what is to be required of the final text. As the Nigel
framework has been devised for use in a computational context, it
takes the form of a grammar 'module'. Outside of the module there is
assumed to be some knowledge representation and reasoning system of
the standard sort that is currently employed in AI and cognitive
science applications. Precisely which knowledge representation system
is irrelevant since Nigel includes an interface which constrains the
grammar's interaction with its 'environment' to quite specific
patterns of question and response. As long as the knowledge
representation system is able to make the distinctions the questions
put to it call for, its precise details remain of no concern to the
grammar.
The interface between grammar and environment is, in fact,
constructed from the choosers which specify how alternative paths
through the grammar are to be selected in particular contexts. The
choosers reach a decision as to which choice is to be made by putting
specific questions to the environment. These questions are couched in
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a formally defined 'inquiry language' - for details of which see Mann
(1982, 1983a) and Matthiessen (1984a). Here again, it is the grammar
which leads the inquiry process. A chooser only becomes active when
the system network with which it is associated has been reached by
the prior alternatives appropriate having already being selected. In
Mann's phrase "all initiative lies with the grammar". The environment
never volunteers information of its own accord; interaction proceeds
solely by virtue of the determinate questions put by the choosers and
the connectivity of the system networks.
Formally, a chooser may be structured as a decision tree whose
nodes consist of the inquiries to be put to the environment. An
example is given in figure 3; this will be used in the illustration
of nominal group generation that I give below. Each choice point in
the grammar has such a chooser-tree attached to it so that the
environment may be interrogated and a choice that is appropriate to
that environment made. The 'only' constraints this places on the
environment are that the environment is able to respond
appropriately. This means that the environment has at least to
support those distinctions represented in the choosers' questions. In
other words, the choosers are intended only to ask questions
sufficient to select among the (very) finite number of options they
have on hand. This assumes that the selection of one choice over
another in some network always carries the same distinction (or set
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Taken from Mann (1982, pi 1).
Figure 3:
Chooser decision tree for the nominal group Number system
This approach to semantics has had some quite beneficial
results. For example, the formalisation of the questions that are
needed to make a grammatical choice appropriately provides
indications of the types of knowledge that the environment will be
required to support if it is going to be able to control correctly
various aspects of the language. These types of knowledge range from
the quite specific - for example, the need for representations that
distinguish between definite existence, hypothetical existence,
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conceptual existence, and nonexistence of actions^ - to a general
organisation of the knowledge held in the environment according to
the grammar's use of that knowledge. This latter organisation has
provided some support for Halliday's conception of linguistic
metafunction. There are at least two areas of knowledge which are
kept distinct by the inquiries of the grammar's choosers; that is, a
system will need information from one area or the other, but not from
both, in order for its choice to be made. These areas are called the
Knowledge Base and the Text Plan and appear to correspond well with
Halliday's ideational and textual metafunctions respectively.^
One point which needs to be stressed, however, is that the
environment is not to be construed in Hallidayan terms; the goal of
the Nigel grammar is to provide one module of a complete text
generation system understood in the established cognitive science
sense. And so, although
"There is an obvious correspondence between the term
environment and the term context from Firthian linguistics ...
it is better to use environment so as not to make or suggest
any implicit assumptions about the nature of what is outside
Nigel." (Matthiessen, 1983, p59n)
Nevertheless, the environment is intended to be where 'intentions to
communicate', 'text plans', 'world knowledge' and the like reside.
Thus an intention to communicate a given message is first generated
and the central problem faced by the grammar becomes: "How can
choices be made to conform to a given intention to communicate?"
(Mann, 1982, p4) This is contrary to the more general view of
12. Mann (1983b, pl2).
13. Mann (1962, pl7/8; 1983a, pll).
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language inherent in the Hallidayan paradigm and conforms more with
the traditional AI view of language as a 'pipeline' between speaker
and hearer - the so-called 'conduit' metaphor of Reddy (1979).
Although this can be a useful position to take in some contexts,
here, where I am seeking an approach fully compatible with the
Hallidayan paradigm, a different emphasis is required.14
An albeit sketchy illustration of the significant
components of clause generation as performed in Nigel will
nevertheless help to place the various constructs and mechanisms
introduced so far.l^ To make the illustration more concrete I will
consider the generation of one particular clause:
John dislikes the lion.
Now, the state of affairs that is taken to hold prior to entering the
grammar for generation to proceed is as follows. First, there is
present in the environment some representation of the particular
meaning of this clause that the choosers may interrogate
subsequently. And second, there is some quite detailed specification
(ideally to be constructed by text planning algorithms) of the
particular properties of the environmental entities capturing the
clause's meaning that are to find expression in the clause to be
generated. Examples of the use of this latter information, which is
grouped together to form a presentation specification, will be given
below in my illustration of nominal group generation.
14. Indeed, there is now increasing criticism of the conduit
approach to language production and interpretation in AI; see, for
example, Appelt (1982, p8) and Boguraev (forthcoming).
15. Although certain simplifications will be made here in the
actual details of the structure generated.
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Regardless of how the information of any particular environment
is actually organised, the grammar considers it to be structured in
terms of a network of hubs by which the information necessary for
representing the meaning to be expressed may be accessed
conveniently. Such hubs are only known to the grammar by arbitrary,
content-free labels provided by the chooser-environment interface.
Thus, when the grammar needs to ascertain information about the
meaning to be expressed in this case, the chooser-environment
interface makes available a name, e.g. 'LION-DISLIKING-EVENT', which
will regularly pick out the area of knowledge responsible for
representing the above clause's meaning - whether that be expressed
in a frame-based notation, a set of propositions in a logic-based
formalism, or whatever. Furthermore, these hubs are only made
accessible to chooser questions via association with grammatical
functions. This level of indirection permits chooser questions to be
expressed independently of the particular hubs being addressed in
particular generative cycles. The associations between hubs and
functions are maintained in a function association table, via which
all chooser questions proceed.
Every cycle of generation, for example, starts thus. First, the
function association table is cleared and then the specially
distinguished function ONUS is associated with the hub labelling the
entire meaning to be expressed by that entry to the grammar. In this
case, the function association table would be initialised to:
ONUS : LION-DISLIKING-EVENT
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Chooser questions concerning this aspect of the meaning to be
expressed then proceed via ONUS rather than via the hub directly.
Hence, the first chooser question to be asked, which arises from the
chooser for the rank system depicted in figure 2 above, is as
follows:
Does the hub associated with ONUS have an illocutionary force?
(cf. Mann and Matthiessen, 1983b, p21)
This question is part of the reasoning about whether the unit to be
generated is to stand alone as a clause or is to be part of some
larger unit that carries the illocutionary force. Here the answer is
'yes' and so the grammatical feature 'Clauses' is selected in the
network. Subsequently, more specific aspects of the meaning to be
expressed may be accessed via indentifying chooser questions such as:
What concept is the process part of the hub associated with
ONUS?
(cf. ibid, p23)
which might associate the label returned as an answer (e.g.
'LION-DISLIKING') with the grammatical function PROCESS enabling
further questions of the form:
What is the entity which the hub associated with PROCESS
affects or is directed towards'?
(cf. ibid., p33)
If the answer to this query (say 'LI0N347' ) was then associated with
the grammatical function GOAL, the state of the function association




A frequently used abbreviation in chooser questions of Mann and
Matthiessen's that I will adopt here is: 'LION-DISLIKING (PROCESS)';
this is to be read as 'the hub LION-DISLIKING associated with the
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function PROCESS'. It should again be noted here that the chooser
questions that are found to be necessary for controlling the choices
the grammar can make in fact place strong grammatically-motivated
constraints upon the kinds of information a knowledge representation
will need to support if it is to control appropriately the aspects of
language the grammar captures.
The use of choosers and the function association table to
control the generation process is an addition to the systemic
framework specific to Nigel. Below the level of the choosers, the
organisation and mechanisms of the grammar are similar, although more
explicitly specified, to previous systemic accounts. The actual
generation of structure remains the sole responsibility of the system
networks. Thus, although the function association table may contain
an association of a hub representing John as the disliker of the lion
(say 'JOHN') with the grammatical function ACTOR, enabling chooser
questions to perform various deductions concerning that hub, unless a
choice is made in the system networks that explicitly calls for the
insertion of the ACTOR function into the structure of the clause, the
presence of that function in the association table will have no
direct result on the structural output of the granvnar. For example,
at this point in the generation of the present case, if the initial
text plan rendered expression of who was doing the disliking
unnecessary, the grammar could just as well produce 'The lion is
disliked', where no ACTOR consituent has been constructed.
The generation process is, therefore, extremely simple in
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concept. Each system that is reached by the path created by prior
choices made presents its own range of further choices. The choice
that is appropriate at that particular point is then negotiated by
the interaction between the system's chooser and the environment.
That interaction is transparent to the system itself: all the system
is responsible for is the appropriate connectivity of the choosers
(linking upwards to semantics) and of the realisation statements
(linking downwards to syntactic structure). Thus, each choice, in
addition to possibly leading on to further systems, may via
realisation statements place constraints on the configuration of
functions that is being produced as the structural 'output' of the
grammar. So far the grammatical functions ACTOR, PROCESS, and GOAL
have been mentioned in relation to identifying the various
participants in the meaning of the clause and the relationship
between them. To conclude this brief illustration of clause
generation I will accept these functions as having already been
inserted into clause structure in order to consider how further
systems serve to determine their appropriate ordering in the final
clause.
In chapter one I suggested that the Hallidayan conception of
'structure' offered a more general standpoint by virtue of the
recognition of at least three 'layers' of functional decomposition
corresponding to the three metafunctions: the actor-process-goal
articulation derives from the ideational layer. Accordingly, other
areas of the network connect choosers whose inquiries effect
reasoning concerning the textual and interpersonal metafunctions
- 150 -
also. To take the textual metafunction first, it is currently assumed
that the text plan constructed prior to entering the grammar has
determined the overall structure of the entire text to be generated.
Thus, questions about which entity is to be considered the 'theme' of
the clause are simply answerable; e.g.: the chooser inquiry
What concept is specified as the theme of LION-DISLIKING-EVENT
(ONUS)?
(cf. ibid., p43)
receives the response 'JOHN' which is associated with the function
THEME. Then, in the present case, system features of the systems
concerned with thematisation are selected which call for realisation




The conflate realisation operator specifies that a single constituent
will be characterisable as fulfilling both the theme and actor
functions in the clause.
The interpersonal layer constraints are imposed by considering
questions concerning the line of argument of discourse development
the speaker is pursuing in the text in which a clause is placed.
According to Halliday, it is these kinds of issues that condition
choices such as that between active and passive. Here then, it is
assumed that the text plan favours constructing the clause around
John rather than the lion and that the clause is not going to appear
as a question. Thus: systems features are selected such that the
functions SUBJECT and FINITE are inserted into the clause structure
and ordered such that the subject precedes the finite element
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(thereby making the clause declarative rather than interrogative),
the function DIREXJTCXDMPLEMENT is inserted into clause structure and
ordered following the finite element, and SUBJECT and
DIREETCCJMPLEMENT are conflated with ACTOR and GOAL respectively (cf.
ibid., p36).
All that remains is for PROCESS to be conflated with FINITE (as
might not happen, for example, if the finite element were instead to
appear as an auxiliary of some kind) and the clause rank structure is
more or less complete. At the (rather low) level of detail described
here that structure is as follows:
■# < THEME ]
ACTOR ]




The constraints specified in the realisation statements have also
been represented here: '<* denotes ordering, clause boundaries,
and vertical alignment conflation. This is the output of this
particular cycle through the grammar; what remains to be done before
a completed surface form results is a similar following of cycles
through the grammar for the lower ranks of organisation such as that
of the nominal group. Below I will also briefly illustrate this
process in order to help show how the functional decomposition of the
clause relates to actual surface forms.
In addition to mechanisms such as the above which are strictly
internal to the lexicogrammar, the Hallidayan paradigm also makes
certain predictions on the kinds of relationships that will be needed
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between levels of organisation within the linguistic system; the
previous section outlined the general framework I have adopted for
the linguistic system so as to be able to investigate those
relationships most easily. As Halliday makes very clear:
"... a linguistic description is not a progressive
specification of a set of structures one after the other,
ideational, then interpersonal, then textual. The system does
not first generate a representation of reality, then encode it
as a speech act, and finally recode it as a text, as some
writing in philosophical linguistics seems to imply. It
embodies all of these types of meaning in simultaneous
networks of options, from each of which derive structures that
are mapped onto one another in the course of their
lexicogrammatical realization." (Halliday, 1978, pl34)
One consequence of this framework, therefore, is that it is now
necessary to consider other sources of initiative in addition to the
grammatical level of form. In particular, it is necessary to examine
the possibility of other levels of form and of constraints that may
be imposed from above, i.e. from the stratum of context and
situation, directly - that is, without having the choosers need to
ask all of their theoretically appropriate questions each and every
time a choice needs to be made. This latter possibility arises from
Halliday's consideration of interstratal realisation and the
bidirectionality of realisation: a mechanism should exist whereby the
context can volunteer information to, or exert influence upon, the
generation process of the formal stratum.
In sections 5 and 6 of the previous chapter I suggested that
the notion of realisation might be very useful in coming to terms
with the extremely problematic relationship between form and
function. In particular, within the Hallidayan paradigm an essential
realisation mechanism for communication across strata of potential is
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'pre-selection'. By means of this mechanism choices taken within one
stratum can constrain choices to be made within other strata -
choices are thus being 'pre-selected' relative to their normal time
of choice, i.e. when the system networks for that stratum would be
active in their own right. If the preselection mechanism is extended
upwards along the realisation chain to relate the strata of form and
context, as the Hallidayan paradigm invites, then a ready-made method
would exist for formalising the obvious sensitivity the linguistic
system shows to its contexts of use.16
The essential feature of the preselection mechanism is that,
instead of a complex set of conditions governing 'micro-function'
formation on the syntagmatic axis, similar sets of conditions govern
the selection of 'features' within other strata, i.e. the mechanism
operates entirely within the paradigmatic axis. Within the Nigel
framework as it stands this has only been formalised among the
lexicogrammatical systems of choice, but the principle remains the
same whether one is dealing with distinct cycles of actualisation
through a single network - the Nigel case - or with distinct cycles
in different networks - as would be entailed in effecting
communication across strata. Pre-selection in Nigel is in fact used
extensively to effect communication between subsequent cycles of
actualisation and this has permitted Mann and Matthiessen to remove
an entire class of realisational rules which previous systemic
16. I will argue below that this is in fact necessary in order to
do justice to Halliday's claim that the "context is predictive of
the text." (1978, pl89) In deed, this has always been central to
Firthian linguistics but there have never been the means available
to formalise the position it entails; as I suggest in chapter
five, perhaps now those means exist.
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grammars had been forced to use, as Matthiessen (1983) argues, at
considerable cost.*7
The following statements exemplify realisation by preselection
in the Nigel grammar:
Preselect ACTOR NominalGroup
Preselect SUBJECT Singular (ibid., p67)
Statements of this type are associated with particular features
within the system networks in the usual manner; i.e. when a feature
which has a realisation statement attached to it is selected, that
statement is performed as the 'realisation' of the feature. These
particular examples have the following consequences: the first states
that the realisation of the clause component possessing the ACTOR
micro-function will proceed by means of an actualisation cycle in
which the feature 'NominalGroup', and therefore all the features on
the network path leading to the 'NominalGroup' feature also, have
already been selected - these choices will no longer be 'free', i.e.
settled by questioning the environment, they will be made
automatically; similarly, the second states that the actualisation
cycle associated with the realisation of the component which
possesses the SUBJECT micro-function will include a path of feature
selections terminating with the feature 'Singular' among its other
selections. In short, the clause constituent which is the ACTOR will
appear as a nominal group and the constituent which is the SUBJECT
17. The rules in question are function realisation statements;
Matthiessen (1983, p70) suggests that earlier systemic accounts,
including Hudson (1971) and Davey (1975), have been obliged to
define a much enlarged set of micro-functions purely for the
purpose of carrying information across cycles. With preselection
no intermediary syntagmatic structure is required specifically to
carry information between cycles through the grammar.
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will be singular; these constituents could, of course, be one and the
same constituent, or fundle, in which case that constituent would be
realised as a singular nominal group. This is the formal means by
which sensitivity to position in structure is achieved in Nigel and
it demonstrates again the clear separation that is enforced in the
Hallidayan account between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of
organisation.
With the preselection realisation operator introduced it is
possible to complete the illustration I began above of the generation
of the clause 'John dislikes the lion'. The structural result at
clause rank given there was clearly some way yet from being the
clause required. The functional decomposition constituting that
result appeared to specify only the orderings of the top level clause
constituents but the result of any one cycle through the grammar in
fact contains much more information. In particular, restrictions on
the units that will be appropriate to express those top level
constituents are imposed in the manner suggested by the preceding
discussion of preslection. Thus, in addition to simply being able to
specify that a particular clause rank constituent is realised as some
particular relevant lexical item (e.g. lexify AGENTMARKER "by"), a
realisation statement located within the clause subnetwork may call
for particular paths to be taken through, for example, the nominal
group subnetwork.
Indeed, the very fact that the generation process was not
complete when the clause rank cycle described above had been
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exhausted is captured by the presence of preselection statement of
the form we saw above, i.e.
preselect ACTOR NominalGroup
alongside those responsible for inserting the ACTOR function into the
clause rank structure. Outstanding preselections state tlat the
grammar should be re-entered and, in this case, that is achieved by,
again, clearing the function association table, associating the
function ONUS with the entity this cycle is to be responsible for
expressing (here, the hub associated with ACTCXR, i.e. 'JOIN'), and
entering the rank system shown in figure 2. This time, however, a
particular path has been picked out in advance and the chooser of the
rank system need not make its inquiries of the environment in order
to select a feature. The feature NominalGroup (at least) has been
preselected and so the grammar can proceed to that choice point
without further ado. Typically it will be the case that many features
will have been preselected; these would often arise from distinct
functions at clause rank and only come to bear on a single clause
constituent via the prior conflation of those functions - therefore
combining the constraints arrived at 'from quite distinct chains of
reasoning.
The work performed by 'presentation specifications', which I
mentioned above, can now be seen quite simply. The presentation
specification provides a formal specification of what is to be
expressed in particular formulations that is created specifically for
the purposes of generation. Thus, in a sentence such as
The leader is John
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in Nigel's environment both references to 'John' would be associated
with a single hub, or 'concept symbol*, e.g. "JLDR", but
"two different presentation specifications for referring to
JLDR would be created. The first might specify that the
resulting expression should convey the fact that the
individual holds the role of leader. The second could merely
state that the resulting expression should convey the person's
name." (Mann, 1983, p4)'®
In the present case, the presentation specification for the hub JOHN
would take the latter of these options.
The situation for the GOAL-associated hub, 'LI0N347', is quite
similar. The presentation specification needs to provide sufficient
information for a form to be selected, although the grammar may
impose additional constraints. Thus, the fact that, here, the word
"lion" is to be used rather than, say, a more general noun such as
"creature" or "animal" is the responsibility of the presentation
specification.What the grammar remains responsible for is deciding
between "the lion" or "the creature" and "it", or between "the lion"
and "lions" or "those creatures" if this clause were in fact to mean
that John disliked the species of lion rather than some specific
animal. The latter of these decisions is made by the chooser depicted
in figure 3 above which is attached to the number system of the
nominal group subnetwork. This chooser illustrates that even a simple
two feature network (where here, for example, the choice is between
Singular and Plural) may call for more varied chooser activity. In
order to arrive at the feature selection of Singular relevant for the
clause at hand the environment must be able to inform the grammar,
18. There is, therefore, a clear similarity between 'presentation
specifications' and Levy's (1979b) 'production specifications' and
'blueprints'.
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via the chooser inquiries, that LI0N347 is both unitary and
extensional. If, however, the decision were to be between the GOAL
nominal groups in the two clauses:
John dislikes lions
John dislikes the creatures
where, in the second clause, "creatures" is being used
nonspecifically so as to mean the species as in the first clause,
then the chooser would make that decision according to the
'collection' versus 'species' response. What John dislikes is
'unitary' and ' intensional', in the sense of its being a set or
prototype, but only "lion" picks out a species.
Finally, similar constraints work to enable the
PROCESS-characterised constituent to select "dislikes" rather than
"hates" or "likes'+negative. Accordingly, at the clause rank there
would be a preselection statement of the form
preselect PROCESS VerbalGroup
while within the verbal group subnetwork the statement
classify EVENT {Lexical features L[}
would restrict or determine the lexical item to be that specified by
the information in the relevant preselection specification. The
structural output of all the cycles through the grammar might then be
as shown in figure 4 below.
19. We shall see in chapter five below, however, some
conversational work this kind of choice can support that goes
beyond that currently envisaged in the Nigel framework.
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THEME RHEME
clause ACTOR PROCESS GOAL
rank SUBJECT FINITE DIRBCTCOMPLEMENT
nominal HEAD MODIFIER HEAD





word John dislikes the lion |
rank
Figure 4:
Functional-structural decomposition of the clause:
John dislikes the lion
It should be stressed that the definitions of those functions
that go to constitute the result of the generation process are only
to be found in the appropriate set of chooser questions as related by
the connectivity of the system networks, for it is only there that
the functionality of the configurations THEME-RHEME, SUBJECT-FINITE,
DEICTIC-THING, etc. are captured. This will be of particular
significance in chapter four below where I will suggest functional
decompositions for the level of discourse analogous to that presented
here for the lexicogrammar but without the chooser specifications
necessary before an adequate formalisation cam be constructed.
It should also be noted that one consequence of the operation
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of the preselection mechanism is to contextucilise the resources
available within subsequent cycles of actualisation so that in many
cases only choices relevant to the particular element being generated
are being considered. The operation of actualisation, i.e. the
pursuance of the choice-making process, has been constrained so that
the theoretically relevant full network is reduced to an actually
relevant subnetwork. This is one means, therefore, of implementing
the essential 'contextualisation of resources' by which the
Hallidayan paradigm seeks to avoid the postulation of 'contextless'
entities. This I described in chapter one when justifying the
assimilation of the conversation analytic viewpoint within the
Hallidayan paradigm. The extension of the preselection mechanism
upwards to relate the strata of form and context should, then, permit
the linguistic system as a whole to be far more responsive to
situations than is presently the case. Furthermore, as will be argued
at length in chapter five, this will be crucial for an adequate
treatment of register-related phenomena and an understanding of
topic.
It is necessary now, however, to consider the extension of the
formal stratum to handle other levels of organisation - particularly
discourse organisation - because it is precisely these resources that
are going to be found of most use in my subsequent consideration of
register and topic.
4. Towards a Hallidayan conversation analysis
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In section 1 I mentioned that Sinclair and Coulthard, in their
original specification of the exchange structure theory for
discourse, decided that Halliday's move away from scale and category
grammar towards a metafunctionally-layered view of the level of form
was unhelpful for the study of discourse. One of the consequences of
this is that exchange structure has been guided towards adopting a
view of discourse which, when considered in the light of the previous
chapter, remains excessively structural in nature. In direct
opposition to Sinclair and Coulthard's rejection of Halliday's
semantic stratum, however, Berry (1981a) suggests that this step was
unnecessary and that the exchange structure level of organisation
should, instead, be interpreted in terms of Halliday's metafunctions
just as is the lexicogrammar. Although in the next chapter I will
argue for extensive modifications to Berry's approach, I will
describe it in some detail as it provides a substantial basis for the
position I adopt towards formalising the insights of conversation
analysis and for escaping the socially-biased and
linguistically-undersupported interpretation of conversational
patterning generally found within discourse analysis.
Berry takes each discoursal unit, including the exchange, to
have three distinct structural decompositions, which arise from the
ideational, textual, and interpersonal metafunctions of the semantic
stratum in an exactly analogous way to the layering of the clause in
the lexicogrammar. She then establishes the utility of the
metafunctional organisation for exchange structure by showing that
the patterning of discourse is not adequately captured by a single
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linear structure and that the layered, multistructural approach can
offer a far more natural account. Furthermore, that Berry's work
suggests that it is useful to factor discourse 'function' into
layers, just as clausal 'functions' are factored, again argues for a
similarity between the discoursal and lexicogrammar levels rather
than a distinction and, therefore, offers further support for the
resolution of the structure/local management distinction proposed in
the previous chapter.
Berry's framework is as follows. Berry first specifies
well-formedness constraints for exchanges in terms of the three
layers of functional organisation corresponding to the three
perspectives of Halliday's metafunctions. Each layer consists of an
ordered sequence of micro-functions, one of which, at each layer, is
designated to be obligatory. The layers are represented thus:
interpersonal: dkl k2 ki k2f
ideational: pb pc ps
textual: &i bi aii bii ... an bn
The underlined functions are those which are obligatory; i.e. these
functions must occur somewhere durirtg the course of an exchange. The
three perspectives correspond respectively to viewing the exchange
as, first, a stretch of language over which knowledge is shared;
second, a stretch of language concerned with the transmission of a
'possibly complex' single complete proposition; and third, a stretch
of language where turns are allocated 'in advance'.
To form an actual exchange, functions from each layer must be
combined to give function bundles, each of which forms a turn in the
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exchange. The minimal exchange, therefore, is one in which all the





As before, the first line is the interpersonal layer: 'kl' marks the
'primary knower', the person who already knows the information at
issue during the exchange; the second line is the ideational layer:
'pc' indicates the transmission of a 'completed proposition'; and the
third line is the textual layer and considers the exchange as a
sequence of turns: 'ai' is the first turn of the exchange. This
example corresponds to single statements complete in themselves and
not necessarily predicting ciny response; as in Berry's
Guide (conducting party round cathedral): Salisbury is the
English cathedral with the tallest spire.
Naturally, such minimal exchanges do not occur very often and, in
fact, probably only do so when there are additional constraints,
typically social, being placed upon the turn-taking. In the guide
example, the nonoccurrence of any'follow-up can be accounted for by
saying that people in sight-seeing parties being conducted by guides
do not in general have rights to turns (or do not feel that they have
such rights) unless the guide makes provision for them to appear.
Similar pressures make this a possible exchange in teacher-pupil
interactions.
The following exchange is slightly more complicated.





Here, where the son is already quite confident that he knows the




ai bi" (ibid., pl44)
Each line again corresponds to a layer of structure and each column
is a speaker's turn", 'k2' is the 'secondary knower', the person to
whom information is imparted, 'ps' indicates 'propositional support',
i.e. the proposition is not still in the process of being completed -
merely supported or attacked,20 and 'bi' is the first turn of the
second speaker.
An exchange characterisation such as the following, also taken
from Berry, uses all the discourse resources described so far.21
(3) dkl k2 ki k2f
Pb PC ps
ai bi aii bii
and corresponds to exchanges such as:
Quizmaster: in England, which-cathedral has the tallest
spire [dkl,pb,ai]
Contestant: is it Salisbury [k2,pc,bi]
Quizmaster: yes [kl,ps,aii]
Contestant: oh [k2f,bii]
21. Subsequently the '|' will designate speaker-transition points.
20. Cf. Burton (1980). The kl-k2 distinction itself echoes Labov's
(1972) distinction between 'A events' and 'B events': "Given any
two-party conversation, there exists an understanding that there
are events that A knows about, but B does not; and events that B
knows about but A does not; and AB-events that are known to both."
(ibid. , p!24) This is then used to motivate simple rules of
discourse such as: "If A makes a statement about a B-event, it is
heard as a request for confirmation." (ibid.) Berry's
formalisation can be viewed as a further formalisation of this
idea.
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The 'pb'-function designates a 'propositional base', i.e. a
proposition skeleton which is incomplete; the 'dkl' designates a
'delayed' kl, i.e. a participant who in fact bears the responsibility
of knowing chooses to withhold his/her "stamp of authority" from the
proposition at issue - this commonly occurs in restricted situations
such as quizzes and school lessons; and 'k2f' designates the state of
the secondary knower's knowledge following the exchange's
transmission of its information. For ease of reference Berry's
micro-functions and their definitions are listed in figure 6 at the
end of this chapter.
All exchange elements, or turns, containing an obligatory
function are themselves obligatory; thus in this example only the
last turn, the contestant's k2f-contribution, the final state of the
'secondary knower's' knowledge, is fully optional in the sense that
it could have been omitted without 'substantially' altering the
exchange.
The appropriate superposition 'of the functions provided at each
layer generates (in the Chomskyan sense) the possible range of
exchanges. Thus, the oddity of exchanges such as the following is
explained by it not being possible to generate the combinations of
micro-functions that are required for the readings intended.
"Son: is Salisbury the English cathedral with the tallest
spire
Father:yes
Son: well, is it
Father:yes
Son: that's right" (Berry, 1981a, pl38)
or ,22
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"Father:Salisbury is the English cathedral with the tallest
spire
Son: well, is it
Father:yes
Son: that's right' (ibid.)
The structural configurations at each layer entail predictions
for the discourse functions of the turns that will occur; for
example, the micro-function 'kl' is obligatory within its layer and
so, until a turn appears which realises the 'kl' micro-function, such
a turn is predicted. That is, in example (2) above, the combination
of 'k2' and 'ai' predicts that 'kl' will occur at a later stage,
while the combination of 'pc' and 'ai', because of the details of the
ideational layer, constrains that occurrence of 'kl* to be at the
next available turn, which is *bi'. The effect of Sinclair and
Coulthard's continual classification is thus achieved, but in a more
functionally motivated and general manner; as Berry explains:
"The obligatoriness of elements can be shown to be predictable
on the basis of just three obligatory functions. In every
exchange, the verbal interaction must be initiated - ai; the
proposition must be completed - pc; and the information in the
proposition must be stamped with the authority of someone who
knows - kl. If any of these do not occur in the first move
they are predicted. They continue to be predicted until they
do occur." (ibid., pl45)
Although formal mappings between the ideational functions and
those of the other layers are not provided, a systemic network
capable of generating exchanges with elements specified at the
interpersonal and textual layers is offered and this is set out in
figure 5 below. Therefore, to take example (2) above again, its
22. It is, of course, to be assumed here that the intonation has
also been inappropriately selected.
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generation would proceed via the path: initiate exchange, this
includes the functions kl and ai in the syntagmatic representation of
the exchange; and select B event, this includes k2 and bi and
conflates k2 with ai and kl with bi. The ordering of ai before bi and
k2 before kl is then established and the two turns of the exchange
have been produced - the first turn 'predicting' the second. Purely
as an illustration, choosers of a fairly trivial nature might be
added to this network as follows; for the three systems, working from
left to right:
(1 ) What is the concept that represents the information to be
exchanged within ONUS?
Associate it with PC.
What is the hub representing the speaker who is to bear the
responsibility for knowing PC?
Associate it with Kl.
Does ONUS include an intention to speak?
yes, choose: Initiate exchange.
no, choose: Keep quiet.
(2) What is the hub representing the speaker who is to speak
first?
Associate it with 1STSPKR.
Is Kl the same as 1STSPKR?
yes, choose: Select A event.
no, choose: Select B event.
(3) Does ONUS include an intention for an immediate exchange of










C+kl 1 —select B +bi
> +ai ) event +aii
(+k2 +bi dkl/ai
k2/ai k2/bi
— keep quiet kl/bi ) kl/aii )
{'genuine' {quizmaster-type
questions} questions}
From Berry (1981a, pl34);
(using the Nigel formalisation:
i.e. '+* includes a function, '/' conflates functions.)
Figure 5:
A network for the textual and interpersonal layers of the exchange
There are also mechanisms for extending the exchange beyond the
maximum of four turns so far possible. Two additional interpersonal
functions are primarily responsible for this: 'qkl' and 'qk2'. The
first of these can occur in place of a k2f and functions as a k2,
predicting a further kl .23 As in, for" example,
Quizmaster: in England, which cathedral has
the tallest spire [dkl,pb,ai]
Contestant: is it Salisbury [k2,pc,bi]
Quizmaster: yes [kl,ps,aii]
Contestant: is it [A2£(qkl):k2,bii]
Quizmaster: yes [kl.aiii]
The second replaces a kl and, in effect, constitutes a 'dkl'-type
function predicting a further k2 and subsequent kl:
Quizmaster: in England, which cathedral has
the tallest spire [dkl,pb,ai]
23. The occurrence of a superceded, potentially-relevant function
classification will be represented throughout this thesis either
by L/Ua. or by being scored through.
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Contestant: is it Salisbury
Quizmaster: well, is it
[k2,pc,bi]
[LI(qk2):dkl,aii]
[implying the contestant is





Berry (1981a) is not particularly explicit concerning the ideational
layer details of these extended exchanges. However, Berry's (1981b)
treatment suggests that the extensions should be seen as realising
propositions which 'embed' the proposition at issue in the exchange
in fairly straightforward ways such as, for example:
oh i.e. 'it is news to me that P'
that's right i.e. 'it is correct that P'
is it? i.e. 'is it correct that P'
sure? i.e. 'are you sure that P'
Finally in this chapter, I should discuss the discourse-level
framework as Berry has devised it in terms of the clear requirements
for a systemic account established in the previous section. Berry's
framework is compatible with many possible developments - not all
compatible with the Hallidayan paradigm as I have characterised it
here", indeed, I will suggest in the following chapter that Berry's
own development must be criticised on such grounds. Furthermore,
since I have argued that a treatment of discourse in terms of
'deviance' from well-formed sequences or in terms of 'grammaticality'
is unhelpful, I will need to set out just what it is that the
generation of particular sequences of discourse-function bundles by a
systemic discoursal account is to achieve. A restatement of the basic
conversation analysis position that I cited above will help in this.
As we have seen, discourse participants are considered to act
etc.
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in terras of accountable normative expectations bearing on the nature
and design of their turns at talk." (Heritage, forthcoming.a, p6) The
systemic discoursal stratum is, then, a statement of the principles
of choice out of uhich specific norimtive expectations arise. These
principles provide a basis for the accountability of the actions they
sanction. It is precisely because such actions conform with behaviour
made comprehensible by the principles of choice that they are
accountable. Furthermore, it is the eventual aim of a Hallidayan
discourse/conversation analysis of the type I am proposing that it
should now be possible for the consequences of particular
discourse-functional choices in context to be tied formally to the
'surface-structural' details of their utterances. This is to be
achieved by virtue of the highly detailed lexicogrammatical systemic
grammars already in existence, particularly those, such as 'Nigel',
where the computational paradigm has permitted maximum breadth and
detail of coverage within a single system which remains,
nevertheless, a comprehensible and useful tool for further theory
construction.
More generally, the empirical activity of ethnomethodology
".. dissolves the apparently solid phenomena to the point
where their processual foundations become visible. It
discloses 'members' work in the world' as those phenomena's
only foundation." (Bauman, 19T78, pl90)
The discoursal stratum of potential can be seen as a characterisation
of that aspect of 'member's work in the world' concerned with the
achievement of accountably coherent interaction. Furthermore, it is
intended to do so in a way which adequately reflects the
'contingency' of that achievement; the systemic discoursal stratum is
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a means of making what occurs in discourse comprehensible by
contrasting it with whatever could have occurred but did not, thereby
displaying that choice's appropriateness. As Schegloff writes:
"Good analysis retains a sense of the actual as an achievement
from among possibilities; it retains a lively sense of the
contingency of real things. It is worth an alert, therefore,
that too easy a notion of 'discourse' can loose us that."
(1982, p89)
And, even though it leads to substantial modifications in both the
details and the theoretical grounding of Berry's framework, this will
be adhered to rigidly in the analyses to come in chapters three,
four, and five below.
To conclude I will summarise the position I have developed so
far. The previous chapter argued that a synthesis of the tenets of
conversation analysis and those of Hallidayan linguistics constitutes
a potentially beneficial framework for approaching discourse and its
relations to linguistic form and to context. This is possible because
the Hallidayan framework, when developed appropriately, exhibits an
almost identical metatheoretical orientation to that of conversation
analysis. Furthermore, and as will become clearer in chapter four,
Berry's development of a formalisation for discourse-level resources
begins to make possible a framework within which full justice can be
done to the subtlety and scope of conversation analytic accounts. A
formalisation of this kind, of discourse in particular and of the
linguistic system in general, is to be pursued, therefore, for the
following three principal reasons: first, it allows a concise
statement of the claims that are being made - thus helping both
theory construction and falsification; second, the presuppositions of
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the paradigm suggest possible directions in which appropriate
generalisations may be sought; and third, it begins to provide a
framework which can offer a much wider coverage of linguistic
phenomena than has been achieved hitherto and which can make explicit
precisely those linkages between discourse and other levels of
organisation, including those of traditional concern to linguistics -
the sentence and the clause, upon which many current theories
founder.
This completes the initial theoretical development of the
linguistic framework and its further development can now be




ideational pb propositional base : an incomplete
skeleton for a proposition
which is awaiting completion.
pc completed proposition
ps propositional support : the accept¬
ance or rejection of a
proposition which has been
completed
interpersonal k2 secondary knower's role : the partic¬
ipant being informed by the
exchange
kl primary knower's role : the partic¬
ipant who is in the position
of bearing responsibility for
the proposition the exchange
is transmitting
dkl delayed kl : where the primary knower
chooses for sane reason not to
give the stamp of his/her
authority as knower at that
turn
k2f secondary knower's final knowledge
state: the utterance which
expresses thesecondary knower's
state either as having been
successfully informed or not
by the exchange
qkl question primary knower's information
qk2 question secondary knower's
information
textual ai, aii, the turns of the first speaker
bi, bii, the turns of the second speaker
Figure 6:
The discourse micro- functions of Berry's (1981a) framework
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Chapter Three
The initial development of the discourse level
In the remainder of this thesis, I undertake the primary
objective of beginning to show how the properties of
naturally-occurring conversation might be described and explained by
a linguistic theory fully compatible with the requirements
established in chapters one and two. At present, the framework that
has been devised merely encapsulates in a semi-explicit fashion the
assumptions I am willing to accept concerning the organisation and
function of the linguistic system. Now the problem turns towards
examining how that framework may be further refined and articulated,
particularly in the realm of discourse, so as to begin to approach an
adequate linguistic theoretical position.
The direction taken will be one of continuous refinement in the
face of the requirements of data analysis; that is, I will be
examining the kinds of extensions that the analysis of several
problematic discourse- and context-related phenomena suggests for the
discourse framework as it has been introduced.
Before describing the data I have selected for analysis,
however, I need briefly to justify my decision to use what some would
consider 'unnatural' discourse. Conversation analysts in particular
make much of their refusal to accept 'impoverished' data and, as a
consequence, generally will only make use of recordings of actual
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spontaneous conversations, unconstrained apart from the natural
exigencies of the situation. I will not be using such data and so,
for those who feel this to be a serious limitation, a few words of
explanation will be appropriate.
1. Arguments for a restricted discourse domain
So far in this thesis I have emphasised that perhaps the
principal function of language is to maintain the shared context in
which the language behaviour occurs. It is that context which is
responsible for the meaningfulness of the activities it encompasses -
with a different context 'similar* activities might receive quite
distinct interpretations. In order to examine this process, then, a
suitable area of data should admit of a description in 'contextual'
terms that fixes the meanings of the occurring language more or less
independently of the specific forms that the language takes. Unless
what is being explicitly shared by the discourse participants in
their interaction can be isolated in some way, it will remain
virtually impossible to specify just why specific linguistic
resources are being deployed as they are. This, in fact, is precisely
the benefit a constrained discourse domain confers. The language
observed in that domain can be seen functioning at all levels of
analysis with sufficient clarity to enable the explanation of the
deployment of linguistic resources in terms of the consequences of
that deployment on contextual development. The risk - ever present in
discourse analysis - that the interpretations made by the analyst
bear little resemblance to, or worse, seriously misrepresent the
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subject matter under analysis is therefore much reduced by the
existence of an externally verifiable interpretation of the context.
Therefore, when one is seeking the beginnings of a framework
that is capable of capturing fine details of language organisation at
many levels of analysis, it becomes essential to narrow the focus of
attention sufficiently for formalisation to commence. Furthermore, if
this can be done without seriously compromising the aspects of
linguistic organisation with which one is concerned at a particular
point in the analysis then the restriction is well worthwhile in the
increased hold on the data that it affords. In short, a restriction
in viewpoint can be seen to include the following beneficial
consequences:
First, the restriction allows a greater depth of motivated analysis.
If what is being shared and achieved in the discourse can be
captured, then the functioning of the accompanying language can be
seen with sufficient clarity to permit the explanation of its
deployment of linguistic resources in terms of the achievement it
represents.
Second, the study of genres under various constraints (e.g.
role-oriented, task-oriented, sound-only, etc.) can still reveal
interesting general mechanisms. For example, in the analysis below I
suggest that the restriction of resources for topic organisation can
be accounted for as an instance of the functioning of a general
mechanism within the linguistic system, i.e.: the negotiated
'pre-selection' of resources for 'fine-tuning' the linguistic system
as a whole for use in particular concrete situations. The study of
- 177 -
genres under different constraints can then be used to round out the
analysis of each particular genre by enabling a more complete account
of those mechanisms operative generally to be constructed.
Third, the description of genre-specific forms of linguistic
patterning is itself a useful and necessary study. For example, the
fact, which we shall see below, that 'role'-constrained discourse
produces certain types of organisation is a phenomenon concerning the
relation between role-structure and discourse forms that any complete
theory will need to address.
And finally, if it is accepted, as I propose, that the linguistic
activity undertaken to lesser and greater degrees defines the nature
of the social activity as it is understood by its participants, then
the study of specific genres becomes an essential part of
understanding the nature of their situations of use. The progression
from less complex to more natural situations then seems an
appropriate research methodology.
As has been shown in many computational environments the
restriction to a specific problem domain has often permitted a level
of detailed description impossible to achieve in less bounded
situations. It appears that this provides a useful lesson in the
formalisation of all levels of human ability, especially in these
early stages of research where a general understanding of what is
involved still lies in the future, and so I believe a restriction to
specifically elicited discourse to be more than justified.
2. Description of the data: the maze game
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The specific discourse domain that I have selected for analysis
consists of protocols gathered from a co-operative game situation
played between two participants. This game has been developed by Dr.
Simon Garrod of the Psychology Department at the University of
Glasgow and is currently being used in various research projects
within that department.* The game, which is called the 'maze game',
is structured such that its players need to communicate to each other
specific positions within a maze-like pattern displayed on a computer
screen; those points include, for example, the positions of specific
entities significant to the game, such as tokens representing
themselves, goals which they have to reach, obstacles, and means of
removing those obstacles. In addition, the players also need to
communicate their co-ordinated plans of action for the playing of the
game. Since the game in itself sets quite a problem-solving
challenge, the players quickly become very involved and produce
spontaneous, informal, mixed-initiative dialogues. Therefore,
although the situation in which the players are interacting is
'unnatural' in that it has been -created specifically to elicit
discourse under controlled conditions, the involvement of the players
in the game nevertheless gives rise to a fairly free use of language.
Furthermore, as the players are out of sight of each other, their
communication is restricted to purely verbal communication and this
removes another level of possible complexity - a level which, given
the current state of the art, the discourse analyst is well justified
in avoiding.^
2. Especially considering that it is now largely accepted that the
limiting of conversation to sound, thereby removing the visual
possibilities of gesture, gaze, etc., does not significantly alter
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The suitability of this kind of restricted domain is also aided
by the fact that the possibilities for action within the game are
completely constrained, thus permitting their formalisation, while
the choices that the players come to make are relatively free and,
within the general possibilities available, subject to negotiation.
And so, even though it is usually clear what players must attempt to
achieve, their particular methods for going about this are not
predetermined and provide a rich source of conversational activity.
The game itself is played as follows. The two players involved
are placed in separate compartments each with a computer visual
display unit. Upon the screens of the display units is shown a
rectangular grid which has been turned into a maze by its being more
or less incomplete; i.e.: an array of points is converted into a maze
by randomly connecting each point to some, but not necessarily all,
of its immediate neighbours. Both players share the same maze
configuration. A player is said to be situated at the points in the
grid, while game moves consist of a player changing his/her current
position to a connected adjacent point. The object of the game is for
the players to bring about a situation in which they both occupy
their respective 'goals' - which are positions in the grid selected
1. In fact, the strictly non-psychological approach I am taking to
the analysis of the data contrasts in interesting ways with the
psychological accounts that are currently under development; the
details of this, however, will not be particularly relevant here.
the organisation of interaction beyond minor, quite predictable
effects such as increased orientation to checking and re-checking
the availability of co-speakers; see, e.g. Butterworth, Hine, and
Brady (1977), and Beattie (1981).
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at random for each player - at the same time. In order to get to that
situation, the players move alternately, either by specifying a
direction in which to go - the choices being up, down, left, and
right relative to the maze - or by passing - which scores a penalty
point against them.
Now, although both players are in the same maze, they have
access to different information. Each player can see the basic maze
configuration, his/her own position, and the position of his/her
'goal' upon his/her own screen. What a player cannot see, however, is
the position of the other player or that of the other player's goal.
Furthermore, communication is made an intrinsic part of the game by
the introduction of 'gates' and 'switch points'. For each player, a
random subset of the paths available are rendered unusable by being
blocked by 'gates' across those paths. Each player can only see
his/her own gates. Also, for each player, a random subset of the
positions in the maze are designated to be 'switch points', the
function of which is to open all the paths in a player's maze which
were blocked by closed gates and simultaneously to close all those
which were previously open. Each player can only see his/her own
switch points, but they are only activated when the player vho cannot
see them occupies the relevant position in the maze. Therefore, the
player for whom a switch point has an effect cannot him/herself
activate it. Instead, s/he must have the other player, who cannot see
that switch point, occupy its position in the maze. By this means the
game is made essentially co-operative and communicative. That
communication is made possible via headphones and microphones and is
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recorded on audio-tape to give maze game protocols. These protocols
are also accompanied by a hardcopy record, produced by the computer,
of the state of the maze as seen by each of the players prior to each
move that is made, thereby providing a verifiable statement of the
actual situation the players are addressing at each stage of the
game.
As an example, figure 1 below depicts the state of affairs that
might hold sometime during the playing of a game. The left-hand maze
configuration shows what may be seen by player A and the right-hand
configuration shows the view of player B. The maze itself is
unchanged in the two perspectives, but the positioning of items
within the maze is specific to each player. A star ('*') represents
the goal of the player who can see it, a cross (*X') the position of
the player who can see it, an 'S' denotes a switch point, and a
barrier across a path ('|* or ) denotes a gate.
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In the particular situation of figure 1 then, player A, who is
situated towards the lower left-hand corner of the maze, can only
move down, moves to the right and up being blocked, while player B,
who is on the top row, can only move to the right, moves to the left
and down being blocked. However, if it were A's turn to move and A
decided not to suffer a penalty point and instead move down away from
his/her goal, then B's situation would be altered. As can be seen
from the right-hand maze, by moving down A moves into one of B's
switch points and so changes the state of all B's gates. The
situation that holds for both players after A makes this move is
shown in figure 2.
Here, again, A can only see the left-hand information and B the
right and so, unless B explicitly informs A of the consequences of
A's move, A has no way of knowing that his/her move has completely
altered B's possibilities for moving. B can now move left or down,
but not right. Furthermore, if B moves down s/he would land upon a
switch point of A (as can be seen from the left-hand maze), change
the state of A's barriers, and so would completely block all of A's
possible moves. This would require the taking of penalty points until
B could again find a switch point belonging to A. It is, then, to
avoid situations such as this and to achieve most readily the
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3. Description of the protocols
Five main protocols vere used as the central data addressed in
this thesis, providing over an hour of conversation in total. Of
these, one (PI, approximately 15 minutes in length) I needed to
transcribe from scratch from the audio-tape. With the other four,
written unanalysed transcripts of the tapes had already been made at
Glasgow, although it was nevertheless necessary to retranscribe these
from the original tapes in order to ensure consistency across the
five main protocols with respect to the particular linguistic details
I wished to be able to address and to reduce further any remaining
differences between transcript and tape. In addition to the five main
protocols, several other game records from the Glasgow collection
were looked at in considerably less detail, both in audio and
transcript form, in order to ensure the typicality of the main
protocols selected. Finally, a collection made by Simon Garrod and
Anthony Anderson at Glasgow of the. expressions used by players to
refer to positions in the maze in a futher ten or so games was used
to supplement those of the main protocols in order to provide
additional justification for the generality of certain of the
conclusions reached in chapter five below.
The actual form of the transcripts of the maze game protocols
as they appear in this thesis will be as follows. Individual
discourse contributions will be represented at the level of the words
of which they are comprised, reflecting as accurately as possible the
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morphological form and state of completeness in which the words
appeared. Standard spellings will be used throughout; the
conversation analysis method of transcription in which a
quasi-phonetic spelling representation is used will not be adopted.3
Also represented will be whether successive utterances are 'latched',
i.e. one following immediately without any break on the heels of the
other; whether an utterance is interrupted; whether overlapping
speech occurs; and whether and where hesitations or immediate
self-corrections occur. This is best clarified by means of some
examples.
Thus, in the utterance
B: Uhu, [A MOVES] (3s)
So you're on the 1- the- the, upper,
the- the uppermost row, right?
B first responds with the minimal agreement or 'carry-on' marker
'uhhuh' (other varieties of this type being 'mmhmm', 'yeah', 'OK',
etc. ) and then pauses. Short pauses will be represented by commas;
longer pauses may have their length also specified as is the case
here.
Other information that may appear in parentheses will also
relate to 'nonverbal' features of the language that are apparent to
the players; as in, e.g.:
A: My earphones fell off er,
B: (laughs) In the excitement
A: (laughs) er, I'm going to move down now,
3. For apt criticisms of several aspects of the conversation
analytic form of transcription see: Owen (1983, pp5-6).




B: That's me moved,
(coughs) Excuse me, (2s)
External, or contextual, information will be placed in square
brackets; by and large the only such information relevant in this
analysis will be the actual game moves that the players make.
Immediate self-corrections which result in a word being broken
off in the middle will be represented by hyphens; in
you're on the 1- the- the, upper
then, player B probably begins to say 'lower', realises this is
wrong, immediately stops and produces a definite article, twice,
before hesitating and finding the apparently appropriate "upper*.
Hyphens will be used to indicate incompletion of forms generally, for
whatever reason they may occur.
In addition to these kinds of information, intonation will be
represented by the rudimentary scheme of including a question-mark
for rising intonation and a full-stop for nonrising intonation; the
default will be nonrising. This is in no way intended to suggest this
is adequate; indeed, the problem is heightened considerably by the
extremely poor understanding we have of intonational phonology
generally and the fact that many of those taking part in the maze
game had Glaswegian or 'western' Scottish accents. The designations
of question or rising intonation I adopt here should be seen, then,
as suggesting an impression of an utterance's perceived role in the
discourse rather than capturing intonational phonetic details. For
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some of the intonational patterns distinctive of the kinds of accents
I have been dealing with here, see: Currie (1979), Brown, Currie, and
Kenworthy (1980).
Emphasis, whether due to explicit contrast, excitement, or
whatever, will also be represented. As in the second of the following
utterances, this will be indicated by italics:
A: And you want me to do that?
B: well, {yes, yes, but,}
A: {you don't? { (laughs)
The braces across speaker turns signify the relative
synchronisation of those turns; that is, in this case, B's "yes, yes"
and A's "you don't?" both begin at the same time and therefore
overlap. Also, following B's emphasised "but", A laughs.
Occasionally, when the use of braces is not convenient, simultaneity
will be indicated by means of a subscripted slash '/\\ this will
signify that a turn labelled *i' that occurs subsequently in the
transcript begins in overlap at that point. The last two turns of the
previous example could therefore be rewritten thus:
B: well, /\ yes, yes, but, /g
k\ : you don't?
Ag: (laughs)
Finally, as in some of the conversation analysis examples used
previously, the equals-sign will specify latched turns, when one turn
follows another immediately without even the normal inter-turn












{ synchronisation across turns
A turn labelled 'i' begins at this
point
er, ehm, etc. 'filled' pauses
• • . signifies that there is talk that
is being omitted from the transcript
at this point
Figure 3: Transcript conventions
One further consideration is also appropriate, however, before
analysis proper can begin. Since a single maze game can last over
thirty minutes, it would be useful to be able to address some
substantially shorter stretch of behaviour as a unit for analysis.
The next section identifies such a unit and explains its motivation.
4. Move segments
Within the playing of the maze game there are several recurrent
situation-types that are necessary for any adequate understanding of
the game.5 These types may be realised in various particular game
specific ways but can be seen to occur in almost all game protocols.
Three types are immediately distinguishable.
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First, there is the beginning of the game: before commencing
the game proper the general situation in which the players find
themselves has to be established. It is here that greetings are
found, comments about the communication channel are most commonly
placed, and the first establishment of the players' respective
positions is undertaken. For example,
A: But we can't see each other this time, Mick.
OK. Start.
B: Aye. Where are you now then?
[11D.0]
B: I'm getting something now.
A: Yeah he's getting something.
B: Right. Now, wait a minute.
A: Right. We can't see each other.
B: Can you see the goals either, no?
A: I can see er,




A: Where are you? (laugh)
[44A.0]
This segment will be called the 'initialisation' segment. It is
typically concluded by the successful identification of the players'
positions, after which the players turn their attention to their
first move. This boundary is often quite abrupt, as the following
shows:
A: Right, got you, got you. [i.e. positions established]
B: Right, so }
A: {I'm off. Right, hell.
B: Where are you moving?
[1 IF.0/1]
The second recurrent situation-type is that which is found at
5. Interestingly, there are protocols in which the players had not
adequately understood the game. It is possible to demonstrate in
these that the required situation-types are not constructed.
- 191 -
the conclusion of the game. This is where both players have succeeded
in moving into their respective goals so as to occupy them
simultaneously. The time the game has lasted and the penalty score
are typically cited by one or other of the players at this stage,
often accompanied by an expression of relief. The segment of the
protocol corresponding to this situation will be termed the 'final'
segment.
Third and lastly, there are intermediate segments derivable
from the move structure of the game. At each moment in the game from
the end of the initialisation segment to the end of the final segment
the players are 'oriented towards', or considering, the next move.
The playing of the game which begins with the consideration of a
subsequent move and ends with the next move having been made will be
called a 'move segment'. The final segment is therefore a special
case of the more general class of move segments.
Considered in this way, then, the behaviour involved in playing
a maze game exhibits the following 'structure':
I (initialisation)M(ove)M ... MF(inal)
The move segment, as the most typical situation of the maze game,
will be adopted here as the primary unit of analysis; 137 of such
move segments were provided by the five main protocols. Protocol
segments cited in the text will therefore be located in terms of the
protocol from which they come (the protocol identifications used
here, with the exception of protocol 'PI', are those that have been
allocated at Glasgow), and the move segment from which the discourse
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segment is taken; for example, the next example below, '44A.4', comes
from the fourth move segment of protocol 44A.®
An approximate indication of the boundaries of move segments is
given by the actual taking of moves by the players of the game. The
correspondence is not exact because it is usually the case that after
a player moves s/he informs the other player, who cannot see the
effect of the move, that the move has been successfully completed.
Thus, at the end of move segments before the players continue with
the consideration of their next move, one finds utterances such as,
B: So I'll just incur a penalty point, alright?
A: Right, [B moves] (3s)
B: Right, that's me incurred my penalty.
[44A.4]
Further, if the move is into a switch-point there will be a
confirmation that the desired switching has in fact been achieved or
an exclamation of surprise or annoyance that there has been an
unexpected switching. For example,
A: ... right you move up now
B: [B moves] Right, is that you changed?
A: Give's a second. Aye ....
[1 ID.24]
or
B: Right. Can you move up now?
A: Yes (2s) Going up [A moves] (Is)
B: Right, you're changing my barriers, OK?
[44A.21]
The structuring of a game into initialisation, move, and final
segments represents the least level of detail that will be considered
for the moment in the analysis of the maze game. In particular, move
6. This is sometimes given in the expanded form AAL0G44A at
Glasgow.
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segments last on average less than a minute and so can be considered
in depth.
In addition, these segments provide a convenient basis for the
formulation of functional roles for the language of the maze game to
bear.^ These roles may be defined in terms of the consequences they
have for the accompanying context and offer a means of defining when
otherwise quite varied linguistic realisations are to be considered
functionally equivalent or related. This permits a specification of
the formal, i.e. lexicogrammatical, alternatives that are available
for realising any given function of the maze game situation. The
question as to what precisely conditions selection among those
alternatives can then be raised in detail. The formal alternatives of
primary concern here, of course, are those that traditionally have
been approached in terms of discourse, i.e. those that can be
considered to lie upon the textual metafunction and interclausal
'dimensions' of linguistic organisation.
An initial functional decomposition of the move segment
provides the following organisation of functional roles for language
to fulfill:
(F1) [ (Ascertain possibilities) ]
(F2) [ (Ascertain requirements) ]
(F3) [ Propose move(s) ]
(F4) [ Consider/Evaluate effects ] repeated until
(F5) [ Decision ] 'plan' formed
(P6) (Report move(s) accepted)
(F7) State current move being made
(F8) Check position/effect of current move
7. This is very similar to Mitchell's (1957) analysis of various
categories of transactions involving buying and selling, which was
first mentioned in chapter two above, and his break down of these
categories into stages.
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Now, at this stage, this is purely a response to the requirements of
the game: it cannot be assumed that this organisation bears any
relationship with any large-scale linguistic organisation a segment
might possess; that organisation remains to be uncovered. Below, in
chapter seven, I will pay attention to one specific functional role
that recurs frequently in the maze game protocols as a subcomponent
of many of the above more general roles. This role supports
utterances such as
I'm in three one [44A.0]
I'm at the very bottom of that row you're at[1 ID.12]
and may be characterised as:
identify a position
- either in absolute terms (e.g. co-ordinates)
or relative to a significant object
This narrowing of attention will permit some quite interesting
general phenomena of discourse and contextual interaction to be
approached.
It is now necessary to examine the suitability for the analysis
of this kind of data of the discourse framework of Berry (1981a)
introduced in the previous chapter. The final sections of this
chapter undertake this examination and find the original framework
wanting in several respects. To prepare the framework for the
analysis of the next chapter, therefore, I will need to make several
significant changes.
5. General problems with Berry's account
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In this section I will briefly discuss a very general
disagreement I have with Berry's suggested development of the
exchange structure account; this will permit the following sections
to proceed to extend that account in two particular directions that
are immediately suggested by a consideration of the language of the
maze game protocols.
My general disagreement rests upon a tendency of Berry's to
attempt to 'rescue' systemic linguistics from the imprecision of
Halliday's more recent work; her position on this point is well
stated in Berry (1980, 1982). Berry argues that the exchange should
be accepted as a well-motivated linguistic unit because it seems to
be possible to isolate several 'patternings' operative over a stretch
of linguistic behaviour more or less co-extensive with the exchange
as Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) originally envisaged it. Berry in
fact describes five sets of rules which specify well-formedness
constraints on these patterns and these may be interpreted as
considering the exchange from various perspectives; Berry (1981b)
describes two 'formal' sets of rules, which will not be of central
importance here, while Berry (1981a) describes the three 'functional'
sets of rules that we saw in the previous chapter", all of these rules
relate to the exchange as an independent unit. Berry summarises these
sets of rules thus:
"i) Rules relating to the co-occurrence and sequencing
restrictions on classes of sentences such as question and
statement;
ii) Rules mapping the appropriate degrees of ellipticity on to
the sequences of questions and statements;
iii) Rules relating to the propositional development;
iv) Rules relating to turn-taking;
v) Rules relating to the relative-knowledge of the
participants." (1981b, p38)
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The first two sets are those which relate to form; the remaining
three relate to function.
Now, as a response to the admittedly poor record systemic
linguistics, particularly in its Hallidayan variants, has had in
proposing explicit treatments of data, Berry is prepared to admit the
theoretical mechanisms of early transformational-type grammars into
her account in order to achieve the required level of formality.
However, this unfortunate Chomskyan slant to the formulation of
linguistic rules culminates in the following statement:
"Rules such as those that I have been discussing in this paper
define only the most regular exchanges. Naturally occurring
texts contain a large number of instances of deliberate or
accidental deviance. This usually means that there will be a
clash between the various sets of criteria provided by the
rules: stretches of discourse will be found which obey some of
the rules but not others. ... It would seem sensible to single
out one of the sets of rules and make this the crucial
defining set for the exchange." (1981b, p38/9)
And, of course, given the typical orientation of discourse analysis
described in the introduction, that singled out set is none other
than those of the ideational layer concerned with the propositional
development. A position such as this, therefore, well justifies
ethnomethodological criticisms of premature formalisation.
Furthermore, it seems to me to violate the spirit of the Hallidayan
paradigm. Considering the lack of fine detail predicted by Berry's
proposed constraints, such a formal isation must be seen as doubly
premature and is only justifiable when it is has already been
accepted that the Hallidayan framework is inadequate for the task at
hand.
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Berry, for example, distinguishes between the responses in the
following two exchanges:
A: Would you like to come round for coffee tonight
B: Who wouldn't
A: Would you like to come round for coffee tonight
B: Yes Thanks
saying that the latter is completely well-formed while the former is
"not straightforwardly well formed. [It is] deviant. Though not so
deviant as to be impossible discourse." (1981b, p31) Deviance,
distinguished from ill-formedness, is then used to justify the
bringing to bear of Gricean implicatures to get over more in the
response than a simple yes/no. But, in these very early stages in the
statement of discourse organisation, one cannot be concerned with
classifying instances of language use as 'deviant* in some sense - if
an occurrence does not fit one's rules then it is the rules that must
go. Below I will be seeking a more general statement of the
organisation of exchanges true to the Hallidayan paradigm which
renders what occurs intelligible, not in terms of 'deviance', but in
terms of the consequences of specific occurrences for the development
of the situation as a whole.
The following example protocol segment will begin to show the
inadequacy of Berry's proposed account in detail. It will also allow
me to demonstrate how the framework may be usefully extended by means
of a thorough re-orientation towards Hallidayan principles rather
than by the adoption of a more traditional structuralist position.
The move segment 44A.20, given below, concerns player B finding
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out vhat s/he must do in order to avoid switching player A. Now, in
Sinclair and Coulthard's (1975) teacher-pupil interactions and
Berry's (1981b) quizmaster-contestant interactions the roles of the
participants are pregiven and hierarchically related. That is, there
is a 'figure in authority', the teacher or quizmaster, and as a
consequence the turn-taking is tightly constrained and embodies a
'speak when spoken to' principle for the participant not in
authority. However, in the maze game situation there is, typically,
no obvious hierarchically-structured role relationship between the
players. Furthermore, as we shall see below and particularly in
chapter seven, the relationships that are present are often arrived
at by negotiation and change according to the maze game task being
undertaken. Thus, in the maze game protocols generally and as can be
seen in segment 44A.20, the strict turn-taking schema of a
role-conditioned genre is broken. There are many and frequent
interruptions and a player often proposes responses for the other
player to accept or reject. Under Berry's account this immediately
leads to a multitude of 'embedded' exchanges and a mass of structural
detail that is of little value in understanding why the language is
occurring as it is.
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1 B: Right, where are your S boxes from where I am
2 A: You're at 4 4? S- (Is) Yes?
3 B: No, I'm,
4 A: 4 5
5 B: 4 5 (Is)
6 A: Well (Is) tha-
7 B: I'm on an S box {of yours?
8 A: {you are, you are, uhu,
9 B: so, if I incur a penalty point I may, change your
10 barriers...
Protocol segment: 44A.20
This 'deviance' from the simplest expected structure hints at a
quite general problem with the exchange structure theory as Berry has
developed it. As I mentioned above, following Coulthard and Brazil
(1981, pi01) and discourse analytic approaches generally, although
Berry considers the exchange to be the unit concerned with
'negotiating the transmission of information', in her formulation,
this negotiation aspect is not particularly stressed. In the quiz
situation it is possible to isolate the questions of immediate
concern that fix the 'information to be transmitted' in a way quite
inappropriate for natural conversation. 'Topics' are not in general
set up prior to the exchange - they are negotiated by the
participants as the exchange proceeds. Furthermore, since exchanges
are only defined with respect to some proposition, as soon as that
proposition is itself undergoing development during an exchange
(which is precisely the case which is explicitly ruled out by the
quiz situation), the isolation of individual exchanges begins to be
problematic. But then, if deviations are to occur so readily, what
predictive power can the framework retain?
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The same problem is also apparent between 'independent'
exchanges. In the quiz situation, as perhaps nowhere else, the
discourse can be analysed as a sequence of exchanges with minimal
interactions between those exchanges. That is, a question is asked
and then answered, then the next is asked and answered, and so on;
this activity constitutes the quiz. To accept such data, not just as
another genre to be fitted into some more general framework, but as a
genre which gives a useful idealised norm, again betrays the
Chomskyan, competence slant given to the theory. Instead of studying
lists of sentences divorced from context to ascertain what
constitutes 'grammaticality', Berry studies exchanges similarly
isolated. The 'decontextualisation' thus implied is contrary both to
the Hallidayan paradigm at large and to the Hallidayan concept of
linguistic potential in particular.
This situation is made worse by the specifically pedagogic
genre implied by the kinds of questions considered. These are not, by
and large, questions seeking information at all but, instead, are
questions for which the asker already knows the answer. Thus, not
only are the boundaries of 'exchanges' particularly prominent in the
quiz situation but the internal structure of exchanges are tied
specifically to this type of genre: indeed, it could well be argued
that, at the level of form at least, the regularities observed in
'exchanges' are purely a product of the restricted situation. To
begin building such regularities into the structural necessities of
the exchange must surely be a questionable practice.
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The following 'exchange' demonstrates well some of the problems
inherent in attempting to treat the exchange primarily as the
transmission of information. This view entails that something needs
to be asserted or that, at least, there is a nonquestioning sentence
or move at the heart of the exchange. Although this may seem a
relatively uncontentious claim, it is by no means as well-formulated
or general as it needs to be. In the exchange
A: can you change me?
B: I don't know. Can I?
A: That's right er ...
[11F.1]
for example, what is it that is being asserted, that B does not know
whether s/he can change A?
A response such as this does not at all reflect adequately what
is happening. In the 'transmitting of information' approach exchanges
are being construed as one particular kind of adjacency pair, the
question-answer, and this is being proposed as the general form of
discourse organisation that involves constrained turn-taking. What
information, then, do summons^response, invitation-reply, and
greeting-greeting adjacency pairs transmit? It should be noted that
it is always possible to create appropriate information as an answer
to this question; for example, 'a willingness to take part in
conversation is transmitted'. But this is placing an additional
interpretation on what is occurring which is imported from the
question-answer paradigm rather than arising out of the analysis of
these types of adjacency pairs themselves. Thus, I would claim that
what the exchange from 11F.1 above achieves is a reassignment of the
knowledge roles A has imposed on the participants. There is simply no
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need to posit some 'information transmitted' of the form 'B does not
know whether s/he can change A' in order to understand the workings
of this exchange. Furthermore, it is interesting that not only does
B's response deny A's estimation of who has knowledge but also
allocates the roles appropriately simply by uttering the question
'can I?'. This question receives no direct answer nor does it need
one, its work has been done simply in virtue of its having been
asked. The 'information transmitted* might then be interpreted as:
'Only A knows whether B can change A'
or,
'in any situation in the maze game, it is the player who
wishes to be changed who is in possession of the knowledge of
where the other player must move.'
or any number of similar propositions. They would all, however, for
the understanding of the discourse organisation, be inessential
analytic constructs. What is essential, following this exchange, is
that A knows 'how to go on'.
How then should the exchange be construed? Returning to the
conception of the unit 'negotiating the transmission of information',
I will focus particularly on the negotiation aspect, first with
respect to question-answer type adjacency pairs, and only
subsequently seeing if further generalisation is possible or
desirable with the exchange structure model. Of primary significance,
therefore, will be the exchange viewed as the unit 'over which
turn-taking is predictable' (Berry, 1981a, pl31) and, with this is
mind, I now turn again specifically to Berry's proposed functional
constraints upon the well-formedness of exchanges.
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Berry's functional constraints on the development of discourse
as described in the previous chapter can be seen as attempts to
suggest isolable aspects of the more general notions of 'conditional
relevance' between adjacency pair parts and 'prediction' in the
exchange theories of Sinclair and Coulthard (1975), Coulthard and
Brazil (1981), Stubbs (1981), and others. The discourse
micro-functions are intended to suggest specific restrictions for
their formal manifestations. Indeed, all five sets of Berry's
constraints may be seen as an attempt to give Coulthard and Brazil's
claim that 'the power of the exchange is that as one progresses the
available options decrease rapidly' (1979, p43) considerably more
theoretical bite.
Now, it is apparent that there are many question-answer
sequences in the maze game protocols for which Berry's account
supplies a reasonably appealing and straightforward analysis. These
can be extremely straightforward as in:
B: Are you stuck all ways?
A: Well I can go back but it's really a waste of time
B: OK
[1 IF. 1]













They can also be more complex exchanges such as the insertion
sequence seen above in segment 44A.20 (lines 2-5). This might be
covered by an exchange of the following form:
t2(- (qkl ):k2
aii










In the majority of cases, however, in order to impose Berry's
organisation upon actual utterances, a good deal of flexibility needs
to be retained in the application of the functional categories.
Indeed, even for these simple cases I have needed to adopt a generous
interpretation of what may count as an instance of an exchange or an
element of an exchange in order to be able to apply the framework as
it stands and there has certainly not been any formal
'identification' process by which I could state why the given
analyses are 'correct' or better than any that might be proposed in
their place.
A discussion of some particular problems with applying the
current exchange structure theory to the data at hand will clarify
the directions in which the theory must be 'stretched' to accommodate
data such as those discussed in this section more naturally. The
first problem I address concerns what are to be considered the
elements out of which exchanges are constructed. The second will deal
with the development of the propositions carried by exchanges, a
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problem mentioned above with respect to ascertaining exchange
boundaries.
6. Turns, sentences, or moves?
A difficulty which immediately arises in trying to apply an
analysis such as Berry's to the maze game data is the status of
speaker turns. For example, as we have seen in chapter two, Sinclair
and Coulthard (1975, etc.) have a discourse level rank scale
consisting of acts:moves:exchanges, while Berry attempts to extend
the lexicogrammatical-level rank scale to handle discourse giving
sentences:moves:exchanges. However, all that which is actually given
in the stretches of language observed appears more on a par with
Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson's (1974) observation that 'speaker
transition recurs'; the proposed relations of speaker turns, defined
as stretches of talk between speaker transitions (a definition
clearly in need of further refinement), to the units of the variously
proposed rank scales are still far from unproblematic.
Sinclair and Coulthard (1975), for example, start with the
adjacency pair notion of the turn but decide that they need a smaller
unit, which they term the move. Also, Coulthard (1977, p69/70)
suggests that the stretch of language termed a turn by those
employing adjacency pair analyses is, in fact, nearer to Sinclair and
Coulthard's conception of the move than to a speaker's 'turn at
talk'. For example, the single turn at talk
'A: To keep you strong, yes, to keep you strong.
Why do you want to be strong?" (Coulthard, 1977, p69)
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both answers one question and poses another, thereby participating in
two 'adjacency pairs' which are 'chained' together. The turn at talk
is deprived, therefore, of any structural significance and fine
details of the interaction of actual physical turns do not play any
significant role in Sinclair and Coulthard's exchange structure
account. Similarly, Berry's (1981b) construction of moves from
classes of sentences makes no explicit use of the physical turn at
talk. Exchanges are the units over which turn-taking is predictable
yet the elements of exchanges are moves. It is therefore accepted
that turns are moves', for example, Berry says of the following
discourse segment,
Teacher: What are seven twelves
Pupil: Eighty-four
Teacher: Right




"It is within the exchange that strict turn-taking must be
observed. It is only at an exchange boundary that a given
speaker may take two turns following." (1981b, p37)
However, I think this neglect of the physical turn at talk as a
theoretically significant unit complicates the resulting theories in
both Sinclair and Coulthard's and Berry's cases.
Richardson (1981) approaches the physical turn and the
'logical' turn, or move, in a more equal fashion. She adopts two
distinct dimensions of patterning: the 'structuration' of talk,
around which exchange structure centres, and the 'synchronisation' of
talk, to which Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson's (1974) 'simplest
systematics' of turn taking applies and for which notions such as
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'overlap' and 'turn gaps' become relevant. The separation of these
two kinds of organisation of discourse permits Richardson to adopt
the following position:
'Although the turn-taking principle is appropriate for the
description of the synchronisation of talk it is not a useful
principle with which to describe its structuration, for not
only can we point to many turns which accommodate more than
one contribution [move], many contributions in fact occupy
more than one turn." (1981, p58)
Thus, a certain degree of autonomy is introduced between the
distribution of moves and the distribution of turns.® Richardson
makes use of this to argue that lexicogrammatical units can
themselves function in discourse patterning rather than serving only
as the realisations of units of the true discourse stratum. With this
in mind she provides several examples where the contribution of a
speaker is to be regarded as a single move because of its syntactic
unity - even though this many spread over several turns and include
clarifying side sequences where the speaker produces turns not
structurally related to the larger move in progress.
When applied to the maze .game data this distinction between
synchronisation and structuration immediately helps with the
usability of Berry's systematisation. For example, the first
'exchange' of protocol segment PI.16,
A: where are you?
B: right see I'm at the third column
A: uhu 4 up
B: yeah
8. It is noteworthy that Reichman (1981 ) has come to a very
similar conclusion from Ahe completely different perspective of
her own context space theory of discourse: "Analysis of natural
dialogues reveals that there is no direct connection between a
speaker's single turn (or speaker shifts) and performing a single
conversational move." (p37)
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presents the problem that by A's second turn the exchange appears to
be structurally complete even though parts of the proposition are
still being proposed (e.g. "4 up"). Berry's functional-level analysis
would be of the form:
k2f k2k2 kl
Pb pc






and the final k2-kl pair is considered a bound, or 'embedded'
exchange along the lines set out in Berry (1981b); some simple
embedded exchanges were illustrated at the very end of the previous
chapter.^ However, the sense in which the final two moves form a
bound exchange is very different from those examples offered in Berry
(1981b) since it is somewhat artificial to claim that "4 up" 'embeds'
in any way the proposition at issue in the matrix exchange.*0 '4 Up"
simply continues that proposition's articulation and so I suggest a
discourse-functional characterisation of these four turns more in
line with the following:
k2 kl k2f-k2 kl
Pb pc pc ps
mi mii « miii
In this version, then, the second move, mii, in which the complete
proposition is given via the two occurrences of pc, is shared across
two turns at talk; in general, the presence of "." as a discourse
function will be used to indicate that the previously specified
discourse function is still in effect. This kind of contribution and
9. Note that to accommodate A's 'uhu' it is already necessary to
construe the functions ai, bi, aii, etc. as indicating moves
rather than turns.
10. Curious quantificational treatments in a Montague-type
framework, of course, notwithstanding.
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its representation at the discourse level will be discussed further
in chapter four under the possible categories of ellipsis; noteworthy
here, however, is the divergence in this use of 'move' from the
speaker-based construct commonly employed in discourse analysis. The
move of the discourse level is to be restricted in meaning to refer
solely to the development of the exchange and hence of the
conversation. The turns that make up this move might well receive
separate (and, indeed, endless!) interpretations as rhetorical moves,
i.e. in terms of their social interpretation, but this is not what is
being focused upon within the discourse level of organisation.
Even though this begins to weaken the structural unity of the
exchange with respect to turn-taking and clearly requires alterations
in the details of the three layers, I will argue that the more
'fluid' assignment and acceptance of predictions on what is to come
enables a far more natural characterisation of complex interaction to
be captured. In particular, in order to capture the flexibility and
adaptability that will be evident below in the use of discourse
resources, a re-emphasis will be necessary upon the principle of
'continual classification* that Sinclair and Coulthard (1975, pl20)
adopt from the ethnomethodologists. Although according to this
principle each discourse contribution is to be seen in the light of
the expectations set up by the contribution preceding, the exchange
structure schemes typically defined capture this setting up and
meeting of expectations well only in so far as the contributions
considered contribute to the construction of a 'well-formed'
exchange. If the notion of the well-formedness of exchanges is not
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given such centrality then one is free to investigate the creative
use of the resources available in a more revealing manner.^ The
analysis needs to make clear what a particular choice of discourse
functions achieves in context and this is often hindered if a choice
is considered idiosyncratic or deviant. The discourse
characterisation presented here is an initial attempt to capture the
workings of 'interactional contingency' as we saw Schegloff describe
it towards the end of chapter two.
Immediately clear here, therefore, is the possibility of making
the discourse-functional organisation very much more responsive to
the fine details of the lexicogrammatical options exercised. A's
second turn can be seen as a continuation of the lexicogrammatical
unit begun by B. Thus, its status as a move can be characterised as a
continuation; this is a phenomenon of the structuration of the
exchange. The fact that the speaker changes during the move is a
synchronisation phenomenon with its own significance and I will
develop an account of this below. The necessity of B's final support
is then predicted by the switch from kl to k2-status during the
previous move since this requires a further kl on the proposition at
issue. B is then restricted to either supporting or rejecting that
proposition because the proposition is already complete.
An example of the latter possibility, i.e. rejecting the
proposition, has also occurred in the examples above; that is, in the
11. This will turn out to be analogous to Levinson's (1981) call
for an emphasis upon 'strategies' rather than 'rules' of
discourse/sequential organisation.
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insertion sequence of segment 44A.20:
A: You're at 4 4? S- (Is) Yes?
B: No, I'm
A: 4 5
B: 4 5 (Is)













The initial move can be treated as a pc rather than a pb-function
because, as indicated by its syntax, it is calling for agreement or
disagreement rather than questioning the polarity; the 'proposition'
being exchanged is taken to be already complete but what has not been
established is the participants' attitude to that proposition. Such a
move then predicts the following move:
kl / ps / mii
No such move is forthcoming, however, and B does not take up the turn
at talk offered. As a consequence A gives a prompt. This is still
characterisable as the second move of the exchange in that its
function relative to the exchange -as a whole is to begin what
typically that move would achieve and it does as much as A can
towards providing the move that is predicted. It is not in A's power
to give the kl-function required and so the k2-function preserves the
prediction that B should respond before the mii-move can be
satisfactorily completed. B, in fact, attempts to disagree with the
proposition A has been responsible for building but A interrupts and
repairs it before B can propose an alternative. Finally, B supports
the modified proposition that has been achieved and no predictions
are left outstanding apart from A's general right to a turn by virtue
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of having asked a question previously.*2 This is further reinforced
by the fact that there is a structurally predicted response called
for by the exchange in the context of which this exchange forms an
insertion sequence.
Again, in this latter example, attention to lexicogrammatical
details can support the segmentation at the discourse level. The way
A's interruption of '45' continues B's interrupted utterance, which
in turn, or in addition, can be seen as the beginning of a
reiteration of A's opening question adjusted for speaker, can be used
to justify taking that '4 5' to be a continuation of the pc started
as move miii by B just as was the case in the example from PI.16
above. Many more examples of this kind of lexicogrammatical
dovetailing will occur below and in subsequent chapters. Equally
importantly, the relevance of the discoursal structuring will also be
discussed since the data so far is compatible with the simpler
principle 'do not repeat things'; I need to show that the choice of
lexicogrammatical pattern indeed helps achieve the particular shape
of the exchange the participants require.
The discussion of propositional development will both aid this
demonstration and begin to set the scene both for a more adequate
understanding of the discourse-functional patternings so far
suggested and for the analyses of chapter four.
7. Thematic progression
12. Sacks (1972, p343).
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As mentioned above, in the maze game protocols, and in all
likelihood in most natural informal conversations, exchanges do not
have the proposition they are to 'transmit' set out neatly
compartmentalised prior to commencing interaction. Within an exchange
a participant may propose a proposition, but that proposition may
well undergo various modifications as the interaction proceeds. Also,
across exchanges, the propositions will tend to lead into one another
in a process of continuous modification and connection and it is
precisely this fact that often hinders the precise location of
exchange boundaries.
To consider another example passed over briefly above, the
exchange:
B: Are you stuck all ways?
A: Well I can go back but it's really a waste of time
B: OK
[1 IF. 1]




However, A's contribution is more than a completion of the
proposition sketched out by B's question. In pretheoretical
'rhetorical relation' terms, A's utterance can be decomposed into a
negative reply which presents a possibility of movement and a
justification for not accepting that possibility. B's final
contribution is as much an acceptance of that justification as it is
an 'indication of a state of knowledge' concerning whether B is
'stuck all ways' or not. This detail is not encoded in Berry's
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classification although a description of A's utterance as a 'move'
with a head 'act' or 'sentence', which provides the required pc, and
a sub-ordinate justification, not shown at the level of the exchange,
is compatible with her framework.
The problem with such a 'structurally rich' interpretation is
that it appears from the data analysis that in actual interaction
such structures become 'unwound' very easily. This then requires a
treatment in terms of deviance. In contrast, the more fluid use of
the discourse functions I am beginning to outline here amounts to a
layered approach to conditional relevance which emphasises a
moment-by-moment assessment of the discourse situation as a basis for
continuation, not a structurally assigned determination of
possibility that tightly constrains the linguistic behaviour of the
participants over an extended stretch of discourse. Whatever is put
forward as a contribution to a discourse will be interpreted in the
light of its discourse-functional position and the prediction this
creates; 'deviation' is always possible and is not, therefore,
appropriately described as 'deviance' at all.
In the maze game example at hand, 11F.1, there is a fairly
clear link between the propositions actually expressed and those that
are predicted. The entire exchange could be expanded as follows:^
B: Are you stuck all ways? [k2/pbj]
A: No [kl/pcj]
B: Therefore you can move [k2f]
Where can you move? [k2/pbg]
A: I can go back [kl/pcg]
13. This is analogous to Goffman's (1981, p62) description of
indirect speech acts and is a forerunner of Levinson's (1983)
account that I introduced in chapter one.
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B: Why not go back?





A description of the actual exchange which could exhibit this
development as it is achieved by that exchange would be preferable to
the one given above and would also make the reconstruction task, an
analytic construct with all the usual pitfalls of over-analysis,
misinterpretation, etc., unnecessary.
A more complex classification of the form:
begins to achieve this. The subscripts to the ideational layer
functions are to label the particular form of the proposition being
negotiated at that point in the discourse; in many cases within
exchanges this will be tied quite specifically to the
lexicogrammatical and intonational expressions that have been used.
This choice of ideational layer organisation is then intended to
capture the 'ongoing' achievement of a stream of propositions linked
by relevance. Importantly, however, that relevance must be recognised
as as much an achievement of the discourse as an objective assessment
- by proposing a particular proposition the proposer is automatically
undertaking to supply grounds for its relevance if called to do so.
As Levinson explains in a similar vein:14
"If S has been talking about X, B should find a way to talk
about Z (if Z is the subject he wants to introduce) such that
X and Z can be found to be 'natural' fellow members of some
category Y. However, it should not be thought that such
co-class membership is somehow antecedently given", rather it
is something achieved in conversation." (1983, p313)






Thus, to consider again the last classification offered for the
unexpanded form of 1 IF.1, the difference in lexicogrammatical
selections between B's first turn and A's response is a strong
indication that A is proposing the contribution of a new, but
necessarily relevant, proposition. The move most simply predicted by
B's question was:
kl/pc]/mii
and A's actual response will be interpreted in the light of this.
Furthermore, and this will be developed upon below, the presence of a
contribution such as A's
kl/pcjymi
can serve to classify further B's question as
k2/pbg/mi
in addition to its initial interpretation. In other words, the answer
can show the answerer's attendance to some particular aspect of the
question as being the 'real' issue at hand. To use Goffman's example:
in
A: Do you know the time? [k2/pbj/mi]
B: 5 o'clock. [kl/pcg/mii]
B's response additionally classifies A's question as pbg (a
classification A can then either accept or deny) and so, in addition
to answering a question, indicates clearly what the relevant question
was taken to be: i.e., in this case, 'what is the time?' or 'tell me
the time'. The predictions for discourse contributions sanctioned by
the discourse level resources are therefore sufficiently strong so as
to guide the interpretations, or the possible inferences, that link
utterances together: precisely because a 'kl/pcj/mii' is predicted,
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an occuring 'kl/pcg/mii' will make strong claims about the
relatedness of the two propositions.
Another clear case of propositional development within an
exchange occurs with insertion sequences. To take the first two turns
of segment 44A.20 above, i.e.
B: Right, where are your S boxes from where I am?
A: You're at 4 4? s- (Is) Yes?
the second question begins a pre-sequence, to use Schegloff's term,
to the answer to the first. That is, the proposition put forward as a
basis for development over the course of the exchange itself turns
out to be in need of development and attention turns to that task
until a satisfactory base proposition is achieved. The
discourse-functional organisation of the entire segment 44A.20,
interleaved for clarity with its actual utterances, is given in
figure 4 below.
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Discourse-functional characterisation of move segment 44A.20
In figure 4, and henceforward in my discussion of the discourse
level of organisation generally, the use of ideational function
subscripts of the form N' will indicate that a modification to an
existing proposition is being proposed rather than starting another
proposition de novo, and the superscripts to ps-functions
will specify whether the support is positive, i.e. agreement, or
negative, disagreement.*5 Note that locally Berry's simplest
predictions within layers are generally preserved; i.e. k2 for a
particular proposition predicts an appropriate kl, a pbn predicts a
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pcn which predicts a psn and, in addition to Berry's constraints, a
ps~n predicts a pcn'.
This characterisation does not, however, capture the particular
facts of the case which indicate that the second move begins an
insertion sequence rather than performing some other function; the
relation between the proposition of pbj and of pc£ is not specified
even though it is explicitly identified in the utterances selected. B
states "from where I am" and thus presupposes that this is shared
information. A more detailed articulation of propositional, or
ideational-layer, development will make this kind of discourse
organisation more transparent to analysis.
One kind of treatment of propositional content that will be of
particular use here is that which considers each discourse
contribution as answering some relevant question; for example, Keenan
and Schieffelin (1976) uses a definition of 'discourse topic' as the
'Primary Presupposition' of some 'Question of Immediate Concern'
which provides the basis for judging which new material a declarative
contribution may introduce as relevant.^ I.e.,
15. A complete summary of the discourse level notation I develop
is given in appendix I below; also, if you are reading an original
version of this thesis, there should be located within the inside
cover a card reproducing this information for ease of reference
while following the analyses presented in this and subsequent
16. The analysis about to be presented, in fact, contrasts nicely
with that of Reichman (1981) where, in Keenan and Schieffelin's
terms, 'discontinuous discourse' is at the centre of attention.
Here, the other side of the coin, i.e. 'continuous discourse',
will be the theme of discussion. Reichman suggests that continuous
discourse does not need a thorough discourse-level analysis, I
think the arguments presented in the next chapter will show this
position to be unwar rein ted.
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Declarative = New Information + Primary presupposition
(Response) relevant to question of question of immediate
of immediate concern concern (Discourse Topic)
(Keenan and Schieffelin, 1976, p345)
Another example of a question-related approach is the 'question-test'
method of ascertaining the information status of clause elements
devised by the Prague School. This, in essence, considers each
sentence to be an answer to a set of questions. Elements of the
sentence which are necessarily found as elements in all the questions
are then placed in a 'topic', or 'contextually bound', segment of the
sentence, elements in none of the questions are placed in a
'comment', or 'nonbound', segment, and any elements left over are
assigned to a 'transitional' segment.
Now, both these analyses are reminiscent of the explicit
account of the relation between questions and answers represented
within the ideational layer of exchange structure. In Keenan and
Schieffelin's account, the question of immediate concern can be
represented as fulfilling a pb-digcourse function; it provides the
basis with respect to which a particular answer may appear.
Similarly, the question-test method can be described as considering a






The fact that any particular answer significantly constrains the set
of possible questions is due to that answer carrying with it a strong
chapters.
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sense of what is being answered.
To accommodate these kinds of observation I will accept a
representation of the propositions negotiated during exchanges which
consists of two segments corresponding to the Prague School's bound
and nonbound segments in the semantic interpretation of the clause.
However, I will term these segments the theme and rheme
respectively.^ There is, as suggested, some correspondence between
pb and pc discourse functions and the theme-rheme articulation of the
proposition but this will need to be made more explicit.
First, the theme will always contribute to the pb aspect of the
exchange; this follows from the phenomena upon which the
question-test is built. Also, the pb aspect may contribute to the
rheme although it need not. A proposition is then made complete by
the proposal and acceptance of some suitable rheme. This enhances the
characterisation of contributions in maze game protocols as follows.
Simple 'statements of fact' such as:
Right, I'm gonna move down [11F.8]
I can move left [11D.3]
well it's me who's moving anyway A1 [PI.1]
etc., can be described in terms of <theme|rheme>-structures by
17. Similar distinctions have been drawn by Kuno (1972, 1975); by
Bates and MacWhinney's (1979, pl78) "single pragmatic relation of
topic-comment created in the process of making communicative
points"; and, more recently - and formally, by Bosch (1983,
pp93-104 and passim) in 'focus-sensitive function-argument'
structures. I will not be concerned with a formal representation
here, however; the main application of the proposed representation
will be as a means of capturing the 'information content' of
discourse contributions so that some of the considerations
relevant to the selection of that content can be addressed.
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propositions of the form:
<I'm going to move somewhere | down >
<1 can move somewhere | left >
<someone is now to move | me>
respectively. The highly elliptical rhemes are to emphasise the
dependence of this segment on the theme. Clearly, ad hoc
specification of themes for contextualising propositions is not
particularly useful but, combining this mechanism with the discourse
functions introduced so far will begin to suggest more adequate means
of ascertaining thematic and rhematic proposition-parts that can be
built upon in chapter four and subsequent work.
Whenever an actual question is asked a very strong candidate
for the theme of the proposition at issue is established. For
example, returning to segment 44A.20, the question:
B: where are your S boxes from where I am?
proposes a proposition which begins:
Cthere are relevant S boxes,
they have locations Lj,
B is at position P=4 5,
Li relative to P are | ...
This is the propositional base designated pbj above. Now, an
insertion sequence is performed in order to prepare the way for
answering a question which cannot be best answered as things stand.
The insertion sequence calls for further actualisation details to be
brought into the open and can, therefore, either call for the
recapitulation of information whose shared status has become weakened
or, alternatively, further develop the theme or pb of the proposition
at issue so that the answer can be constrained to be maximally
relevant to the question the asker is attempting to achieve.
- 223 -
In the current example of 44A.20 I have placed the proposition
'B is at position P' in the theme of the relevant proposition
because, as with the other components, there is evidence from the
protocol that there are good grounds for considering these
propositions to have been shared; an initial investigation of the
principles for achieving this allocation of theme and rheme
components will be undertaken in the next chapter. This is, in fact,
supported by the form of A's next utterance which,
lexicogrammatically, is not a question but a simple declarative -
strongly suggestive of a pc-function. This is to be expected because
the proposition, as an element of the theme, is not being presented
as a subject for negotiation. A shows awareness of this fact by
presenting his/her question as a statement of em already arrived at
proposition, i.e. the proposition, designated peg above,
<B is at position P = | 4 4 >g
B then, in producing a following psg, has to reject A's proposal
since it amounts to an assessment of the theme of the shared
proposition B is attempting to achieve. Had B's position simply not
been in the theme then A's response would more likely have been:
wel1, where are you?
as in the similar exchange:
A: If I move up, will I affect you?
B: Where are you?
A: I'm, see that row you're on?
B: Aye
A: I'm, at, second from bottom
B: Well, you don't change me, no.
[1 ID. 15]
While in:
A: right, what happens if I move to the right?
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B: Wh-, you're at the very top, are you?
A: No, I'm one down from the top
B: If you move to the right,
you change me
[1 IF.9]
B begins as if the theme does not include A's position but then
self-corrects, although wrongly.
For the proposed mechanisms to offer any benefits for the
analysis of the maze game protocols in particular, and discourse in
general, the links between the lexicogrammatical descriptions of
contributions and their discourse functional descriptions will
clearly need to be made more explicit. However, even though this is
also necessary in order to refine the proposed discourse functional
classifications so as to reach a state where they may profitably be
formalised, in this thesis I will only be able to begin the
investigative work required. With this in mind, then, the next
chapter will now turn to the examination of some of the observable
formal, i.e. syntactic and intonational, phenomena of maze game talk
and considers whether there are any indication that they can be
reliably interpreted as manifestations of discourse organisations as
captured by the discourse framework that I have now begun.
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Chapter Four
Some functional organisations of discourse
1. The aims of the current cycle of analysis
Although I did not describe this aspect of her work in any
detail, Berry's (1981a, b) initial framework for a Hallidayan
functionally-layered view of exchange structure attempts a certain
degree of formality by specifying the syntactic realisations of her
discourse level functions. For example, the sequence of ideational
functions (pb, pc, ps) is related to a sequence of increasingly
elliptical classes of clause, while the interpersonal functions (kl,
k2) are associated with a distinction between questions and
nonquestions.
Unfortunately, as I suggested in the previous chapter, this
simple association of function and form is largely made possible only
by a strict structural pre-interpretation of the exchange and a
suitable restriction on the area of data considered. With my move
towards trying to gain a better general understanding of the
linguistic patterning of discourse and of what that patterning
achieves, an immediate statement of the co-occurrence relationships
between discourse level functions and syntactic/intonational
manifestations has had to be postponed. It will be essential,
therefore, in the "analyses' that follow, to be clear on precisely
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what claims are, and are not, being made.
First and foremost, I must emphasise that the contents of both
this chapter and the next are to be accepted as the first stage
towards a true formalisation of the organisation of conversation
rather than as that formalisation itself. The reason for this is as
follows. As I described in chapter two, systemic grammar can be
conceptualised as dividing its descriptive workload between ordered,
functionally-labelled components of structural units and a network of
decisions as to how those components are to be arranged and realised.
This division permits a methodological separation of the
formalisation task for conversation into two stages, of which this
thesis will only address the first. In this stage it is the
functional components of conversation themselves that are being
sought rather than their attendant decision processes; this renders
the investigation essentially pre-formal in that it is only with the
specification of the decision processes also that a true
'formalisation' is to be obtained.
The motivation for this way of proceding is to be found in the
lack of knowledge currently concerning linguistic 'structural'
patterning at the level with which I am concerned; i.e. at the level
of discourse and conversational organisation rather than of the
clause. As was shown in the introduction to Nigel in chapter two,
there is now a reasonably good understanding of the kinds and types
of structural-functional elements from which clauses are constructed.
These are represented in a systemic framework such as Nigel by those
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functions that are introduced by realisation statements spread across
the networks of choice. However, when we come to consider discourse,
similar knowledge is scarce - which is not, of course, surprising
since discourse has not typically been regarded in the way I have
proposed we accept here.
The eventual aim of formalising discourse activity in terms of
this level of functional organisation must be to achieve a set of
discourse-oriented 'structural' categories that enables the
relationship between discourse organisation and formal, i.e.
syntactic and intonational, organisation to be captured more readily.
It has not proved possible so far to achieve a similar goal by
appealing to the more globally-centred functional organisations
provided in so-called 'rhetorical' relation accounts and so, rather
than by appealing to some social interpretation of language activity
such as that they offer, it is hoped that remaining closer to the
micro-organisational details of discourse and conversation will fare
better. Subsequently, an account of discourse structure couched in
terms intrinsic to conversational activity itself might be in a
better position to permit a more formal specification of the rich
structural patterning that has been observed in both discourse and
conversation analytic accounts.
The intermediate aims of the current thesis can therefore be
expressed thus. Pre-formal discourse-functional classifications of
sequences of discourse contributions are to be collected and
discussed in order:
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1) to facilitate an improved understanding of the particular
functional loads specific to conversation that discourse
contributions carry - this amounts to a pre-formal attempt to
characterise the interactive achievement of conversationalists in
more general and theoretically grounded terms than found in
conversation analysis;
2) to capture what various discourse organisations have in common -
to label two, apparently quite diverse, stretches of language with
the same discourse function is to claim that they perform the 'same',
in some fairly strong sense, work relative to the discourse;
3) to begin to get an improved sense of precisely what kinds of form
constraints discourse organisation, as expressed in terms of the
discourse function characterisations, brings to bear;
and 4) to arrive at a better position from which to construct
systemic networks for the discourse level, i.e. the functional
classifications are to provide constraints and guidelines on the
networks of choice that are to be constructed in a subsequent cycle
of analysis.
Before proceding to the analyses and discussions of this
chapter proper and their further accumulation of discourse function
sequence classifications, I will now, in order to clarify the above
aims somewhat, illustrate their application with a brief summary of
the framework as developed in the previous chapter. This is made
doubly appropriate by the weakened relation between form and
functional labelling that the extended framework exhibits; the status
of the proposed discourse organisation classifications has already
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been altered sufficiently from Berry's original conception so as to
require a more explicit statement of what those classifications now
represent.
2. Summary of the status of the extended discourse framework
A good rallying point for revealing the differences between
exchange structure as proposed by Berry and the discourse level as I
am developing it in this thesis is offered by the final discourse
characterisation for the move segment 44A.20 that appeared as figure
4 of the previous chapter. Prior to this example sequences presented
could be construed as being at least similar to the exchanges of
Berry cited in chapter two. In the analysis of 44A.20, however, we
find more loosely constrained cycles of k2-kl and pc-ps function
sequences occuring, functions occasionally being repeated, and no
explicit marking of exchange boundaries.
The reasons for this change centre around the different
emphasis I argued for in the previous chapter concerning the
interpretation that is to be given to the functional work the
discourse level achieves. Thus, the move away from considering an
exchange to be the 'unit concerned with the transmission of a
proposition' to focus more upon the negotiation of propositions
naturally tends to accept a far greater fluidity in the sequences
supported. What must now be attempted is the construction of a
framework which can appropriately represent and constrain that
fluidity.
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Several aspects of the 'weakening' of the structural integrity
of discourse sequences relative to Berry's framework have now been
illustrated; for example, a single function bundle is no longer
equivalent to both a move and a turn as was the case in Berry
(1981a), neither is an exchange necessarily concerned with just one
predefined and static proposition. As consequences of this, the idea
of an exchange as a unit over which 'turn-taking is predictable' has
to be given less prominence and more refined recognition criteria
have to be found for the functional labelling of discourse
contributions.
In this and the following chapter I will propose various
symptomatic lexicogrammatical and intonational details of utterances
in the maze game protocols but I must stress that I am not able to
present adequate formal criteria for label assignment at this stage.
It is to be hoped that later analyses, building on the guidelines I
set out here, will achieve some success in this direction but, as I
have explained, at present the approach remains informal. Before
briefly sketching the work characterisations at the discourse level
are to perform, I will summarise the revised status of the functions
proposed within each layer of discourse structure and attempt to
clarify further the new constructs and relationships involved.
First, then, at the interpersonal layer, Berry's view of
primary and secondary knower maintains an unnecessarily individualist
orientation in that details of the speakers' and hearers' actual
- 231 -
knowledge states are quickly brought to mind. The real issues here
should rather be: (i) who accepts responsibility for what is proposed
in the discourse and for developing what is proposed further if
required; and (ii) providing an interpretation of the development of
a discourse in terms of a process which increases the number of
speakers who might subsequently adopt a position of responsibility
with respect to the ideational content shared during that discourse
if they are called to do so. Thus, a k2-labelled contribution is
taken explicitly to decline responsibility for developing the
discourse on the topics established as relevant at that time. For a
discourse to proceed smoothly, for some speaker to take
responsibility for its subject matter naturally facilitates matters
and the kl label is assigned to contributions which achieve this. The
k2f function then represents contributions where the subject matter
of the discourse thus far is claimed to have been shared among the
participants successfully. Significant here, as with all the
discourse level functions, is that the central aspect of their
meaning is how they effect the development of the discourse. It is
perfectly acceptable, for example, for a speaker who 'knows' some
fact to decline the responsibility for developing a discourse where
that fact is currently relevant; this will be illustrated further
below.
Second, within the ideational layer, each sequence of pb-pc-ps
labelled contributions is taken to achieve one completed 'contextual'
(or 'environmental', in the Nigel framework's terms) entity and to
establish the speakers' attitudes towards that entity. Such entities,
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in accord with my current attempt to stay more rooted in the actual
concrete forms of discourse and conversation, are to be seen as
'complete' with respect to a single pass through the lexicogrammar:
if a contextual entity provides sufficient specific information for a
complete clause to be generated then that entity will be regarded as
complete also J Furthermore, which clause is to be generated is
normally constrained by the forms that have occured in the discourse.
If, for example, there is no mention in the discourse of a location
with respect to some proposition then that proposition may be
regarded as complete without containing locational information; i.e.
propositions should be clearly tied to how they are presented. Again
with these functions, what is central is their capturing of the
discourse development. The pb function takes the discourse from
whatever state it was in previously to a new state where there is
some explicitly incomplete proposition at issue, the pc function then
offers seme completion of that proposition, and the ps function
records, typically, the speaker who bears responsibility for its
development's support, or otherwise, of the proposition as it has
been shared in the discourse thus far.^
Finally, within the textual layer the shift in orientation
concerns considering moves as 'units of discourse development',
1. This, of course, needs a far tighter specification but will
have to suffice for the present.
2. In addition, this developmental aspect of the ideational layer
as increasing the range of propositions that may be accepted as
shared is the motivation for the labelling of propositions in
terms of their themes that will be proposed in section 6 below,
for it is precisely the theme that captures those aspects that are
taken to be already shared.
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interpreted in the general light of that which the functions at the
other layers are taken to be achieving, rather than as being more
closely tied to turns. Thus, a move is an isolable stretch of
language that develops the situation in a particular,
discourse-motivated way. More than one speaker can then naturally
contribute to each such development since it is to be defined with
respect to the conversational situation and not with respect to
individual speakers.3
The purpose of these discourse-level functional
characterisations can be brought out by again explicitly connecting
them with their position in the systemic framework as a whole. A
functional classification (at any level or stratum within a systemic
account) is a trace of the choices that have been made among the
networks relevant at that level. It is the networks that specify
ordering and value restrictions on the resultant functional
structure. At the discourse level, then, such networks are to
represent classifications of situations interpreted in terms of the
production of conversations. Therefore, any particular structural
configuration serves as an indication of what conversational
situation classifications have been made and, given an adequate
specification of the networks, what classifications may follow.
It is the function of the networks to provide an understanding
3. It is clear that there remain problems with this view also, not
the least being the ill-specified nature of these supposedly
'unitary' discourse developments. Below I will only be able to
suggest possible specifications, however, rather than arriving at
firm conclusions.
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of where one is in the linguistic development of the conversation so
as to constrain what may be said next. The range of potential
available at each point serves to capture, in a non-individualised,
socially-motivated sense, the 'strategies' for discourse continuation
available to speakers in that situation, i.e. speakers' potential for
conversational action as provided for by the current situation. Each
sequence of function bundles produced at the discourse level
therefore indirectly represents a moment-by-moment assessment of the
discourse situation as a basis for continuation and offers a
functionally motivated characterisation of sequential location as
called for by Schegloff and Levinson in chapter one.
Furthermore, the nature of the systemic 'generation' procedure
when applied to my view of the discourse level complicates the search
for clear criteria for assigning discourse functional labels to
utterances because the ordering and value restrictions imposed upon
discourse function structures are expressed over sequences of
lexicogrammatical elements. Recognition is essentially based upon
sequence as well as form and it is not, in general, possible to take
form alone and predict the appropriate discourse function of single
lexicogrammatical contributions. This requires that we examine both
what forms discourse functions appear to condition, and in what
sequential contexts they do so, in order to sharpen the recognition
criteria to the point where they might usefully serve as guidelines
for accurate discourse classifications and the construction of
discourse networks.
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It is perhaps also worth drawing attention here briefly to why
form alone is not sufficient for functional labelling from the
perspective of how the connection between form and discourse function
is to be expressed in terms of the mechanisms of a systemic
framework. Taking three of the functions that have been introduced so
far, pb, ps+ and kl, we might express their 'formal' (i.e. within the
stratum of form: lexicogrammar and intonation) manifestations by





The right-hand elements in each case are intended to denote system
features within the formal system networks that would produce
realisations of the kinds observed in the previous chapter.^ However,
these realisation statements alone are insufficient because, to be
used, they must be placed with the appropriate features of the
discourse level networks. In other words, we do not know the
paradigmatic location of these statements and, hence, we do not know
when they are to apply. It is, then, necessary to formulate the
networks of choice for the discourse level before such realisation
statements can be of use and the rest of this thesis is to be
considered as the first stage towards this eventual goal.
4. Of course, in real specifications of these realisation
statements, the features used would be those defined by their
respective networks. Thus, with respect to the lexicogrammar as
defined by Nigel, the first statement could be stated as
'Preselect PB [Clause, IndependentClause, Indicative,
Interrogative]'. These are the features actually employed within
Nigel (cf. Mann and Matthiessen, 1983b, pp40-42) and have the
effect of placing an 'Order FINITE SUBJECT' constraint upon the
lexicogrammatical structural result.
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I will now turn back to the problem of accumulating
classifications of discourse sequences and of improving the
reliability and replicability of such classifications. At present it
is appropriate to look at discourse functions as constraining
lexicogrammatical possibilities rather than defining them. Several
suggestive links have already been made in the previous chapter
between discourse level constructs and form; e.g.: the link between
moves and lexicogrammatical cycles (as evinced by the sharing of
moves and moves being 'redone'), the link drawn between propositions
and lexicogrammatical cycles, and the link between kl- and
k2-labelling and turns. In particular, in order to see whether
statements can be made that (i) improve the, currently intuitive,
labelling procedure, and (ii) enable constraints to be suggested
across sequences of lexicogrammatical units, I will examine the
following formal stratum phenomena: ellipsis, some simple anaphora,
particular syntactic form selections, the ordering of units, turn
boundaries, and some simple distinctions of intonation.
The investigation will be organised into various analyses as
follows. Sections 3 and 4 will consider certain aspects of ellipsis,
section 5 will begin an investigation of tag questions, and section 6
will consider two particular forms of anaphoric reference. In each
case the claim will be made that the deployment of these available
forms does suggest a resource for the construction of particular
structurally-characterisable sequences of discourse development. The
final section of the chapter then attempts at least to summarise the
conclusions drawn during analysis concerning the organisation of
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discourse level resources.
3. Categories of ellipsis
This section will begin the assessment of the ellipsis
phenomena found in the maze game protocols. It is necessary, first,
to describe ellipsis in a manner compatible with the extended
systemic framework I have adopted. This can be achieved by
considering ellipsis as a resource for making use of conversational
work that has already been done. This functionally-oriented
characterisation proves more revealing than one more narrowly
circumscribed appealing to notions such as 'incomplete' structure.
In terms of the actualisation processes among the linguistic
networks, i.e. the process of 'making choices', ellipsis becomes a
means of accepting aspects of established actualisations as the
starting points for further actualisation. This reflects the notion
that the language that is used is itself available as a resource for
the continuation of talk. Such availability is clearly not
context-free and I will suggest that discourse organisation provides
one crucial set of constraints upon it. I should perhaps emphasise
that I am not pursuing here a classification in terms of the
lexicogrammatical; Halliday and Hasan (1976) provide this most
adequately. This classification resides above the lexicogrammatical
details at a 'meta'-level. Some similarities may be drawn with the
notions of 'recurrence', 'partial recurrence', 'parallelism', etc. of
de Beaugrande and Dressier (1981, p49) or de Beaugrande (1980, pl33);
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however the psychological processing resources upon which these
notions are based have no place here. The more appropriate way to
regard this classification is as a statement of the similarities and
differences in the choices made across distinct lexicogrammatical
cycles rather than of the particular types of choices made within
single cycles that are discussed by Halliday and Hasan.
Lexicogrammatical contributions can then be classified according to
their elliptical status on the following lines.
A contribution which is the result of an actualisation cycle
complete in itself will be termed a lexicogrammatical base.
Subsequent contributions can then make appeal to this base and use it
in various ways! actualisation can be carried further to make more
details explicit; modifications can be made in the base by appealing
to it as a context with respect to which the new contribution will be
interpreted (i.e. selected choices will be 'undone' and replaced,
again to a greater or lesser degree of explicitness); the base can be
repeated without change for some reason', or the actualisation can be
'embedded' as a cycle or set of cycles within the cycles of new
contributions. The following introduces each of these possibilities.
3.1 Additions
The simplest form of further actualisation occurs when the
contributions so far are treated as not having exhausted a given
actualisation cycle. Thus a lexicogrammatical base need not be
specified all at once by a single speaker. This gives rise to two
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linked types of ellipsis: ellipsis by virtue of 'more to come' and
ellipsis due to 'some already said'. Instances of the former type I
will classify as pre-bases, and instances of the latter type will be
additions. The elliptical status of the contributions in a
pre-base | add | add | ... | add
sequence is only evident when they are treated in isolation; for
example, the following two turns have a 'pre-base|add' structure
which succeeds in specifying a completed base:
B: so now we've got more penalities
A: {-ties than moves
[PI. 3]
This kind of 'ellipsis' arises purely from the interaction of
lexicogrammatical level 'structuration' and the 'synchronisation'
organised by turn-taking.
There appears to be a strong motivation for discourse
participants to achieve complete bases and this renders a
contribution consisting explicitly of a pre-base very well-suited to
achieve a question:
B: And you are, actually, 5 down and,
A: 2 across
[38A.42]
B: So you are now sort of 4,
A: 4 on the bottom uhu
[PI. 4]
In addition, as with almost everything in discourse, classification
is an achievement of co-operating participants rather than an
objectively given fact of the matter. Thus, what is proposed as a
base by one speaker may be justly considered to function as a
pre-base if a subsequent speaker provides an appropriate addition.
For example in:
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B: I can move to the right.
A: And change me?
[1 ID.21]
B: If you move up, you'll change my barriers,
A: And you want me to do that?
[44A.20]
the first contribution of each pair is complete in itself but is then
incorporated into the bases established by the relevant second
contributions.
These examples can all be taken, therefore, as single
lexicogrammatical units which happen to have a speaker transition
occurring within the stretches of language they occupy.5 The various
layers and levels of organisation discernible in these stretches of










which decomposes the behaviour in terms of the various levels of
analysis available. Thus, evidence for the extent of moves can be
inferred from lexicogrammatical completeness and incompleteness: a
move is at least one base.
The prebase-addition distinction is not alone in being
sensitive to turn boundaries rather than move, clause, or exchange
boundaries. The kl and k2 functions are also assessed relative to the
current speaker and this reflects the fact that these functions are
not static elements underlying the production of discourse but are
5. Jefferson's (1973) consideration of 'completions' also covers
this kind of phenomenon and Halliday and Hasan (1976, p203/4) at
least hint at it.
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constantly, from moment to moment, being achieved by the talk in
progress. This reflects again the commitment of the discourse level
to discourse development rather than static product. Certain
speech-situation exophora is similarly sensitive to current speaker
wherever and whenever it occurs: for example, the selection of first
and second person pronouns. Thus, in the following:
A: So if I moved up
B: Uhu, you'd be on an S-box of mine
A: Uhu, and then, you wouldn't be able to move,
would you?
[44A.13]
although the subject-matter and its accompanying linguistic form is
shared across utterances, the subject-matter articulated may be
represented by the single expression:
So if [I/you] moved up, [I/you] 'd be on an S-box of
[yours/mine] then, [you/I] wouldn't be able to move.
The second utterance of A connects grammatically with the preceding
clause, i.e. B's utterance, not A's first utterance and so, as far as
the lexicogrammar is concerned, the changing of speakers can be
ignored. This reiterates the previous chapter's claim that a single
grammatical 'structure' may sprea,d over several speakers' turns.
Alternatively, to concentrate more on the process of the generation
of that structure, a single 'phase' of actualising linguistic
potential may spread over several utterances; only the
'intersubjective' process of actualising the potential needs to be
maintained. At any time during the process some participant in the
context must have taken it up, which participant, however, and the
length of time that individual continues to be responsible for the
actualisation, are in an important sense immaterial for the
lexicogrammatical level. As long as some participant is undertaking
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to maintain it the actualisation will proceed; the activation of
potential is therefore often a co-operative affair.
3.2 Modifications
Modifications usually result in contributions which either make
some correction or contrast to what has been said, answer questions
using a syntax parasitic upon that of the question, or further
explicate some aspect of the proposition proposed in the
lexicogrammatical base - again using the syntax of that base.® So,
whereas the previous type of ellipsis simply accepts the established
actualisation as given, a modification contribution explicitly alters
some aspects of that actualisation. In order to achieve this
sufficient contextualising information has to be given to pinpoint
the areas of potential where choices are being reselected. This can
be achieved in several ways.
Areas can be indicated explicitly in the base by a question
word or question syntax; this interprets such lexical items and
syntactic devices as making available a lexicogrammatically-based
cohesive resource in which specific lexicogrammatical contexts can be
set up for further development. This occurs in many simple
question-answer pairs, for example:
B: can you move to your left?
A: yeah
[1 ID. 17]
A: where can you move then?
B: back to where I was
6. There is, then, some similarity between a base-mod- ... -mod
sequence and the discourse unit 'member' suggested by Coulthard,
Montgomery, and Brazil (1981, p34).
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[PI. 4]
The first of these sets up a lexicogrammatical actualisation cycle in
which the polarity requires explicit realisation; the second makes
available a 'syntactic frame' of the form 'I can move (then) ...'
which the answerer, if s/he wishes, can take as given in the
actualisation cycle of the answer.
Areas of actualisation can also be specified by the
modification itself. This can either be minimally explicit, relying
on thematic considerations, as in:




or completely explicit, relying upon a virtual repeat of the entire
base with the modification typically picked out by intonational
prominence,
A: And does that mean you can't go up?
B: No, that'll mean I can go up.
[1 ID. 11]
3.3 Repeats
Contributions may also simply repeat the base established with
no modification or further development. This device is usually
employed either to indicate the hearer has, in fact, heard what the
speaker said, to support a proposition, or to draw attention to what
was said in the base to provide an opportunity for self-repair. In
all cases the repeat may be complete or partial.
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The first usage is exemplified by:
B: I've moved up.
A: You've moved up.
[PI. 16]
B: and the one to the right of that is my home
A: one to the right OK
[PI. 16]
The second by:
A: 0-on the bottom row?
B: Yeah, on-on the bottom row.
[44A.0J
And the third by:
A: Where are you?
B: Well, uhm, I am on ... the fourth block,
A: (2s) the fourth block?
[44A.0]
3.4 Einbedding
I will use this classification to describe situations where a
contribution is linked by the speaker to the preceding contribution
by lexicogrammatical devices such as conjunctions and certain types
of ellipsis of the form:
A: ... Can you move down?
B: I don't know
[11F.1]
It must be emphasised that the embedding here is to be understood to
be at the level of the processes of making choices and does not
necessarily correspond to any structural embedding.
For example, the use of conjunctions to bind discourse
contributions is very common and it does not seem appropriate to
analyse all such occurrences as giving rise to complex clauses:
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B: can you move to your right?
A: Yeah, but we're back to where we were
[1 ID.21]
A: you on the third column fourth up?
B: yes
A: alright well move up then
B: but I can move to the left
[PI .16]
These do not seem to be equally analysable as 'pre-base|addition'
sequences but there is probably no sharp boundary to be drawn between
the two interpretations in many cases. The placing of a boundary
would, in any case, depend upon the precise lexicogrammatical account
of conjunctions adopted: whether they were treated as forming large
single lexicogrammatical units (moving towards the pre-base
addition - ... - addition analysis), or as distinct lexicogrammatical
units to be related at a discourse level. It is the latter conception
that 'embedding' as a classification is intended to cover. The
lexicogrammatical base of the preceding contribution is 'made use of'
to launch the current contribution but is not considered as 'active'
or 'current' as it is in the addition and modification cases.
It is worthwhile briefly considering the relationship between
the notion of embedding being suggested here as a category of
ellipsis and Berry's proposals concerning 'embedded' exchanges and
propositions that we encountered briefly at the end of chapter two
from which my use of the term derives. A typical example, from Berry
(1981b), is the following:
1 A: is it six o'clock yet?
2 B: yes
3 A: is it?
4 B: yes
(1981b, p6)



















As we saw in chapter two, discourse contributions such as that of
move 3 are analysed as cases of 'clausal ellipsis' in that they are
assumed to be abbreviated versions of propositions of the form:
is it correct that [it is six o'clock yet] ?
But although this might be plausible in the case of responses such as
'sure?', 'really?', and the like, here a simpler interpretation seems
preferable; move 3 may be considered as a repetition of the polarity
elicitation which draws attention to that area of the propositional
development in precisely the same manner as repetitions have been
claimed to do above and shown to do below. This saves an appeal to
the complicated mechanisms of embedding in at least some cases and
















This begins to suggest a greater variety of possible
k2f-functions. Move 3 occurs in an expected k2f-slot, but indicates
that A's state of knowledge is not as secure as is desirable at the
end of an informing exchange. I will make a distinction, therefore,
between a 'success' informing function which is exchange-final,
'k2f.f', and a failure informing function, 'k2f.c', which is exchange
7. The propositional functions of moves 3 and 4 are followed by
question marks because Berry herself does not provide an explicit
treatment of the propositional layer for exchanges of this form.
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continuing. The distinction also appears to be carried by
contributing a lexicogrammatical form that may be positively
classified ideationally; e.g. an explicit commitment to the
proposition is reconfirmed, in this case, by means of the pb-function
indicated by the interrogative syntax. A k2f.c-function then calls
for a following kl and acts as does Berry's qkl. The difference
between k2f.c and qkl lies in the fact that a k2f.c is not seen as
generating an embedded exchange but, instead, continues the
interaction over further moves with the same proposition is at issue.
Examples from the maze game protocols conforming to this
pattern are:








A: ... {actually, {if you move right I can get to my,
B: {is {is that one of your S boxes?




These all, in fact, also conform to Berry's proposed realisation of
'qkl' contributions, i.e. in each case the question "takes the form
of the auxiliary verb which has most recently been used in the
exchange and a pronoun, these being in interrogative order" (1981a,










which is essentially the same as the one I just gave for Berry's
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example.
Cases such as these are not to be admitted, then, as instances
of lexicogrammatical 'embedding' - which is just as well since this
would certainly require a stretching of the term somewhat.® But what
then is to be made of Berry's other proposed examples of embedding -
do these generate embedded exchanges as Berry claims or are they too
analysable in a less structurally constricted manner? The only
relevant example Berry gives here is of the form:
Quizmaster: In England, which cathedral








Berry suggests for this sequence a nested structure consisting of two
embedded exchanges; each of the quizmaster's follow-up questions
introduces a further sub-ordinate exchange. However, with the
discourse resources developed so far, we can now analyse this
sequence in what I would claim to be a far more natural way", i.e.:
dkl k2 k2 kl k2f.c kl kl
pb| pci pb2 pc2 pbg pc2 psj
mi mii miii miv mv mvi mvii
base mod emb mod mod mod rep
Sure? yes qui te yes
sure?
Both the quizmaster's "sure?" and "quite sure?" are labelled as
8. In Halliday and Hasan's terms these cases are better treated as
instances of 'propositional ellipsis' (19Y6, pl98); this would
distinguish them from occurrences of 'sure?', 'really', etc. which
are cases of 'clausal ellipsis'.
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pbg-functions indicating that they are being taken as elliptical
versions of
Are you (quite) sure?
rather than
You are (quite) sure?
which would receive a peg label and require the contestant's
subsequent utterances to be labelled psg.9
Here, there is only one level of 'embedding' at the exchange
level and this is a constrained kind reminiscent of the insertion
sequence. Also, the last move, mvii, is not considered as the final
move of the rightmost, deepest embedded exchange as it appears to be
in Berry's account; instead, it is itself a closing 'bracket' which
follows the central sequence and meets the expectations set at mi.
The central sequence could be extended but it would be difficult to
engineer further embedding. The typical interpretation of such
attempts would be of a further move exactly parallel to miii,
superceding that move rather than being subordinate to it.
Furthermore, the central sequence does not need to be created or
extended by lexicogrammatically-embedded elliptical contributions;
the contributions
Quizmaster: would you like to change your mind?
Quizmaster: would you like another guess?
Quizmaster: try again
9. Although this second alternative would also be compatible with
the forms observed, it is clearly unsatisfactory to have this
duplicity of possible analyses. Either further constraints need to
be found to select between them or a less 'delicate' pair of
functions needs to be introduced that is neutral between the two
more refined interpretations. I will leave this question
unaddressed here.
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all, I take it, acceptable at miii (and at mv for that matter), are
equally interpretable as new lexicogrammatical bases but would still
result in the same analysis as above at the discourse-functional
level. The expectation of the final kl/psj evidently provides a
sufficiently constraining force for the support of extensive thematic
development in the central sequence.
As with insertion sequences, the function of the central
sequence constrains the component moves to those that will achieve
the required result. Indeed, the move at miii, i.e 'Sure?', is not in
general adequately characterised as an elicitation of the truth or
falsity of the proposition: "the contestant is sure that...' at all.
This can be brought out by considering slightly different situations
where essentially the same discourse organisation is deployed.
Consider a quiz situation in which the contestant is asked not to
answer some question for which the quizmaster holds the correct
answer, but to choose some particular course of action. The
discourse:
Quizmaster: Well, what will you do?
Contestant: I'll take the money
Qu izmaster: Sure?
etc.
exhibits the same organisation as above and can be continued in an
exactly parallel fashion (with one exception: the first move is not a
dkl since only the contestant can hold the final authority on what
s/he will choose to do). The continuation of the discourse with
k2f.c-moves such as 'quite sure?' on the part of the quizmaster then
serves the important function of giving the contestant opportunities
for repairing the move made at mii. In this example, another course
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of action could be chosen, while in Berry's example, another answer
could be volunteered. This analysis would then even serve for the
following situation:
[chess game in progress]
(moves piece to some position)
Sure?
(takes piece back and moves another)















The move at miii projects another turn-at-talk for the contestant
before the exchange is closed 'irrevocably*.That turn can be used
for repair-work rather than for a straightforward response to miii
and so the precise propositional content of miii need not be
important as long as it performs the function of giving away a turn.
From this diversion we can see that the notion of elliptical
embedding is by no means the creator of complex nested structures as
is necessarily the case in Berry's account. Embedding serves more as
a relatively weak link between successive cycles through the
lexicogrammar reminiscent of hypotaxis.^ It is readily available for
building discourse contributions 'on' to those preceding, thereby
creating a minimal structural unity, although, due to its weakness,
it will be found below that this method is often combined with others
so as to bind contributions together more convincingly.
11. Halliday and Hasan, in fact, distinguish sharply between
genuine embedding and hypotaxis: "...reported and conditional
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3.5 Nonsyntactic contributions
Finally, in addition to the above categories of ellipsis, it
also appears possible to have discourse contributions which fall
outside of the main lexicogrammatical actualisation scheme
altogether. This phenomenon has been addressed by Richardson (1981,
p55), who proposes a distinction between syntactic and nonsyntactic
contributions.*2 Thus, for example, 'uhu' does not seem to be
appropriately classed as an instance of a lexicogrammatical unit no
matter how elliptical, neither, in many cases, do: 'OK', 'right',
'ehhum', or 'yeah'. These items Berry (1981b) describes as 'clause
substitutes' and she accordingly assigns them to the ellipticity
class in her framework which does not contribute any new
lexicogrammatical material; the same 'facts of the matter' will be
treated here by including nonsyntactic moves, along with repetitions,
in the class of contributions which do not further propositional
development: i.e. those which either have no ideational layer
component or are interpretable as ps-moves.
12. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975, p41) draw a similar distinction.
Further examples of nonsyntactic contributions occur below when
'micro-exchanges' are introduced.
10. Perhaps favouring, then, the pc interpretation.
clauses are both HYPOTACTIC but not 'embedded' (i.e. not
RANKSHIFTED; it is this that is the relevant concept, since
'embedding' has not been clearly distinguished from hypotaxis in
much recent grammatical analysis). That is to say, such a clause
is EEPENDEMT ON another clause but not structurally integrated
into it; it is not A CONSTITUENT OF it." (1976, pl36) It is the
former notion that has been of concern here.
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Armed with this simple proposed classification of
lexicogrammatical units with respect to the manner of their
'completeness' or 'incompleteness', I will now consider the
distribution of units within discourse contributions in order to see
if any discourse-level conditioned patterns occur.
4. Discourse organisation and ellipsis deployment
The most obvious place to begin examining the connections
between these forms of ellipsis and discourse is in the achievement
of thematic progression. Each form of ellipsis, with the exception of
repetition and nonsyntactic contributions, can be seen as attempting
to develop the propositions at issue in specific,
narrowly-constrained ways. The nonelliptical form, or
lexicogrammatical base, establishes a configuration of realisations
in some way appropriate at that point. The propositional, or
thematic, representation specifies both the ideational 'content' of
the lexicogrammatical base and the particular way this content is
being inserted into the discourse. At present I take that content to
be closely tied to the lexicogrammatical forms employed and ellipsis
then becomes a resource for operating upon content within a
structurally defined stretch of discourse in quite narrowly
constrained ways.
The 'addition' ellipsis type is the simplest in this respect
since it is only serving to mark a change in speaker; the proposition
being articulated in the lexicogrammatical unit is unaffected. One
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consequence of this that we have seen is that if a speaker
self-selects and makes a contribution which can be classified as an
addition to the previous - perhaps interrupted - turn, then both
turns may become part of the same discourse move. Hence, addition is
one significant resource for sharing moves.
One of the principal reasons why this possibility of sharing
moves is made use of appears to be that it accelerates the flow of
information or of topics within the discourse while simultaneously
enabling a check to be kept upon the direction of that flow. This
feature of discourse is prefigured in Sacks, Schegloff, and
Jefferson's (1974) proposal that each turn at talk needs to achieve
some minimal conversational 'work' which brings about a three-part
structure: "one which addresses the relation of a turn to a prior,
one involved with what is occupying the turn, and one which addresses
the relation of the turn to a succeeding one." (p722) Additions can
be seen as extensions which rely upon the strong cohesive
relationship imposed by lexicogrammatical unity in order to show the
first speaker that some point has been successfully made, what that
point has been taken to be, that the hearer accepts it, and that the
discourse is proceeding smoothly along the lines intended and is
ready to proceed further.
This can be summarised by extending the framework so as to




















The pk2f-function will designate a preemptive k2f, or state of
knowledge following the informing achieved by a pc. Thus the
'exchange' is, in a sense, 'hurried through': the work of achieving
the pc contribution is shared and the first speaker, following the
preemptive k2f, needs only to support the proposition before
proceeding with topical development secure in the knowledge that the
point has been grasped. This is perhaps the limiting case of showing
orientation to a prior utterance - the utterance can almost attempt
to be its own prior utterance by taking over the actualisation of
that turn. If this is started early enough then the preemptive
contribution can become the lexicogrammatical base and the
interrupted contribution is superceded.
An example of this in fact occurs in protocol segment 44A.20
which was used as the example of figure 4 in the previous chapter.
When the insertion sequence of lines 4-5 has been completed, the
following turns are produced.
Well, (Is) Tha-
I'm on an S box of yours?
you are, you are, uhu,
Now the analysis given previously in figure 4 for these turns can










First, speaker A attempts to begin the sequentially relevanced
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proposition completion but B interrupts. One set of typical symptoms
of a pk2f contribution's occurrence is, then, that a pc-classifiable
move 'in progress', i.e. lexicogrammatically incomplete and
interpretable as a pre-base, is interrupted by a further
pc-classifiable move with respect to a proposition established as
being labelled k2 for the speaker who interrupts.
Another example of a contribution which serves to push the
discourse forward is A's in:
B: right so I'm at the third column
A: uhu 4 up
B: yeah and ...
[PI .16]
In this case, the labelling of A's turn as including a pk2f function
rests upon a propositionally incomplete move being 'interrupted'
rather than one lexicogrammatically incomplete.^ For such
propositional incompleteness to be recogniseable it is useful to
consider propositions for specific purposes to have 'preferred'
forms. The deployment of the linguistic resources available - and, in
particular, the discoursal resources - so as to achieve such agreed
upon ways of articulating specific types of propositions will be
addressed in more detail in chapter five as one consequence of the
negotiation of 'particularised registers' ; here, I will simply accept
the results of this process. Thus, for example,
13. This is taken to be the origin of the 'uhu' in A's turn; the
fact B's first move is lexicogrammatically complete makes a
discourse-level interpretation of that turn as a completed moie
relevant. Such a move would be labelled 'kl/pc/mi' and so
relevances a 'k2f/mi+i' follow-up. The ability of the discourse
level to support multiple sets of 'layers' of interpretation
simultaneously and to combine these into single turns is one very
interesting line of future development. I will not be able to
address this satisfactorily here, however.
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<player X is at some position P= | column Y and Z up>
will represent the kind of proposition the participants in the game
from which the last exchange was taken have agreed upon for answering
questions such as 'where are you?' at that particular stage in the
discourse.^
As a consequence of the presence of such proposition skeletons,
speakers will expect certain thematic progressions and deviations
from the expected progressions may be quickly drawn attention to and
incompletenesses recognised. Thus, as we shall see in the protocol
segment 44A.0 below, B's answer to the question 'where are you?'
(line 1-3) fails to articulate the complete proposition expected by
A.
1 B: well, uhm, I am on the fourth, block from the, (2s)
2 what the right or left, I can't see, hold on,
3 1 2 3 yeah, the fourth block,
4 A: uhu
5 B: Ehm, (Is) where are you? (2s)
6 A: The fourth block?
7 B: You know, fourth from,}
8 A: {0-on tHe bottom row?
9 B: Yeah, on-on the bottom row.
10 A: Yeah, well, I'm in 3 1, (Is)
11 B: uhu, right, OK,
12 A: That's the third one,
Protocol segment: 44A.0
Furthermore, although this segment exhibits a whole host of
14. The existence of preferred forms for this particular class of
propositions in the context of the maze game has been demonstrated
conclusively by Anderson (1984); chapter five will address this
further.
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misinterpretations and confusions and I shall return to the kinds of
detailed negotiations and problems that can arise in chapter five, a
very significant additional point to be made here is that the
context-centred view of discourse development in no way compromises
the ability of the framework to account for divergences in the
classifications speakers make of those contexts. In this example
then, such a divergence is illustrated with respect to the expected
preferred forms for representing position specifications. Thus, on
the one hand, B seems to begin with an expectation that all s/he need
specify to complete propositional bases of the form
<player X is at position P = |
is something along the lines of
Y blocks from left>
or
Y blocks from right>
A, on the other hand, is expecting something involving both row and
column along the lines of
Y blocks over on row Z>
B's first contribution meets the first part of the expectation this
sets up and so exactly the same situation prevails as far as A is
concerned as was the case in the immediately preceding exchange from
PI.16. Here, however, A is not in a position to preempt and so must
be content with the minimal acknowledgement marker 'uhu' indicating
s/he is ready for the next part of the proposition. B is under the
impression that not only has a properly • formed and complete
lexicogrammatical base been produced but also a complete proposition
rendering the pc-move complete. A's 'uhu' is not, as we shall see, an
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archetypal instance of a k2f-move and so B does not respond smoothly.
The question, at line 5, when it does come is found by A to be
completely out of place.
In short, the two interpretations of the discourse so far can
be schematised as shown in figure 1.
k2 1 kl I 1, 0 k2
for A: pb] [ pci - 1 pb2
mi | mii i -> i mi
1-3 4 5
base base vhu elm base !
k2 | kl k2f 1 0 k2
for B: pbj 1 PCI I pb2
mi i mii miii | mi
1-3 4 5
base base vhu ehm base
Figure 1: An illustration of multiple analyses [44A.0]
For B the discourse can be held to be, if not as free-flowing
as might be hoped, at least reasonably coherent; but for A there are
outstanding expectations which need to be fulfilled before a coherent
discourse can be achieved, namely the completing of the pc] initiated
by move mii.
The reason why there is no conflict between multiple analyses
of this kind and the avowedly interorgcinisrnic level of description at
which the type of linguistic analysis proposed here resides is as
follows. It has to be recalled that the primary mechanism for
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capturing the interorganismic potential for behaviour that situations
make available to the bearers of roles in those situations is the set
of networks of choice at each stratum and level within the linguistic
system. However, the essential sharedness of this general potential
to act is not sufficient to guarantee that any particular linguistic
forms will always correspond to a unique set of choices within each
level. This is because of the equally essential context-enbeddedness
of the actualisation process. Thus distinct contextual specifications
can relevance distinct choices within, for example, the discourse
level of form which remain compatible with a single selection of
lexicogrammatical choices. In short, the networks represent all
speakers' abstract potential and the consequences of any choice that
has been made for the choices then available at other levels. But
then, since each actual speaker is necessarily embedded in his/her
own, more-or-less unique, particular selection from the
intersubjectively-established range of potential contexts, the same
lexicogrammatical phenomena can give rise to different functional
classifications when the effects of the actual contexts of
individuals are added in.
The resulting analyses are nevertheless interorganismically
viable in that they are all drawn from the range of abstract
potential shared among the members of a society and may hence be
adopted by any speaker as necessary: because the range of potential
behaviour is shared, divergences in interpretation can be noticed and
corrected particularly effectively.^ This is the situation in the
present case when at line 6, after a long gap, A attempts to preserve
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a context more compatible with his/her own prior expectations. A
first then produces a 'repeat' which does not develop any proposition
at issue further but which is aimed at redrawing attention to the
lexicogrammatical base from which it is taken and to the proposition
that lexicogrammatical base was concerned with. The turn is a
standard call-for-stocktaking one and hence can be analysed for both
players as
k2f.c / pcj / miii rep
Repetition such as this is a common resource for indicating an
unsatisfactory state of knowledge following a supposedly informing
move and so has the desired effect despite the slight contextual
divergence. The k2f-status with respect to the proposition at issue
of moves mi and mii establishes the turn as a related miii
temporarily superceding B's attempted new question at line 5.
B begins the called-for repair but is again producing a
contribution compatible with his/her own expectations which are at
odds with those of A. From the situation as disclosed to B the only
possible inadequacy in his/her reply at line 1 was the lack of an
explicit statement of whether the block was fourth from the left or
fourth from the right. As soon as this becomes clear, i.e. as soon as
B's utterance establishes an equally divergent situation, A
interrupts with a preemptive addition which displays the kind of
information relevant to A's situation. B then acknowledges the
15. More strictly: speakers in a situation are constantly
producing behaviour from within the range available; each speaker
is aware of that range to the extent that deviations are
recognised as such and provide evidence for operating within an
altered range, hence altering the situation that holds.
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proposed proposition completion as correct and A goes on to answer
the postponed question of line 5. The discourse-functional analysis
for these contributions is therefore, again for both players, as
their temporarily divergent contexts converge:
k2f.c kl pk2f kl k2f kl
PC] PC] PC] PS] P°2
miii miv - miv mv mvi mii
6 7 8 9 10
rep add add yeah
rep
yeah we 11 base
This last example and the ones preceding should have made it
clear that there is now no well-formed 'sequence' of ellipticity
classes (i.e. additions, modifications, etc.) being proposed
comparable to the formal sets of exchange descriptions given in Berry
(1981b): almost any order could occur. The ellipticity class of a
contribution is instead to be seen as offering an indication, when
considered in its discourse context, of the precise function the
contribution is intended to fulfill. Thus, the correct assignment of
identifying subscripts for the discourse functions pb, pc and ps, is
often made by deciding which particular lexicogrammatical base the
move is addressing, while the particular discourse function to be
selected is significantly constrained by the ellipticity class that
occurs.
However, as can be seen in the analysis of lines 7 and 8 in
segment 44A.0, for example,
6
7
A: The fourth block?
B: You know, fourth from,}
16. Interestingly, A in line 12 restates his/her position in the
format initially adopted by B, B does not understand this and as a
result misinterprets A's position specification at line 10 anyway.
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8 | A: {0-on the bottom row?
the addition of line 8 is not an addition to the developing base
growing from the addition of line 7 but, instead, supercedes that
addition. Yet this distinction is not at present apparent in the
ellipticity class labelling and this does not make explicit,
therefore, required information relevant to discourse functional
labelling. This information can be included by labelling the stages a
base passes through during its development.
Thus, in the sequence,
A: so if I moved up,
B: uhu, you'd be on an S box of mine,
A: uhu, and then, you wouldn't be able to move,
[44A.13]
the smooth development of the base at issue can be represented by:
pre-basej | addj \ | addj g
Each contribution advances the base to a new state. This contrasts
with the case of lines 7 and 8 above from 44A.0 in which development
is not smooth because line 7's addition is not incorporated. The
analysis here is:
pre-basej | ... | add] j | add] i
Both line 7 and line 8 address the state embodied in pre-basej and so
are rival candidates for the same move rather than co-existing as
parts of a move. It should perhaps be re-emphasised here, then, that
these ellipticity categories are functional labels and not absolute
identifications of the propositions or lexicogrammatical bases at
issue. A sequence of identically labelled contributions, such as the
'add] i | add] j' sequence just cited, therefore claims those
contributions to be performing the same function (i.e. taking a basej
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to states represented as base] |) rather than as claiming identical
content or the occurrence of identical items.
Repetitions should also be augmented in this way. In their
case, however, a new state is not created; instead an orientation to
some particular area of an existing lexicogrammatical base is
established. Thus,
base] repj
will signify a full repetition of the base, while
basej rep] ]
will signify some particular part of the base. In addition, an area
can be picked out by name", for example,
rep [pol]
will be used to signify that it is the polarity of the
lexicogrammatical base that is being repeated. This occurs in
questions of the form:
A: Right, I'm totally boxed in
B: you are?
which will be discussed below.
Modifications can be labelled in an exactly analogous manner;
for example, had the above exchange been
A: Right, I'm totally boxed in
B: are you?
the second contribution would have the classification:
mod [Q]
indicating that question syntax had been imposed. Similarly, had B's
response been "you aren't", then the classification would have been:
mod [pol].
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Similarly, the lexicogrammatical base category can be specified
further to indicate particular details of the lexicogrammatical
actualisation that are relevant. It should be remembered, however,
that this technique is only to be adopted as a shorthand notation in
the absence of a complete specification of the lexicogrammar; given
that specification actual feature choices would be used to capture
the information here informally picked out by name.
One useful specification of this kind is Berry's distinction
between question syntax (Q) and nonquestion syntax (S); here I will
base this entirely upon syntax however, and will not admit 'rising
intonation' as relevant. Thus the contributions:
you can't go to the left either? [44A.3]
and not bother changing you? [11F.9]
you know how there's there boxes [PI.0]
so you are now sort of 4, [PI.4]
will all be classified as
base [S]
regardless of the fact that they clearly function unambiguously for
both players as questions in their respective situations of use. This
permits a simple correspondence to be set up between base [Q] and
base [S] classified contributions, or sequences of contributions, and
pb- and pc-classified moves respectively. Both pb and pc require an
established lexicogrammatical base for their moves to be considered
complete and a base-contribution trivially provides this.
The lexicogrammatical layer of the description of segment 44A.0
that was used to illustrate multiple analyses and as given in figure
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1 above can now be rewritten as follows:
1-3 5 6 7
basej | base2 I ehm baseg | repg.i I add2.2 I
8 9 10
add2 2 I Ueah reP2.2 I yeah well mod3 j[S]
The additions at lines 7 and 8 are oriented towards the particular
area of actualisation in need of repair by the focusing operation
achieved by the repetition at line 6; this is reflected in their
labels by incrementing the label of the repeat not the base. This
notation thus permits a general distinction to be drawn between those
pk2f-contributions which are used for agreement and to develop the
discourse in the direction the kl-role bearer is proposing, by
incorporating a set of lexicogrammatical choices, and those which
propose their own direction, attempting to supercede the move that is
interrupted or preempted.
The sequencing of types of elliptical contributions in this
segment 44A.0 can now be shown to relate quite simply to the manner
in which the thematic progression occurring throughout the segment is
being achieved. Thus, the first contribution, as at least the




B: well, uhm, I am on the fourth, block from the, (2s)
what the right or left, I can't see, hold on,
123 yeah, the fourth block,
can be put into a correspondence with a propositional description
paraphrasable as:
<B is at some position P = | the fourth block...>2
The thematic segment of the proposition was given by the preceding
question. As described above, a comparison with the expected thematic
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progression at this point in the discourse gives different discourse
functional classifications for the two players, i.e. a completed pc
for B and an incompleted pc for A. The propositional development at
the outset of line 5 from the perspective of each of the players is
then:
for A: <B is at some position P = the 4th block | >2
for B: <B is at some position P = the 4th block >2
A is awaiting further development which B noticeably fails to provide
when the unrelated base of line 5, "where are you?", introduces the
proposition:
<A is at some position Q = | where >3
The repetition at line 6 refuses to leave the unresolved proposition
and places proposition 2, with the expectation that some work is
still needed, back at the centre of the discourse.
6 A: The fourth block?
7 B: You know, fourth from,}
8 A: {0-on the bottom row?
9 B: Yeah, on-on the bottom row.
B attempts to perform that work but is misled by his/her
preconception concerning its nature; B's 'you know' can be seen as
supporting a description of that preconception of the form:
<player X is at, from the left, position P = | the Yth block>
i.e. the direction in which the counting of 'blocks' is to proceed is
not really at issue, it is established as part of the theme of
requests for positions. B nevertheless attempts to make it explicit
since there is little else over which a problem could have arisen.
The moves of lines 6 and 7 are then described as follows:
6 rep2.i'<B is at some position P = the 4th block2.i I ... >2
7 add2.2:<® at some Position P = the 4th block |
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from the ... >2.2
A rejects this proposal of rheme and substitutes one compatible with
his/her own preconceptions of what is required of a position
specification, i.e.
8 add2 2:<B is at some position P = ,
[from the left], the 4th block |
on the bottom row >2 2
B accepts this by means of the repeat:
9 rep2,2:<® is at seme position P =,
[from the left],
the 4th block on the bottom row >2.2
and the proposition is completed, leaving A free to take up the third
proposition with its expectation establishing 'where'.
There is a close link to be observed, therefore, between the
ellipticity class adopted and the effect that is had upon thematic
development. This effect may be summarised as follows:
base: a new proposition is proposed;
add: an already proposed proposition, or proposition part, is
extended;
rep: no new propositional development occurs, instead particular
orientations to proposed propositions, or proposition
parts, are proposed;
mod: an already proposed proposition has some part retracted and
respecified.
In the analyses below, then, these classifications of
lexicogrammatical cycles will be appealed to throughout as a
significant set of informal guidelines for assigning and justifying
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discourse functional labelling.
5. The discourse functions of tag questions
In section 3, in the introduction to the embedding category of
ellipsis, we saw a proposed discourse-functional analysis which
contained a different ordering at the ideational layer than that
encountered previously. The analysis was of Berry's example:
1 A: is it six o'clock yet?
2 B: yes
3 A: is it?
4 B: yes
(1981b, p6)

















Distinctive about this analysis is the characterisation of the move
at line 3, in which the micro-function conflation:
k2f / pb
appeared relevant. Now, it was not possible to generate contributions
such as this under Berry's original account, and it is possible to
show that speakers often make far more flexible use of the discourse
resources available than Berry's account suggests. As was suggested
in the previous chapter, many of these 'deviations' in fact provide a
useful means of incorporating contributions into the natural flow of
the discourse and of binding that discourse together into
tightly-cohesive units. This section will illustrate this kind of use
with particular reference to the discourse function of tag questions
and some related forms, all of which may now be readily accommodated
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in an illuminating way.
Examples of the forms of 'questions' that will be at issue here
at first are:





I won't change anything, will I?
No
Right, now hold on...
(3) A: Well that's not much good is it?
B: Well look how ...
(4) A: This is it, is it?
B: uhu
A: The big finale
B: This is it ...
(5) B: Wh- you're at the very top, are you?






In each of these the relevant 'questions' were given rising final
intonation.
5.1 Interrogative tags
The first three conform to the standard format for
tag-questions where the polarity of the appended question is the
reverse of that in the main clause. The tag question is also
elliptical with respect to all but the polarity of the main clause;
in fact, with lexical ellipsis within the verb group (i.e. ellipsis
where the main verb is presupposed) polarity cannot fail to be
expressed^ and typically the tag explicitly selects polarity to
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repudiate that of the clause it presupposes. This repudiation means
that the tag element cannot be classed as repeat ellipsis but,
instead, must be seen as modification. Also, the syntax of the tag
becomes that of a question and so the ellipsis specification of the
clause-tag sequence can be described as."
base^ modi[P°l>
The discourse-functional specification of the second component, i.e.
the tag itself, is therefore pb/k2.
The function of the tag, however, is to call for the addressee
to support the proposition at issue. That is, if the
discourse-functional specification of the first component of the
tag-containing contribution is pci/k2, then the called for support
would be of the form ps^/ld . But a follow-up such as this would be
expected anyway without the intervening tag: what, then, does the tag
contribute?
It is clear that the usual use of a tag question occurs in
situations where the speaker is either already quite confident of the
outcome or is displaying a former confidence perhaps made
problematic. In (1) above, the question is almost serving as a prompt
for the other player, drawing the attention of that player to
something that is equally available to both players. In (2), strictly
speaking B cannot know that his/her move will not change the other
player's situation but the discourse so far had given B good grounds
for accepting that this was, in fact, the case. In (3), the
17. Halliday and Hasan (1976, p!76).
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tagged-contribution functions as a negative evaluation of B's
proposed move and so B does not 'answer' the tag at all but, instead,
goes on to propose an alternative.
With these considerations in mind I will take the tagged
contribution to indicate that the proposition at issue is being
treated as 'already known' by the speaker; i.e. the speaker is
displaying a kl-role concerning that proposition rather than the more
strictly appropriate k2-role. Since this is a dispreferred option for
B-events^® unless there are some specific social role relationships
to support it, the speaker also prepares an opportunity for his/her
addressee to support (positively or negatively) the proposition at
issue, thus leaving the 'final stamp of authority' with the
participant for whom the proposition at issue genuinely denotes an
A-event. This is also supported by the fact that the use of tag
questions for confirming the sharedness of B-events with respect to
the speaker is still not as common as their use for AB-events and
simple evaluative comments such as:
B: it's like chess isn't it
[38A.34]
In these cases the establishment of a proposition at issue to which
both participants bear a kl-role is entirely appropriate.
The tag question achieves this as follows. First, the polarity
of the lexicogrammatical base that has been proposed is modified,
giving rise to a modified proposition. That modified proposition is
then made the base of a polarity-seeking question. The speaker adopts
18. See: Labov (1972, pl24) and chapter two.
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a k2-role towards this proposition, thereby declining responsibility
for development at that point, and so calls for the next contribution
to reflect a kl-role. This gives a discourse-functional specification





The straightforward answer to the question at mii is a pc\ \/k\ and
this can be either positive or negative; that is, it can be either a
modi 2[S] or a modi 2[S.pol], depending upon whether the polarity
proposed in the propositional base is accepted or modified. In the
former case, the contribution is equivalent to a modj j[pol]; in the
latter, it is equivalent to a repi i[pol]. But these are typical
manifestations of ps~ and ps+ containing moves respectively and so
the answer to a tag can be described as:
pcj i ps~i
either kl kl
modi_g[S] = modi j[pol]
pci.i ps+i
or kl kl '
modi g[S,pol]= repj i[pol]




kl = ) kl
and a successful sharing and confirmation of sharing of the
proposition at issue.^
19. Similar to this are those cases where the tag is given falling
intonation; these suggest that the sharedness of the proposition
is not at all controversial and the adoption of a kl role by both
speakers is warranted. The sequence is then: [pcAl. pb/kl,
ps/kl]» and the question verges on the rhetorical.
- 274 -
It is interesting that a single move can display all these
functions nad this again suggests the utility of providing for
multiple sets of discourse functions as was mentioned in passing
above, the construction of a single turn from distinct discourse
function sets appears to be achieved here by the deployment of the
lexicogrammar according to the pc-function and the intonation
according to the ps-function. Typically, a ps+-contribution will have
noncontrastive intonation compared to the contrastive intonation of a
ps~-contribution and this choice is displayed in the 'answers' to
tags.
Furthermore, the pc^-function of the tag-answering move might
suggest the possibility of a subsequent actual psj in addition to the
parallel ps. This may be what has occurred in the following, where
the conflation of the answer to the tag and the support for the
tagged proposition has failed to be achieved:
A: uhu and then you wouldn't be able to move would you?
no?
B: No I wouldn't be able to move,
In this case B gives a full unreduced repetition of A's original
tagged question, again a standard way of supporting a proposition.
This example can be analysed as above until A preempts B's
answer with 'no?'. As we have seen, this interruption of a
prospective, or in progress, pc/ld contribution predicts a follow-up
supporting contribution for that proposition. B supplies this with
'no' but this can no longer be conflated with the preceding
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pc-contribution to give rise to the called for support for A's
original proposition because that move has already been completed.
Hence B has to supply that support explicitly. The
discourse-functional specification for this sequence is then:
PCI pbj i pcj \
kl k2 pk2f




basej modj |[pol,Q] mod] gCS.pol] | repj g rePl
uhu would you? no? no
Normally, what here occurs at mv would have occurred 'implicitly' at
miii, but A effectively blocks this; a ps/pk2f-contribution is not a
good candidate for a move in most contexts.
When the conflation is achieved the motivation for an
additional distinct follow-up ps is largely removed. On the one hand,
if the addressee supports the tagged proposition, then the two
propositions at issue have merged and the support of one is the
support of the other. On the other hand, if the addressee does not
support the tagged proposition, then the entailed ps~j predicts a
following pcj modifying the proposed proposition and this
automatically provides a ps+ for the proposition created by the tag.
The full ideational layer sets of discourse functions for the second
case could therefore be represented by:
PC] pbj • pci j ps+i i
ps-i• pcj-
The last two moves cannot be conflated further since a pc and a ps
relative to a single proposition require distinct moves.
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5.2 Declarative tags
Returning now to examples (4) and (5) above, these can be seen
to differ from (1-3) in that the appended question is of the form
modi CQ]
that is, the polarity is not affected. In these cases, there seems to
be no strong suggestion that the proposition had been shared
previously in the discourse and so a k2 role with respect to that
proposition is appropriate for the speaker. One immediately possible
function is then suggested by the description:
pcj pbj j
k2 k2
basej mod] i [Q] » repj[pol]
This is another way of initiating a repair", the first move proposes
the proposition at issue while the other picks out an area to use as
a repair origin. Thus, one can envisage a maze game situation in
which a player attempts to move out of turn and the other player
responds: 'it's your turn, is it?', thereby drawing attention to the
repairable behaviour - linguistic or otherwise. However, I have not
encountered examples such as this in the protocols I have examined.
Another possibility is that the k2-role selected for the first
move is a k2f- or pk2f-role rather than a simple k2. This fits
example (4) well and again illustrates the flexibility that the
discourse resources provide. Example (4) is taken from the very end
of that game. A has just moved into his/her goal and prior to that B
had said that s/he was one away from his/her goal. Thus, when A takes
the first turn s/he is relying upon B's previous claim to be one away
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from the goal since this would mean that the next move to be made
would be the last of the game. But only B knows this for sure and so
A is justified in accepting a secondary knower's role. However, there
is not really any doubt that the game is about to end so A can be
sufficiently confident to be able to show a preemptive following
state of knowledge and then to give B an opportunity to support it.
It is also up to B to show that the final move has, in fact, been
made and the game has been brought to a successful conclusion; A is
therefore helping to make a turn-at-talk available to B for that
report to come. When B only supports A's state of knowledge, A goes
further and, by a minor modification to the proposition at issue,
gives B another turn in which, after again supporting the modified
proposition, B then reports having made the necessary move. It is
interesting to note that B's final 'This is it' displays support not
only for the modified proposition but also the original proposition
by repeating the same choice of words', this achieves an extremely
tight cohesively-bound sequence of contributions.
















base] mod] i [Q] mod] ,2^1 moch.l/1.3 rePl
this is it is it vhu the big finale this is it
Again the straight-forward sequencing of discourse functions has been
deviated from in order to achieve the precise consequences required:
the pk2f-contribution has been brought before the k2 that would have
given rise to it and the pb-contribution has accordingly been placed
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following its related pc. In addition to B's simultaneous support of
both of A's forms of the proposition at issue at mv, the choice of a
simple 'uhu' at miii displays that mii can be considered a pbj for
which the corresponding pcj has already occurred: thus B has again
shown that s/he accepts that really there is only one proposition at
issue.
Example (5) can be analysed in precisely the same way. The
initial 'wh-' of B's first utterance, beginning the question 'where
are you', is abandoned and the proposed answer is put in its place.
This still leaves B with the job of turning the contribution into a
preferred form for a question and so the prerequisite pb is tagged
on. In this case, however, A provides negative support and so follows







wh- basej mod[Q] no mod] j
5.3 Micro-exchanges
A superficially similar organisation to the above tag question
cases that frequently occurs is illustrated in the following
examples:









A: I'm gonna move...
[38A.41]
This organisation may also be assimilated with the discourse level
account as follows.
As opposed to the above examples, in cases such as these the
primary speaker is typically involved in the articulation of a
complex collection of propositions and provides occasions for the
hearer to acknowledge that the development so far has been grasped.
Although the propositions above tagged in this fashion denote
k2-containing moves the pattern occurs equally with kl-containing
moves; for example:
B: If ehm, if you move, up, one, and then up,
another time, you'll hit an S, an S ehm, gate
for me, OK?
A: OK,
B: So, un- unless...
[44A.2]
B: I'm moving back, OK?
A: Great yeah uhhum
[PI. 22]
A: I'll just go straight up, {right
B: {right uhu
[44A.27]
The speaker can also achieve a similar effect by leaving a pause at
an obviously incomplete stage in the propositional development. The
hearer typically responds as above; e.g.
A: Well you see, (Is) if I go up one,
B: uhu
A: to, 3 3
[44A.7]
The possibilities here range from the provision of straight-forward
spontaneous back-channel contributions from the hearer,^0 through
back-channel contributions brought about by the speaker's genuine
hesitations and back-channel contributions implicitly elicited by
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deliberate pauses, to explicitly called for contributions in response
to items such as 'OK?', 'right?', etc. Common to all of these is the
fact that the floor remains with the speaker and the hearer's
contribution is not normally regarded as floor-claiming. If the
hearer wishes to disagree or to indicate that there are problems to
be resolved the design of the turn selected resembles that of an
interruption or, if the primary speaker was explicit in his/her
offering of the floor, an insertion sequence.
I will distinguish types of possibilities as follows. Cases
where an explicit progress-check elicits a response from the hearer
will introduce 'micro-exchanges'. These mirror the sequencing
resources discussed so far for exchanges and, in fact, could be seen
as arising from conventionally elliptical questions. Their discourse






The function of the micro-exchange is to provide an explicit occasion
for repair which raises the hearer's response to the status of an
actual conversational move. The primary speaker can then utilise the
predicted k2f-slot to continue his/her extended turn, thereby
20. See, for example: Yngve (1970, p568). It is widely accepted
that in the speech event of conversation there are (at least) two
channels of information open; the main channel contains the
current speaker's utterances, while the back-channel carries the
addressee's supporting gestures, remarks, etc., which do not
directly contribute to the discourse but instead signal to the





overruling and presupposing a k2f with respect to knowledge of the
hearer's position. This contrasts with cases where the hearer
volunteers support. The back-channel contributions there will not be






The motivations for the production of contributions such as this are
well discussed by Schegloff (1982); to summarise his conclusions,
these contributions act both as 'continuers' (1982, p81), which
indicate that the primary speaker is accepted as being in the midst
of an extended 'turn', and as indications that an opportunity for
initiating repair is being passed (ibid., p88). There is a sense,
then, in which the back-channel contribution proposes an implicit
k2f.f, i.e. it indicates that the discourse is proceeding
satisfactorily and that the primary speaker can continue with
thematic development.
It appears possible for speakers to use their selection of
back-channel responses for a variety of purposes. Schegloff, for
example, suggests
"that the availability of a range of tokens may matter less
for the difference of meaning or usage between them (if any)
than for the possibility thereby allowed of varying the
composition of a series of them. Use in four or five
consecutive slots of the same token may then be used to hint
incipient disinterest, while varying the tokens across the
series, whatever tokens are employed, may mark a baseline of
interest." (1982, p85)
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A further use seems to be to attempt to project an imminent
turn-at-talk for the hearer; the primary indication of this is an
increase in the tempo of delivery of the continuers and again,
possibly, a selection of a single token for repetition. This may be
captured by proposing that there is an attempt to render the implicit
k2f.f explicit and, therefore, to achieve a conversational move which
may then interact with move expectations. Thus, in the opening
segment from protocol PI below where player B is determined to take
the initiative, we can see that A's initial attempt to specify
his/her position is immediately criticised by means of a side
sequence in lines 9-10.
1 A: ...see how there's a box jutting out
2 on the right hand side of the sfcreen
3 B: {yes
4 A: Well, uh, there's a column before that
5 you know
6 w{ell nearly full column right}
7 B: {yeah {yeah yeah
8 A: I'm on the bottom one
9 B: Well well just call them columns OK every-
10 A: OK OK, OK right so ...
Protocol segment: P1.0
Also indicative of B's wish to lead the discourse are the very
early response at line 3 and the interpretation of A's 'you know' at
line 5 as initiating a micro-exchange when it could as easily be
ignored as a pause-filler. A then also adopts the rapid repetition
strategy at line 10 to wrest a turn back from B. Both B's latter
'yeah's at line 7 and A's 'OK's can therefore be given a
k2f.f / mii
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interpretation, rather than a simple pass and the general expectation
that a k2f.f-contributor has a right to a turn can be allowed to
operate.
5.4 Newsmarks
One additional set of related contribution sequences can now
also be motivated in terms of the distribution of discourse functions
they exhibit. Although members of this particular set are not so
frequently represented in the maze game protocols, Jefferson (1981)
has discussed such sequences in some depth; the talk trajectories she
describes will therefore serve as the basic data for which an
analysis will be provided.
The sequences are lexicogrammatically similar to the tag cases
discussed above but have the initial pc-classified contribution and
the focusing follow-up pb-contribution distributed across consecutive
turns. This alters the function of the follow-up pb quite
substantially; whereas before the pb fundle served as a tag, when it
is produced by another speaker it serves instead as a 'topicaliser*
which guides subsequent discourse development. Such topicalisers
Jefferson terms newsmarks and she defines these as "objects which
specifically treat a prior turn's talk as 'news' for the recipient
rather than merely 'informative'." (Heritage, forthcoming.b,
p48:fnl4) Examples are turns such as 'Really?', 'did you?', 'oh you
did?', 'you are?', etc. Although such turns might appear quite
emphatic topicalisers and might be thought always to display a
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willingness of the second speaker to participate in the topic talk as
initiated, Jefferson in fact notes the following co-occurrence of
type of newsmark and talk trajectory.
Turns such as 'oh really?' occur in sequences of the form "(1)
news announcement, (2) 'oh really?', (3) re-confirmation and (4)
assessment (which is generally terminal or topic-curtailing)."
(Heritage, ibid.) Turns such as 'oh did you?', 'oh you did?', etc.,
i.e. "'oh'+partial repeat", occur in sequences where slot (3) or (4)
contains further talk or solicitations of talk on the news rather
than the termination of its discussion. Turns such as 'did you?',
'are you?', etc., i.e. free-standing partial repeats with
interrogative syntax, occur in sequences where there is a stronger
commitment to the discussion resulting in an acknowledgement at slot
(4), rather than an assessment, and a voluntary continuation of talk
on the news at slot (5). And finally, partial repeats with
declarative syntax act either as do turns such as 'oh really?*, i.e.
as topic-curtailing, or project a disagreement at slot (4). Each of
these trajectories can now be motivated from a consideration of the
constraints so far proposed at the discourse level of organisation.
The first thing to note in the demonstration of this is that
'oh' regularly occurs as a manifestation of the discourse function
k2f; this is compatible with Heritage's (forthcoming.b) analysis of
'oh' as a "change of state" marker. As he argues, an occurrence of
'oh' does not promote further talk on the topic at issue itself and
this can be seen to correspond well with the terminal position of k2f
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in Berry's layer of exchange structure.^ Then, in combination with a
nevsmark, the raising of the status of the information that is given
to 'news' can be interpreted as an adoption and re-emphasis of the
k2-role the speaker bears with respect to that information. This is
captured by a conversational move which simply reaffirms that role
and results in the following discourse organisation for slots (1) and





The additional k2f fundle can be viewed as, in a sense, already
accepting the relevance and importance of what was presented even
before further development.
The general resources of the discourse as described thus far
then make the following two predictions. First, the k2-role projects
a necessary subsequent kl-role and a possible k2f; and second, the
pc^-function makes the most simply available function in that layer a
ps$i. The psj can only be conflated with the kl and so the






giving rise to the slots (3) and (4) Jefferson has observed: the
normal realisation of a kl-move is nonrising-terminal intonation,
while that of a ps-move is either a repeat or a minimal confirmation
or denial such as 'yeah' or 'no'.
21. Especially, as will be suggested in chapter six, when it is
deployed in the early stages of topic generation.
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The 'oh' plus partial repeat case has a slightly different
discoursal characterisation in that the repeat introduces a further
pb or pc-function more directly analogous to the tag cases discussed
above. Interrogative syntax has been regularly associated with the
pb-function, declarative with pc: thus, the second part of slot (2)
then contains either a pb- or a pc-function in addition to its k2. In
both cases a kl/ps-move is projected for slot (3) and, in addition,
the speaker at slot (3) has the option of following up the
development the pb- or pc-functions initiate. Both pb^ and, because
of there already having been a k2f with respect to a pc^ at slot (2),
pc^ make available the function pcj[ at the second part of slot (3).
Then, since the second speaker has his/herself carried thematic
development beyond the k2f, thereby displaying an orientation to talk
on the topic, this can become a pcj, that extends discussion in a
thematically relevant way. If, however, the speaker at slot (3) fails
to take this option immediately, at slot (4) the speaker can attempt
to hasten its acceptance by explicitly offering a k2/pbj or k2/pcj
move, thus giving rise to a further talk solicitation.
The most interesting cases are the final two, for whereas the
distinction between interrogative and declarative syntax turns out to
have little effect in the previous example, it appears to have
dramatic consequences when the 'oh'-item is not present. The
discoursal characterisation accounts for this as follows.
The case of free-standing partial repeats with interrogative
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syntax at slot (2) is quite straightforward. The turn at slot (2) may
be classified as a k2/pbj^-move and, as before, this projects a
ps^-function for slot (3) and a pcj-function for somewhere after slot
(3). Furthermore, the lack of a k2f-function with respect to pc^ at
slot (2) makes it appropriate for the speaker to provide one at slot
(4) giving rise to an acknowledgement which should not be
topic-curtailing because of the outstanding expectations of the
pcj-move. The discourse characterisation can therefore be represented
as:
PCi pbi PSi pcj
kl k2 kl k2f kl
mi mii miii miv mv
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
However, when a declamtive partial repeat is given at slot
(2), the situation is quite different. In the case where slot (4) is
topic-curtailing, it can be noted that there are no discourse
expectations outstanding and so curtailment is quite appropriate. The
characterisation here is:
PCi PCi PSi •
kl k2 kl k2f
mi mii miii miv
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The pcj^-move at slot (2) cannot project a pcj continuation because
there has been no prior k2f with respect to pcj to indicate that
topical development may proceed. Furthermore, a simple k2 is not the
only possibility and Berry's dkl finds a useful application in this
case. Its primary effect here is to propose a reassignment of
knowledge roles with respect to the information at issue. I should
note that this option was not available in the previous occurrence of
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a k2/pc-move, i.e. in the 'oh' plus partial repeat with declarative
syntax case, precisely because of the presence of the k2f-function;
this function entails acceptance of the way the knowledge roles have
been allocated and so a proposed change would require very much more
conversational work. Thus, since the dkl-function predicts not only a
following k2 but also a subsequent kl where the full authority of
'someone who knows' is exerted, the discourse characterisation of the













news I repeat | re- | disagreement
confirm
The move in which k2 and ps are conflated should be a highly
dispreferred choice. Normally it is only the 'knower' who has the
right to support the information being shared but the change of roles
at slot (2) upsets this. Thus, it is quite predictable that "'you
did?' may project disagreement and, in projecting disagreement, may
license 'paranoid' responses"(Heritage, forthcoming.b, p51); to be
asked to support something which one does not have the right to
support provides a good incentive for changing one's ground, as the
following example cited from Jefferson demonstrates:
(1) A: Derek we have no hea::t.
(2) D: Yih have no hea:t?
(3) A: We, can't feel any.
In which, at slot (3), presumably to avoid having to offer a
k2/ps-move, A retreats from the former claim and so at least accepts
the possibility that a change in knower-role allocation is warranted.
This section has suggested, then, three principal additions to
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the discourse level framework. First, the sequence [pc-^ pbjj may be
used (either within a single turn or across consecutive turns) to
point subsequent discourse development in a quite specific direction;
the pc-fundle typically includes either a kl or a pk2f at the
interpersonal layer depending upon the status of the proposition at
issue at that point in the discourse. Second, assessing a
contribution with respect to distinct propositions can justify
distinct discourse function labels that apply simultaneously - any of
which may be used subsequently to construct further turns. And third,
interaction can be facilitated by variously 'bracketted' sequences
that mirror the usual discourse organisation on a smaller scale, e.g.
by micro-exchanges.
6. The discourse functions of anaphora - focus reinterpreted
Berry, following Sinclair and Coulthard and other exchange
structure theorists and as can be seen in the possibility of complex
recursive structures within the exchange, has usually placed the
exchange at quite a high-level in discourse organisation. An exchange
can, in such frameworks, end up covering an extremely extended
stretch of discourse. The direction I have taken here, however, moves
more towards the fine details of interaction and the removal of
complex recursive structure. Conversation, under this view, is more
concerned with the ongoing achievement of interaction on a
move-by-move basis and my discussion of anaphora in this section,
therefore, will investigate the possible role of certain choices of
pronominal forms of reference with respect to that ongoing
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achievement. Although the types of anaphora that occur in the highly
constrained discourse domain provided by the maze game are extremely
restricted in number, the use of the third person forms is not simply
predicted and, in fact, offers a conveniently delimited and yet
highly revealing domain of inquiry. In particular, the usual kind of
analysis in this area now rests upon a treatment in terms of 'focus'
but I will now demonstrate that an examination from the perspective
of guiding interaction can be equally revealing.
Perhaps the most straight-forward contribution to the
interpretation of the reference forms at issue here is the pragmatic
delimitation of the type of entity concerned. This has been
discussed, from quite different perspectives, by Webber (1979) and
Yule (1979). Thus, in the contributions:
that's an S box of mine [44A.13]
is it the only way you can go [44A.13]
it doesn't change any of my barriers [44A.1]
one can be reasonably sure that the entity/process to which the
relevant pro-form in each case is referring is: a position in the
maze, a direction in which to move, and a move respectively. This
information is given by the proposition predicated of the pro-form
rather than by the pro-form itself.
The question must then arise as to whether there are further
constraints which permit the narrowing down to a particular
antecedent of the required type. Is it conceivable that there is
nothing more complex occurring than a matching against possibilities
with no further guidance from the context or the discourse history? I
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will examine instances of these reference forms in the protocols in
order to throw some light on this issue. First, I will consider
'that', then 'it', and finally the interaction between the two and
some other related forms and usages. I will proceed by giving the
discourse-functional characterisations of the environments in which
the reference forms occur in order to see if any general
co-occurrence relationships can be established.
6.1 The discourse role of 'that'
The sequence below from protocol segment 38A.31 offers a good
place to start and presents no problems for the discourse-functional
characterisation, which is set out in the usual manner in figure 2.
The sequencing here can be seen to accord well with the simplest
recognised discourse development. There are no functions 'out of
sequence' and the individual *pb-pc-ps' progressions are chained
together neatly. (The entire sequence is, in fact, a response to A
asking 'where's your nearest S?' which, as a 'pt>2/k2', renders moves
mi and mii a pre-answer sequence.)
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1 B: Well, I'm, at the moment, where I am,
2 I'm, four down, and three along, (Is)
3 A: four down, (Is) {and three along
4 B: {and that's a special square of mine,
5 A: well I'm nowhere near that,
6 have you got a special square,
7 anywhere in the top two rows?
8 B: yeah,
9 A: where?
10 B: ehm, two down, and three along,
11 A: two down three along,
12 right I can get into that just now, ...
Protocol segment: 38A.31
PCI 1 PC2 PC3
kl k2f kl k2f.f k2
mi mii miii miv mv
1-2 3 4 5 6-7
basei | repi. i |emb2 |base3 basc^.
PC4 1 Pbs PC5 1 PC6
kl k2 kl k2f. f kl
mvi mvii mviii mix mx
8 9 10 11 12
yeah mod4.i mod4 2 rep4 .2 base6
Figure 2:
•
Discourse-functional characterisation of segment 38A.31 |
The first two instances of 'that', in lines 4 and 5, are
coreferential and both anaphorically specify a position in the maze,
namely the position which is shared in lines 1-3. I noted above that
the 'embedding' class of ellipsis was the weakest of all, equivalent
to a lexicogrammatical base apart from being linked hypotactically or
cohesively by conjunction with a preceding base. It is then
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appropriate that the bond with the preceding discourse should be made
stronger in B's contribution in line 5 by the deployment of the
anaphorically cohesive reference item 'that*. Furthermore, in the
k2f.f-contribution at line 5, A chooses to do more than just
acknowledge receipt of the information; indeed, in this position it
would be odd not to continue with a further contribution of some
kind. A needs to express that the position forwarded by B is of no
use for A's prospective move since what is required is a 'special
square' that is near to A's position not B's. Lines 6 and 7 can,
then, be seen as a repair of A's original, and misleading, question.
Line 5 prepares the ground for a retry of that question by closing
the sequence of moves mi-miv; player A displays understanding of the
information given so far and makes it clear that this is of no help.
Again, the use of the backward-looking reference item 'that' is
entirely appropriate for binding the sequence mi-miv into a cohesive
whole which is about to be superceded. This illustrates a possible
'topic-curtailing' use of conversational moves of the form 'pc/k2f.f'
anologous to moves we saw above in relation to newsmarks; this
function also would be expected considering the 'term defining' role
of 'pc/k2f.c' contributions demonstrated in the next chapter.
The occurrence of 'that' in line 12 is in a
discourse-functional environment analogous to that of miii and again
refers to a position. B has answered A's revised question at mv and
so it falls to A to display understanding of that answer and to
continue the discourse in an appropriately responsive fashion. The
position forwarded by B is, this time, not to be disregarded but used
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in the game and, by means of the anaphoric cohesion made available by
'that', A can display that the discourse-continuation being proposed
is making use of B's information.
One function that 'that' is serving in such cases can be simply
stated in terms of the theme-rheme articulation of the propositional
content I introduced above. Whenever a sequence of 'that's is used it
first forms the thematic segment of a new proposition at issue
picking out the rhematic segment of the previous proposition and then
maintains this theme over several propositions. For example, the
propositional development achieved by lines 2-5 of protocol 38A.31
can be represented as follows.
<B is somewhere 4 down 3 along>
-> <4 down 3 along is a special square of B>g
-> <4 down 3 along is somewhere that A is nowhere near>3
This organisation corresponds to one of the basic patterns of
'thematic progression* described by Danes (1974, pi 18), and is
reproduced here as figure 3. In this pattern each new cycle of





Theme i > Rheme3
etc.
Figure 3: Danes(1974) - thematic progression type 1
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One slight variation in this scheme is exemplified by the
contributions:
B: I'll move home again
A: Well that's an S box
B: Exactly
A: Well, that's not much good is it?
B: Well look how ...
[PI.24]
Here the second 'that' is not quite coreferential with the first; the
propositional development runs:
<B is to move somewhere | home again>
-> <B's home | is an S box>
-> <B's moving home | is not much good>
Thus, although broadly speaking the thematic segment remains,
different aspects of it are focused upon in A's two utterances.
A more substantial variation is found in sequences such as the
following which are very common:
A: ... right you're in, 12345 down and 2 along,
right?
B: uhu
A: I'm gonna move into the square immediately to the left
of that,
is that a special square, no?
B: No. ...
[38A.41]
B: ...right see I'm at the third column
A: uhu 4 up
B: yeah and the one to the right of that is my home
A: one to the right OK, that's 2 up
[PI. 16]
In these examples there is a progression in the referent of the
anaphor. The first 'that', as before, picks out the rheme of the
preceding proposition, but the second then does the same", i.e. it
picks out the new rheme rather than the previous theme. The
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propositional development of these two examples can be represented,
therefore, as:
<B is at some position which is | 5 down and 2 along>
-> <5 down and 2 along and
| one to the left is where A is going to move>
-> <5 down and 2 along and one to the left,
where A is going to move,
| is not a special square>
<B is at some position which is | 3rd column 4 up>
-> <B's home relative to 3rd column 4 up is
-> <one to the right is, relative to A,
one to the right>
2 up>
As the sequence proceeds information is proposed and accepted in a
cycle which leads to a simple growth of the proposition at issue.
'That' is here used to orientate propositional development towards
the proposition as it stands at any point so that it may be extended.
This latter pattern of discourse organisation is also described by
Danes (1974); it is shown in figure 4.
Themei > Rhemei
V
Theme2 (=Rhemei ) > Rheme2
V
Theme3 (=Rheme2 ) > etc.
Figure 4: Danes (1974) - thematic progression type 2
One significant consequence of this is that the propositional
development being accomplished can be freed from the strict
one-to-one correspondence with the lexicogrammar that has been made
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use of so far. The coherence of propositional development is being
displayed in the appropriate selection of anaphors rather than in the
selection of ellipticity. In this way, both ellipsis and anaphora can
be seen as alternative resources for binding sequences together: the
former working upon the lexicogrammatical actualisation, the latter
upon the propositional. In fact, the range of operations available
for the construction of propositions parallels those described for
ellipsis. As Halliday and Hasan note, the difference is primarily one
of 'level'; ellipsis is a lexicogrammatical phenomenon, a relatedness
of form, while cohesive anaphora is a semantic phenomenon, a
relatedness of function.
The schemata for thematic progression can now be used to make
the discourse-functional specification more sensitive to the
particular ways in which accountably coherent discourse is being
achieved. To take as an example the discourse-functional



















it can be seen that the coherence of the sequence pcj-pc2~pc3 is not
represented. As the formulation stands at present there is nothing to
link the proposed completed propositions together. The subscripts of
the ideational layer functions can now be made to do some work of
their own rather than simply echoing those of the lexicogrammatical
bases: the subscripts will now track the themes of their
propositions. Thus, sequences of propositions which achieve
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'coherent' thematic development as sanctioned by the theme-preserving
pattern will receive the same subscript. Those that conform to the
theme-changing pattern will be represented by a sequence of
consecutive subscripts. This partitions discourses into sequences
where the thematic development is at its simplest; these will be
termed 'thematic sequences' and correspond approximately to Keenan
and Schieffelin's 'continuous discourse'.22
The propositional development of the protocol segment with
which I began this subsection, i.e. 38A.31, can now be specified as
follows. The state of development at each move which proposes a
completed proposition is:
<B is at some position which is | 4 down and 3 along>mi.
mii: <4 down and 3 along is one of B's special squares>
miv: <4 down and 3 along is somewhere A is nowhere near>
mvi: <B has a special square somewhere in top 2 rows>
mviii: <B has a special square at 2 down 3 along>
mx: <2 down and 3 along | is somewhere A can move>
Thus, the moves at miii and mx are theme-changing, those at miv and
mviii are theme-preserving, while those at mi and mvi can be said to




[pci P°2 PC2] [pb] PC] pbj PCJ
mi mii miii miv mv mvi mvii mviii mix
and, furthermore, as was suggested need be the case in chapter one,
it begins to tie together the 'interactional' and 'transactional'
views of discourse organisation quite closely.
22. And hence, also to sequences internal to Reichman's
'conversational moves'; significant differences will, however, be
mentioned below.
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To demonstrate this I will briefly consider one result of the
protocol analysis performed by Yule (1981). Having observed that
nonlexical reference items (e.g. 'it*, 'that', and null anaphora) can
refer to both themes (i.e. theme-preserving sequencing) and rhemes
(theme-changing sequencing), Yule associates the two patterns of
thematic progression with two possible 'speaker discourse
strategies'. These Yule terms the 'speaker's-topic-priority-rule' and
the 'current-entity-priority-rule' respectively. He then concludes:
"The decision to interpret 0 [null] as a current-entity or as
a speaker's-topic entity has to be based, not on the
environment of the utterance containing 0, but on the hearer's
assessment of the larger discourse strategy employed by the
speaker." (1981, p221)
Now, Yule states that the type of discourse analysis he is performing
contrasts with "that commonly found in primarily sociolinguistic
approaches where it is the nature of the 'interaction' which is
investigated." (ibid., pl7) The discourse strategy employed by a
speaker is, therefore, to be seen as a strategy for 'transferring
information'.
However, the revised description of the ideational layer of
segment 38A.31 above includes the deployment of 'that' as just
another member of the set of linguistic distinctions which display
the discourse organisation that is being achieved. That participants
in a discourse are able to arrange and to schedule their interactions
so as to achieve their discourse aims is, I take it, not
controversial. Indeed, some of the analyses I have already given show
a selection of particular types of discourse contributions in order
to affect the course of the interaction in various ways. But then, to
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suggest that the selection of certain linguistic forms, e.g. 'that'
or null-anaphora, needed to be explained by a still 'more'
intentional process such as selecting from available strategies seems
curious. If any 'transferral of propositional information' that may
be imputed to the discourse contributions has already been achieved
by virtue of the interaction being effected successfully, then there
is little need to decontextualise the discourse achievements those
contributions represent so as to be able to construct the possible
discourse strategies speakers are supposed to wield 'intentionally'.
Schegloff (1977), as in fact we have seen in chapter one, makes
essentially what I take to be Yule's point above concerning the need
to consider 'discourse strategy', rather than the 'environment of the
utterance', although in somewhat more general terms. The formal
manifestations I describe here represent those resources which often
carry discourse organisation - but precisely which discourse
organisation is not then recoverable simply from an examination of
the manifestations exhibited. The discourse level is accepted here as
an autonomous level of meaningful patterning with its own internal
organisational principles which must also be taken into
consideration. This also goes against Berry's attempt to treat
exchanges as lexicogrammatical units; the tendency to reduce all
adjacency pairs to question-answer sequences only hides the problem
of noncorrespondence between discourse-level and
lexicogrammatical-level acts.
The distinction between deciding to interpret a referent
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according, on the one hand, to the environment of an utterance and,
on the other, to an assessment of a 'larger' discourse strategy must,
then, be seen as unhelpful. Only if the environment of an utterance
is artificially restricted can its information be ruled out as
irrelevant to the assessment. Manifestations of 'discourse
strategies', when interpreted in context, combine to display the
strategy being pursued. They need to do this since a strategy may
only be proposed subject to ratification by the other participants in
the discourse situation. If it is not ratified then repairs will be
initiated and the strategy will be modified; in a sense, this is
better expressed by saying that the strategy will modify itself since
the strategy does not exist in isolation from the stream of situated
discourse behaviour from which it is abstracted.
This can be seen in the following discourse
characterisation of the protocol segment 44A.13:
A: Well, well I can have a penalty point
if that'll help
B: well if you go back down, {right?
A:
, {uhu
B: then that would be better,














The first use of 'that'
uhu
peg pbg peg




'current-entity reference': A introduces a move and immediately
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refers to it. Now, the move at mii projects a psg/kl^move. This is a
strong prediction: a kl must follow and there is only one possible
propositional function still available for conflation with it.
Whatever occurs at miii is going to be interpreted as a psg/kl-move
or a pre-sequence for such a move.








While if a ps~2 were to follow then, as described above, the





The actual move at miii reflects the fact that discourse participants
will often, perhaps usually, avoid giving an explicit, distinct
statement of understanding when a discourse-continuing move can be
made to display the required statement instead. Move miii, therefore,
relies upon its compatibility with a continuation of the discourse in
which a ps~2 had been given. Furthermore, the expected modification
comes at the thematic level and addresses the thematic sequence began
at mi rather than the individual element of mii.
As has been widely noted, any discourse development which is
not following a simple thematic progression requires that the speaker
responsible make due reference to that fact. This, for example,
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Reichman (1981) describes in her treatment of 'clue words', and
Schegloff and Sacks (1973) refer to under the heading of
'misplacement markers'. There is probably a continuum of types of
progression available which ranges from the barely necessary logical
conjunction to a full side sequence as defined by Jefferson (1972).
The move at miii attempts to terminate the thematic sequence begun at
mi and so needs to draw attention to the fact that the thematic
sequence is not being continued. This can be achieved in a variety of
ways. The speaker can deny the proposition proposed at mii, 'that'll
help', and give the projected ps_2 explicitly; as will be clearer
after the discussion of 'it', 'that' would not be entirely
appropriate in such a move. Alternatively, the speaker can explicitly
evaluate the move at issue negatively indicating that it is to be
passed over; in this case the evaluation would be theme-preserving
and so a 'that' could be appropriately deployed (as was the case in
38A.31, line 5, above). Or, the course the speaker actually took, the
original thematic sequence can be restarted with an alternative
possibility. This, as the most abrupt discourse development, well
justifies the speaker's immediate use of 'right?' to enlist his/her
hearer's support for the move taken. All three possibilities entail a
ps~2~nK>ve and the linguistic distinctions drawn and resources
deployed reflect this. The use of 'that' at mii and its non-use at
miii both co-occur with other features symptomatic of the discourse
development undertaken. Thus, although Yule is perfectly correct to
state that the wider discourse strategy has to be considered, the
assessment of that strategy is only possible on the basis of the
linguistic actualisation which constitutes the 'environment' of
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actual discourse contributions.
The use of 'that' at the second part of miii is, similarly,
theme-changing and parallels the thematic sequence developed in moves
mi and mii. At miv, however, the speaker achieves a theme-preserving
move deploying 'that'. Again the thematic sequence is being brought
to a close but, this time, the maze game move proposed has been
positively evaluated. All the resources the speaker draws upon in
moves miii and miv combine to achieve the required aims: i.e., a maze
game move is selected for the other player, that move is evaluated as
a desirable one, discussion of possibilities is brought to a close,
and the speaker invites the other player to perform the move. This is
achieved in the ongoing organisation of the discourse, a separate
'strategy' for its achievement was not necessary.
This view of the function of the reference item 'that' and of
its place among the linguistic resources generally will be further
clarified by the consideration of the use of 'it' to which I now
turn.
6.2 The discourse role of 'it'
One of the simplest occurrences of the referential endophoric
use of 'it' is in answer to questions where the attributes of some
entity are requested. This occurs twice in the sequence:
A: Where is your goal?
B: Ehm, it's, on, the top row, (Is)
and it's, fourth-, fifth along, (Is)
A: {Yes
B: {Wh- where's yours?
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A: It's, the top row and second along
B: uhu, OK
The propositional development of the two question-answer pairs is
identical in form; they are, respectively,
This progression superficially resembles the theme-preserving
sequence but there is an important difference. The relations between
states in propositional development discussed above were all between
completed propositions; here the relation is one of progression from
a propositional base to a completed proposition. This suggests that a
much 'closer' relationship is entailed by the occurrence of 'it' than
of 'that'; the latter operates across sequences developing single
propositions while the former operates within such sequences.
This conclusion also appears to hold when both reference forms
are found in close proximity. For example, in the sequences of the
form (of which there are very many instances);
B: OK, if you go to, the left, (Is)
A: wi- will that change a gate?
B: it will change a gate for me, yeah
first, A's 'that' achieves a theme-preserving move which specifies a
propositional base and, second, B completes that base using 'it'. The
discourse-functional characterisation is then:
->
<A's goal is somewhere where?>
<A's goal is somewhere top row 5th along>
->
<B's goal is somewhere vhere?>












OK base] 0 baseg rep2 yeah
add2.1
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This sequence is, therefore, readily seen to be a coherent segment of
discourse. There are cases, however, where 'it' occurs in other
environments and a treatment of these will allow a more general
statement of the 'meaning' of selecting 'it' rather than some other
form.
In the following examples, the move in which 'it' is deployed
is again a pc following a pb but the two moves do not form a
question-answer pair.
A: Well if I move to the left now,
will that be helpful to you?
It's the only way I can move actually, (laughs)




Here A's second pc is clearly not serving as a suggested answer to
the question s/he has just put; on the contrary, it seems to be
trying to suggest that the question's answer is in fact irrelevant
due to there being no other choice of maze game move available. A's
turn as a whole, then, is both informing B that A can only move one
way and seeking B's approval for that move. B, accordingly, gives
that approval but the nonelliptical form of the contribution supports
the view that the thematic progression over this sequence was not as
smooth as it might have been.
One of the ways in which Halliday and Hasan contrast 'it' and
'that' is in terms of 'selectivity': the demonstratives are
selective, the personal 'it' nonselective.^ This could be a factor
in the use of 'it' in this case. A wants to achieve a shared
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orientation to his/her moving left as the only move possible. 'It',
as nonselective, suggests there is no need to make a selection
because there is only one entity from which to choose. A little later
in the same game a similar sequence occurs:
In the penultimate turn it is B, this time, who selects 'it' and
again there is a suggestion that there is only one possible entity
that could be at issue, i.e. A's move up. Notice also that the
contribution in which 'it' first occurs is here a pb-move following a
pc-move, which gives another possible environment.
However, all the examples considered so far, including the
original question-answer pairs, share a similarity in the kind of
'conversational work' that the discourse participants are undertaking
in the contributions in which 'it' occurs. That is, they all co-occur
with 'repair' work with respect to the original proposition at issue;
more specifically: the moves initiate repair of the rheme of that
proposition.24 Just what is to be taken as the proposition at issue
in each case can be clarified by consideration of the
discourse-functional characterisations. To take the last example
first and indicating repair work on a proposition by a dash ('), the
organisation of segment 44A.13 can be set out thus:
24. For this to apply to question-answer pairs generally I am







Right, where are you going?
Up, (laughs)
hold on hold on, that's an S box for, of mine,
(Is) Ah, yeah well
is it the only way you can go?
I think it is, well, I can go down actually,
[44A.13]
23. Halliday and Hasan (1976, pp58, 70).
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pbj PC] peg 0 ptq * pej • PCJ •
right k2 kl k2f.c kl (k2f) k2f.c (kl) kl
mi mii miii miv mv mvi mvii mviii
basej modj J hold on baseg - baseg emb3 i base^
hold on
(The 'that' of baseg is theme-changing giving rise to peg and the
'it' of baseg accompanies the onset of repair at mvi.) B begins by
asking for A's move and A responds by specifying the direction (mii).
B is unhappy about this and so initiates a continuing k2f-move in
order to project discussion of A's intended move. Move miv presents
the reason for B's objection but A fails to respond in a positive
manner. B, on the failure of moves miii and miv to evoke a more
agreeable completion of pb|, takes a further k2f.c move; this can be
seen as a retry of move miii although the action B takes at mvi is
more positive. Instead of inviting A to respond (a k2f-move is not
obligatory), B projects a turn-at-talk for A in which A is to make a
pc/kl-move. Furthermore, as befits a k2f.c-move, B explicitly draws
attention to A's response at mii by use of the endophoric 'it' and so
calls for an alternative. At first, A attempts to support his/her
previous answer (although hedging on the kl role), but then provides
a new completion for the original pb] at mi: instead of a definite
move up being planned for A, the participants now find themselves
situated with a downwards move for A proposed (but not yet accepted,
although it is accepted after a few more turns).
The organisation of the first example, segment 44A.9, can be
set out similarly:
PC} pbg pej • | pi^2 P°2 I










basej baseg base3 rep] base4 all right
Here A initiates a thematic sequence which is to be concerned with
finding the next maze move A is to make. At miii, however, A makes an
additional move prior to the answer projected for B by mii. The
structural role A's action entails is pk2f but the form of the
contribution and its kl function supercedes this interpretation. The
anaphoric reference 'it' at miii can be seen, by type alone, to pick
out the direction of a move and only one move is at issue. Attention
is therefore being drawn to the preceding propositional state which
has the direction as theme. This is the propositional base of mii,
i.e.:
The move at miii does not so much 'repair' the rheme of this
proposition as trample on it. B finds him/herself in the position of
having a ps-move expected by an apparently superceded pk2f/pc, and a
k2f-move expected by a preceding kl, both projected for the same
move. In the absence of an unambiguous lead from A, B plays safe and
contributes a full repetition of the move at issue and positively
evaluates it.
The discourse-functional characterisations of the first
question-answer pairs can remain unchanged; the 'repair' of
incomplete propositions is already represented in their progression
from pb to pc. However, although the idea of repair, when interpreted
broadly, fits the occurrences discussed so far and, indeed, also fits
<A moving left | helpful for B?>
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clear cases of repair such as:
A: ...is 2 3, an S gate for you? (Is)
B: Ehm (2.5s) no, oh yes it is 2 3 is uhu
[44A.7]
this appeal to 'incompleteness' needs a tighter specification.
Furthermore, the analysis I have presented may at first sight seem
unsuited for the use of 'it' in normal extended discourse as a simple
attenuated form of reference sanctioned by the high salience of the
referent. For example, even if the analysis can be applied to cases
such as
B: ...there's a T shape, right? {I'm in,
A: {Mnhm,
B: if you can imagine it
I'm in the centre bit of it, ...
[38A.10]
perhaps by treating the there-clause as a pre-sequence which
establishes a theme to which the following information ('I'm in the
centre bit of it') addresses itself and therefore completes, it may
be unclear how this could improve on the standard treatment in terms
of focus introduced in chapter three. The protocol segment 38A.7
below exhibits the use of pronouns that is standardly investigated in
terms of focus and so a consideration of this will help assess the
possibilities available.
6.3 A noncognitive re-interpretation of focus
In segment 38A.7, 'it' appears in two distinct 'chains of
reference'. The first starts some twenty turns earlier with the pair:
one of those S squares [4 turns] the special.
Fifteen turns later, at line 2, the referent is picked out again by
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'that special square', then by 'the special square' and, finally, by
'it' at line 6. The second chain refers to B's 'moving backwards' and
consists of:
move backwards (line 9), it (1.10), it (1.12), it (1.14).
Both presumably conform to the standard focus interpretation: the use
of the demonstrative 'that' to effect reference back over a
substantial segment of the discourse appears similar to cases
discussed by Reichman (1981, pi 19 and passim),^ while the phrase

















just go back to that special square somehow?
I- I st-,
I can't- I'm in the special square
(laughs)
And I can't move anywhere out of it
(laughs), oh we're both jammed in,
You can't move anywhere at all, no?
I ca- I can move backwards but,
it's not gonna change anything {at all
{well
it's the only thing you can do then, (Is)
{OK
{see- what what we're gonna get out of it,
right, I'll move- make my move again
Protocol segment: 38A.7
However, if we examine the thematic development achieved by
25. Although Reichman, as far as I can tell, does not present an
explicit account of why a definite expression should be used over
a demonstrative as in line 4, nor an account of a pronoun as in
line 6. Reichman's approach is compatible with a strictly
syntactic production of the latter but see, for example, Bosch's
(1983) criticisms of the structural account.
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this segment the following picture emerges. B's contribution at line
1 starts seeking maze game moves of a particular sort from A in order
that B's situation can be improved. The appropriateness of this
conversational move at that time rests upon its being A's turn to
make a maze game move since only moves by A can change B's situation;
B therefore is quite justified in proposing a propositional base of
the form;
<A must move somewhere |
backwards and back to that special square?>
A starts a reply with 'I can't', which is suspended, and then informs
B that s/he is already in 'the special square' and cannot move out of
it. This amounts to quite a substantial revision of the assumptions B
displays in his/her question and, in fact, it is profitable to view
the design of A's contributions in lines 4 and 6 as arising from the
conversational 'work' that A has to do in order to achieve this
revision. The specific revisions required amount to: first,
correcting the theme of B's proposition because A cannot move
somewhere and, second, re-acquainting B with the relative positions
of A and the 'special square' so that B is aware of the impossibility
of attempting to move 'back' to it.
A's first attempt, 'I can't', may have been aimed at an
immediate revision of the theme but as a syntactically appropriate
answer to B's question it would have failed to display this function
as clearly as it might. B, unless given good reason, would interpret
A's response as completing the rheme of the propositional base rather
than addressing the theme. Furthermore, as a simple extension of the
rheme it would have failed to display to B quite the extent to which
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B's presuppositions were in error.
A's self-repair, 'I'm in the special square', answers B's
question as B would expect but does so by altering the rheme rather
than by merely completing it. B's laugh at line 5 is a good
indication of an acceptance of A's alteration. The proposition at
issue is then:26
<A must move somewhere |
ixLchoxJUuir*. ojlcL BjxcJl to- tfixUL u^cJLaJL ^cjxiwxx!7>
A is in the special square>
This still has not fully corrected B's wrong impression of the state
of affairs but the new rheme gives A a convenient platform from which
to alter the theme at line 6; resulting in:
<Q ukual wvwxe, rxmejojuxut.
A cannot move anywhere | G la ul the special square>
out of
This B then accepts with the archetypal k2f.f introducing item 'oh'
and brings the topic to a close with a summation of the present state
of play: 'we're both jammed in'. The discourse-functional
organisation of lines 1-7 is then simply:^?
0 pb] pc pcj • pci " pep
k2 kl - kl k2f kl k2f.f
m mi mii mii miii miv mv
1/3 1-2 4 5 6 7
0 base base NV [prebase add]
emb
NV+O/i+base
Lines 8-15 also cohere into a well-defined whole. First, and
again displaying the 'flow' of topic typical of discourse,28 a picks
26. It will be recalled that L/Ua is being used to
indicate a 'passed over' interpretation of some kind.
27. 'NY' denotes a non-verbal response such as laughing, etc.
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up the aspect of B's summation at line 7 which is not directly
available to A and explicitly checks it. (Moves such as this, which
focus on particular aspects of a previous proposition, will be
identified by the subscript 'F' on the ideational layer function.) As
discussed above, A's contribution at line 8 is structured so as to
elicit support for the proposition at issue and so B's response at
line 9 is a case of an implicit ps~n followed by explicit pcn*; in
terms of the thematic development:
<(B moxxjc OAJpnAgjuty
B can move backwards ...
Then, as was the case in lines 1-7 with respect to the proposition at
issue there, this single proposition forms the basis for subsequent
discussion. Although further information is brought to bear and
decisions are made, in an importaint sense there is no thematic
progression at all. The achievement of a complete, supported, and
acknowledged proposition is the conversational task the players
undertake until acceptance is given by B with the 'OK' of line 13 and
A's 'right* at line 15 displaying that topic is moving on. This
passes through the following stages:
<B can move backwards
not going to change anything ...
only thing B can do ...>
see what happens ...>
while the discourse organisation is accordingly:
pep (pci) PC] • PC| •' ps+i••• pci
k2 kl k2f.f ( kl ) •
mvi mvii mviii mix mx .
8 9 10 12 13 14
base rep[pol] [base but base] base OK base
28. This idea of topic 'flow', originally developed by Sacks is
treated at length in Casey (1981) and will be referred to further
below.
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The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the original
specification of the use of 'it' as co-occurring with 'repair' work
does capture a significant aspect of how the discourse is being
developed. The unifying feature seems to be that the selection of the
anaphor 'it' does not advance the thematic progression but, instead,
displays that work is still necessary or is being performed upon the
proposition then at issue. This lack of thematic progression also
explains the occurrences of 'it* found in the previous section in the
analysis of tag questions in which the questioner is explicitly
'failing' to take up the development and so 'encourages' his/her
interlocutor to do so.
If the stretch of language over which work on a single
'proposition' is undertaken is viewed as the 'discourse unit' within
which the functionally-labelled sequences being described here
operate, then this becomes very reminiscent of Coulthard and Brazil's
claim concerning the exchange; i.e. that the exchange
"... is the unit concerned with the transmission of
information ... [it] carries one (potentially complex) piece
of information and its polarity, and that the information and
polarity can only be asserted once." (1981, plOl)
However, as this and the previous chapter have shown, the conception
of the exchange as the simple three or four move entity presented by
Coulthard and Brazil is in need of serious further development. Berry
(1981a, pl39) at leasts hints, however, that some such development
has been accepted as necessary and so the extensions I have suggested
here may be taken as a first step towards this.
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Within this view, then, what has happened to the notion of
'focusing'? First, it can be observed that the approach here shows
several similarities with Reichman's (1981) in that a discourse unit
- which may as well now also be labelled an exchange - has been
proposed within which anaphoric reference by 'it' is preferred for
its objects of interest. Reichman's unit is described as "a set of
utterances ... [which] fulfills a speaker's communicative goal
vis-a-vis a particular preceding part of the discourse." (1981, pl6)
This reflects her concern with addressing a 'higher' rank (or as I
argue, stratum) unit than I have considered so far since examples of
her communicative goals are: support a claim, challenge a claim, make
an analogy, etc. Each of these could extend over substantial segments
of discourse. In contrast to this, I claim that the notion of
exchange, as just defined, is a more 'general' construct and is
better suited as a discourse-level entity than Reichman's
conversational moves and context spaces. This is to begin to specify
the particularly linguistic goals of discourse that I criticised
Reichman and others for not addressing in the Introduction, while
simultaneously allowing us a better grasp of Halliday's claim, which
I cited in chapter one, that: "The input to the semantic networks is
sociological and specific; their output is linguistic and general."
(1973, p80) Reichman's units are contextual and sociological, not
discoursal and linguistic. A further level of patterning needs to
mediate between a stratum such as Reichman's and lexicogrammar and
the discourse-functional level I describe here is intended eventually
to achieve this.
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This necessarily involves a re-interpretation of 'focus', or at
least of the local focus phenomena at issue at the moment. Instead of
a language-extrinsic notion imposed upon linguistic organisation by
the processing capabilities of the supporting mechanisms, focus here
can be seen as a label for one aspect of the work to which discourse
addresses itself. That work is the achievement of mutually-agreed
progressions of accountably relevant thematic development and is
brought about by the deployment of the available discourse-level
resources. The orientation of discourse participants towards the
subject-matter of the discourse is, then, a consequence of
language-intrinsic resources and does not yet require a justification
in terms of underlying 'processes' of interpretation. Each particular
development of the discourse sanctions appropriate future
developments and 'focus' is an attempt to describe this at the wrong
level. This claim parallels Grosz, Joshi, and Weinstein's (1983)
treatment of 'local' focus in terms of 'centering'; their conclusion
that this construct derives "from neither semantics nor pragmatics
exclusively" and that its principles "must be elicited from the study
of discourse itself" (1983, p48) is fully compatible with the account
given here and I suggest that a thorough statement of the discourse
resources I have begun to describe would subsume their account and
explicitly relate the resources that bring about those phenomena
which have been attributed to 'focus* to more general resources of
discoursal and contextual development.
One of the essential points I hope has been suggested
throughout this chapter is that cohesion-'building' resources are not
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to be seen as 'problems' needing 'resolving' on the part of the
conversational participants. They are instead precise instructions
upon how the interaction is to proceed, what is being talked of, what
has been understood in the talk so far, and so on. Thus, for example,
ellipsis is not some principle of 'laziness' or even, necessarily,
economy. It is a positive meaning distinction which captures the fact
that potential that has been established is to continue as
established and is not yet to be superceded. This contrasts with any
view of ellipsis as primarily a feature of memory focusing with
respect to 'recentmost' syntactic structure; ellipsis here is a
stabilised linguistic resource for preserving the actualisation of
systemic potential - 'memory for structure' is to be constructed
first as a linguistic phenomenon rather than a psychological one.
Similarly, as I have suggested, focus is not something which is
passively 'tracked', it is an ongoing contingent achievement which
participants work at and maintain by their deployment of cohesion
resources. When a particular discourse organisation has been
achieved, this entails specific thematic progressions and appropriate
saliencies. The discourse, then, itself guides and indicates the
appropriate manner of its interpretation.
Furthermore, a more general conclusion to be drawn from the
above discussions is that there are particular discourse resources
available to the participants in the maze game situation for
achieving accountably coherent streams of linguistic interaction and
that the management of the expectations these resources create when
deployed can itself become a significant part of the interaction.
- 319 -
Thus, most simply, a question can achieve the expectation of having
an answer occur - which is a useful result if information is to be
shared - but very much more complicated uses, such as those which
have been illustrated in this chapter, are also possible.
It will be useful now to draw together the results of the above
discussions somewhat in order to summarise the discourse-functional
sequences that have been attributed to the maze game protocols. The
classifications offered here can be seen as an initial attempt to
specify part of the 'semantics' of cohesion and, as suggested in
section 1, are to serve as constraints upon the output of networks of
choice to be constructed for the discourse level at a later cycle of
investigation.
7. Discourse function patterning - an initial collection
In the general development of the discourse level framework
that I began in chapter three, two locally-oriented sources of
organisation were considered: turns and moves. There I demonstrated
that it was useful to separate turns and moves as belonging to two
complementary dimensions of discourse patterning - this was explained
in terms of Richardson's distinction between discourse structuration
and discourse synchronisation. The discourse resources which give
rise to moves are clearly where I am attempting to place most of the
work of achieving conversation and so the organisation at this level
is considerably more complex than that for turns. All that needs to
be built into the turn-management system at this point, is a role for
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the participant who is, at the time, speaker; i.e. who is responsible
for the actualisation being undertaken. A turn is then the stretch of
talk over which the bearer of this role does not alter. As far as the
discourse structuation is concerned, the simplest sequences of
functionally-labelled contributions can be set out by specifying for
each discourse (micro-)function the sequence of further functions it
projects both retrospectively and prospectively. Also, commonly
occurring 'realisations' of each micro-function will be given if any
have been observed. This basic discourse level information is




spectively current prospectively common
projected and projected realisations
sequence actual sequence
... mj_2 Dij-i m, Ui+l nii+2 . ..
k2 kl k2f rising final
intonation





k2 kl k2f.f falling final
intonation
kl k2f falling final
intonation










kl pk2f kl interruption

















Simplest discourse function order lists
(centred on a 'current' function)
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It should again be stressed that this is not intended as a
'formalisation'. The statement that, for example, a k2 function makes
relevant a kl function which in turn make relevant a k2f function is
a claim about the properties of one possible sequence of
lexicogrammatical and intonational actualisation cycles, not one
about the only sequence that may 'legally' occur and its realisation
in form. Claims of the latter sort, if possible at all, must await
the associated networks of choice. Furthermore, this table does not
include the sequences discussed above which appear to rest on certain
combinations of micro-functions from distinct layers; for example,
that a 'k2/ps' projects a 'kl/ps' for the other player. Figure 5,
therefore, only serves as a slightly extended version of Berry's
basic three layer schema with which I first introduced her account of
the functional level at the end of chapter two.
Berry, of course, goes on to formalise the general constraints
she observes across layers in terms of a system network which
generates bundles of discourse functions, i.e. moves or turns in her
framework; the 'grammatical' sequences of moves then entail an
interlayer series of constraints. The problem here, of course, is
that we are not in a position to construct system networks. It is not
clear in structural terms what stretch of language a network would be
defined over and, therefore, lacking the necessary higher vantage
point from which to begin systematisation, such a move would be
premature. Drawing an analogy with lexicogrammar, the current stage
of the investigation may be likened to a set of observations of the
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form 'modifier precedes head' or 'theme precedes rheme' - while the
mutual ordering of certain function bundles has been described and
motivated, the notions corresponding to the noun group or clause in
which such function bundles are operational are missing from the
discoursal account. There is no basis, then, on which to suggest
'features' for the discourse level systems of choice because we do
not yet have an entity to classify in featural terms - there is no
point of entry to the network required.
What has been suggested is the notion of extending the range of
the exchange so as to fill the role of the structural entity within
which the discourse functional sequences may be more properly
specified. The work of this chapter can therefore be seen as an
initial listing of some of the more common functional decompositions
of such a unit and a collection of observations concerning such
decompositions' possible functional roles in the context of
developing a discourse.
As a summary, then, of some of these decompositions and
observations I will conclude this chapter with first, a list of
general observations on the effects of moves or constitutive
functions of exchanges on discourse development, and second,
observations on what may for the moment be loosely described as
inter-exchange developments - i.e. on commonly occurring sequences of
exchanges that develop an entire series of propositions. Any network
that is constructed for the discourse level will have at least to
support these organisations and, via its chooser specifications,
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motivate their use similarly.
Sequences relating to single propositions
(R1) When a pb function follows a pc function for the same, or
related, proposition at issue (hereafter 'pai'):


















(R2) When a pk2f function precedes a pb function for the same pai,





the projected pcj ] of slot 3 entails a psj - this case shades into
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(Rl.b) above.





may occur with AB-events where both speakers have the right to bear a
kl-role with respect to the pai.
(R4) It is possible to have single moves classified differently at a
single layer with respect to distinct pai's; e.g.
(R5) Repetitions may be achieved by modifying an intervening
lexicogrammatical base to accord with one previously given.
(R6) A move of the form: 'k2f.c/pc-j/mj: [rep]' picks out, by means of
the repetition, a repairable rheme (i.e. that of pc^) for upcoming
(R7) A speaker may always 're-do' a niQve, but has to be aware of the
prevailing discourse expectations and design the contribution
accordingly.
(R8) An in-progress move of the form 'kl/pcj/ may be interrupted so
as to carry the exchange towards early completion as follows:
PCI.1 Ps+l.l







Inter-exchange progressions that develop series of propositions
(R9) A thematic sequence of completed propositions may function as a
single completed proposition.
(RIO) Moves may work on an existing proposition by means of
(i) lexicogrammatical addition or modification
(ii) anaphora (especially it)
The former gives rise to 'intra-pai' progressions; the latter
to repair. These categories often overlap, although a general
distinction is that repair is a positive action taken in
response to a perceived inadequacy whereas progression is more
neutral and less actively seeks to right a state of affairs.
(R11) Focusing on the theme of an incomplete proposition projects an
insertion sequence.
(R12) A k2f.f function implies that:
(i) the pai is established and accepted
(ii) the proposed role allocation (particularly kl and k2) is
accepted
(iii) thematic progression may continue if relevant (by, e.g.
prior rheme becoming current theme, providing a new
lexicogrammatical base, or anaphora - especially that).




(R14) A micro-exchange may occur within progressions between
sequences related to their respective pai's; e.g.
pci [ PC I PS I ] pci+l
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(R15) A pep may relevantly follow a pc^.
(R16) In a sequence such as (the bracketed fundle is optional)
(i) the ps+i+] entails a k2f with respect to pc-[
(ii) the pci+| entails a ps^
(R17) A sequence may not proceed beyond ps^ to sequences relating to
a proposition pc^+j until a kl with respect to pc^ has been
forthcoming; e.g.
P°i , Pbi+1 , PCi+l









Some contextual consequences of discourse
In chapter two I suggested that the relation between form and
function might be grounded in the Hallidayan notion of realisation
between strata; language was to be considered as the realisation of
context. It was also suggested that, in order to accommodate
Halliday's claim that context is predictive of the text, the context
might also, in addition to the formal stratum system networks of
lexicogrammar, intonation and discourse, need to be considered a
source of initiative; i.e., the state of affairs within the Nigel
framework whereby "The environment never volunteers any information;
all of the information received by a choice expert is in response to
questions asked" (Mann, 1982, p5) might need to be altered. Finally,
while the discourse-functional level as articulated in the previous
chapter has suggested that there is an extremely local - i.e. centred
around 'exchanges', adjacency pairs, and the like - kind of
organisation around which cluster certain phenomena of ellipsis,
anaphora, substitution, reiteration, etc., this chapter will argue
further that there is achieved in the discourse a more lasting
orientation which is not structurally-bound at the lexicogrammatical
or discoursal levels', this orientation I will term microregister. The
discussion here will help (i) to get an improved sense of how the
'preferred' forms for propositions made use of in the previous
chapter are established - thus again increasing the potential
reliability of recognition criteria for discourse functions - and,
- 329 -
(ii) to begin to suggest the direction I favour for improving the
sensitivity of the formal stratum of the linguistic system to the
effects of context as called-for above.
The discussion will proceed in three stages, each stage
concentrating on a more specific and localised area of concern than
the last. The first stage briefly discusses some of the ways of
approaching the relation between context and language that have been
proposed in the Neo-Firthian tradition. The second, drawing on
examples from the maze game protocols, shows that the largely static,
general and anonymous mechanisms previously proposed for relating
language and context can also be observed operating actively in
specific and individualised uses of language in order to promote a
case-by-case alignment of the linguistic resources available to
individual discourse participants. Finally, the third stage takes
this to its logical conclusion and sketches how the highly detailed
and specific, shared orientation of linguistic and contextual
resources among discourse participants is maintained in the
appropriate selection of discourse function sequences.
1. Register and micro-register
As has been mentioned above, the Firthian and Neo-Firthian
traditions of linguistic analysis have always been concerned with the
relations between contexts and the language that occurs in those
contexts. This arises naturally from Firth's placement of the context
of situation at the centre of his view of language. The consideration
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of the language of particular contexts soon led to investigations of,
first, the ways in which language differed from context to context
and, second, the aspects of context that were to be held responsible
for such differences. Studies of 'stylistic' variation were also,
then, discussed in these terms, as, for example, in Eiikvist (1964)
and Spencer and Gregory (1964).
The theoretical construct which was devised for explaining such
variation was 'register'; the language of any particular register was
to be identified by virtue of the distinctive set of regularly
co-occurring linguistic features that that language displayed. This
was intended to capture theoretically the obvious differences that
are found between the language of, for example, newspaper headlines,
technical journals, informal conversations, plays, political
speeches, recipes, and so on. By listing the various linguistic
differences between texts of different registers and associating such
differences with particular differences in their 'social contexts',
it was hoped that the longstanding Firthian goal of being able to
bind context and language together formally would be realised.
The variation in language attributed to register has been
termed 'diatypic' by Gregory (1967),1 that is language variety
'according to the use' rather than according to social position as is
captured in 'dialectal' variation. The particular dimensions of
difference devised for the individuation of registers at the
contextual/situational level accordingly revolved around the manner
of use and purpose that the associated language was being asked to
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serve. Indeed, the most common sense in which register is understood
remains in terms of informal, stylistic descriptions such as
Gregory's technical versus nontechnical, formal versus informal,
didactic versus nondidactic, spoken versus written, sound-only versus
face-to-face, and so on.
However, this did not supply as systematic a way of decomposing
the situation as was required for the precise statement of the
predictions situations make of their texts. All that could be
achieved was a list of likely linguistic properties associated with
each contextual distinction, which, although useful, was not regarded
as the final endpoint of analysis.2 Halliday's view of the role of
register in the linguistic system places the inquiry at a more
fundamental level:
"All language functions in contexts of situation, and is
relatable to those contexts. The question is not what
peculiarities of vocabulary, or grammar or pronunciation, can
be directly accounted for by reference to the situation. It is
which kinds of situational factor determine which kinds of
selection in the linguistic system. The notion of register is
thus a form of prediction: given that we know the situation,
the social context of language.use, we can predict a great
deal about the language that will occur, with reasonable
probability of being right. The important theoretical question
then is: what exactly do we need to know about the social
context in order to make such predictions?" (1978, p32)
A classification scheme for situations intended to represent those
aspects of the social context important for prediction was developed
by Halliday, Mcintosh, and Strevens (1964) and this scheme is
1. Cf. also: Halliday (1978, p35).
2. For examples of such lists, see Ochs' (1979) discussion of
planned versus unplanned language, Givon's (1979a) development of
a pragmatic versus syntactic distinction in modes of language use,
Rubin's (1980) dimensions of communicative experience, and also
Enkvist (1980) for a literature review.
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accepted almost unaltered by Halliday (1978).
Within this framework situations are considered along three
dimensions of organisation. It is proposed that a characterisation of
"what the participants in the context of situation are actually
engaged in doing" (Halliday, ibid., p222), "the role relationships in
the situation in question" (ibid.), and "what function language is
being made to serve in the context of situation" (ibid.) should be
sufficient to enable quite specific predictions to be made about the
details of the language that occurs. Halliday describes these three
dimensions in more detail as follows: any situation is taken
necessarily to entail specific 'values' in respect of
"(i) the social action: that which is 'going on', and has
recognisable meaning in the social system; typically a complex
of acts in some ordered configuration, and in which the text
is playing some part, and including 'subject-matter' as one
special aspect; (ii) the role structure: the cluster of
socially meaningful participant relationships, both permanent
attributes of the participants and role relationships that are
specific to the situation, including the speech roles, those
that come into being through the exchange of verbal meanings;
(iii) the symbolic organisation: the particular status that is
assigned to the text within the situation; its function in
relation to the social action and the role structure,
including the channel or medium, and the rhetorical mode."
(ibid., pi42/3)
These are then labelled as, respectively,
"a field of significant social action, a tenor of role
relationships, and a mode of symbolic organisation." (ibid.,
pl43)
To take one of Halliday's examples by way of illustration of
these constructs." in a game of football the 'field of significant
social action' would be the game itself plus any language which the
players might make use of in the playing of the game, the tenor would
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consist of the relationships of members-of-a-team, opponents,
referee, etc., and the mode would be the classification of the
occurring language as instructions and orders and the like between
the participants while playing. This would contrast with the
situation when the players might be, for example, discussing the game
afterwards in which case the field of activity has become the
discussion itself, the tenor may have changed to, perhaps, drinking
companions, and the mode would be the particular rhetorical forms of
discussion deployed. It is then Halliday's claim that the
specification of a social context in terms of its field, tenor, and
mode provides precisely the information necessary for predictions
concerning the language to follow.
Halliday, in fact, goes even further than this and claims that
"There is a tendency ... for the field of social action to be
encoded linguistically in the form of ideational meanings, the
role relationships in the form of interpersonal meanings, and
the symbolic mode in the form of textual meanings." (ibid.,
P123)
Such a position is certainly not uncontentious and, indeed, until
recently it was difficult to see how it might be investigated;
without a substantial formalisation of the Hallidayan framework
claims such as this could only stand as potentially interesting
suggestions which were completely unfalsifiable. Now, however, Mann
and Matthiessen's argument that the environment of the Nigel
framework may be usefully segmented in ways reminiscent of the field,
mode, and tenor articulation does, at least, begin to offer support
of a kind.
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Relevant here, however, is that there is an important
difference in the role granted to register in Nigel and that
suggested by the Hallidayan paradigm", furthermore, I think it can be
shown that it is the Hallidayan view that is the more appropriate.
For Halliday,
"The semiotic structure of a given situation type, its
particular pattern of field, tenor and mode, can be thought of
as resonating in the semantic system and so activating
particular networks of semantic options... " (ibid., pl23)
Register therefore serves the important function of making the
linguistic strata of potential sensitive to their contexts of use.
Certain paths for the actualisation process are judged to be more or
less relevant even prior to attempting their actualisation. In
contrast to this, the position in Nigel is that the only means by
which sensitivity to context may be achieved is by having the
choosers ask the appropriate range of questions: all initiative lies
with the grammar. As a consequence of this the role of register is
taken to be minimal. This has to be the case simply because no
mechanism exists for unsolicited high level information to influence
actualisation processes. The appropriate question has first to be put
to the environment otherwise no information is forthcoming.
Unfortunately for the Nigel organisation, it can not be the case that
choosers are always able to ask appropriate context-independent
questions of the environment in order to generate appropriate forms.
This can be shown as follows.
Within the maze game, it is possible to set up correlations of
the same general form as employed for capturing register, i.e.
'whenever contextual feature F occurs, so do linguistic features Lj,
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Lg» ..., Ln', but whose validity is often strictly local. In
addition, such correlations need not necessarily be stable and may
pass through several instantiations during their lifetime. For
example, if one considers the 'contextual feature' consisting of that
relevant entity to do with the positions within the maze that change
«
the state of a player's barriers, i.e. a 'switch point', then players
may refer to this entity in many ways. But their selection of
referring expressions is significantly constrained by the other
referring expressions that have been used previously in that
particular discourse', this is one of the results obtained by
Anderson's (1983) detailed statistical examination of the types of
expressions and terms employed by maze game players. Thus, in
protocol 38A, where the first four references to switch points were
contained in the utterances:
B: I'm stuck, can you get into one of those S squares?
A: Right I'm in the special now
B: ...can you go backwards and, just go back to
that special square somehow
A: I can't I'm in the special square
[38A.2-7]
in the rest of the game the standard lexical items selected for
referring to a switch point remain "special square", occasionally
abbreviated to "special".
Similar convergences of term selection occur for each of the
other relevant entities also. Barriers may come to be called
'barriers' or 'gates'; the players' goals become 'goals', 'homes',
'asterisks', and so forth; a player's position might simply be
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identified by 'where I am' or 'where you are' or, more indirectly, as
in the case of the use of 'asterisk' for goal, by referring to the
symbol displaying the position on the screen. In addition, expression
selection can have consequences for grammar as well as lexis. For
example, a common alternative for talking about switching is to use
the verb "change" with the player affected as direct object; this
gives rise to exchanges such as,
B: If you move to the right, you change me
A: If I move to, the right?
B: Uh-huh
A: I change you. Well do you want changed?
B: Well, Aye, change me.
[1 ID.3]
In protocols where this occurs it is often the case that there is no
mention of barriers at all. Players will either say that they are
simply "blocked", or that they cannot move in a particular direction.
Utterances such as,
B: ...if I move up, then, I'm going near to my target,but then, ehm, I'm faced with three barriers
[44A.3]
are not then found. Of course, the situation is often far more
complicated than this. In one game, p.layer A systematically refers to
"gates" and player B to "barriers" throughout the entire game, and
player B, while usually adopting "S boxes" for switch points, once
refers to one as an "S gate" after which A always uses "S gate".
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of convergence is quite clear in every
protocol; there will always be a large candidate set of potentially
adequate descriptions or referring expressions for players to adopt
and yet the fact remains that they very soon settle upon a stable set
of preferred terms which remain in force, if they do not lead to
subsequent confusion, for the duration of the game.
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Anderson (1983) also shows that essentially the same phenomena
manifests itself at a higher level in the organisation of the
protocols; for example, one task that players of the maze game must
be able to perform is the satisfactory identification of specific
positions within the maze. As is probably evident from the examples
of protocol segments given in previous chapters, one particularly
effective means of performing this task is to adopt a 'co-ordinate
system' of some kind; this may either be quite explicit, as in
A: I'm in 3 0, and it's your turn to move,
and you're in 4 1, right?
[44A.4]
A: So you're now at D1 are you?
B: uhhuh
A: And I'm in B5.
[20B]
or implicit, as in utterances of the form,
A: Wait a minute you on the 3rd column 4th up?
[PI.16]
B: so I'm in the 3rd row, 3 in.
[1 ID.8]
The important point here is that players are not free to choose any
form they care to when they use a maze position description. The
descriptions available for use are always restricted to just those
that conform to the general features for descriptions that are
current at that point in the game.
This can easily be shown to be far more than a 'stylistic'
variation, or an indeterminacy in form selection, by the fact that if
players do not respect the constraints in force they then run the
very serious risk of being misinterpreted; i.e their meaning will not
be clear. A player only has the right to expect to be understood as
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long as s/he conforms to the sanctioned forms of expression. As an
example of this, the two lists below contain a selection of the
expressions used by two particular sets of players to refer to
positions within the maze. Each column contains the expressions used
by a single pair of players during a single game. Different people
were playing in each game and in both games the players elected to
use a co-ordinate-like system for identifying positions.
Now, there are certain regular features shared by the members of each
set. For the first pair: whenever a specification including both
column and row is given, the column precedes the row; the word
'column' almost always appears when it is relevant; when a substitute
form such as 'one' is used it substitutes for 'box' not 'column'; the
specification of the row includes the direction 'up' unless it is the
'top' or 'bottom' row that is specified; and the column specification
is usually an ordinal while the row specification is usually a
cardinal. For the second pair: co-ordinates are often explicitly
used; when co-ordinates are used the column precedes the row,
otherwise the row precedes the column; the co-ordinate form is
occasionally expanded to something of the form 'X along Y up'; the
word 'row' almost always appears when relevant and co-ordinates are
not being used; and when a substitute such as 'one' appears it




2nd column bottom one
5th column 3 boxes up
4th column 3 up
the top box






4 along 3 up
21,31,23, etc.
the bottom row 3 along
top row 5th along
the 2nd box
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These features are employed productively by each pair of
players; that is, it is often not possible to move an expression from
one set to another without changing its meaning: e.g. for the first
pair '2nd box' can only mean '2nd box up' whereas, for the second
pair, it can only mean '2nd box along'. Thus, on the one hand, when a
player from the first pair says,
there's there's just a box separating me 'n that
to express the position of that player relative to his/her goal, this
means, for both players, that the player and his/her goal are
separated along the vertical dimension. On the other hand, had a
player of the second pair said this it would have been far more
likely to refer to a separation along the horizontal dimension.
The existence of particular forms of expression that are only
appropriate in the contexts of particular games - or, more
accurately, in the contexts of particular interactions - demonstrates
that there is some activity in process whereby 'theoretically'
possible forms are being restricted to actually relevant forms.
Furthermore, this activity appears to be one of negotiation', again,
this can be quite explicit, as in:
B: ...Now I'm on the 4, 4 0 OK?
A: OK
B: so,
A: Are we calling that zero then, instead of
one? (laughs)
B: Well, what do you think? Bottom, just the bottom row,
number four, OK?
[44A.1]
B: what you mean is we'll go along from the left
OK it'll be easier that way
A: from the, no it's not easier for me




but, more commonly, the negotiation is quite implicit in the
interaction. After a few turns a preferred range of expressions will
have been established but the exact details of how that came about
will not be reflected explicitly in the subject matter of the
utterances performed. It is the dynamics of correlations such as
these that constitute the microregister concept.
The important consequences of this as far as specifying chooser
questions is concerned is that it is not even possible to construct
the 'presentation specifications' necessary for many choosers to
function. Chapter two briefly introduced the presentation
specification construct: "Through presentation specifications the
environment designates the content to be conveyed in each particular
constituent, (but not how the content is to be expressed)." (Mann,
1983a, p3) Mann suggests that the presentation specification is
particularly useful in that it represents the content "without its
allocation to constituent units." (ibid.) This is supposed to make
available a line of inquiry which asks how such allocation is to
function, although the kind of modularity this assumes has been
criticised throughout this thesis.
'Competition among the possible constituents of a nominal
group for representation of possession seems to be a typical
case. We would like to know, for example how the decision
between using the determiner "his", the prepositional phrase
"of his", and the clause "which he has" is made. A
presentation specification can say in a syntactically neutral
way that possession is to be expressed." (ibid.)
However, how content is to be expressed is not a local issue for
which the grammar can be expected to provide the 'right questions'.
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For example, it may be necessary, due to the way an interaction has
proceeded, for a preference to be expressed as to which of the
possible forms for possessives is to be adopted in some particular
case; the presentation specification, apparently, should not be able
to perform this function as 'syntactically neutral' "possession" has
been singled out as the relevant primitive at the presentation
specification level. I am unclear quite where the warrant for
proposing such form-free meanings resides. Of course, informally it
could be claimed that the alternatives offered are possible ways of
expressing a single environmental distinction; but, as the
negotiation of forms of expression in the maze game protocols shows,
possible ways of expressing environmental/contextual distinctions
can, and frequently are, created and given quite particular meanings
by discourse participants in the course of interaction. The three
alternatives proposed for possession may well find themselves
performing quite different work if situation-specific 'meanings' are
created for them. Prior to the interaction, it cannot be known
precisely which alternate forms will be selected to carry the
necessary contextual distinctions. In general, therefore, it is not
possible to presume that the forms which compete for the expression
of such distinctions will be just those forms that may be said, under
some situation-neutral interpretation, to express the same 'content'.
The presentation specification can also be seen as offering a
mechanism by which the grammar may import a situation-specific state
of affairs for interrogation in situation-nonspecific ways. That is,
meaning is given to chooser questions of the general form 'is it
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relevant to mention X?' by defining relevance as presence in the
presentation specification. A representative sample of chooser
questions of this form is given by the following examples, all taken
from grammar-environment dialogues reported by Mann and Matthiessen
(1983b) and Mann (1983a):
"Is it preferable to express the knowledge represented by
GREENWICH (LOCATION) or not?"3
(Mann and Matthiessen, 1983b, p31 )
"Is it preferable to mention SIR-CHRISTOPHER (AGENT) as the
agent of GAZEBO-BUILDING (PROCESS)?"
(ibid., p38)
"Should a secondary speech act be performed in conjunction
with WREN-GAZEBO (ONUS)?"
(ibid., p43)
"Should GAZEBO-BUILDING-POLARITY (POLARITY) be given
distinguished emphatic or contrastive status?"
(ibid., p48)
"Establish that information about the possessor of
APPOINTMENT should be expressed."
(Mann, 1983a, p9)
"Establish that the presentation specification for
APPOINTMENT does not indicate that color, location, use,
substance, size, place of origin or age should be
expressed."
(ibid., p8/9)
It should be clear from these inquiries that the level of detail
expected of the text plan and presentation specifications is very
high. This has to be the case because of the necessary generality and
topic-independence of the grammar and hence of the choosers: they
have to ask every question which could conceivably be relevant. But,
as we have seen with respect to the selection of interaction specific
forms of expression, lexicogrammatical feature selections may also
carry meanings which arise out of the functional orientations of
specific situations. The problem then is to find what sort of
questions one could possibly make choosers ask to deal with this kind
of meaning.
3. It will be recalled that this notation, 'H (F)', is used to
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As an alternative approach to this set of problems, however, I
will pursue the line of inquiry I suggested would be necessary in
chapter two: i.e. the acceptance of sources of initiative additional
to that supplied by the choosers. With this in mind, the role of
register will now be strengthened considerably. Rather than it being
a very weak inter-stratal constraint that is only called upon to do
any work when all intra-stratal, i.e. lexicogrammatical, constraints
have been applied as is the case presently envisaged in Nigel, it
instead can be incorporated in the negotiation of finer and finer
individualised registers, the 'micro-registers', so as to tailor the
resources of the linguistic system to the specific needs of the
situation. This is made possible by extending the definition of
situation type to include a continuum of situation types ranging from
the anonymous to the highly individualised. Registers as more
normally defined are then merely the default organisation a situation
type brings to bear before the participants have taken that situation
over and made it their own.
The central concept to which I will appeal here is the
pre-selection configuration; this is to be held responsible for
phenomena along the entire register-microregister continuum.
Essentially, this construct aims to include within a Nigel-like
framework a mechanism capable of capturing the simple
characterisation of register I gave above, i.e. whenever contextual
denote the environmental hub named 'H' which is currently
associated with, and hence made accessible to the grammar by, the
grammatical function *F'.
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features F occurs, so do linguistic features Lj, Lg, L^, in
terms of pre-selection as it is already defined in Nigel; all that
must be added is a set of realisation statements associated with
contextual elements rather than solely with lexicogrammatical
features as is the case at present. The effect of such statements
would be to predispose a wide range of grammatical systems to select
some particular restricted set of the choices theoretically available
to than; also, because the actualisation of the grammatical networks
always proceeds in relation to some specific area of the context
(e.g. the 'hubs' in the environment), such pre-selection is not a
'general' restriction on what features are to be selected but is
rather a specific call for particular features when realising
particular contextual distinctions. A preselection configuration, as
I am using the term here, then, will refer to the set of preselection
statements that is associated with a particular contextual element.
Thus, the use of a co-ordinate system by players in the maze
game, for example, may now be seen as the systematic association of
some identifiable aspect of the 'context^ with a particular
preselection configuration to do with realising or expressing that
aspect. It should be noted that this is exactly analogous to the
traditional conception of register and it therefore remains diatypic
variety, although on a somewhat smaller scale. Furthermore, as has
been demonstrated, the entire area of preselection to be associated
with an aspect of context is subject to negotiation. The players need
not adopt a co-ordinate system and, even when one is adopted, further
details may still be needed to be made explicit and be agreed upon.
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This notion begins to do considerably more work when higher
levels of organisation are considered; for example, I have noted
Anderson's result that players do not necessarily come to negotiate a
co-ordinate system - indeed, there are several general schemes of
descriptive apparatus players may employ. The selection of these
general schemes can be viewed in precisely the same way, and exhibits
precisely the same phenomena, as the negotiation of particular forms
of co-ordinates. This is shown most clearly in the investigations of
maze game protocols undertaken at Glasgow where several possible
types of descriptive apparatus were revealed. In particular, Anderson
has demonstrated by detailed statistical analysis that the
description scheme adopted by a player in any game will more closely
resemble that of his/her partner in that game than those schemas used
by him/herself in games with other partners. The selection of
description schemes must, therefore, be seen as an achievement of
individual interactions between players rather than as a prespecified
adoption of some scheme according to personal preference. This can be
taken as good experimental evidence for the existence of the
microregister phenomenon.
Even when a description scheme becomes totally unwieldy,
4. Such as elements of the functional decomposition of move
segments given in chapter three above. Contextual stratum
functions and their organisation have not been considered in any
depth in this thesis because of the centrality of discourse as the
topic of discussion. Possible articulations of their organisation
have been suggested in, for example, Turner (1973) and
Cook-Gumperz (1972), among others; they suggest networks of
'social potential' that include "such details of particular cases
that we would find it relevant to take notice of in our everyday
life." (Cook, 1969, pl35)
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players will still attempt to make it work due to the force of the
established pre-selections - to overcome those pre-selections and
establish new ones requires more conversational work than players are
generally willing to undertake and is only attempted in the face of
severe communicative problems, even then perhaps only after several
failed attempts within the old system:
A: Where are you yourself?
B: I'm er, well you know how, well it's difficult ehm
you know where the middle right indicator is?
A: Yes.
B: Well count that middle right indicator as a box.
A: Mn,
B: Then move to the left, that's one box, two boxes,
three boxes, four boxes, five boxes right.
A: Yes.
B: I'm in the fourth box.
A: I'm lost I'm lost I'm lost.
B: The middle right indicator OK?
etc.
[40B]
This consideration of descriptions emphasises precisely the
range of explanations with which the microregister concept is to
compete. Whereas it is possible to view the selection of description
scheme in 'psychological' terms as a particular organisation of an
individual's knowledge base, the microregister places the description
scheme at the interorganism level by interpreting it as a shared
orientation of the available linguistic potential. Rather than using,
for example, a 'diagonal vector' description, because that is the way
the knowledge base has managed to organise its view of the maze, the
description scheme adopted should be seen as a direct consequence of
how the discourse itself has been constructed and the shared
linguistic potential focused. This clearly establishes that variation
in the language that is used of this sort cannot in general be looked
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upon as 'mere' stylistic variation lacking significance for what is
taken to be the main work of communication - transmitting
information.
Neither is it possible to assume that the language that is used
is simply serving as a translation of the underlying level of
knowledge representation and plans where the 'real' work of playing
the maze game is being performed. Plans may be, and frequently are,
constructed by the players in order to achieve goals within the game.
But those plans are necessarily articulated in terms of those
players* understanding of the game situation in which they find
themselves and, crucially, that understanding can now be seen to be
articulated in turn in terms of the mutually constructed view of the
game that is supported in the players' linguistic interaction.
Antecedently-given plans are not being 'dressed up' so that their
surface linguistic realisations are appropriate - it is only from
that 'surface form' and in its terms that plans are created. As was
the case with 'focus' in the previous chapter, the establishment of a
description scheme in particular, and microregister in general, is
but another aspect of the intersubjective work that discourse
achieves.
Diatypic variety, in general, therefore remains characterised
as the regular association of contextual items with preselection
configurations over the linguistic potential that is available, but
the continuum of situation types within which such contextual terms
are placed results in differing statuses of association. When the
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association is entirely subject to convention and the individual is
not free to alter or ignore it without expecting marked consequences
to follow, then the preselection constitutes a register in the
traditional sense. In this case the preselection is itself given
social significance and its use has the power to generate the
situation-type with which it is associated with little or no support
from the context that is actually in force. Thus, in a play or a
novel, or in everyday conversation, it is possible to evoke a
situation-type such as sports commentary, a religious service, eating
at a restaurant, etc. merely by using the form of language typically
associated with that situation. Whereas, when the association has not
been made subject to convention in this way it becomes necessary to
negotiate both the area covered by preselection and the contextual
items with which it is to be associated. The preselection
configuration is a temporarily agreed way of saying, or better,
following Halliday, of meaning the things that need to be expressed
in a particular situation or range of situations. In this latter case
much more support is required of the situation-type in force. Without
the agreed upon context, the use of some linguistic potential
constituting a preselection configuration would be insufficient to
effect communication; for example, a maze game player would not in
the middle of a game be able suddenly to start using co-ordinates
when no such system had been agreed upon previously.
It is possible, then, to represent the distinctions between
differing points on the scale of diatypic variety solely in the tying
of linguistic potential to more or less general situation-types.
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Registers are preselection configurations that are associated with
situation-types of very general application, in effect,
conventionally. When an individual supports such a situation the
relevant potential is preselected and so appears for the speakers in
that situation to employ", conversely, the apparent use by an
individual of linguistic resources within a recognisable preselection
indicates that the associated situation is then relevant. For less
general situations there will be fewer established preselections and
individuals supporting them consequently need to generate their own
in order to communicate most effectively within its confines. By most
effectively I mean that the converse posited to hold for registers
should also be applicable here: it is the alignment of the
perspectives held by participants in a context that constitutes
communication and the establishment of a locally negotiated and
accepted area of linguistic potential for expressing just what is
necessary for that context renders the maintenance of that alignment
via language particularly effective. This process can be seen, then,
to be one of fine tuning the general resources language provides so
as to be able to maintain that explicitly shared context necessary
for coherent joint action with the greatest economy of effort. This
framework must distinguish therefore between 'locally' relevant
functional organisations of resources, which will be represented by
preselection configurations, and those much more generally applicable
resources which provide the basis for that preselection, i.e. the
linguistic potential itself.
It should be pointed out that there is a clear overlap in
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function between Nigel's presentation specifications and
pre-selection configurations. However, there are two important
distinctions between the two; the first is that pre-selection
configurations are not to be restricted to content and include how
that content is to be expressed, and the second is that the
preselection configuration is an active entity which directly affects
chooser operation. In both respects, it has been shown that it is the
preselection configuration which offers the more explanatory view.
For example, although it is clear that Mann realises the difficulties
involved in the selection of particular forms over others
theoretically appropriate, his proposed solution does not
sufficiently cover those difficulties; e.g.
"The sets of terms which compete as candidates, e.g. for the
main verb of a clause or head term of a nominal group, are
highly variable and dependent on the subject matter of the
communication. Hence they are not susceptible to static
analysis as part of the grammar, and they are not easy to
represent in systemic terms." (ibid. p4/5)
Candidate terms are not dependent upon subject matter (i.e.
ideational aspects), they are, as I will suggest in the Conclusion,
dependent upon topic. This includes many aspects in addition to the
ideational and is more adequately described, as I will suggest, as a
general orientation of the linguistic resources which exhibits
sensitivity to topic. Therefore, pre-selection configurations, by
virtue of their generality and their relatedness to topic phenomena
that I will justify below, largely subsume the presentation
specification construct and provide a more appropriate basis for the
generation of term sets.
It will not be possible to 'define' individual pre-selections
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here in any detail since this would require a complete description of
the lexicogrammatical level of organisation and its associated
choosers. Nor, in general, would this be a particularly useful step
to take. The particular pre-selections which may be called for are to
a large extent irrelevant; it will be necessary for some
pre-selections to exist - it is this that makes the linguistic system
responsive to the tasks that will be required of it - but precisely
which pre-selections will be in a state of constant flux. What will
be important below, therefore, is how discourse participants can
establish pre-selection configurations in their interactions and this
is the issue addressed in the next section.
2. Discourse development - the creation of microregisters
So far in this chapter, I have attempted to show that there is
a pervasive phenomenon of microregister at work in discourse for
which the notion of the pre-selection configuration suggests a
possible account. Now, I will combine some of these elements and
investigate how the discourse-functions discussed in the previous
chapter achieve microregister orientations in practice, i.e. how
pre-selection configurations are to be established, and how these
might subsequently help to constrain 'topicality'. This is to take
the phenomenon of 'convergence' observed by Anderson and others
considerably further so that it may eventually be linked to the
fine-detailed discourse organisation constructed by speakers when
interacting and explained as a positive resource in the maintenance
of that interaction.
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It should be clear that just to use some form is not sufficient
to freeze it into the highlighted linguistic resources that
constitute a microregister; the initial questions which must be
asked, therefore, are which aspects of discourse help fix the
microregister, which do not, and why. To attack these questions I
will consider in the remaineder of this chapter three areas of use
for maze position descriptions: the first proposals of terms of
reference found within the initial segment, successful subsequent use
and, finally to conclude the chapter, places where difficulties arise
which indicate that a change of terms may be necessary.
When a maze game begins the players know that they must
communicate their respective positions', they also tend to communicate
the positions of their goals although this information is not quite
so relevant at this stage. It is readily noticeable that the person
who makes the first moves towards ascertaining these positions
frequently also attempts to define the terms that will be used.
Furthermore, the players will subsequently tend to utilise the
resources proposed in these initial moves rather than presenting new
possibilities; new possibilities will appear, but usually these will
be integrated into the supporting framework the established
possibilities provide. The following initial segment of protocol 11F
demonstrates these features nicely.
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1 B Right, where are you at the moment?
2 A Right now I'm down the bottom,
3 B Right.
4 A To your left,
5 B Right.
6 A And er, go to the-the middle one on the left,
7 B Right,
8 A On the bottom and up one
9 B Ah, so you're er, 2nd row from the bottom.
10 A I'm 2nd row from the bottom,
11 I'd be}-
12 B: {2nd in from the left
13 A. 2nd in from the left, OK.
14 B: Right, ...
Protocol segment: 11F.0
Here, in lines 2-8, A presents a relatively complicated
description of his/her position which relies upon access to the
display of the maze for it to be successfully decoded. A first homes
in on a particular position that may be identified by virtue of the
maze configuration (line 6) and then specifies his/her position
relative to that (line 8). Although this succeeds in locating the
position B requires to know, B begins to present an alternative, more
concise description in line 9. A accepts this in line 10, realises an
alternative specification is in progress and attempts to complete it.
B, however, interrupts and provides the completion which A again
accepts (line 13). The only aspects of A's description that survive
are the orientations towards the bottom and the left of the maze.
This can therefore be viewed as establishing a schema for position
specification of the form:
{Player X is at position P =,
M rows from the bottom,
N in from the left}
This is an example of the 'preferred form' for propositions that
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serve this particular position-specifying function that was made use
of in the previous chapter. Now this should also be seen as a
shorthand notation for the preselection configuration to be
associated with the contextual function 'identify a position'. In its
full form it would list the detailed lexicogrammatical feature
choices that give rise to forms of the observed kind. This list would
naturally alter as the microregister evolved.
Thus, when B comes to specify his/her position, the orientation
to the left is not so convenient and, apparently due to the position
of strength B seems to possess at this point in the discourse, s/he
is able to replace the schema-part 'N in from the left' with 'N in
from the right' thus:
B: Right, well I'm at the top, right?
A: The top
B: ehm, 1, 2, 3 in from the right.
A: Mnm-hmm, is that it?
B: Aye, ...
[11F.0]
Now, the force of B's selection of description schema is shown in the
exchange of information that follows; B asks A for the position of
his/her goal and A not only gives this information in the terms of
the new schema but also spontaneously volunteers a respecification of
his/her own position in those terms.
B: Aye, and my-, right, where's your goal?
A: My goal's just one across from you.
It's 3 in from the right,
I'll be 4 in from the right.
However, even in situations such as this where one player is defining
the terms, there is still a two-way interaction because in B's next
turn, which volunteers the position of his/her own goal, s/he echoes
- 355 -
the initial structure of A's turn before giving a further
specification in the terms of the established schema:
B: Right, well mine is 1, 2, 3 across from you.
A: 1, 2, -{























... where are you?
Right. Ehm. Last, right,
see how there's a box jutting out
on the right hand side of the s{creen
{yes
Well, uh, there's a column before that
you know
w{ell nearly full column right}
{yeah {yeah yeah
I'm on the bottom one
Well well just call them columns OK every=
OK OK, OK right so the 2nd column bottom one=
what do you mean the sec-}
{second from the right=
What you mean is we'll go along from the left
OK it'll be easier that way
from the, no it's not easier for me
yes it you might as well





A similar initial request for a possible specification followed
by a respecification is apparent in the segment P1.0 above. Here B's
taking on the responsibility for defining the terms is even more
explicit, as shown in line 15's "what you mean is such a move
does not betoken an equal relationship between the participants at
that point in the discourse. Indeed, in the previous chapter we saw
how there were many indications in the /orm of this interaction that
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B was attempting to take the initiative and control its development.
Now we can see that this extends to more than just the interaction,
it also includes the definitions of the terms of reference that are
to be used during the game.
The establishment of these terms proceeds as follows: A in line
4 mentions the right hand side of the screen, this is clearly not
adopted as the shared orientation because of B's comments at lines 13
and 15; A in line 6 introduces 'columns', this is accepted explicitly
by B in line 11; that columns should be counted from the left is
proposed by B at line 15 and accepted by A at line 19; and finally,
A's reference to the 'bottom one' at line 12 is accepted unchallenged
by B and explicitly used by B at line 20. The state of the
description schema following line 20 is then:
{Player X is at position P =,
M columns from left,
[bottom]}
And so, while an explicit general form has been established for
the horizontal dimension, all that ha's been achieved for the vertical
dimension is an orientation towards the 'bottom'. It is therefore
predictable both that the next position specification should result
in the establishment of a more generally appropriate schema and that,
in the absence of a general specification at the outset, the players
would resort to more ad hoc types of specification. Protocol PI
continues as follows:
B: {OK
A: {Where are you?
B: I'm in the 1st column,
you know how there's three boxes
A: uhhuh
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B: I'm in the centre box
A: (quietly) in the centre box alright
B refers to a maze specific configuration of 'three boxes' and,
although this does not itself generate an acceptable schema, it does
provide the resources for one to follow subsequently. Both A and B
have adopted 'boxes' as the description of the elements which
constitute columns and the pre-existing orientation to the bottom
makes counting upwards the logical choice. The next position
specification is, in fact,
A: I have to get to er, 2 boxes above me,
that's the 5th column 3 boxes up.
and the general description schema has become:
{Player X is at position P =,
M columns from left,
N boxes up from bottom}
It is possible at this stage to suggest several factors which
contribute to the acceptance or nonacceptance of description schema
elements. First, it seems that if there is a player who is taking a
strong initiative, as is also revealed by a variety of interactional
details, then the terms s/he proposes will be good candidates for
adoption in a lasting description schema. Also, if a player who is
not in the initiative-holding position uses a term proposed by the
player who is, then this almost guarantees the acceptance of that
term as an established resource for subsequent position description.
This is not a symmetrical relationship; even though the player with
the initiative may use a term provided by the other player, this does
not necessarily indicate that the term will occur again.
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There is, furthermore, a tendency for the expression of the
description schema that is accepted to occur in specific
discourse-functional environments. In the first example above,
segment 11F.0, the actual expression of the schema is given by player
B in lines 9 and 12:
so you're, er, 2nd row from bottom. ...
... 2nd in from the left.
The discourse-functional characterisation of this segment can. be
summarised as follows. B asks where A is in line 1 and A responds, at
length, in lines 2-8; this is essentially a question-answer sequence
with the answer proposition being replaced by a thematic sequence.
k2 kl .c kl .c kl .c kl
pt>i PC! PCl.l pc2 P°2.1
mi mii -> miii -> miv -> mv
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
right basej base2 right addg \ right embg right add3 j
(=add2.1)
The design of the move at line 8 both indicates that this
contribution is the last of a sequence and links back to move mii by
the repeat of 'bottom', thus helping bind moves mii-mv into a unit
with respect to mi. Now, following that unit, B has the options
relevanced by the potential k2f-slot; but rather than just accepting
the information, s/he chooses to respecify A's answer. This in fact
constitutes a k2f.c move: the 'exchange' is not being permitted to
end at this point, it is being extended. The characterisation of






















It should be noted that this use of a k2f.c move is somewhat
different from those seen in the previous chapter; player B is using
a move that indicates there has been some difficulty in the exchange
even though A has successfully communicated the information
requested. The existence of the k2f.c slot might then be glossed as
capturing the fact that the person who is informed has a general
right to assess the adequacy of that informing.
Similarly, in the second example, segment PI.0, A gives a
lengthy response to B's request for A's position which B does not
allow to go unchanged. However, in this case, B's respecification is
extremely abrupt and clearly demonstrates the position of strength
s/he is adopting. The discourse up to the first respecifying move may
be characterised thus:
k2 k2 kl kl [ k2 kl ] 'kl k2f.f
pbi pcj PS] pc2 [ pc ps J P°2'
mi mii mii j miiij [ mi' mii' ] miiij mivj
1 3-4 5 6 [ 7 9 ] 8 9








Now, even though A has brought the insertion sequence of moves
mij-mivj to a close and answered B's original question, B's next move
does not display orientation to that answer at all and, instead,
links itself (by the use of 'them' and 'columns') with A's last
pre-answer move, miiij, thereby extending that pre-answer sequence
and making A re-do the answer. This gives lines 10-12:
I'm on the bottom one.
Well well just call them columns OK every=
OK OK, OK right so the 2nd column bottom one=
B's move is one way of achieving a side sequence and it, again,
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occupies a k2f.c slot. Also, as the turn initial 'well well
suggests, this move can be regarded as a retraction of B's previous
mivj/k2f.f at line 9. The discourse therefore continues as:
[ k2f.c k2 kl ] kl
[ PC2' • psg' • ] PC3'
[ mivj mi' mii' ] mii
[ 11 11 12 ] 12
[ baseg OK OK OK ] right so mod4 j
B does not accept this attempt by A to answer the original question
of mi either, and follows A's second mii with another nonfinal
follow-up k2f.c move:
13 B: What do you mean sec-
A sees the inadequacy of his/her specification and interrupts with a
self-repair but B overrules this and proposes an alternative form of
specification with the uncompromising:
15 B: What you mean is we'll go along from the left
16 OK it'll be easier that way
A attempts to disagree with B's proposed description schema at line
17, but B will brook no disagreement and simply asserts at line 18
that his/her position is the correct one, receiving A's consent at
line 19. The side sequence of lines 15-19, carried mostly by the
moves mi*-mv', is then complete, a new description has been
established and A finally achieves an answer to B's original question
which B lets pass. These final moves of the segment are classified as
depicted in figure 1 which, for ease of reference, interleaves the






















B: What you mean is we'll go along from the left
OK it'll be easier that way
A: from the, no it's not easier for me
B: yes it you might as well
A: OK ...
k2f.c k2 kl 0 kl kl kl k2f
PC3' PC] PS4 psT ps| pc2
mv mi' mii' mvi miii' miii' miv' mv'
15 15 16 17 17 18 18 19


























Discourse-functional characterisation of P1.0, lines 13-22
What these analyses demonstrate is that as well as having clear
consequences for the subsequent construction of sequences of turns,
the selection of particular discourse-functional types of
contributions establishes more globally-active constraints on the
design of contributions that will be considered appropriate for
achieving particular specified activities required by the situation.
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The discourse function characterisations of the moves which
successfully propose the description schemata that are accepted in
the two cases given within this section, for example, are as follows;
in segment 11F.0, lines 9 and 12:
k2f.c/pci'/mvi ... pk2f/pcj• j/mix
and in segment P1.0, lines 11 (proposing 'columns') and 15 (proposing
counting from the left):
k2f.c/pc2*'/mivj ... k2f,c/pc3*•'/mv
The combination of the k2f.c and pc micro-functions can, therefore,
be seen to be an effective resource for achieving this kind of work.
It manages both to express the necessity of repair in the preceding
exchange and, by the proposal of a completed proposition, to leave no
doubt that an alternative is available. Furthermore, in the first
example, the pk2f-variant further emphasises that B is in control and
the preceding k2f.c is in no way passing the initiative for repair
back to A.
This general configuration also seems to occur even where the
difference in the initiatives taken by the players is not so marked.
For example, in 11D.0, the first specification of a position is again
by A in response to a question from B:
A: I'm at the, left hand corner.
B: Right.
A: One along, one up.




which gives the discourse-functional characterisation:
kl kl k2f.c
pcj P°1,1 Pci.l
mii -> miii miv
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By move miv the schema is fixed as an available resource as evinced
by B's subsequent move:
B: Well I'm in the right hand corner,
one along one up
It is noteworthy that this case could be analysed as simply a case of
syntactic parallelism arbitrarily produced by the speaker for
'stylistic' or 'ease of processing' reasons; here it has been shown
as an instance of a rather more general utilisation of discourse
resources that may be regularly observed in the maze game protocols
to perform quite specific conversational work. The choice and pursuit
of sequences containing the kinds of discourse contributions shown in
this section to be effective for fixing microregisters can,
therefore, be undertaken by discourse participants specifically to
help construct shared views of a problem domain or area of interest.
3. The maintenance of microregisters
Once an initial description schema has been established this is
by no means the end of the matter however; in fact, the initial
schema can be shown to be more of a special case because it is only
there that a schema is to be created from scratch. In subsequent uses
of the schema various changes commonly occur and, again, the question
to be raised is whether there are discourse environments particularly
suited to such changes.
We have just seen how following the identification of the first
maze position a schema of greater or lesser generality may be
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established. In games where a co-ordinate-like description is chosen
early, the schema can become very general and detailed very quickly;
but in games where, for example, a figural approach is taken, the
schema may not advance much further than: 'use a figural description'
and the explicit negotiation of details found in the above case will
not then be so likely. In the discussion of PI .0 it was noted that
following the first position specification an explicit schema-part
for the vertical dimension was still required. The progression to the
establishment of this schema-part displays aspects of both initial
and subsequent schema use. B's first response relies upon a
configural element as is common when there has not yet been a more
general schema established:
B: I'm in the first column.
you know how there's three boxes
A: uhhuh
B: I'm in the centre box
A: (quietly) in the centre box alright
This is represented by the discourse functions:
kl k2 kl kl k2f.f
PC] PCJ psi pc2
mii mi j miij miii miv
Here, the first introduction of 'botes' into the schema occurs at mij
and, due to the k2-status of this move, it is not possible for the
discourse to proceed unless 'box' is also accepted. Thus, the psj of
miij cannot occur if A is going to challenge that usage subsequently;
A's repeat of the term at miv then establishes it explicitly.
The absolute maze position specifications that occur throughout
the rest of this protocol are as follows:
A: that's the 5th column 3 boxes up.
B: I have to get to the 4th column / uhhuh / 4 up
A: 4th column bottom
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B: so you are now sort of 4, / 4 on the bottom uhhuh
A: we're in the same column right? / yeah / third
B: I'm in the top box you're in the bottom box
A: I'm in the 4th column 2 up
B: right see I'm at the 3rd column / uhhuh 4 up
A: Wait a minute you on the 3rd column 4th up?
A: Cn. tt. 4th column 2 up
B: 3 4. I mean 3 at the top.
B: so you'll be in the 4th column 3 up
And, as the work upon the protocols of Anderson (1983) and others has
shown, this type of homogeneity is completely typical. There are no
sudden references to '3rd box down' for example, or even changes of
ordering between the columns and the boxes", the procedure remains
unaltered once established. The normal use of a schema can therefore
be seen as one of minor modification rather than of large-scale
change. Modifications such as these can be captured by reference to
the requirements of lexicogrammatical modification introduced in the
previous chapter. For modification to be effective, it is necessary
for sufficient contextualising information to be given to place the
modification's lexicogrammatical retractions and restatements.
Furthermore, sufficient, here, may be defined with respect to the
current preselections governing the choice of expression.
Preceding the first of the above list of position
specifications, for example, the following preselection schema was
shown to be active:
{player X is at position P=, M columns from left, bottom}
The lexicogrammatical details of the preselection should ideally also
be defined but, as I explained above, this can only be done properly
in relation to a full specification of the lexicogrammar; the details
given here, therefore, are intended to be suggestive of the approach
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to be adopted rather than a definitive account. To begin with, in
segment P1.0, each dimension of the position specification was
realised separately in, at least, two distinct nominal phrases. But
with the first position specification of the above list, the
preselections are supportive of a simplification and both dimensions
appear within a single nominal phrase, the vertical dimension being
realised as a 'post-modifier':
5th column 3 boxes up
The preselection can be described then as an association between
established 'background' entities and certain paths of
lexicogrammatical actual isation", modifications are defined with
respect to those paths. The second specification of the above list
then displays a modification in the post-modifier and this survives
for the rest of the game.
Two directions of simplification often occur in this type of
context; either the dimensions are combined as here, in which case
some vestiges of the original form are usually preserved (e.g.
'column' and 'up'), or the dimensions remain distinct nominal phrases
and each may be simplified maximally arriving, eventually, at
explicit co-ordinates. This has occurred, for example, in the
protocol^ from which the following position descriptions are taken.'
2nd from the left and 2 up from the bottom
2nd column and 2 up
column 2 box 4





5. Cited by Simon Garrod, School of Epistemics Seminar, April 27,
1984.
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In the former case, it seems that the placing of the post-modifier
inhibits the removal of the head noun and a complete co-ordinate
system is not achieved; in the latter case, no such difficulty
appears.
This development does not appear, then, particularly sensitive
to discourse environment. Whenever a position specification is
required, the expression selected will conform to the preselection in
force. That preselection will also tend to simplify the expressions
that occur, within the limits set by avoiding ambiguity and
dispreferred forms, by only explicitly realising contrasts. Two
deviations do occur in protocol PI however, and these do seem to have
at least been triggered by the discourse context.
The first instance occurs in the environment of a hesitation:
B: so you are now sort of 4 (Is)
A: 4 on the bottom uhhuh right I'm scoring another
penalty point OK?
[PI. 4]
It should be noted that by this t'ime in the discourse the relative
status of the players has become far more equal. B had attempted to
take the first move but was rebuffed by A; furthermore, just prior to
the above utterances A had told B where to move as follows:
A: ... and I'll get free,
if you move bac(k
B: {right 0K=
A: move back=
B: OK don't shout (Is)
[PI. 4]
The utterances of the first instance form a simple check upon A's
position, perhaps as much for B to regain face as for information
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since A's position had been identified only a few turns before. This
is supported by A's response since it runs on immediately into the
next move segment. In fact, B's selection of 'so' gives credence to a
pc]/k2f/mi reading for the initial turn which would certainly justify
A's immediate continuation and make the discourse characterisation a
straightforward:
pci - PC] psi pcj
k2 k2f kl kl right kl OK?
mi mii miii mi (new 'exchange')
The discourse environment here, therefore, provides a place where the
form used is unlikely to be considered salient or 'at issue' while a
hesitation on B's part leaves a lexicogrammatical pre-base
unsympathetic to the inclusion of the usual head noun 'column'.
The second instance of deviance may be treated similarly. Its
environment is a self-repair that is made necessary by a hurried
response to a heated question:
B: I can't move up I'm up as far as I can up!
A: How-where are you?!
B: 3 4. I mean 3 at the top.
A: Oh you're kidding ...
[PI. 17]
Again the form of the position specification is not made an issue;
all that is required is an immediate response.
It is interesting that, whereas in the first case the exclusion
of the head noun could have been interpreted as an expression of lack
of importance by the player with the initiative, in the second case
it may express an orientation by the player in the inferior position
towards the need for a quick reply. Thus, the possibility is
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suggested of the use of a form generating a potential resource which
participants can subsequently employ to express required distinctions
and deviations from a presumed 'usual' case. But, of course, any such
interpretation can only be made with respect to the background of
possibility provided by the established norm of the preselection
configuration; the need for the participants to be able to establish
such norms and to be responsive to their existence is, therefore,
again highlighted.
4. The resolution of conflicts between microregisters
The discussion in this section will centre around the slight
breakdown in communication from protocol 11D that is presented below.
First I will describe the nature of that breakdown and then explain
its occurrence by reference to the preceding evolution of the maze
position microregister. This will demonstrate that the way the
discourse developed not only makes the confusion of one player
predictable but also suggests why the other player thought s/he would
be interpreted correctly. The argument therefore not only contributes
to the preceding elaboration of the connection between
discourse-functional resource deployment and contextually-based
preselection configurations, but also helps clarify how em increased
awareness of the function of discourse (both discoursally and
contextually) can significantly reduce the complexity of the
interpretive work necessary for understanding discourse by means of a
























Now, can you still change me?
2nd row, {3 in
{can you move down?
I can move down, aye.
If I move down,
Wh-whereabouts are you? It didn't change.
I'm in the 3rd row, 3 in, {from the right
{3rd row,
3rd row. Wait a minute.
Is it the 3rd row down?
Protocol segment: 11D.22
In the first four lines A shows signs of not being quite in
control of the information necessary for playing the game at that
point. A's question of line 1 is reminiscent of an exchange we saw in
chapter three in which one player incorrectly allocated the kl and k2
roles concerning the possibility of switching; there the response of
the other player was to correct the misallocation explicitly by means
of the contribution:
B: I don't know. Can I? [11F.1]
Here, although the response is more co-operative, it nevertheless
'repairs' A's mistake by, in effect, stating what A's question should
have been in order to ascertain the information required. A, however,
is still not allocating the knowledge roles correctly and at line 3
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attempts to convert B's move into an answer for the initial question
at line 1. B at this stage has no alternative other than to allocate
the roles directly, as in the example of the previous chapter, with
the question "will that change you?" rejecting A's question of line
3. The discourse-functional characterisation of lines 1-4 is, then,
quite interesting in that both players are attempting to guide the
discourse as they see it should go and yet still manage to build each
contribution into a single, coherent line of discourse development;






Thus, B's move at mii attempts to re-classify A's mi as a
'pt>2>/k2/mi', but A's move at miii attempts in turn to convert B's mii
into a pre-baseg which, when taken with A's addition, would create a
base2 expressing a pcj - which would complete A's pbj of move mi. B
has then to extract him/herself from the confusion with a fresh miii.
Pbi P°2 pcj




With the knowledge roles correctly allocated A addresses the
next problem: s/he no longer knows B's position and so cannot provide
an answer to B's pb3 at line 4. At line 5, therefore, A initiates an
insertion sequence to ascertain B's position. In response, B first
gives a position specification relative to the landmark of his/her
goal and then attempts to offer a co-ordinate-like absolute
specification. This A interrupts at line 8 with the kind of question
which s/he should have asked at the outset, i.e. "can you move
down?". This contribution is not an answer to B's question at line 4
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and so helps to repudiate the false direction taken in lines 1-4. The
insertion sequence of lines 5-7 is completed but the embedding
question is rendered no longer relevant. B's response at line 9
displays that A's question is outside of immediate expectations by
constructing the required pc as a full repetition and appending a ps.
























B attempts to consolidate this development of the discourse still
further but A interrupts ordering B to move down. At line 12,
however, B succeeds in connecting the new development with the old by










mod3 j (=modj j)
and converts lines 1, 8, 9, 12, and 13 into a coherent sequence of
discourse moves that establishes ' where B should move to change A.
This coherence is represented in the discourse-functional
characterisation by the labelling of the ideational and textual layer





















A's first move has been interpreted as establishing the purpose of
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the discourse at that point and the subsequent moves succeed in
bringing the segment begun by pbj to a successful resolution in the
corresponding pcj• at line 13.
Unfortunately for A, at line 15 it becomes clear that a mistake
has been made and A has no option other than to reassess B's
position; B provides this information at line 17. A's response to
this simple pc move is the following:
Pbl. 1
k2f. f k2f.c k2f.c
miv miv miv
18 19 wait 20
repi 2 rePl.2 a minute modj 3/mod[Q]
is it the 3rd row down?
to which B supplies a 'pci j/kl/miv:repj 3', enabling A's k2f.f at
line 22. Interesting here is that A finds it necessary to use a k2f.c
which extends the proposition offered by B, thereby suggesting that
B's formulation and A's interpretation of such formulations had
drifted apart. But given the mechanisms of convergence for
microregisters that I have described, how did this situation arise?
The first establishment of the maze game specification
microregister in this protocol was cited above in section 2's
discussion of initial segments; the first two position specifications
were as follows:
A: I'm at the left hand corner / ... / one along one up
B: Well I'm in the right hand corner, one along one up
The position specification schema might therefore be represented by:
(Player X is at position P=,
relative to left hand corner,
one along from left,
one up from bottom}
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which is proposed by A, accepted by B, and then altered by B
(providing grounds for a conciliatory interpretation for 'well') so
that 'left' is replaced by 'right'. However, the subsequent design of
position specifications shows that this most simple course was not
taken by the players. In all likelihood because of the equality of
the relationship between these players, the generalisation of the
proposed schema typical of the cases I examined above, whereby the
schema becomes applicable to both players, does not immediately
occur. Thus, instead of the single schema presented, following the
two initial moves the players appear to have established two distinct
schemata:
(Player A is at position P=,
one along from left, one up from bottom}
(Player B is at position P=,
one along from right, one up from bottom}
And in the subsequent position specifications, these provide the
basis upon which those specifications are understood and constructed;
e.g.
B: I'm 3 along. [from right]
A: I'm still on the same row, but 1 along. [from left]
B: That's me 4 along from the, left, from the right.
A: No, I'm 2 along from the left.
B: I'm in the 4th box from the, right.
This is supported further by the fact that the correct schema is used
regardless of speaker; for example, we find A referring to B's
position by:
A: ... are you 3 along now? [from right]
and B referring to A's position by:
B: ... you're 3 along from the left.
This demonstrates again both the creative aspects of microregister
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negotiation - there can be no guarantee that one particular line of
development will ensue regardless of the details of the particular
interaction - and the shared nature of a microregister.
The next stage in the evolution of these microregisters comes
in move segment 11D.8 when B, for the first time since the beginning
of the game, supplies an absolute vertical position:
... so I'm in the 3rd row, 3 in
As would be expected for B, the horizontal specification is again
relative to the right; while the vertical specification makes use of
A's prior use of 'row' and the initial orientation to moving upwards
from the bottom of the maze. However, soon afterwards A makes the
following contribution in which 'row* is used completely differently:
I'm at the very bottom of that row you're at, you're on,
Here 'row' is being used vertically rather than horizontally as had
been the case previously. That this is not a momentary lapse on A's
part is shown by the subsequent specification, which runs:
B: Where are you?
A: I'm, see that row you're .on?
B: Aye.
A: I'm, at, 2nd from bottom.
[1 ID. 15]
Whether A had misinterpreted B's re-introduction of rows as intending
a vertical specification (perhaps because this was the first
horizontal specification since the beginning of the game and may,
consequently, have been missed), or whether the existence of a
distinct schema for the two players interfered with the sharing of a
single interpretation, is unclear. Whatever the details may have
been, the consequences of this rift are very soon apparent in the
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breakdown of segment 11D.22.
The path to that breakdown appears to be as follows. Soon after
A's vertical uses of 'row' B contributes the relative position
specification:
So, you're 2 below me, 1 2.
Now, this utterance, although apparently harmless and clearly
understood by both players, leads to a further divergence in expected
position specifications because of the already divergent
microregisters with respect to which it is judged. For B, who has
used 'rows' successfully as horizontal specification entities, the
utterance can be understood as equivalent to the expanded form:
A is two rows below B
Previously rows had been counted upwards from the bottom of the maze
but now, as B nears the top of the maze, an orientation towards
counting down from the top is found easier; this new, downwards
orientation is reflected in this utterance also. But for A, rows have
not been associated with the horizontal and so the utterance is not
expandable as it was for B. Therefore, not only is the interpretation
of 'rows' left in doubt, but also a re-orientation to the top of the
maze when considering vertical specifications is not perceived by A.
In short, there now appear to be two wildly divergent schemata in
use, approximately representable by:
for B: {player X is at position P=,
M rows down from top, N in from right}
for A: {player X is at position P=,
N rows from left/right, M up from bottom}
Although there does appear to have been some generalisation and
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convergence during the game, for example the orientation to the right
comes to prevail, the extent of the incompatibilities present make
the eventual misunderstanding inevitable.
When B responds, therefore, to the request for his/her position
in line 5 of segment 11D.22 with
7 | B: 2nd row {3 in
A's interpretation is in part predictable on the basis that hitherto
position specifications for A had been almost exclusively concerned
with the position relative to the left and right and B's "2nd row"
appears to A to provide that information. The immediate maze
environment of B's position from A's perspective is shown below in
figure 2; B's actual position, of course unknown to A, is marked by
the character 'B'. From this we can see that an interpretation of B's
utterance by A as meaning the '2nd row in from the right' is
compatible with A's conviction that moving down would result in B
reaching a switch point and therefore changing A, especially
considering that it would be unlikely for A to be mistaken about the
vertical position; A's likely interpretation of B's position is
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'B': denotes B's actual position
'b': denotes A's likely interpretation of B's position
Figure 2:
Maze configuration of 11D.22 from A's perspective
The failure of B's move to cause A's barriers to be changed
prompts the second position specification at line 17:
17| B: I'm in the 3rd row down, 3 in, {from the right
Here B produces a specification in the same format as at line 7,
reflecting the established schema, with an expansion in an area of
possible difficulty. Unsurprisingly, given the earlier polarisation
between right-oriented specifications for B and left-oriented
specifications for A, B decides to make the rightwards orientation of
his/her schema explicit. A's response, however, is to focus on the
"3rd row" and s/he manages, in line 20, to volunteer the correct
interpretation: '3rd row down".
It is worth noting that it would be extremely unlikely for A to
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have suddenly lost track of the game sufficiently to place B in the
lower half of the maze - as would be required to contrast "down" with
'up' and that B's explicit "from the right" in a distinct
specification to that containing the "3rd row" is sufficiently at
odds with A's schema to warrant re-appraisal. Furthermore, the
position third row down is the only likely position in the top right
hand quarter of the maze into which B could move down without having
entered a switch point for A. The situation was, therefore, entirely
in favour of A arriving at an accurate interpretation at this point
and, indeed, B subsequently uses formulations such as
... the goal is the 1st row, 3 in
without any misunderstanding ensuing.
It is also possible to track the developments of these
divergent microregisters in terms of the discourse developments which
established them. As we have seen, following the initial schema
specifications, the microregisters remain largely unaltered until
explicit vertical positions are again included by player B. However,
support for A's having missed the alteration is offered by the fact
that from the initial establishment of description schemata right up
until the breakdown of segment 11D.22, the acknowledgement a player
gives to the position specification of the other player is quite
minimal. Early in the game there is the occasional respecification,
e.g.
B: That's me 4 along from the, left, from the right.
A: Er, you should be beside me then.
[1 ID.4]
but subsequently, and more commonly, understanding is simply assumed.
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For example, in
A: If I move up, will I affect you?
B: Where are you?
A: I'm, see that row you're on?
B: Aye.
A: I'm, at, 2nd from bottom.
B: Well, you won't change me, no.
the position specifications stand as complete, unproblematic answers
which permit the nested sequence of insertions, Q1Q2Q3A3A2A], to
survive intact. Thus, the informed player is clearly not finding it
necessary to provide any explicit k2f-moves as indications of a
successful informing, further thematic development is being embarked
upon immediately.
Only when the breakdown is recognised are explicit k2f-moves
with respect to position specification discourse sequences found
again. Then the situation resembles that observed above in initial
segments and, in lines 18-20 of 11D.22, two k2f.c-moves are produced.
Furthermore, the form of the latter k2f.c-move,
20| A: ... Is it the 3rd row down?
explicitly proposes a modification to the information proposed and
thus serves to establish a re-negotiated schema for A and to confirm
the existing schema for B. This situation also suggests that when a
problem does occur, a player who is seen to have made a mistake is
placed in a less powerful role with respect to the discourse. Even
though it is player A who puts forward the position specification at
line 20, player B retains the right to correct this assessment. This
is because a microregister already exists and it is possible for a
player to adopt a kl-role towards its details and so to act as the
'final' authority for its correct usage. The other player may or may
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not challenge this but would only do so if s/he were able to justify
the adoption of a more powerful role in the discourse. This is
clearly not an option available to A at this point in protocol 11D.
One can see, therefore, that the breakdown discussed in this
section and the lead up to its occurrence, while conforming to the
results of the previous discussions in this chapter, are also made
quite transparent to analysis when viewed in terms of the types of
conversational processes that I have described. Following the initial
establishment of schemata, subsequent uses follow without any need
for explicit acknowledgements of the success of maze position
specifications. Any changes that do occur are quite minor. When there
is a problem, however, the situation reverts partially to that of the
initial segments inasmuch as explicit acknowledgements and
substantial reformulations are again produced. The tight connection
between discourse contribution design and the contextual
establishment of microregisters serves to constrain significantly the
range of possible interpretations that can be placed upon the
discourse and hence permits a better insight to be achieved into the




1. Summary - the account so far
This thesis has been built upon the basic premise that the
fundamental 'function' of language may be taken to be the creation,
maintenance, and development of essentially shared, intersubjective
provinces of meaning. This has been shown to be a logical outgrowth
and continuation of the Firthian tradition in linguistics and, more
particularly, of the theoretical position articulated in Halliday
(1978). According to this position 'context' has come to denote an
entity which is already taken to 'transcend' those individuals who
participate in it. The general behaviour potential that is current at
any stage and, importantly, this includes linguistic potential, is
not tied to any individual participants, speakers or hearers - it is
fundamentally intersubjective in that the potential and realising
contexts are both logically prior to their relevant individuals and
objects, and it is they alone that render those individuals and
objects meaningful. This is contrary to the cognitivist, or
'transcendentalist', standpoint in which differences and
individuality are accepted as the basic phenomena which are to permit
the later construction (somehow) of an intersubjective bridging
between individuals. The mechanisms by which intersubjective
constructs such as contexts and their contents are maintained were
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accepted, then, as the central objects of linguistic inquiry and this
thesis represents an initial cycle of investigation into their nature
and construction.
As consequences of this position, discourse must be seen both
to arise out of its context and to reshape that context - as is held
to be the case in conversation analysis - and that context is
maintained intersubjectively. The context always embraces the
language behaviour of all the discourse participants who take part.
At no point in the account has it been necessary to describe
individual-specific processes for accomplishing the design of
discourse contributions and the subsequent orientation of speakers
towards the areas of context that are picked out as being of concern.
In particular, the conversation analytic emphasis upon the shared
nature of talk required a consideration of interaction which focused
attention upon both production- and interpretation-related issues.
Indeed, I have deliberately not distinguished these two aspects of
the use of language in this thesis because the generalisations
proposed are intended to reside at a 'higher' level of abstraction
that is relevant to both. Language restructures intersubjective
contexts; whether one is hearing the language or producing the
language the effects at this level are the same - the context is
restructured.
Similarly, there has been no distinction drawn between speakers
and hearers; a deployment of resources at one level is taken to have
consequences at other levels regardless of how that deployment came
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about, i.e. whether by producing an utterance or by interpreting one.
It is, of course, possible for speakers to have divergent views of
what is occurring, but these views are always couched in
intersubjective terras - even in their divergence it would be possible
for each to be the view of all; there is simply no such entity as a
'private* context at this level of analysis. The deployment of the
conventional resources for designing and producing discourse can be
seen, therefore, as the means by which an essentially shared,
intersubjective set of demonstrably intelligible contexts is
maintained. Consequently, the discourse participants 'understand'
both the discourse and each other in that the existence of some
history of discourse contributions necessarily relevances possible
continuations and developments - it is in the grasping of these
possible futures for interaction that understanding resides.
Within this initial cycle, then, the phenomenon of discourse
has been focused upon as being of crucial importance. It is in the
form of discourse and conversation that language has evolved to play
the role of supporting intersubjectiv'ity. It is in natural, connected
discourse, therefore, that the essential features of that role may be
seen most fully. Two principal areas of concern have been addressed:
(i) the organisation of discourse as a distinct level of
linguistic structural patterning;
(ii) the consequences of that organisation for the intersubjective
contexts in which it is deployed.
The first detailed elaboration of the discourse level resources
available for constructing conversation was approached in chapter
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four by demonstrating how certain regular lexicogrammatical
properties of conversation could be seen as indicative of " an
autonomous level of linguistic patterning. That autonomous level was
characterised in the terms of the discourse-functional organisation
proposed. The possible discoursal conditioning of the following
phenomena was investigated: ellipsis, repetitions, certain pronominal
selections, the structuring of individual speaker's turns by means of
questions, tags, pauses, interruptions, etc., and sequences of turns
designed to achieve particular interactional aims (e.g. securing the
floor). In general, it was suggested that these possible forms could
be beneficially treated not as 'problems' requiring solution (e.g.
'here is an elliptical expression, or here is an occurrence of "it",
what possibly could it be referring to?'), but rather as detailed
instructions to the participants in the situation as to how that
situation (including the discourse in process) is to be developed.
This entirely supports, therefore, the conversation analytic claim
that by an appropriate interpretation utterances can be revealed to
meet quite precisely the demands and purposes of their contexts of
utterance; almost no detail is too srmll to reflect linguistically an
utterance's 'situatedness', comprehension of the speaker of that
situatedness, and the intended development of the situation that the
utterance represents.
Subsequently, in order to address the communication necessary
between the strata, of the linguistic system chapter five
investigated the consequences of the deployment of the available
discourse organisational resources proposed, not in terms of
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lexicogrammatical properties of utterances, but in terms of the
properties established at the contextual stratum. More particularly,
because of this thesis's focus upon discourse, the aspects of context
studied were restricted to those relevant to subsequent discourse
design. The essential construct proposed here as an extension to the
Nigel framework was that of the 'preselection configuration'. This is
a very general mechanism by which certain choices of discourse
design, e.g. the selection of referring expressions, may be
constrained by the discourse history; thus, as we shall see, helping
to create 'topics'.
One of the more significant possibilities the argument in
chapter five established was just how the strict implementation of
Firth's prism metaphor succeeds in the Introduction's goal of placing
a far greater work-load upon the language that occurs, rather than
requiring the immediate acceptance of 'underlying' mechanisms where
the 'real' work of comprehension is supposed to be undertaken. For
example, it was illustrated how in the course of the discourse of a
maze game protocol the players construct how they are to view and to
describe the relevant aspects of the game that need to be
communicated. The mechanism proposed to capture this phenomenon then
interpreted it as the establishment of a shared orientation of the
potential for action available in the situation. It is not the case
that players come to the game with a pre-given and inflexible set of
plans for dealing with the game and terms for expressing those plans.
The players instead both take part in a process of view construction
and negotiation in which proposals are made, often implicitly in the
- 387 -
way the discourse is organised, and then accepted or rejected (again
often implicitly) prior to any possibility of their subsequent use.
Crucially, the effective formation of plans typically arises in the
very terms established by the players in interaction; that
interaction may, therefore, profitably be viewed as prior to plan
construction.
This is one manifestation of the fact that it is not useful to
see the linguistic activity of the players and the solving of the
maze game puzzle as distinct problems. In the very achievement of
discourse appropriate to the situation the activity necessary for
playing and solving the game has been realised. The language does
not, therefore, act as an 'interface' between problem-solver and
world; language is, on the contrary, the socially-maintained force by
which shared problems of this kind may be established and their
solutions achieved.
The general organisation of the linguistic system as it has
been articulated over the course of this thesis is summarised in
figure 1 below. On the lefthand side we have the basic framework for
handling the lexicogrammar as inherited from Nigel. The righthand
side depicts the overall flow of control in my attempt to extend this
to provide a unified framework capable of incorporating both an
interpretation of the Hallidayan and conversation analytic views of
the relation between language and context (cf. chapters one and two)
and the results of my investigations into the organisation and
function of discourse (cf. chapters four and five). Thus, there are
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now assumed to be at least three areas of linguistic patterning based
on form: the lexicogrammar, discourse and intonation. The
organisation within these levels is to be represented by system
networks which interrogate the context via choosers and create
functional-structural results via realisation. In addition, the
systems and their choices which are actually considered in any
particular situation are further constrained by allowing that
situation to associate elements of its context with a relevantly
restricted range of systems and choices. The definition of such
restricted ranges of potential is made via preselection
configuintions which constitute more or less general registers or
microregisters. Finally, it is also assumed that the three levels of
form can also interact in a straightforward fashion, via
preselection, as do the various cycles or actualisation that arise
solely within the lexicogrammar for each rank of unit generated (e.g.
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The view of the linguistic system developed in this thesis
Clearly, while this thesis has addressed many aspects of this
general organisation, a completely specified framework is still some
way off. In particular, systems of choice for the discourse level of
form have not been provided and the mechanisms involved in the
preselection configuration have only been outlined rather than being
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specified in detail. To conclude here then, I will in the next two
subsections attempt to suggest the directions in which more complete
specifications of these areas are to be sought and, in subsection
1.3, sketch an analysis of Schegloff's cited telephone conversation
that illustrates the view proposed.
1.1 The discourse level of form viewed as topic development
Chapter four brought us to the stage where a collection of
functional decompositions of a unit loosely characterised as an
'exchange' had been set out. Each decomposition was claimed to
achieve some set of discourse developments by means of a regular
correlation between discourse micro-function and conversational work.
It was acknowledged, however, that the state of the analysis achieved
so far is not yet adequate to the task of providing the eventual
required fonrtalisation of discourse organisation. In order to get a
sense, then, of how in a subsequent cycle of analysis an adequate
systematisation might proceed, it will be useful to focus here upon
what precisely the sequences of moves whose various patternings I
have now described are achieving. What is required here is a way of
focusing on that work the particular deployment of discourse
functions achieves at the level of discourse itself - i.e. the work
in terms of which functionality at the discourse level is to be
defined. This is to seek the terms necessary for the eventual
construction of networks of potential for the discourse level that
could give rise to the discourse-functional patterns actually
observed. Berry, for example, justified her initial formalisation in
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which the kl, pc, and ai micro-functions were declared obligatory by
interpreting the exchange as the unit 'concerned with the
transmission of complete propositions'; the resulting network
accordingly involved features to do with either informing or
eliciting propositions about either A- or B- events. Naturally, with
my move away from the emphasis on the transmission of information, an
alternative vantage-point needs to be found.
A potentially useful starting point is provided by some of
Sacks's observations on the construction of sequences of utterances
in talk and their relation to 'topics'; Casey has summarised these
observations as follows:
'Where utterances are consecutively arranged in some relation
to one another, topic will result and will, furthermore, be a
locus of conversational organisation. ... In other words, when
speakers attend the requisites of consistency and coherence
they are, in doing so, attending topical coherence.
Understanding becomes, in addition, topical understanding and
topical items are placed with reference to prior and present
topic." (Casey, 1981, p8)
It is possible then that a consideration in terms of topic of
conversational organisation as captured in the discourse-functional
characterisation I have developed could suggest a possible
systematisation of the discourse level resources. In particular,
Casey's (1981) discussion of topic 'flow' fits extremely well with
the account offered above and provides a useful broadening of
perspective.
Casey focuses specifically upon the ways in which discourse
participants 'begin' topics. Two distinct organisations are observed:
beginnings "may be organised either for a new topic to flow from a
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prior topic, or as specifically segmented, and dislocated from what
has preceded them." (ibid., p2) Many of the resources he describes as
typically employed for achieving topic flow are similar to the
lexicogrammatical manifestations of discourse organisation I
discussed in chapter four. However, problematic for any more
formally-specified approach to topic flow is the fact that no way has
been achieved of recognising from a consideration of linguistic
'form' - construed as widely as necessary - talk on a 'new' topic as
distinct from further talk on the old topic. Casey notes that the
resources he describes for effecting topic flow are the very same
resources that allow for utterance-by-utterance cohesion as have been
detailed by Sacks, Halliday and Hasan, and many others. Indeed, he
claims this as a positive result of the investigation; for example:
"Although Sacks has observed that this phenomenon can display
a topic density we have shown that it can operate across
topics and, thereby, organise the production of a new topic."
(ibid., p76)
or,
"Again it can be found that a phenomenon Sacks has observed
operating to establish an utterance-by-utterance coherence can
also operate across topics and actually organise a coherent
topic flow." (ibid., p83)
The observation that these resources.for utterance-by-utterance
coherence operate both within and across topics suggests that it is
indeed beneficial to treat them as a distinct level of organisation
as I have done in this thesis.
Casey's account also draws attention to the need to focus upon
a particularly difficult problem if systematisation is to be
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achieved: i.e., just where does this notion of 'topic' fit into the
framework as a whole? Re-interpreting Casey's discussion of topic
flow in the terms of the discourse-functional level of form, it seems
that coherent utterance-by-utterance development might be achieved by
speakers' adherence to the potential of the discourse level but, in
addition to that organisation, a segmentation into stretches of talk
by orientation to topic is also suggested. Thus, although, for
example, a thematic sequence may be conuersationally coherent in that
the discourse contributions that carry it conform to the
micro-function distributions of the discourse level of form, it has
not yet been established how that might correspond to organisation by
'topic'. Furthermore, since the same resources are to be applied
across and within topics, it will be useful to examine stretches of
discourse with specific reference to topic to see if any additional
isolable linguistic consequences are to be found specific to topic
segmentation. This proves considerably easier in the constrained
domain offered by the maze game than it is in natural conversation,
and in the next subsection I will suggest in particular that the
microregister construct can help with this.
Finally here a consideration of Casey's discussion of the
segmented production of topics will pull together conveniently some
of the various principles of discourse organisation proposed in
chapter four. Casey notes that there are occasions where topic flow
is not operating, a new topic is begun, and that new topic requires
no disjunctive marking of any kind. This is due to the fact that the
discourse participants know that topic flow is not operating and
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hence that it is relevant to try to produce a 'first' topic from
scratch so that conversation may proceed. This provides an
environment for the deployment of discourse resources that is
sufficiently distinctive for it to be examined without the benefit of
a supporting contextual formalisation.
Casey sets up his discussion as follows.
"Where topic flow is operating speakers are orienting to and
engaging in topic talk already. By contributing to an
in-progress flow of topic talk, both speakers are repeatedly
indicating their current and continuing availability for, and
commitment to, talking topically. Therefore, where topic flow
is functioning, availability for indulging in topic talk is
not a paramount issue as speakers are constantly reiterating
their mutual orientation towards topical involvement.
Conversely, where topics are being started at a point where
topic flow is not operating speakers work within the
constraint of needing to establish mutual availability."
(ibid., pi 19)
The work with which speakers need to concern themselves when
generating a topic from scratch then divides into two stages. A
speaker must first establish that his/her hearer is available for
talk generally and, then, seek particular topics which will be
accepted by the hearer as appropriate for conversation at that point.
The discourse move primarily responsible for this is the 'topic
initial utterance' which outlines "an area of substantive content
which topic talk could encompass for the immediate future of a
conversation." (ibid., pl23)
Casey describes the possible move trajectories which can follow
particular types of topic initials in some detail but I need only
consider the general statement of his results here. In short, a topic
initial may be followed by one of three types of move: a
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'topicaliser', which a hearer may produce to display acceptance of
the topic initial's material as topic-worthy and which indicates that
the speaker may continue; on-topic development, which goes further
and shows that the hearer, or second speaker, is also able to develop
the discussion of the proposed topic material; and negative
responses, which may either curtail further discussion of the topic
or leave the initiative entirely with the first speaker as to whether
s/he pushes the initial topic or attempts to initiate another. These
possibilities may be summarised thus:
(1) [topic initial topicaliser | on-topic development .
(2) [topic initial on-topic development ...
(3) [topic initial negative response ]
In addition, following Pomerantz (1975), Casey suggests that a
possible form of trajectory (2) may be described as:
(4) [assessment | agreement further assessment ...
On the basis of his examination of conversation and the discovery of
the above organisational structures, Casey concludes:
"All topic initials, as the first turn of a topic beginning,
can fulfill three functions. Firstly, they lay a basis for
talking topically as a conversational activity, secondly, they
propose the initiation of particular topic material ..., and
thirdly, they project for which speaker will develop the topic
material posited in the topic initial, and, at which stage of
the sequence." (ibid., pl46)
But particularly interesting here is that this is almost
identical to a general statement of the workings of the
discourse-functional level I have proposed; Casey's three functions
correspond to the textual, ideational, and interpersonal
metafunctions respectively. Indeed, when the discourse-functional
level is applied to the move trajectories (l)-(4), their organisation
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appears to be quite simply motivated. Furthermore, by accepting
Casey's view of the conversational work these trajectories achieve, a
more coherent view is afforded of the discourse-functional resources
as a whole: i.e. discourse-functional characterisations should be
seen not as being solely related to the transmission of propositional
information at all but, in addition, are equally concerned with ways
of continuing to talk topically.
This suggests the following constraints on topic initial moves,
or rather on topic talk sequences generally, when seen in terms of
the discoursal micro-functions developed above. First, the acceptance
of a topic involves the negotiation of kl- and k2-roles with respect
to the topic proposed for discussion. This is intended as a more
general organisation than the allocation of these roles discussed
above and can be taken as a general framework within which
propositionally-local variation can occur. Clearly, for topical
development to ensue there ought to be at least one bearer of a kl
role. Trajectory (3) above'can be said to include, therefore, move
sequences such as:
in which the necessary kl has not occurred and topical development is
jeopardised. Trajectory (2) is analogous to sequences such as:
This resembles a simple exchange as examined by Berry and, indeed, as













particular method of topic establishment.
We are now also in a position to distinguish this last case
from trajectory (4) because there neither speaker declines to accept
a kl-role. The first assessment claims a kl-role but, in contrast to
the situation in trajectory (1) which I discuss in a moment, the
second speaker does too. The structure here is then simply:
PC] ps+i peg
kl L21 kl kl
mi mii miii
which was found in the maze game in relation to AB-events.
This suggests a second area of constraint in topic talk: i.e.
that thematic sequences should occur to develop that talk. In short,
a pc^ should project a pc^+i unless conversational work is done to
bring the topic to a close and thereby suspend thematic development.
Furthermore, in an exactly analogous manner to Coulthard and Brazil's
(1981) discussion of options being restricted as the exchange
proceeds, at the level of topic one finds with the moves concerned
with the initial production of topic that the 'scope' of their
propositions at issue is much broader than those that occur later. It
is these initial moves which set the bounds on the topic to be
developed and disagreements, 'final' acceptances (e.g. k2f.f),
repairs, etc. have much greater consequences on the future course of
the discourse here than do those occurring later.
A consideration of the possibilities that fall under trajectory
(1) offers further support for these constraints. Trajectory (1) can
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be predicted by taking the topic initial to claim a kl-role for its
speaker (a 'self-selecting topic initial' in Casey's terms [pl63] ),
which the topicaliser accepts while also displaying a k2-role
allocation for its speaker. I.e.
Casey describes the topic initial in this case as relying upon "its
recognisable status as the presenter of a partial item of
information." (ibid., pl65) His discussion of this could be usefully
extended by a consideration of just what constitutes a 'partial' item
of information. For example, in Gricean terms it could be described
as a violation of the maxim of quantity, or, in those of Polanyi
(1978b), as an incomplete 'story' which has not yet displayed its
point, its reasons for being brought up. This would clearly bring to
bear some much needed, further constraints upon the notion of
relevance with respect to thematic progressions.
The picture so far constructed for the discourse level of
organisation can, then, be summarised thus. Sequences of
conversational moves are constructed according to the constraints
specified so as to achieve thematic progressions which develop talk
on mutually agreed topics. The principal stretches of language over
which the constraints operate should be seen as the thematic sequence
which carries a single topic and the exchanges within that which
serve to carry the thematic sequence. Each such stretch of language
needs to allocate 'knowledge' roles and produce a sequence of










the topic. It should be noted that throughout the thematic sequence
essentially the same constraints are operating. Whereas Casey deals
with the resources of topic flow and segmented topic generation quite
separately, here there was no need to develop a distinct set of
resources at the level of discourse.
This corresponds to the observation cited above that
utterance-by-utterance cohesive ties can also support topic flow. The
discourse level resources themselves organise sequences regardless of
their status with respect to topic in that their constraints always
apply. The essential difference, then, between topic-internal
contributions which do not function to organise larger stretches of
discourse and topic-initial contributions which do is placed at a
higher level of thematic sequence selection. This is not to be
construed as a reduction to the purely ideational content of a
discourse: as the next subsection will clarify, such selection is not
restricted to a selection of 'factual content'. In topic-initial
contributions then the scope of the propositions proposed are far
wider than that of those occuring subsequently. Propositions
occurring earlier in a sequence are free to address wider issues and
participate in fixing the boundaries within which the subsequent talk
is to develop, thereby organising the large stretches of talk
associated with particular topics.
1.2 The relation between topic development and microregiser
The two 'levels' of work I described in sections 2, 3 and 4 of
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chapter five, the conversational level of developing a coherent
discourse and the contextual level of maintaining and extending a set
of microregisters, can now be related more generally. To achieve this
it will be useful briefly to review once again the logical steps that
intervene between discourse contributions and microregisters.
At the least 'abstract* and most easily recognisable level come
the structural entities that result from cycles of actualisation
within the lexicogrammar. In chapter four, I classified these in
terms of their 'completeness' , or independence from previous cycles,
by means of the lexicogrammatical 'base': a base is the result of one
independent cycle of lexicogrammatical actualisation. Material for
these bases is taken from the ongoing thematic progression, which is
represented by the theme-rheme propositional structures associated
with the ideational layer micro-functions of the discourse level,
i.e. pb^, pcj[, etc. Bases are also shaped by the requirements of the
other discourse layers as they each contribute to the construction of
sequences of discourse moves.
In the previous subsection I was able to suggest that the
resources of the discourse level of form provided one essential means
for managing the topical development of conversation; by the
appropriate deployment of those resources discourse participants
could negotiate the establishment, elaboration, and completion of
sequences of topically relevant talk. This is reflected in the
thematic progressions and the particular forms adopted for their
supporting lexicogrammatical bases. However, thematic progressions
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are often only recognisable sis such by virtue of a perceived
orientation towards some communicative goal; that is, unless the
connection can be seen the sense of progression will be lost.
Naturally the discourse level resources can provide significant clues
that there are connections to be made and guide the search for such
connections, but the actual fact of connection nevertheless resides
at the stratum above the formal, among the situation-dependent
meanings of the context, and not among the formal patterns
themselves.
Chapter five showed that one means that is available to
discourse participants for aiding the recognition and construction of
topical connections is the regular association of linguistic formal
features with such situation-specific meanings as are found
necessary. This kind of association, which constitutes the
microregister construct, is then always tied at the contextual level
to more or less specific 'functions'. Such functions are not the
generalised 'meta'-functions of the linguistic system but are instead
the actual functions that language is called upon to perform in
context. They may be 'anonymous' to a greater or lesser degree, in
that they may not have been allocated to particular individuals, but
they will remain necessarily 'specific' and context-tied. Evidence
for such functions can be obtained from the presence of
microregister-like phenomena: when there appears to be a stable, if
evolving, set of possible linguistic realisations which regularly
occurs in the context of a particular task then that task is a
candidate for a contextual function. The principal example dealt with
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in chapter five was the identification of a maze position during the
playing of the maze game.
The establishment of microregisters appears to be an automatic
consequence of discourse development. When no problems are
encountered minor simplifications may be made with little or no
comment. More substantial alterations are more or less likely to be
accepted depending upon at least the following three aspects:
(i) the power of the role adopted by the speaker; this can in part
be influenced by the speaker him/herself by designing
discourse contributions as if s/he were in the superior role
by such means as taking the floor, deploying
pk2f-contributions, offering respecifications of others'
contributions, interpreting fillers as micro-exchanges,
interpreting micro-exchanges as genuine questions, etc. - in
short, actually possessing a superior role and acting as if
one does often become indistinguishable;
(ii) the salience given to a particular stretch of discourse - if
a discourse segment is explicitly marked to be not central by,
for example, fast delivery, low phonological prominence, less
autonomy of design, etc. then even if possible
respecifications of microregisters occur, it will be unlikely
for them to be adopted;
(iii) the use of particular discourse environments for drawing
attention to explicit modifications in, and proposals for,
microregisters; for example, most commonly in the above, the
use of the k2f.c-slot for precisely this kind of
conversational work.
Once established the microregister provides certain specifically
relevant shapes of propositional development and certain specifically
relevant forms for their linguistic realisation.
This leads on naturally to a further development of the view of
'topic' being taken here although, again, the metatheoretical
presuppositions of the Hallidayan conversation/discourse analytic
approach require slight extensions to be made to the term as it is
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more generally understood. The particular slant on topic that I
propose follows from Schegloff's (1972) discussion of the term.
Schegloff argues that the selection of refering expressions should be
seen as one resource for displaying a coherent perspective relevant
to the talk at hand; that is, it provides an excellent resource for
displaying orientation to topic. The fact that there are available
alternatives provides for the possibility of discourse participants
analysing the terms which are actually selected in contrast to those
which are not in order to gain a sense of the consistency, and
'topicality', of the discourse's development. The major point here
then is that if formulations are indeed selected specifically to
create a coherent set of formulations which together continually
succeed in orienting discourse participants towards the intended
discourse topic, then
"it would clearly seem foolhardy to try to excerpt from its
conversational surroundings some particular formulation, and
examine how it was selected out of the set of terms that are,
by a correspondence test of truth, equally "correct". The
selection would seem understandable only as part of the
co-selection of the variety of terms occurring in the
conversational segment." (ibid., p80)
But, of course, the suggested formalisations of term selection,
Nigel's included, attempt precisely such an isolation.
The notion of 'topic' and that of microregister can now be
brought together as follows. Schegloff points out that a central
conversation analytic observation about 'topic talk' is "co-selection
of features for topic" (ibid.)', that is,
"if one looks to the places in conversation where an object
(including persons) or activity is identified ..., then one
can notice that ... the selections made at each spot are
"fitted" to each other, or "go together". Rather than saying
"they fit the topic", or are "appropriate to the topic", it
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may be preferable to say that in their co-selection they, at
least in part, "constitute" the topic." (ibid.)
Schegloff's discussion also provides a detailed justification of this
view with respect to location identifications. In addition chapter
five criticised ideationally-centred approaches to term selection and
suggested that contextual constraints will need to be brought to bear
on the lexicogrammar if appropriate decisions are to be possible.
This position was supported in the maze game protocols by virtue of
the many examples of game-specific negotiated meaning, and their
accompanying restriction of forms, which demonstrated that the
expressions to be selected ought to be restricted even prior to
selection on any such grounds as denotational adequacy. As Anderson's
results show, for example, the word 'row' might well be used to refer
consistently either to a horizontal path or to a vertical path, or a
'box' may be a single position within the maze or a box-like
configuration of such positions. It would, therefore, involve
considerably less 'work' for candidate terms to be restricted
contextually, i.e. on the grounds of their precise meaning in
context, at an early stage in the process. As a consequence of this,
for most situations there is far less choice than the grammar alone
would lead us to expect.
Now the current view of topic provides a further possible
characterisation for this kind of 'meaning in context'. While it has
been suggested that term formulations are constructed according to
the expectations provided by the microregister, it has now been
claimed that when the set of formulations in a discourse is
considered, the selection of those forms exhibits a common
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orientation that can be said to 'constitute' the topic of that
discourse. But a common orientation such as this is precisely the
kind of organisational feature that a stable microregister would
induce in segments of conversation over which it was active. Thus,
orientation to topic can be seen as a necessary result of any
microregister that endures unchanged over a stretch of discourse. Of
course, for a microregister to remain unchanged is not something that
simply 'happens' since, in theory, discourse contributions always
have consequences for the microregister. This is because the
actualisation of linguistic potential only proceeds with respect to
the possible and the possible is always situationally restricted -
thus, the deployment of discourse resources cannot help but leave
behind more or less determinate indications of the restrictions
within which that deployment occurred. As long as no clear
indications of those restrictions have been provided, the situation
to which the language is responding and, hence, the meaning and
intention of that language, will remain unclear. The practical
consequences of this are that, if speakers wish to preserve a
microregister, then they must select the language they are to use
accordingly; i.e. they must do the appropriate "conversational work'
for the microregister, and hence the orientation to the topic, to
continue. The recognition of topicality and thematic progressions may
thus be helped substantially by the application of the microregister
construct in both interpretation and production.
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1.3 An example analysis of Schegloff's cited telephone conversation
To conclude this 'state of the model' section I will return to
the original conversational fragment that I used in the Introduction
to contrast the conversation analytic approach to the standard
rhetorical relation approach typically adopted in cognitive science
and linguistics proper. The 'solution' suggested there to the problem
of discourse interpretation was that it was necessary to free the
analysis of discourse from the imposition of socially-based
categorisations of linguistic behaviour in order to make visible the
genuinely linguistic organisations of discourse upon which the social
categorisations rest and which govern the details of linguistic
realisation in form. I will now, therefore, re-analyse the fragment
in terms of the model as developed this far so as to:
(i) illustrate how the components of the model would fit together
in practise;
(ii) show how the model begins to achieve some of the aims I
outlined for a theory of the linguistic organisation of
conversation;
and (iii) suggest some immediately warranted further lines of
development.
The relevant part of the fragment is repeated in figure 2
below. I have reformatted it to pick out those aspects particularly
significant for the analysis of the interpretation and
re-interpretation of contributions 5-7. Essentially the line
numbering now reflects each lexicogrammatical contribution that is
accepted as forming the basis for subsequent contribution design.
This is in no way intended to suggest that the unnumbered
contributions should be ignored in a complete analysis; I am adopting
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this simplification purely to aid the task in hand. The shape of the
analysis will be as follows. I will first briefly motivate the
conversational state of affairs that is taken to hold over
contributions 1-4. This establishes the discourse developments
relevant at that point and so serves to fix the appropriate
continuations and their interpretations as suggested by the discourse
model. I will then describe how those continuations both explain the
design, and allow for the interpretation, of contributions 5-9.
1. B: ... I said, it comes down t' this:=
= Our main difference:
( I feel that a government, i-
the main thing, is- )
2. th-the purpose a' the government, is, what
is best for the country.
3. A: A/mhmm
( B: He says, governments,
an' you know he keeps-
he talks about governments,
they sh- )
4. the thing that they sh'd do is what's right or wrong.
5. A: For vhom.
6. B: Well he says- { he-
7. A: {By what standard
( B: That's what- )
8. that's exactly what I mean,
( he s- )
9. but he says ...
Figure 2:
Schegloff's (1977, p81) cited telephone conversation
(contributions central to the analysis only are numbered)
There are good grounds for accepting from the outset the two
sets of sequential relevances Schegloff proposes to be operative in
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this conversation: i.e. those of a story being told and those of an
argument in progress. As was mentioned in the Introduction, A's
selection of back-channel contributions (e.g. contribution 3) is
indicative of an extended turn in progress and may be interpreted,
following chapter four, as passes. Also, B's contribution 1 may be
taken as marking a potential move from a story in progress to a
summary of the story (expressed in contributions 2 and 4) and
potential conclusion. Similarly, B's selection of alternating 'I
said'-'he says' headed contributions provides equal support for the
argument in progress interpretation. The conflicting nature of the
positions of B and the teacher is also expressed in the strong
syntactic parallelism at clause rank of the summary statements,
contributions 2 and 4.
Now, while in chapter five the microregister construct was
illustrated only with respect to the lexicogrammar, the similarity in
the statuses accorded the lexicogrammar and the discourse level (cf.
figure 1) suggests the possibility of a similar phenomenon of
contextual preselection with respect to discourse patterning. This is
where I will place observations such as Reichman's concerning
rhetorical structure. Two microregisters will be accepted as being
relevant then in the fragment at hand: the first influencing design
according to a social interpretation of the speech event as a
story-telling, the second according to an interpretation of the
subject matter of the story as an argument. The first microregister
is seen in preselections concerning the development of thematic
sequences that carry a story and the favouring of conversational
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passes by the hearer until the point of the story has been reached;
the second in preselections concerning the simultaneous alternation
of B's turns and the teachers with positions in the argument and the
establishment of thematic sequences where propositions challenge each
other in the way Reichman and others have described. The state of
affairs in contributions 1-4 is depicted in figure 3; here I will
explicitly make use of the multiple sets of discourse functions
suggested in chapter four so as to capture the sequencing being
governed by the two microregisters in force. For ease of reference
the identifying subscripts used for lexicogrammatical bases and




as part of story story summary
microregister (S) < >
speaker B A B
discourse kl kl kl
level PC] pc2 PC4
functions mis mils -> miiis
1exicogrammatica1 basei base2 Mmhim base4
classification
contribution 1 2 3 4
number
discourse kl kl kl
level PC| PC2 pc4
functions miA miiA miiiA
speaker B T
social status < > < >
as part of argument argument position argument
microregister (A) 1 position 2
Figure 3: Analysis of contributions 1-4
This is the context, then, into which A's contribution 5, "For
whom', is launched. Two quite distinct sets of options for
interpreting this contributions are relevanced by the two
microregisters and both of these are actually relevant at that point.
For the story-telling, an extended sequence of kl-interpretable
contributions have been delivered and the options for A therefore
revolve around a k2f-function to mark acceptance of the 'knowledge'
shared. The functions relevant for designing A's contribution (mivg)









That is, if further details of the story are to be elicited then A
may design a k2f.c contribution in which some area of concern is
picked out by the proposition included. Alternatively, A may accept
the story as it is and produce a simple k2f.f, possibly including
some noncontinuing propositional content via a pc-function. However,
from the perspective of the argument interpretation, the options
relevanced for a forthcoming turn are more along the lines of a
'kl/P/miv^' where the ideational function is any one of:
pci : with proposition i supporting propositions 1 and 2
ps^j g • explicit support for propositions 1 and 2
pbj : with proposition i challenging proposition 4,
(perhaps rendering the kl function a dkl or, a more
indirect challenge, a k2f.c)
ps~4 : explicit challenge of contribution 4.
The actual form of contribution 5 selects among these as
follows. Lexicogrammatically "For whom" links with the preceding base
and enforces an interrogative feature selection', it is therefore a
mod4 i [Q]
This is primarily compatible with a pb-function and so the
interpretations relevanced by the two microregisters are reduced to a
*k2f.c/pb4 j/mivs' for the story-telling and a 'dkl(or
k2f.c)/pb4 j/miv^' for the argument.
The appropriate contextualisation of these moves by virtue of
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the microregister with respect to which they are being produced here
becomes quite crucial. In particular, the propositions receive
slightly differing interpretations and, as can be seen from the
different bearers of the roles of speaker, the assignation of
interpersonal layer functions is being based upon different sets of
responsibilities in the two cases. Thus, while an appropriate gloss
of the story-telling's move might be:
A requests of B clarification over the issue of who it is that
B is stating the teacher regards governments should do what's
right or wrong for,
for the argument the gloss is:
A challenges the teacher (via B) over the issue of who it is
that governments should do what's right or wrong for.
As we shall see in a moment, I think it can be justified that the
second of these interpretations requires 'more' work on the part of B
and so it is quite understandable that B, in fact, responds to the
story-telling relevances first. That is, B attempts to produce a
clarificatory 'kl/pc4 i/rnvg' as contribution 6.
A quickly interrupts this move however. Furthermore, the form
of A's interruption, a mod4 i [Q] precisely analogous to contribution
5, serves to close off the possibility of B pursuing a mvs-move at
that point by displaying a marked divergence from the relevanced
'pk2f/pc4 i' that might have occured as an interruption and by
placing that interruption sufficiently early as to render itself,
rather than contribution 6, central for subsequent discourse
development. With the mvs course blocked, and hence the relevance of
an mivg interpretation most unlikely, B is free to take the mv^
argument line of interpretation for his/her contribution.
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Significant here is that a simple continuation of the discourse
according to the argument microregister would be somewhat
problematic. If we accept the dkl-interpretation of contribution 7
for the sake of concreteness, then the move this relevances at mv^
is: k2/pc4 i/mv^. But, due to the microregister role associations,
this is a k2 assigned with respect to the teacher not B. If B were to
attempt to produce such a move directly, s/he would be placing
him/herself in the role of the teacher - giving rise perhaps to
utterances of the form:
'well, he would say that ... '
etc. Furthermore, since the argument microregister defines 'sides'
trading turns, the association which would then have been established
would be the teacher versus A, with B playing the role of the
teacher. As this has the consequence, presumably not what B had
intended at all for this conversation, that A and B are now in an
adversary relationship with B taking the position of someone with
whom s/he has been at some pains to disagree, it is most unlikely
that this line of development would be undertaken.
B, then, has to find a course of action which projects a more
acceptable continuation of the conversation. Fortunately, A's
contribution 7 quite readily supports such a course. If the role
associations of the argument microregister are examined prior to
contribution 7, the situation that prevails has B and the teacher as
the arguers. Then, by means of contribution 7, A's proposal of a dkl
function with respect to a proposition attributed to the teacher
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groups A and B together as holding the true responsibility for
deciding what it is that governments should do. Therefore, as regards
this particular topic, contribution 7 implicitly proposes that A and
B share kl-assignation criteria. But this is as valid a
conversational proposition as any other and so B can respond to it as
such. Ve then have an implicitly proposed, i.e. 'disembodied',
completed proposition related to proposition 4.1 for which B holds
the right of accepting or denying; i.e. contribution 7 creates a
'meta' level set of discourse functions containing the move
'k2/pci)/mi^' with proposition D glossable along the lines of:
B takes the issue of who it is that governments should do
right or wrong for as a serious flaw in the teacher's
position.
This B responds to with the explicit 'kl/ps£)+/niiiM' of contribution
8: "that's exactly what I mean".
A's utterance has now been successfully assimilated into the
development of the discourse and has achieved an expression of
support for B by proposing that A and B may be grouped together as
far as the argument microregister is concerned as arguing against the
teacher. Both the story-telling and the argument are then free to
proceed since no strong expectations are left outstanding at the
meta-level. Also, B's explicit acknowledgement of A's support ensures
that the former possibility of A and B being allocated to different
sides in any continuation of talk according to the argument
microregister no longer threatens. The analysis of contributions 5-9
is set out in figure 4.
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social status clarification story
as part of story seeking clarification continuation
mi r»rnrocri cf cjv /"Q / \/" __ \ \
speaker A B A A
discourse k2f .c kl pm- kl
level pt>4.1 PC4.1 - pc- PC4.1
functions mivs mvs mvs
social status challenge argument argument
as part of argument position 2 position 2
microregister (A) < ><
speaker a A (B) T
discourse dJLI dkl kl
level P&-4.1 Pb4.i PC4.I
functions wLU-A miVA mvA
social status A agrees with B B accepts
as metatalk (M) < > < >
speaker A A B
discourse L2 k2 kl




lexicogrammatical mod4.i prebase6 mod4 i bases baseg
classification CQ] [Q]
contribution 5 6 7 8 9
number
Figure 4: Analysis of contributions 5-9
In conclusion, then, I hope this detailed example has suggested
the positive role the discourse level of organisation and its
relationship to context can have both for designing appropriate
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discourse contributions and for guiding the particular questions to
be asked and deductions to be performed to arrive at discourse
interpretations. Resolving the problems posed by needing to achieve a
sanctioned distribution and combination of discourse level
micro-functions with the contextual consequences such distributions
enforce appears to offer precisely the necessary set of interpretive
tasks by which an appropriate understanding of a discourse may be
constructed and suitable continuations assessed.
2 The re-evaluation of cognitivist constructs
It is clear, even though I have throughout this thesis
criticised theoretical constructs for the explanation of linguistic
phenomena that are compatible with a cognitivist interpretation, that
accounts proposed in cognitivist terms do appear to have succeeded in
clarifying the operation of various mechanisms observed to operate in
language. My response to this, as first mentioned in the introduction
and argued in chapter one, was that what had in fact occurred in
these cases was that the true nature of the accounts proposed had not
been realised: the accounts were not appropriately considered as
cognitive at all but were instead social explanations all along. The
essential explanation for this can be found in the fact that
everything that is relevant to language is already and necessarily
socially real. It is only because a distinction has been imbued with
social relevance that it is recognised in language.
For example, hesitation in speech, to take a paradigmatic
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'performance' variable, is not something of purely individual,
'psychological' import: the length of time a hesitation may last is
socially defined. Thus, a hesitation may not be remarked upon - may
even pass unnoticed - because pauses of such length are not socially
relevant. However, after some length of time, it does become of
possible social relevance (e.g. it may be taken as indicating that a
turn has ended, that a turn is not coming, that the speaker has
decided not to speak to the addressee any longer, etc. ) and a filler
is necessary to prevent the long silence - necessary because cultural
norms make it so. Regardless of the fact that there may be a
perfectly sound psychological basis for the hesitation at some level,
e.g. a 'processing delay', the consequences and perception of the
hesitation remain those that have been socially established: 'after a
pause of length tj, it is relevant to do X', 'after a pause of length
of time tg, it relevant to do Y', etc. It is these kinds of
considerations which determine what will happen in the face of any
particular hesitation not the determination of some 'more real'
attribution of the phenomenon to the physical functioning of
'brain-ware'.
This is particularly important because once a phenomenon is
recognised to be socially real - as is necessary for there to be any
response to it as relevant for any course of action whatsoever
(including choosing to ignore it) - it may subsequently be produced
precisely for its social effects rather than for a presumed
processing reason. Thus, if one wants to be perceived as providing a
thoughtful response to some question (or perhaps as being offended by
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a question, etc. ), then a momentary silence may be produced prior to
a turn to give the intended impression. But then no psychological
attribution of 'processing in progress' or 'delay due to emotional
interference' is at all appropriate. The hesitation phenomenon is
being deployed just as would any other available linguistic resource
and so should be treated similarly: i.e. at the social,
personal-level of description appropriate for linguistic phenomena
generally. Without some understanding of the social functionality of
observable phenomena, therefore, the attribution of
psychological-level explanations is surely premature.
The principal manifestation of this position in this thesis has
been the demonstration that certain archetypally cognitivist
constructs can quite adequately be re-interpreted as purely
linguistic or contextual resources for the design of appropriate
discourse contributions which need in no way rest upon a
psychological foundation. This has been shown particularly in the
area of 'focus': local focus receiving a non-cognitivist
interpretation in chapter four, and aspects of global focus in
chapter five.
Those phenomena now traditionally captured in terms of focus
have been considered in the current framework as members of a set of
linguistic resources for affecting the development of discourse in a
distinctive fashion. The examples discussed in chapter four
accordingly established the use of the pronoun 'it' as being
indicative of repair at the propositional level, and was contrasted
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with the use of 'that', which was found to be indicative of regularly
occurring patterns of propositional development.In addition, the
treatment of 'plans' implied here similarly re-evaluates these
constructs' cognitive status. Rather than being 'underlying'
cognitivist constructs which are used for the design of talk and,
hence, which make language possible, they are instead to be seen as
essentially linguistic large-scale structures for the organisation of
behaviour. Thus, we make use of our linguistic abilities to create
these extended structural schemes we term plans, not vice versa.
This is potentially very beneficial precisely because of the
problems alluded to in the Introduction and chapter one concerning
planning-based accounts. The discourse-functional resources of the
discourse level begin to offer a means of escaping the necessarily
trouble-ridden establishment of 'possible' plans that is required for
the antecedent and context-neutral specification of potential
relevance or connectedness asked for in planning and deep micro-world
approaches. In particular, these resources might provide for the
ongoing negotiated achievement 'of topic flow independently of
particular 'topics' and content. One can begin to see, therefore, how
the deployment of resources such as those I propose can take on the
task of organising and guiding contextual development in a way which
remains securely at the personal level and which does not fall foul
of the inherent confusions of an inappropriate cognitivism.
Finally, and again much more generally, I hope to have
illustrated in this thesis that any claim such as Pylyshyn's that:
"...any AI system is at some level a psychological theory
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simply because the description of the intelligent task to
which it is addressed already is essentially a description of
some psychological processes." (Pylyshyn, 1979, p42)
presents a hopelessly narrow interpretation of the potential scope
and power of cognitive science. For a 'cognitive science' to develop
that is capable of usefully addressing as wide a range of the
phenomena of mind as is currently being attempted - and especially
phenomena related to knowledge and language - it will be necessary to
move to the position where cognitive science has become a more
abstract enterprise which concerns itself with the personal level,
not the sub-personal. The research reported in this thesis therefore
represents such a position and is, then, manifestly not offering a
"description of some psychological processes".
The redrawing of the 'work' that language achieves in discourse
that has been established in this thesis then necessarily
significantly alters the design-goals for any person-machine language
interface which is to going to be able to communicate effectively.
The 'theory of conversation' called for in the introduction has at
least been outlined and its claims are sufficiently incompatible with
those methodologies for dealing with discourse currently accepted for
interesting practical comparisons to be pursued.
Two quite general considerations we have seen above are the
following:
(i) the re-interpretation of many small-scale linguistic phenomena
as precise instructions to the interpreter rather than as
problems needing resolution;
(ii) language itself is seen to organise context and guide
development and this casts further doubt upon the value of the
conduit metaphor 1 and hence of the modular segmentation of the
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language problem found in approaches such as Nigel.
Responsible for (i) is the fact that the linguistic resources
of the discourse level provide an additional set of 'communicative
goals' to which discourse contribution design must be sensitive.
Thus, many discourse responses which may previously have appeared to
be 'indirect' can now, by virtue of the appreciation of the
particular conversational work these responses achieve in addition to
the simple transmission of information, be seen to be startingly
direct; this was illustrated in detail by the examples of chapter
four. Furthermore, the placing by (ii) of the work of organising
context on language itself allows us to escape the necessity of the
prior establishment of planning-possibilities for understanding what
has been contributed to a discourse that has been claimed to be so
problematic.
3. Further development
I will now bring this thesis'to a close by briefly outlining
three areas of particular concern that I have failed to address
adequately within this initial investigation into the organisation of
discourse. These areas are, therefore, prime targets for the next
cycle of investigation, plans for which are already well advanced.
1. Reddy (1979).
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(1) As I explained towards in chapter four, the discussion there had
still not reached the point where it would be possible to
propose useful systemic networks for a formalisation of the
discourse level of linguistic potential. It is clear that this
problem will need further consideration before the resources I
have described can be incorporated within a more complete
computational implementation of the linguistic system as it is
defined by the Hallidayan paradigm. However, one possibility
which might need to be addressed is that the networks of the
discourse level are 'degenerate' in that such a low level of
structural 'density' is supported that networks there may not
show significant organisational properties. That is, there may
not be the large number of mutually-ordered micro-functions and
the dependencies these create that are found within the
lexicogrammatical level. This would contrast discourse with the
lexicogrammar where the rich interaction of many and varied
layers of possible grammatical functions defines a very dense
set of structural constraints and inter-relationships and would
uphold the argument I put forVard in chapter two for the
similarity in kind between discourse and syntax, while
simultaneously accounting for the strong intuition that they
are somehow different.
(2) The discussion of chapter five has made it clear that the
formalisation of an additional channel of communication between
the choosers of the grammatical level system networks, and
other levels and strata of organisation, which operates in the
reverse direction to that currently supported in the Nigel
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framework, may help provide a far better understanding of a
range of formerly intractable linguistic phenomena; e.g. topic
and the fine sensitivity shown by the deployment of the
resources of the linguistic system towards the prevailing
context that I have attempted to capture in terms of the
'microregister'. The goal here, therefore, would be to provide
a much clearer specification of how preselection configurations
actually operate upon the choice process during
lexicogrammatical actualisation. This can only be undertaken,
however, within the framework provided by an already extensive
level of formalisation of lexicogrammatical resources;
fortunately, the Nigel framework provides this level of detail
and so now research in this direction should be pursued.
(3) Finally, in the discussions throughout this thesis I have assumed
a level of organisational detail that resides at the stratum of
context; I have not described that organisation in terms
specifically to do with context - only in relation to its
consequences for discourse. In other words, I have not dealt
with 'pure' contextual development, only the phenomenon of
microregister by means of which that development achieves a
pervasive influence on discourse design. I believe it is both
possible, and eminently desirable, now to attempt
formalisations of this level of detail in a manner wholely
compatible with the practical and theoretical considerations
established by an adherence to the Hallidayan paradigm. It is
only out of such an investigation that a completely compelling
account of the phenomena of knowledge, planning, etc. as being
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dependent upon language will arise. As a practical
demonstration of the possible accuracy, or otherwise, of the
philosophical discussions I presented in chapter one, then,
such an account would be most valuable.
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Appendix I
Glossary of discourse level micro-fimctions
ai, aii, aiii, ... Berry's original functions
for moves of the first speaker
bi, bii, biii, ... Berry's original functions for
moves of the second speaker
mi, mii, miii, ... Moves of standard topic development
mi', mii', ... Moves of a micro-exchange
mij, miij, ... Moves of an insertion sequence
Ideational laver
pbj^ Proposition base, necessarily incomplete
pb^• pb with respect to a repaired proposition
pc^ Proposition completion
pcj• pc with respect to a repaired proposition
pep pc with respect to aspect of previous
proposition
psj Proposition support; either:
ps~i - negative (i.e. challenge)
ps+j - positive (i.e. acceptance)
psj/ ps with respect to a repaired proposition
Interpersonal laver
kl Primary knower, the informer
kl.c Primary knower, informing to be continued
k2 Secondary knower, the informed
k2f State of secondary knowledge after informing:
k2f.f - successfully (i.e. 'exchange final')
k2f.c - unsuccessfully (i.e. 'exchange* continuing)
pk2f Pre-emptive k2f, interrupts an informing move
dkl Delayed primary knower, kl to follow
Moves that weren't
L2f-,t2, Discourse environment relevances a move











One complete lexicogrammatical actualisation
A base interrupted by a turn boundary
Addition to basej, creating a new
base basej j
Modification to base^, creating a new
base base^ j
Modification to a base in respect of feature
labelled
Repetition of aspect of base^
Repetition of aspect labelled
A connected ('embedded') lexicogrammatical
base
Miscellaneous
0 Move terminated before classification possible
NV Nonverbal contribution (e.g. laughter, etc.)
Continuation of previous micro-function at this layer
Interrupted or incomplete move
-> Move opportunity passed
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for moves of the first speaker
Berry's original functions for
moves of the second speaker
Moves of standard topic development
Moves of a micro-exchange














Proposition base, necessarily incomplete
pb with respect to a repaired proposition
Proposition completion
pc with respect to a repaired proposition
pc with respect to aspect of previous proposition
Proposition support; either:
- negative (i.e. challenge)
- positive (i.e. acceptance) ~










Primary knower, the informer
Primary knower, informing to be continued
Secondary knower, the informed
State of secondary knowledge after informing:
- successfully (i.e. 'exchange final')
- unsuccessfully (i.e. 'exchange' continuing)
Pre-emptive k2f, interrupts an informing move
Delayed primary knower, k1 to follow
Moves that weren't
k2f, k2, pk2f, ps,
etc.
Discourse environment relevances a move













One complete lexicogrammatical actualisation
A base interrupted by a turn boundary
Addition to base , creating a new
i
base base.




Modification to a base in respect of feature
1abelled
Repetition of aspect of base
Repetition of aspect labelled





Move terminated before classification possible
Nonverbal contribution (e.g. laughter, etc.)
Continuation of previous micro-function at this layer
Interrupted or incomplete move
Move opportunity passed
